T. P. Daver vs Lodge Victoria No. 363, S. C. Belgaum

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 414 of 1960

Decision Date: 12 December 1962

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, J.L. Kapur, J.R. Mudholkar, Subba Rao

In this matter, the Supreme Court recorded the full title as T. P. Daver versus Lodge Victoria No. 363, a domestic tribunal of the Supreme Court of Belgaum, with the judgment rendered on 12 December 1962. The bench that heard the appeal consisted of Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner was identified as T. P. Daver and the respondent as Lodge Victoria No. 363, situated in the Supreme Court of Belgaum. The judgment date was noted as 12/12/1962 and the citation for the decision was reported as 1963 AIR 1144 and 1964 SCR (1) 1. The case involved the legal question of the authority of a domestic tribunal, specifically a Masonic lodge, to expel its members, emphasizing that such authority derives from the contract by which individuals become members, that the lodge’s rules must be strictly observed, that the lodge must act honestly and in good faith, and that it must not exceed its jurisdiction, a matter also touching upon the limited jurisdiction of civil courts in such internal disciplinary matters.

The headnote of the judgment explained that there exists a Scottish Masonic institution known as the Grand Lodge of Scotland, under which operate District Grand Lodges, and beneath them Daughter Lodges. Each of these bodies is governed by its own constitution and laws. Under those laws, a member who faces disciplinary action by a Daughter Lodge can appeal first to the District Grand Lodge and, subsequently, to the Grand Lodge of Scotland. The appellant in the present case was a member of a Daughter Lodge at Belgaum called Lodge Victoria. The second respondent, Lodge Victoria, lodged a complaint alleging that the appellant had committed twelve Masonic offences. The Secretary of Lodge Victoria issued a notice to the appellant, enumerating the alleged offences and requiring a written reply within fourteen days. The appellant responded in detail to each charge. A special meeting of the lodge was then convened, during which each charge was read, members were invited to comment, and each charge was put to a vote. The lodge members unanimously found the appellant guilty of every charge and passed a resolution to expel him, subject to confirmation by the District Grand Lodge. The lodge communicated this decision to the appellant, who subsequently filed an appeal to the District Grand Lodge. The District Grand Lodge, after granting him an adjournment to appear in person, dismissed the appeal at its next meeting, during which the appellant was absent. The appellant then filed a further appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland, which also dismissed his appeal. Following these internal proceedings, the appellant instituted a suit before the Civil Judge of Belgaum, seeking a declaration that the resolution of Lodge Victoria expelling him was void and that he remained a member of the lodge. The Civil Judge dismissed the suit. The appellant then appealed to the High Court of Mysore, which likewise dismissed the appeal. The present appeal before the Supreme Court was filed by way of a certificate granted by the High Court. The appellant’s contentions were that Lodge Victoria lacked jurisdiction to try the alleged Masonic offences because such offences fell within the jurisdiction of the District Grand Lodge, Bombay; that the disciplinary proceedings prescribed by the governing law, specifically law 198, were not strictly complied with; and that the fourteen days to

