Tekan and Others vs Ganeshi

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No 367 of 1959

Decision Date: 22 February, 1962

Coram: Wanchoo

In the matter titled Tekan and Others versus Ganeshi, decided on 22 February 1962, the Supreme Court examined a dispute concerning the right to eject a tenant under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The petitioner, identified as Tekan and others, claimed to be the lessee of a large tract of land that included the portion occupied by the respondent, Ganeshi, who was the tenant. The petitioner lodged an application with the Assistant Collector invoking section 14A(1) read with section 9(1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, asserting that he was a landowner who required the land for his own cultivation and therefore sought the respondent’s eviction. The Assistant Collector allowed the application. The respondent appealed to the Collector, contending that only a landowner could dispossess a tenant‑at‑will and that the petitioner, being merely a lessee, did not qualify as a landowner within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act. The Collector agreed with the respondent and set aside the order. The petitioner then appealed to the Commissioner, who reversed the Collector’s decision on the basis that a lessee, likened to a mortgagee in possession, is treated as a landowner for all purposes. On further revision, the Financial Commissioner held that the petitioner was not a landowner and thus could not obtain ejectment. The petitioner sought relief before this Court by way of special leave, maintaining that he was a landowner within the definition of section 2(1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act. The Court ultimately held that a lessee holds land from the true owner and is obligated to pay rent, making him a tenant under section 4(5) of the Punjab Tenancy Act. Consequently, the lessee could not be considered a landowner under section 312 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act nor under section 2(1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, and therefore had no right to eject the respondent.

This case proceeded in the civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No 367 of 1959, arising by special leave from the judgment and order dated 23 November 1957 of the Additional Commissioner of Punjab in Revision No 143 of 1956‑57. Counsel for the appellants represented the petitioner, while counsel for the respondent represented the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 22 February 1962. The Court noted that the sole issue presented on appeal was whether the appellant qualified as a landowner under the statutory definition in section 2(1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act. After examining the relevant statutory provisions, including sections 2(1) and 9(1) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, sections 3(2) and 4(5) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, and sections 3(2) and 4(5) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, the Court concluded that a lessee who occupies land under a lease from the true owner and pays rent falls within the category of a tenant rather than a landowner. Accordingly, the appellant could not invoke the ejectment provisions of section 14A(1). The Court affirmed the decision of the Financial Commissioner that the appellant was not entitled to eject the respondent.

In the present dispute the appellant filed an application under section 14‑A(i) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, No. X of 1953 (the “Act”), read with section 9(1) of the same statute, seeking the ejectment of the respondent on the basis that he himself was a small landowner. The appellant asserted that he was the landowner and that the respondent occupied the land as a tenant‑at‑will. He further pleaded that because the land comprised less than thirty standard acres, he required the land for his own cultivation and therefore was entitled to eject the respondent. The application was originally presented before the Assistant Collector, who found that the respondent was liable to be ejected and consequently allowed the appellant’s application. The respondent then appealed to the Collector, contending that only a landowner could dispossess a tenant‑at‑will under section 14‑A(i) and that the appellant, being merely a landlord of the respondent and not a landowner, could not invoke the provisions of section 14‑A(i). The Collector accepted this argument, held that the appellant was not a landowner, allowed the respondent’s appeal, and dismissed the appellant’s ejectment application. Unsatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Commissioner. It is relevant to note that the appellant held the land under a lease from the actual owner, and his lease covered a larger tract of land that included the portion occupied by the respondent. Before the Commissioner the appellant maintained that he qualified as a “landowner” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act and therefore was entitled to eject the respondent. The Commissioner, however, likened the position of a lessee to that of a mortgagee in possession and held that a lessee could be treated as a landowner for all purposes. Accordingly, the Commissioner set aside the Collector’s order, restored the Assistant Collector’s ejectment order, and allowed the appellant’s appeal. The respondent subsequently filed a revision before the Financial Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner held that a mere lessee who possessed only constructive possession, as was the case here, could not be included within the term “landowner” as employed in the Act. He further observed that even if the appellant was the landlord of the respondent, he could not be deemed a landowner within the statutory meaning. Consequently, the Financial Commissioner allowed the revision, reversed the Commissioner’s order, reinstated the Collector’s dismissal of the ejectment application, and dismissed the appellant’s claim. The appellant then applied to this Court for special leave, an application which was granted, bringing the matter before this Court. The sole issue raised by the appellant before us is whether the Financial Commissioner erred in holding that the appellant was not a landowner. Determination of whether the appellant qualifies as a landowner depends upon the definition of the term in the Act, which reads: “(1) ‘Landowner’ means a person defined as such in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act XVII of 1887).”

