The Board Of High School and Inter-Mediate... vs Bagleshwar Prasad and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 328 of 1962

Decision Date: 27 August 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

The Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India, which was decided on 27 August 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, and the bench also comprised Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The parties to the dispute were identified as the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, as the petitioner, and Bagleshwar Prasad together with other respondents. The case was reported in the 1966 All India Reporter at page 875, in the 1963 Supreme Court Reporter (Third Series) at page 767, and was later cited in the 1969 Supreme Court Cases at page 198. The citation also references the provision of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, relating to the power of a High Court to interfere with decisions of a domestic educational tribunal concerning disciplinary action.

The factual backdrop involved the Board’s cancellation of the High School Certificate result of the respondent for the 1960 examination, following the findings of a sub‑committee that had investigated allegations that the respondent and another candidate had used unfair means in the English, Mathematics and Hindi papers. The allegation centred on the respondent’s provision of wrong answers to Question 4 of the Hindi III paper in precisely the same manner as those given by a candidate whose roll number immediately preceded the respondent’s. The High Court interpreted the charge narrowly, viewing it as an allegation that the respondent had copied either from the answer script of the candidate with the consecutive roll number or from a common source, and consequently held that the sub‑committee’s findings were unsupported by evidence, thereby setting aside the cancellation. On appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court held that, given the circumstances, the identity of the erroneous answers rendered the charge of employing unfair means highly probable, and that the sub‑committee’s reliance on such probability and circumstantial evidence could not be described as lacking evidence, especially where direct proof is rarely obtainable in similar matters. The Court further observed that disciplinary inquiries conducted by educational institutions should be appreciated by the High Court, and that, provided the enquiry is fair and affords the candidate an opportunity to defend himself, the standards of proof should not be as stringent as those applied in ordinary criminal trials. The appeal, designated as Civil Appeal No. 328 of 1962, was taken by special leave from the Allahabad High Court judgment and order dated 4 September 1961 in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 3469 of 1960. Counsel for the appellants included the Advocate‑General for the State of Uttar Pradesh and other legal representatives, while counsel for Respondent No. 1 appeared on behalf of the respondent.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, J. This appeal by special leave arises from a writ petition filed by the respondent, Bagleshwar Prasad, against the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad, and its Secretary, who are the first and second appellants, together with another appellant. In his petition the respondent challenged the validity of the order issued by the first appellant on 5 December 1960, which cancelled the respondent’s result in the High School Examination held in 1960. The respondent had taken that examination while enrolled at Nehru Intermediate College Centre, Bindki, and he was declared to have passed the examination in the Eleventh Division with distinction in Art. Following the examination he joined the first‑year Intermediate class at Kulbaskar Ashram Agriculture College, Allahabad. On 3 September 1960 the respondent received a letter from the Principal of Adarsh Higher Secondary School, Kora Jahanabad, the institution from which he had appeared for the High School examination. The letter summoned him to appear before a Sub‑Committee to answer a charge that he had used unfair means in the English, Mathematics and Hindi papers. He duly appeared before the Sub‑Committee, was formally charged, and his explanation to the charge was recorded. The charge was based on the observation that, in the third Hindi paper of the examination, the respondent had given a wrong answer to Question No. 4 that was identical to the wrong answer given by another candidate whose roll number was 91733, whereas the respondent’s roll number was 91731. The respondent was shown the identical wrong answers and was asked to explain the similarity. He acknowledged that the wrong answers appeared to be the same but denied that he had employed any unfair means. The Sub‑Committee was not satisfied with his explanation and reported that both the respondent and the candidate bearing roll number 91733 had used unfair means. Acting on the Sub‑Committee’s report, the first appellant issued an order cancelling the results of both candidates. Both candidates then contested the validity of that order in the Allahabad High Court. The petition filed by the candidate with roll number 91733 was dismissed, whereas the petition of the respondent, Bagleshwar Prasad, was allowed, and the impugned order of the first appellant cancelling the respondent’s 1960 High School result was set aside. The appellants have now approached this Court by way of special leave against that High Court order. From the petition filed in the High Court (Writ Petition No. 3469 of 1960) it appears that the respondent challenged the impugned order on several grounds. The principal contentions advanced by the petitioner concerned the competence and authority of the first appellant, as well as the regularity and fairness of the enquiry that had been held. These issues were presented for decision before the High Court in the companion writ petition No. 3196 of 1960. The High Court rejected the petitioner’s contentions of law in that petition and, for the reasons recorded in its judgment, rejected the same contentions in the present petition. Consequently, the challenge to the validity of the order on points of law was not sustained. The High Court then turned to examine a narrower ground of attack, namely that the impugned order was not supported by any evidence. The High Court’s judgment indicates that the Court was inclined to accept this argument and consequently set aside the order on the ground that it lacked evidential support. The correctness of this finding is seriously disputed before us by the learned Advocate‑General appearing for the appellants. It is a common ground that the proceedings taken against the respondent relate to the alleged unfair means he was said to have employed in the examination.