The appellant contended that the fourteen‑day period, which he was statutorily entitled to after filing his answer, had been denied to him, and he further argued that the resolution to expel him was erroneous on its merits. The Court held that the authority of associations, clubs and Lodges to expel members originates from the contractual relationship established when a person becomes a member, following the principle set out in Bonsor v. Musicians Union, [1956] A. C. 104. Accordingly, a member of a Masonic Lodge is obliged to obey the Lodge’s rules, and where those rules provide for expulsion, the member may be expelled only in the manner prescribed by the rules, a proposition approved in Maclean v. The Workers' Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602 and Ezra v. Mahendra Nath Banerji, I. L.R. [1946] 2 Cal. 88. The Lodge must act strictly in accordance with its own rules; the question of whether a particular rule is mandatory or merely directory is to be determined in each case, applying the well‑established rules of construction. The Court observed that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is limited; it cannot serve as an appellate body reviewing the decision of such a private tribunal, but it may set aside an order if the tribunal acted without jurisdiction, acted in bad faith, or violated principles of natural justice, as discussed in Maclean v. The Workers' Union, [1929] 1 Ch. 623 and L.A.P. O'Beilly v. C. C. Gettens, A I.R. (1949) P. C. 313. The procedural rules governing civil tribunals cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to Lodges; instead, a broader inquiry is required to determine whether natural‑justice principles were observed in the particular circumstances. In the present case, the Court noted that the appellant never raised any objection to the procedural steps, and therefore could not demonstrate that the resolution passed by Lodge Victoria contravened natural justice, referencing Maclean v. The Workers' Union, [1929] 1 Ch. 602. Law 198 expressly confers jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge to try a member who commits an offence, and this jurisdiction cannot be displaced by the general provisions of Law 128. The term “offence” in Law 198 is limited to violations of the Daughter Lodge’s own regulations. The Court found that the disciplinary rules were strictly complied with. Regarding the claim that the appellant was denied the additional fourteen‑day period to present his case, the Court held that no prejudice resulted from this omission, and because the appellant never complained to either appellate body, he effectively waived the requirement of that rule. Consequently, given that the appellant raised no objection and no violation of natural‑justice principles was established, the Court concluded that the resolution of Lodge Victoria was not invalid, and the Civil Courts lack jurisdiction to review the merits of such a domestic tribunal’s decision.

In the present case the Court observed that it possessed no authority to review the substance of a decision that had been rendered by a domestic tribunal. Both of the lower courts had concurrently concluded that the Daughter Lodge had acted in good faith, and the parties had failed to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstance that would warrant judicial interference. Consequently, the Court declined to scrutinise the merits of the Lodge’s decision. The judgment concerned a civil appellate jurisdiction, specifically Civil Appeal No. 414 of 1960, which was an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 25 September 1958 issued by the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal (B) No. 256 of 1956. Counsel for the appellant were Naraindas C. Malkani and G. Gopalakrishnan, while counsel for respondent No. 1 were Bishan Narain and S. P. Verma. The decision was handed down on 12 December 1962 by Justice Subba Rao.

This appeal, taken on certificate, arose from an internal dispute among members of a Masonic body known as Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C. situated at Belgaum. The lodge is part of a Scottish fraternity called the Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Scotland, headquartered in Edinburgh and hereinafter referred to as the Grand Lodge of Scotland. The Grand Lodge of Scotland supervises a network of Provincial or District Grand Lodges spread throughout the world, each of which oversees its own Daughter Lodges. The Grand Lodge of Scotland operates under its own written Constitution and Laws, and each District Grand Lodge has a separate Constitution and Laws of its own. One such District Grand Lodge is the Grand Lodge of All Scottish Freemasonry in India and Pakistan, which is headquartered in Bombay. The Daughter Lodge at Belgaum falls directly under this District Grand Lodge and is governed by the Constitution and Laws of that District.

The appellant had become a member of Lodge Victoria in 1948. On 16 October 1952 the second respondent lodged a formal complaint against the appellant before the Master of Lodge Victoria, alleging that the appellant had committed twelve Masonic offences. The complaint asserted that, because the appellant was alleged to have breached Masonic law, he should be tried by the Lodge in accordance with Law 198 of the Constitution. Accordingly, on 20 October 1952 a notice of the complaint was served upon the appellant, directing him to submit a written response to the Secretary of the Lodge within fourteen days of the notice. The notice also informed the appellant that he had a right to appear at a special meeting scheduled for 8 November 1952 and to present his defence. On the same day, the Secretary issued notices to all members of the Lodge, inviting them to attend the special meeting that was to consider and adjudicate the complaint.

In compliance with the notice, the appellant filed a comprehensive answer on 27 October 1952, addressing each of the charges contained in the complaint. In his answer the appellant requested that his complete replies be read in full to the assembled brethren who were to decide the matter, and that he be informed of the total number of brethren present at the meeting. This request formed part of the appellant’s procedural submission prior to the hearing of the case.

