Thakur Narwar Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1961

Decision Date: 02/02/1962

Coram: KAPUR, J.

In this case the appellant, Thakur Narwar Singh, filed a petition against the State of Madhya Pradesh. The judgment was delivered on 2 February 1962 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India. The matter arose from criminal offences that the appellant had allegedly committed in the princely State of Jhabua in 1948, at a time when Jhabua was not yet incorporated into the Dominion of India. The appellant was subsequently tried in 1955 before a Sessions Court under sections 380 and 451 of the Indian Penal Code for those same acts. The principal question before the Court was whether the Indian Penal Code could validly be applied in 1955 to conduct that had taken place in 1948 in a territory that was then outside the Indian Dominion, and whether the State’s own penal code contained any provision equivalent to the sections of the Indian Penal Code under which the appellant was convicted. The Raja of Jhabua had, by a formal notification, made the Indian Penal Code applicable within his state. After Jhabua merged into the State of Madhya Bharat, the Rajpramukh issued Ordinance No 1 of 1948, which continued the laws already in force in Jhabua, including the Indian Penal Code. Later, the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (Act 3 of 1951), in section 6, repealed the existing laws of the State but expressly saved any penalties, forfeitures or punishments that had arisen in respect of offences committed under any law that was repealed. The Court held that, at the time the offences were committed in 1948, the applicable law in Jhabua was the Indian Penal Code, and that law remained in force for those offences through the 1948 ordinance and the subsequent Part B States (Laws) Act. Consequently, any penalty incurred for the 1948 offences was punishable under the Indian Penal Code as it continued to apply to the territory of Jhabua.

The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed under special leave against the judgment and order dated 26 September 1956 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench), which had upheld the conviction of the appellant under sections 380 and 451 of the Indian Penal Code. The appeal was recorded as Criminal Appeal No 130 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant presented arguments challenging the applicability of the Indian Penal Code to the 1948 conduct, while counsel for the State defended the conviction. The Court examined the legislative history, noting that the Raja’s notification and the Rajpramukh’s ordinance had explicitly extended the Indian Penal Code to Jhabua, and that the Part B States (Laws) Act, while repealing prior statutes, preserved the effect of any penalties arising from offences committed under those statutes. The Court concluded that the appellant could indeed be tried in 1955 under the Indian Penal Code for the offences committed in 1948, because the same law was in force at the time of the offences and continued to be applicable through subsequent legislative measures. The judgment affirmed the High Court’s decision, confirming that the conviction under sections 380 and 451 of the Indian Penal Code was legally valid.

In Jhabua State there existed a jurisdiction called Thikana Jhaknawda, which was a Jagir. The thakur of that Jagir, Thakur Narayan Singh, died on 11 November 1945 without leaving a male heir. His two widows subsequently adopted Gajendrapal Singh, the second son of His Highness the Raja of Jhabua, on 15 July 1946. The appellant later made representations asserting his right to succeed to the Thikana, but those representations were rejected by His Highness, and a further representation to the then Political Agent was likewise turned down. It is alleged that the appellant entered into a conspiracy with approximately one hundred and fifty persons and, on 18 January 1948, forcibly entered the Thikana, took possession of it, and remained in unlawful possession for about seven months before relinquishing it. The prosecution against the appellant and fifteen others under sections 121, 295 and 455 of the Indian Penal Code commenced on 7 October 1955. The appellant was convicted under sections 451 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code, while the remaining accused were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. The appellant appealed his conviction to the High Court, but the High Court dismissed the appeal. He then approached this Court by way of Special Leave. When the appeal was heard on 9 January 1962, the Court raised the question of whether the appellant could be tried in 1955 under the Indian Penal Code for offences allegedly committed in 1948 in the former State of Jhabua, and whether the penal law of that State at the time of the offences contained provisions comparable to those sections. As this question had not been raised before any lower court, the Court adjourned the hearing to allow the parties to submit the necessary material. The argument before the Court was confined to this point, because the Court found no substance in any of the other matters raised in the appeal.

According to the Report of the Council of Administration on the administration of Jhabua State for 1935‑41, page 48, the then Raja of Jhabua State, by notification, had applied the Penal Code of India to the State of Jhabua among other laws. After the State of Jhabua became part of the State of Madhya Bharat, Ordinance 1 of 1948 issued by the Rajpramukh continued the laws that were already in force in Jhabua, and this ordinance was later superseded by the Regulation of Government Act (Act 14 of 1948), which likewise preserved those existing laws in that part of Madhya Bharat. On 22 February 1951, the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (Act III of 1951) was enacted. Section 6 of that Act dealt with repeals and savings and provided: “If immediately before the appointed day, there is in force in any Part B State any law corresponding to any of the Acts or Ordinances now extended to that State, that law shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, stand repealed: Provided that the repeal shall not affect, (a) the previous operation of any law so repealed or.................. (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or.” This provision indicated that the repeal would not affect the previous operation of any law that was in force at the time of the offence, thereby preserving the applicability of the Indian Penal Code to offences committed in 1948 in Jhabua. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal lacked merit and dismissed it.

The Court quoted the relevant portion of the repeal provision, which read: “incurred, under any law so repealed (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any law so repealed…… and any such…… remedy may be…… enforced…… and any such penalty…… may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed.” The quotation highlighted that, notwithstanding the repeal of a law, the penalties, forfeitures or punishments that arose from offences committed under the repealed law would continue to be enforceable, and that those penalties could be imposed exactly as if the repealing legislation had never been enacted.

Applying that provision, the Court held that at the time the appellant allegedly committed the offences, namely in the year 1948, the substantive criminal law governing the State of Jhabua was the Indian Penal Code. The Court observed that the Indian Penal Code had been adopted in Jhabua by a notification of the then Raja and was subsequently sustained by an ordinance issued by the Rajpramukh after Jhabua merged into the State of Madhya Bharat, and that the later Part B States (Laws) Act of 1951 expressly preserved the operation of the earlier law. Consequently, any penalty that arose from an offence committed in 1948 remained punishable under the Indian Penal Code as it applied to Jhabua State, notwithstanding the later repeal legislation. Because the repeal clause expressly protected such penalties, the appellant’s contention that the law no longer applied was untenable. The Court therefore concluded that the appeal was without any legal force, dismissed it, and ordered that the appeal be dismissed with no further relief.