The Court noted that the companion revision petition bearing W. P. No. 3196 of 1960 was also before the High Court. The High Court rejected the legal contentions raised in that petition and, for the reasons recorded in its judgment on that earlier petition, applied the same reasoning to the present petition. Consequently, the challenge to the validity of the order on the basis of points of law was not upheld. After dismissing the doctrinal arguments, the High Court turned to a narrower ground of attack, namely that the impugned order was alleged to be unsupported by any evidence. From the judgment of the High Court it appeared that the court was inclined to accept this argument and therefore set aside the order on the premise that it lacked evidential support. The correctness of that finding was seriously contested before this Court by the learned Advocate‑General appearing for the appellants. Both parties agreed that the proceedings initiated against the respondent concerning the alleged use of unfair means at the examination were quasi‑judicial in nature, and that, in a proper case, orders issued from such proceedings could be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further agreed that the High Court would be justified in annulling the impugned order if it were satisfied that the order was not founded on any evidence. An order issued by a tribunal after a quasi‑judicial enquiry, which is not supported by evidence, is deemed erroneous on its face and, accordingly, may be set aside by the High Court exercising its jurisdiction to grant writs under Article 226.

In the facts before the High Court, the court found that the enquiry committee’s conclusion—that the respondent had copied either from the answer book of the candidate bearing Roll No 94733 or from a common source—was not backed by any evidence. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court assumed that the sole charge against the respondent was that he had copied from the candidate bearing Roll No 94733. After making that assumption, the High Court observed that no charge was made that the respondent had connived in the other candidate’s act of copying, and it noted the absence of any evidence to prove such connivance. The High Court also stated that no evidence had been produced to substantiate the allegation that any outsider, including the respondent, had assisted the candidate. This reasoning formed the basis of the High Court’s final conclusion. The Court observed that the High Court erred in presuming that the only allegation against the respondent was direct copying from the paper of the candidate bearing Roll No 94733, and that this mistaken assumption was the root cause of the other conclusions reached by the High Court.

In reviewing the observations of the High Court, the Court noted that the wording of the charge, as printed in the record, seemed to support the High Court’s narrow interpretation of the allegation. However, the charge had originally been framed in Hindi, and it was undisputed that the Hindi version had not been correctly translated when it was reproduced in English. The inaccurate translation gave the impression that the sole allegation against the respondent was that he had copied directly from the answer‑book of the candidate bearing Roll No. 94733. In reality, the Hindi charge described a situation in which, because the identical mistaken answers were observed, there was a suspicion of copying, which is a broader assertion than a simple claim that the respondent himself had copied from the other candidate.

The Court then examined the respondent’s own statement. He unequivocally declared that he had not copied any material from any other candidate’s answer‑book, nor had he permitted anyone to copy from his own answer‑book, to the best of his knowledge. He admitted that the erroneous answers appearing in his paper and in the other candidate’s paper were identical, but he was unable to explain why this had occurred. When questioned about receiving any assistance from outside sources, he responded in the negative. Consequently, the enquiry could have framed the charge against the respondent in any of three alternative ways: first, that he had copied from the candidate bearing Roll No. 94733; second, that he had connived at that candidate’s copying from his answer‑book; or third, that both candidates had obtained the same answers from a common external source. Each of these alternatives, if proved, would constitute the adoption of unfair means.

Because the High Court had assumed that the charge was limited only to the first alternative and had ignored the other two possibilities, the Court concluded that the High Court’s interpretation was erroneous. Moreover, the Court identified an additional, significant circumstance that the High Court had failed to consider. Evidence indicated that, at the examination held at the Bindki Centre, unfair means were employed on a large scale by many students, and the overall atmosphere of the examination was not conducive to maintaining the discipline normally required. The Court observed that rivalries and party politics pervaded the Municipal Board that administered the institution, as well as the staff members. Influential local individuals and members of the Municipal Board reportedly exerted improper pressure on the Principal and the invigilators to assist the wards or relatives of their friends in the board’s examination. This unhealthy environment, the Court held, contributed to the widespread adoption of unfair means at the Bindki Centre.