In his written response the appellant requested that his complete answers be read in full before the brethren assembled to decide the matter, and that he be informed of both the total number of brethren present and the number of votes cast either for or against each charge. A careful reading of that reply reveals that the appellant understood the charges against him to relate to specific offences that were alleged to have been committed by him, and his answer was framed on that understanding. On 8 November 1952 a special meeting of the Lodge was convened in accordance with the notice. The minutes of that meeting recorded that eighteen members were present. At the meeting each of the charges was read aloud, the members were invited to make comments, and a decision was taken on every charge. After discussion, each charge was put to a vote. The members present voted unanimously, holding that every charge levied against the appellant was proved. Consequently the members passed a resolution to exclude the appellant from the Lodge, pending confirmation of that exclusion by the District Grand Lodge under Law 199 of the Constitution. The decision reached at the special meeting was communicated to the appellant on 15 November 1952.

Un dissatisfied with the resolution, the appellant filed an appeal against the order on 24 November 1952, addressing it to the District Grand Lodge. On 5 October 1953 the District Grand Lodge met to consider the appeal. The appeal was dismissed. The proceedings noted that, although an adjournment had previously been granted to allow the appellant to appear in person at the meeting, he remained absent. The appellant then made a further appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland. That Lodge treated the sanction imposed on the appellant as a “suspension sine die” and advised the Victoria Lodge to review the suspension after twelve months, provided that the appellant applied for reinstatement. No evidence shows that the appellant ever filed such an application for review.

On 7 September 1954 the appellant instituted civil proceedings in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum. The suit sought a declaration that the resolution passed by the Victoria Lodge on 8 November 1952 was illegal and void, that he remained a member of the Lodge despite the resolution, and also sought an injunction restraining the officers and servants of the Lodge from preventing him from exercising his rights, together with an award of damages. The appellant named as defendants the Victoria Lodge as the first defendant, the complainant as the second defendant, the Secretary of the Lodge as the third defendant, and the District Grand Lodge, Bombay, as the fourth defendant. All defendants contested the suit. The learned Civil Judge dismissed the suit, and the appellant’s subsequent appeal to the High Court of Mysore was also dismissed. The appellant now filed the present appeal, relying on a certificate issued by the High Court. Counsel for the appellant reiterated before this Court all the contentions that had been raised, without success, in the lower courts. Before addressing those submissions, the Court considered it appropriate to briefly outline the law governing the power of associations such as clubs and lodges to expel their members.

In this case, the Court explained that the authority of lodges to expel members arises from the contractual relationship created when a person becomes a member. This principle was reiterated by Lord Morton in the decision of Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union (1). In that case a trade‑union member named Bonsor was expelled after his admission to the union. Lord Morton observed that when Mr Bonsor applied for membership and his application was accepted, a contract was formed between him and the union, obligating him to obey the union’s rules. He further held that the union impliedly agreed not to exclude Mr Bonsor except in accordance with those rules. The Court noted that this contractual origin of the power to expel carries the corollary that the conditions set out in the rules must be strictly followed when a member is expelled. The Court then referred to Maclean v. The Workers’ Union (1), wherein the contractual basis of the power was described. The judgment stated that where a tribunal is created by rules adopted by persons forming a trade union, the plaintiff’s rights against the defendants depend solely on the contract embodied in those rules. On that footing, the learned judge declared that a domestic tribunal is bound to act strictly according to its rules and must act honestly and in good faith. The same principle was echoed by the Calcutta High Court in Ezra v. Mahendra Nath Banerji (1), which made a similar observation. It held that any condition specified in a rule must be strictly complied with because the power of expulsion depends on the terms of that rule. The Court then posed the question whether the doctrine of strict compliance requires that any minute deviation, however small, render the expulsion void. It said that the answer depends on the nature of the rule infringed, and that a rule may be mandatory or merely directory depending on its purpose and the context in which it operates. The Court indicated that it would examine this aspect of the doctrine when addressing the counsel’s argument that the rules were not complied with in the present case. Finally, the Court reiterated the settled position on the limited jurisdiction of civil courts over decisions of domestic tribunals. Citing Maclean v. The Workers’ Union, Maugham J. observed that a civil court has no power to review the evidence or to determine whether the tribunal reached a correct conclusion. The Court concluded that this view is consistent with earlier observations of the Judicial Committee.