In the statutory definition of “landowner,” the provision includes an “allottee” and a “lessee” as defined in clauses (b) and (c) of section 2 of the East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement) Act, 1949, hereafter referred to as the Resettlement Act. An explanatory note adds that when land is mortgaged with possession, the mortgagee shall be deemed to be the landowner. The record shows unambiguously that the appellant does not qualify as an allottee or a lessee under the definitions in clauses (b) and (c) of section 2 of the Resettlement Act, and it is also undisputed that he is not a mortgagee possessing the mortgaged land. Consequently, the appellant can only claim the status of landowner if he falls within the definition contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. Section 3(2) of that Act defines “landowner” to exclude a tenant or an assignee of land revenue, while it includes a person to whom a holding has been transferred, a person whose estate or holding has been let in farm under the same Act for the recovery of arrears of land‑revenue or a sum recoverable as such arrear, and every other person not earlier mentioned who is in possession of an estate or any share or portion thereof, or who enjoys any part of the profits of an estate. The appellant contends that he should be regarded as a landowner within this subsection because he enjoys a portion of the profits of the estate. The latter part of the definition, which forms the basis of his argument, applies only to persons who are not tenants or assignees of land revenue; therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the appellant is a tenant. If he is a tenant, the definition expressly excludes him from being a landowner. To resolve this, reference must be made to the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, to ascertain the meaning of “tenant” and to decide whether the appellant falls within that category. Section 4(5) of the Tenancy Act defines “tenant” as a person who holds land under another person and is, or would be but for a special contract, liable to pay rent for that land to the other person. The definition expressly excludes (a) an inferior landowner, (b) a mortgagee of the rights of a landowner, (c) a person to whom a holding has been transferred or an estate or holding has been let in farm under the Punjab Land Revenue Act for the recovery of arrears of land revenue or a sum recoverable as such arrear, and (d) a person who takes a lease of unoccupied government land for the purpose of sub‑letting. It is not contested that the appellant does not fall within any of these four exceptions, and therefore the next step is to examine whether he holds land under another person and is liable to pay rent, which will determine his status under the tenancy definition.

The Court observed that there is no dispute that the appellant does not fall within any of the four exceptions listed in the subsection concerning sub‑letting. Consequently, the Court examined whether the appellant can be described as a person who holds land under another person and who, either expressly or by way of a special contract, would be liable to pay rent for that land to the other person. After considering the facts, the Court was of the opinion that the appellant satisfies the definition of “tenant” contained in section 4(5) of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The Court noted that as a lessee the appellant holds the land from the owner who granted him the lease, and that he is bound to pay rent equal to the lease money for the land he occupies. By virtue of this relationship, the appellant clearly qualifies as a tenant within the meaning of section 4(5). Because the appellant is a tenant, he cannot be regarded as a landowner under section 3(2) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The Court further added that the record of the Girdawari entries corroborates this conclusion; the entry records the appellant as a tenant, listing “Tekan and others, Gairmaurasian first through Ganeshi Gair Maurasi second half.” Accordingly, the appellant is a tenant of the leased land and, given the statutory definitions, cannot be treated as a landowner. On this basis, the Court held that the appeal fails, dismissed it with costs, and entered an order that the appeal is dismissed.