In this matter, the High School examination, which had been discontinued for several years, was reinstated in 1960 because of public demand, and the resumption produced a disastrous outcome. On the day the English paper was administered, students were working in Room No. 3. Fifteen minutes before the allotted time expired, an answer sheet prepared by an outsider was thrown into the room from Room No. 18. The sheet was a typed document containing answers to every question in the paper. Assistant teacher Khajuha, who served as one of the invigilators, alleged that the answer sheet had been typed in the superintendent’s office, although that allegation was subsequently denied. Reports submitted by the invigilators together with the findings of the enquiry committee indicated that the invigilators were terrified by the prevailing rowdyism and by pressure exerted by influential persons. Consequently, they felt unable to enforce discipline in the examination hall. As a result, it was not surprising that some invigilators failed to prevent copying; indeed, six of them were cautioned to exercise greater care in the future. The enquiry committee’s report further revealed that the complaints it examined concerned widespread copying in several papers besides Hindi. After reviewing all the material, the committee concluded that the respondent and the candidate bearing Roll No. 94733 had employed unfair means. When assessing whether the committee’s conclusion against the respondent was justified, it would be unreasonable to ignore the circumstances surrounding the entire enquiry. This includes the disturbed and riotous atmosphere that characterized the examination hall during the 1960 High School examination at the centre, and the High Court, however, disregarded this background in its consideration. Prior to the High Court hearing, a statement was filed showing the seating arrangement in Room No. 10 where the respondent wrote his answers. The respondent occupied seat number 3 in the third row, while the other candidate, Roll No. 94733, sat in seat number 4 in the second row. The High Court placed great emphasis on the observation that the respondent could not have turned around to view the other candidate’s answer book. It found no evidence that the other candidate might have copied from the respondent with his collusion. Upon review of the incorrect answers given by the two candidates, the Court was not prepared to accept the proposition that the identical wrong answers arose by accident or coincidence. Several of the erroneous responses, and especially the manner in which they were written, suggested a common source or direct copying, a point that the High Court failed to appreciate.

In this case the Court observed that the manner in which the incorrect answers were given by the two candidates clearly indicated that the answers were either the result of one candidate copying from the other or that both candidates had copied from a common source. The Court noted that the High Court had entirely overlooked the importance of this observation. It was held that the Enquiry Committee was required to decide the matter by examining the nature of the incorrect answers themselves, and that is precisely the approach the Committee had taken. The Court further expressed that it would be inappropriate to demand direct evidence showing that the respondent could have looked back and copied the answer written by the candidate seated behind him. The Court also recognized the alternative possibility that the candidate sitting behind might have copied from the respondent with his connivance, and it was not unlikely that the two candidates could have communicated with each other. The prevailing atmosphere in the examination hall did not exclude such a possibility. All of these considerations were matters that the Enquiry Committee had to take into account, and the fact that the Committee did not produce an elaborate report did not imply that it had failed to consider all relevant facts before concluding that the respondent had employed unfair means. The Court emphasized that educational institutions such as the university or appellant No. 1 have the authority to constitute Enquiry Committees to address instances of unfair means, and that these domestic tribunals ordinarily possess jurisdiction to resolve all pertinent questions based on the evidence placed before them. While direct evidence of cheating may sometimes be available, the Court acknowledged that there are cases where only probabilities and circumstantial evidence are obtainable, and that such evidence must be examined to reach a conclusion. The Court cautioned that the problem of unfair means is a serious one for educational bodies, and that courts should be reluctant to intervene in the decisions of domestic tribunals unless there is a clear justification. Regarding the validity of the impugned orders issued by the university under Article 226, the Court clarified that the High Court was not hearing an appeal of the original decision; its jurisdiction was limited to reviewing whether the order was supported by any evidence. The Court affirmed that if an order were wholly unsupported by evidence, the High Court would be justified in setting it aside, but such a conclusion must be reached only after assessing whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence justify the order. Finally, the Court asserted that enquiries conducted by domestic tribunals must be fair, that students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunity to defend themselves, and that the tribunals must scrupulously adhere to the principles of natural justice, without the requirement to apply the full rigour of criminal trial procedures.

The Court observed that it would be unreasonable to bring into these educational enquiries every rule that governs criminal trials in ordinary courts. In the case before it, the Court noted that there was no suggestion of animus and no allegation of malice on the part of any party. The enquiry conducted by the university tribunal was found to have been fair, and the respondent was given a proper opportunity to present his defence. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order that had been passed against the respondent. The Court further added that, although it was inclined to accept the argument advanced by the Advocate‑General against the High Court’s decision, it would not make any consequential order in favour of the appellants because the Advocate‑General had clearly indicated that he did not seek any such relief in this appeal. The Court noted that the respondent had successfully passed his Intermediate Examination in June 1962, and it was fairly conceded that there was no intention to disturb his academic or professional career under the present circumstances. The Advocate‑General had sought a decision from the Court because he feared that the reasoning adopted by the High Court in setting aside the order against the respondent might be interpreted to mean that, under Article 226, the High Court could examine the merits of the order passed by appellant No. 1 in similar cases. While the Court agreed with the appellants that the High Court’s order was not justified, it chose to refrain from setting that order aside for the reasons already explained. Finally, the Court ordered that there would be no costs awarded to any party.