The judicial committee, in the case of L.A.P. v. Gittens, observed that neither the learned judge nor the members of their lordships’ board possessed authority to act as an appellate court over the decisions of a domestic tribunal such as the Stewards of the Trinidad Turf Club. The Privy Council later affirmed this principle, stating that all such matters were essentially for the domestic tribunal to resolve as it deemed appropriate, provided that the tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction and acted honestly and in good faith; the court could not intervene even if it considered the penalty severe or the standard applied to be particularly strict. An additional issue that could be noted concerned the extent to which the doctrine of bias might be invoked in the context of domestic tribunals, such as those formed by clubs. The observations of Maugham J. in Maclean’s case were relevant to this point. In that case the learned judge held that a person who joins an association governed by rules under which he may be expelled has no legal right of redress if the expulsion follows the established rules, however unfair or unjust those rules or the tribunal’s action might appear, so long as the tribunal acts in good faith. The phrase “the principles of natural justice” was explained to refer, in this context, to the principles of fair play deeply embedded in the conscience of modern Englishmen, meaning that an inquiry necessarily required that the accused be given an opportunity to defend himself and to explain himself. There was no difficulty on that point. Moreover, the judge noted that it is generally a reasonable inference from the rules that when a dispute exists between two persons, neither of them should sit upon the tribunal. A further difficulty in proceedings before committees constituted by clubs involved clearly delineating the line between the prosecutor and the judge. Maugham J. highlighted this problem and remarked that, in many cases, the tribunal inevitably assumed the dual role of prosecutor and judge because there was no other party to prosecute. He illustrated the situation with an example where a council was tasked with considering the conduct of a member whose behavior was disgraceful and, if found guilty, expelling him. Frequently, the matter reached the council’s attention through a report of legal proceedings in the press, after which the member was summoned to appear before the council. The council’s duty was to cause the member to appear and to permit him to explain his conduct, and in performing that function the council could be seen as acting as the prosecutor.

In this case, the Court noted that the council, although appearing to act as a prosecutor, is authorized by the regulations to perform such duties and therefore is not barred from taking further steps required by the rules. The Court further advised that clubs should, whenever possible, draft their internal rules so as to avoid any clash between prosecutorial and judicial functions within the same body. However, when the established rules expressly sanction a combined procedure, a member who has voluntarily accepted those rules cannot claim a violation unless the inquiry conducted under those rules reveals fraud, malice, or unfair treatment. From this discussion the Court distilled three guiding principles, namely that a member must obey lodge rules, the lodge must act strictly according to those rules, and civil courts have limited jurisdiction over lodge decisions. First, a member of a lodge is bound to comply with the lodge’s rules, and if those rules provide for expulsion, the expulsion may be carried out only in the manner prescribed by the rules. Second, the lodge must act strictly in accordance with its rules, and whether a particular rule is mandatory or merely advisory is to be determined in each case by applying well‑established rules of statutory construction. Third, the jurisdiction of a civil court is limited; it cannot act as an appellate body for decisions of the lodge, but it may set aside a lodge order. The court may intervene only when the lodge acted without jurisdiction, acted in bad faith, or violated the principles of natural justice as explained in the cited authorities. Having set out these principles, the Court turned to consider the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.

The appellant contended that Lodge Victoria lacked authority to determine whether a member had committed a Masonic offence, arguing that such offences fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Grand Lodge of Bombay. The Court held that the question must be resolved by interpreting the lodge’s own statutes, particularly Law 198. Law 198 provides that every Daughter Lodge is entitled to try any member accused of any offence and sets out a detailed procedure for serving a written complaint. The complaint must be served on the accused brother by registered letter sent to his last known address, and it must specify the offence alleged against him. The accused brother is then entitled to reply in writing within fourteen days of the posting of the complaint, or within any longer period that the complaint itself may specify. If the accused files a written answer, or if the time allowed for answering expires without a response, the matter must be brought before the Lodge for consideration and judgment. The case may be heard either at a specially convened meeting called for that purpose or at an ordinary meeting of the Lodge. The meeting that will consider the complaint must be summoned by a circular issued by the Secretary, which must state that the complaint and any answer will be presented for the Lodge’s consideration and judgment. If a Lodge does not normally convene its meetings by circular, the Court observed that the meeting shall be called in the manner prescribed by the Grand Committee. Alternatively, the Grand Secretary may call the meeting on behalf of the Grand Committee. Notice of the meeting must be sent to the accused brother by registered letter posted to his last known address at least fourteen clear days before the meeting date. Whether or not the accused has filed a written answer, he shall be entitled to appear at the meeting, or any adjournment thereof, and to state his defence. After the case has been considered, the Lodge shall render its decision by a vote of the majority of qualified members present throughout the hearing. If the complaint is sustained, the Lodge shall pronounce any admonition or sentence that the majority of voting members deem appropriate, although expulsion may be ordered only by the Grand Lodge.

When a Lodge does not issue its meeting notice by circular, the meeting must be summoned in the manner that the Grand Committee orders, or by the Grand Secretary acting on its behalf. The notice of such a meeting is required to be sent to the brother who is accused by means of a registered letter addressed to his last known residence. This notice must be posted at least fourteen clear days before the date on which the meeting is to be held. The notice must state that the brother may appear at the meeting, as well as at any adjournment of the meeting, regardless of whether he has submitted a written answer to the complaint, and it must inform him that he may present his defence at that time.

After the matter has been fully considered by the Lodge, the Lodge is obligated to render a decision. That decision is to be reached by a vote of a majority of the qualified members who are present and who vote on the issue; only those members who remain present throughout the entire hearing are entitled to cast a vote. If the complaint is upheld, the Lodge may impose an admonition or any other sentence that the majority of voting members deem appropriate. However, a Daughter Lodge does not possess the authority to impose a sentence of expulsion, because the power to expel a brother is vested exclusively in the Grand Lodge. In cases where the circumstances are sufficiently grave, the Daughter Lodge may, instead, recommend to the Grand Lodge that the brother be expelled from the Craft. The judgment that is pronounced must be communicated immediately in writing, through a registered letter addressed to the brother, informing him that the decision is final unless he files an appeal. The appeal must be made to the Provincial or District Grand Lodge, or to the Grand Lodge itself when the Daughter Lodge lies outside the jurisdiction of any Province or District, and the appeal must be lodged within one month from the date the notice of judgment is posted. In special situations, the Grand Committee, acting through the Grand Secretary, may extend the time limit for filing an appeal.

Law 128 provides that a Provincial or District Grand Lodge shall hear and determine every subject of a Masonic complaint, dispute, or difference that is initiated before it, appealed to it, or referred to it, concerning Daughter Lodges or brethren of the Scottish Craft within that Province or District. The Provincial or District Grand Lodge may pronounce an admonition, issue a sentence of suspension, or, in the case of a Lodge, suspend its charter. The procedure applicable to all such complaints, disputes, or differences is to be regulated mutatis mutandis by Laws 104 to III inclusive. Law 56 further provides that the Grand Lodge, through its Grand Committee as previously described, shall hear and determine all subjects of Masonic complaint or irregularity relating to Lodges or Brethren within its jurisdiction, and it may impose admonitions, fines, suspensions, or expulsion. Under Law 198, every Daughter Lodge is entitled to try any member accused of an offence; Law 128 assigns to the Provincial or District Grand Lodge the authority to hear all Masonic disputes or differences involving the brethren of the Scottish Craft; and Law 56 authorizes the Grand Lodge to hear such complaints and to impose suitable punishments. It is noteworthy that Law 198 uses the term “offence,” whereas Law 128 employs the expression “Masonic complaint.”

Law 128 used the term “offence,” and the Court observed that because the complaint alleged that the appellant had committed masonic offences, the appropriate authority to hear the matter was the District Grand Lodge rather than the Daughter Lodge. The Court noted that the expressions “offence” and “masonic complaint” were not defined in the Masonic Laws. In general legal usage, an offence means any act or omission that is punishable under the law that is in force at the time. The phrase “masonic complaint” was described as a broad expression capable of covering any grievance relating to masonic affairs. The Court said it was unnecessary to determine whether the phrase “masonic complaint” was wide enough to include an “offence.” However, the Court emphasized that Law 198 expressly gave a Daughter Lodge the power to try a member who commits an offence, and that this specific jurisdiction could not be displaced by the more general provisions of Law 128. Consequently, the central issue was whether the allegations made against the appellant fell within the meaning of “offences” as defined by Law 198. The Court explained that, in the context of Law 198, the word “offence” could only refer to a breach of the internal regulations of the Daughter Lodge. Because the complete set of regulations had not been produced before the Court, it could not definitively say whether the allegations satisfied that definition. Nevertheless, the complainant, the appellant himself, and the other members of the Lodge, including its officers, all proceeded on the assumption that the appellant had committed “offences.” The complaint listed twelve separate charges, and the appellant responded to each charge individually. In his written response, the appellant specifically remarked, “Further if my accuser and others of his mind have thought this alleged ‘offence’ serious enough to be included in this complaint, why did they not take any action in the matter immediately instead of taking it up after sleeping over it for no less than three to four years?” This statement showed that even the appellant accepted that, if proven, the allegations would amount to “offences” within the meaning of the relevant law. At a special meeting of the Lodge, it was held that the twelve charges had been proved, and, on that basis, the Lodge imposed a punishment on the appellant. The appellant raised no objection that the charges did not constitute “offences” under Law 198, nor did he challenge the Lodge’s authority to determine whether he had committed such offences. The Court therefore concluded that all parties involved had implicitly accepted that, should the alleged acts be established, they would constitute offences under the Masonic regulations. If the allegations indeed amounted to offences, Law 198 would automatically apply, and neither Law 128 nor Law 56, which confer jurisdiction on a District Grand Lodge over “masonic complaints,” could override the specific jurisdiction granted to the Daughter Lodge. Accordingly, the Court held that the Daughter Lodge possessed proper jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the second respondent against the appellant and to decide the matter on its merits.

In this case the Court examined whether the procedural requirements of Law 198 had been strictly complied with. The relevant portion of that law provides that after an answer is lodged, or after the time for doing so expires, the complaint must be brought before the Lodge for consideration and judgment either at a special meeting called for that purpose or at a regular meeting of the Lodge. The meeting must be called by a circular sent by the Secretary, and the circular must state that the complaint and any answer, if given, will be presented before the Lodge for consideration and judgment. The factual record showed that a notice fixing the date of the special meeting was issued to the members before the appellant filed his answer to the allegations made in the complaint. The appellant argued that this sequence violated the strict compliance requirement of the statute. The Court observed that the statute does not require that notice to the members be issued only after the answer is lodged; it merely requires that the matter be considered after the answer is lodged or the time for answering has expired. The statute also does not prescribe that the answer be communicated to the members, only that the notice state that the complaint and any answer will be brought before the Lodge. Consequently, the Court held that the essential requirement was satisfied because the members received the proper notice and, at the meeting, both the complaint and the appellant’s answer were considered. Therefore, the Court concluded that the provisions of Law 198 relating to the notice of the meeting had been strictly complied with.

The Court then turned to the second provision of Law 198, which mandates that a notice of the meeting be sent to the accused brother by registered letter to his last known address at least fourteen clear days before the day of the meeting, and that whether or not he has lodged a written answer, he shall be entitled to appear at the meeting or any adjournment and state his defence. The appellant contended that this clause required an additional fourteen‑day period after he filed his answer to enable him to present his case before the Lodge, and that such a period was not granted. The Court examined the language of the provision and found that it imposes a fixed minimum period for serving notice, but it does not create a further substantive right to extend the time after the answer is filed. The Court noted that the appellant had been served the notice in accordance with the fourteen‑day requirement and that he had expressly indicated in his answer that he would not attend the inquiry. Moreover, the law permits the accused to apply for further time, but the appellant neither made such an application nor raised any objection to the lack of extra time in any of the appellate proceedings. By his answer and subsequent conduct, the appellant effectively waived the statutory entitlement to additional time. Accordingly, the Court held that there was no breach of the procedural provision and that the trial was not vitiated by any alleged error.

The Court observed that the appellant had not been afforded the extra fourteen‑day period that the law permitted for filing his case before the Lodge, and that in the present matter no such additional time was granted. Accordingly, the appellant had received notice of the hearing in accordance with the statutory requirement, but the notice did not include the full period prescribed by the law. The Court then considered whether this procedural deficiency rendered the trial void. It found that the appellant had suffered no prejudice because he never complained about the shortened notice. In his written answer he expressly stated that he would not attend the inquiry. Although the law allowed a party to request further time, the appellant did not make such a request, because he did not wish to appear at the meeting. He also did not raise any objection to the notice in either the appeal before the District Grand Lodge or the subsequent appeal before the Grand Lodge of Scotland. In those appellate forums he chose to argue on the merits of the case, and his answer and subsequent conduct indicated a clear waiver of the statutory requirement.

The Court held that the appellant could not now invoke the alleged breach of procedural rule to set aside the proceeding. It explained that a distinction existed between the jurisdiction of a Lodge and the irregular exercise of that jurisdiction in taking procedural steps. A party to a dispute may waive objections to procedural defects, and the appellant had the opportunity to object to the reduced notice period but failed to do so. By his conduct, he had expressly waived his right under the law, and having waived it he was barred from relying on the defect. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant could not rely on the alleged procedural irregularity to invalidate the Lodge’s decision.

The Court further rejected the argument that the members of the Lodge acted as both prosecutors and judges, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. It noted that the proceeding concerned a private Lodge, not a tribunal or a court, and therefore the strict standards applicable to judicial bodies could not be transferred wholesale. While an earlier resolution (Ex. II‑4) demonstrated that eleven members of the Lodge were unfavourably disposed toward the appellant, the current inquiry concerned a complaint lodged by the second respondent. Notice of that complaint had been given to all Lodge members. Although some members might have harboured personal dislike for the appellant, including the complainant himself, twenty‑two members met and, after considering both the complaint and the appellant’s answer, unanimously found him guilty. The Court remarked that, had the appellant objected to the participation of any member in the meeting, he could have raised such an objection, but he did not do so. Accordingly, the resolution passed by Lodge Victoria was not deemed to have violated any principles of natural justice.

In the present case, the appellant had the opportunity to object to the participation of any member of the Lodge Victoria in the meeting that considered the complaint, yet he chose not to raise any objection. The Court noted that the procedural rules that apply to formal tribunals and courts cannot be transplanted wholesale onto organisations such as Lodges, because they are private bodies with their own internal regulations. Consequently, the inquiry must be conducted by looking broadly at the total circumstances of each case to determine whether the fundamental principles of natural justice have been observed. Applying that broader test to the facts before the Court, and bearing in mind that the appellant remained silent and did not contest the composition of the panel, the Court concluded that the resolution adopted by the Lodge Victoria could not be described as tainted by a breach of natural justice. The parties also urged the Court to re‑examine the entire record in order to verify the correctness of the Lodge’s decision. The Court reiterated that, as previously explained, civil courts do not possess jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of decisions taken by a private association such as a Lodge. Moreover, both the lower courts had found that the Daughter Lodge acted in good faith when it dealt with the complaint against the appellant, and this finding was concurred by the present Court as a concurrent fact. Established practice dictates that the Supreme Court ordinarily refrains from disturbing such concurrent findings of fact unless exceptional circumstances exist, and no such extraordinary situation was presented here. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to bear no costs.