State of Orissa vs Bidyabhujshan Mohapatra

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1962

Decision Date: 19 October 1962

Coram: J.C. Shah, Bhuvneswar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

In this case the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 19 October 1962 in the matter of State of Orissa versus Bidyabhujshan Mohapatra. The opinion was authored by Justice J C Shah and the bench comprised Justices J C Shah, Bhuvneshwar P Sinha, P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo and K C Das Gupta. The petitioner was the State of Orissa and the respondent was Bidyabhujshan Mohapatra. The decision is reported in 1963 AIR 779 and in the Supreme Court Reports Supplement (1) 648, and it has been subsequently cited in R 1967 SC 1353, R 1969 SC 966, R 1970 SC 679, RF 1972 SC 1975, F 1974 SC 1589, RF 1976 SC 232, RF 1977 SC 2411, F 1989 SC 1185 and RF 1989 SC 1854. The case concerned disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, the existence of two parallel procedural regimes, the right of appeal under one regime but not the other, the question of whether this disparity amounted to unlawful discrimination, the permissibility of punishment, and the extent of court interference. The statutory framework involved the Orissa Disciplinary Proceeding (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951, the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, and constitutional provisions Article 14, Article 309 and Article 311. The respondent, a permanent non‑gazetted employee of the State, was charged with (i) receiving illegal gratification on five occasions and (ii) possessing property disproportionate to his income. The Governor referred the matter to the Administrative Tribunal constituted under section 4(1) of the Disciplinary Proceeding (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, which were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The Tribunal found that four of the five alleged instances of illegal gratification were proved and that the second charge of disproportionate property was also proved, and it recommended dismissal of the respondent. After giving the respondent a reasonable opportunity to show cause, the Governor dismissed him. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the dismissal on two grounds: that the Tribunal Rules were discriminatory because they did not provide a right of appeal, and that the Tribunal had violated the rules of natural justice during the inquiry. The High Court, noting an earlier decision that had held the Tribunal Rules discriminatory but which was itself under appeal before this Court, declined to decide on that issue and instead considered the second ground. It held that the second charge and only two of the five heads of the first charge were established and directed the Governor to reconsider whether dismissal should be maintained on that basis.

The Supreme Court finally held that the Tribunal Rules were not discriminatory. It observed that two sets of parallel rules – the Tribunal Rules and the Classification Rules – existed simultaneously, and that proceedings could be initiated against the respondent under either set at the Governor’s discretion. In substance, the Court found no material difference between the procedural requirements of the two rule‑books. The Court explained that merely preferring one permissible procedure over another did not give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Although the Classification Rules provided a right of appeal from a penalty order while the Tribunal Rules did not provide a right of appeal against the Governor’s order, the Court concluded that this disparity alone did not constitute unlawful discrimination.

The Court observed that the authorities did not establish any ground for upholding a claim of unlawful discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon the rulings in Sardar Kapur Singh v. Union of India, [1960] 2 S. C. R. 569, and Jagannath Prasad v. State of U. P., A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1245, which were followed. By contrast, the earlier decision in State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das, A. I. R. (1961) S. C. 1715, was distinguished and not applied. The Court further held that the High Court possessed no authority to direct the Governor to reconsider the matter of punishment. The role of the High Court, according to the Court, was limited to examining whether any constitutional guarantees had been breached; it was not empowered to interfere with the severity of the penalty so long as that penalty was supported by the applicable rules. Accordingly, the motivations that led the punishing authority to impose the sanction were deemed non‑justiciable, and the penalty itself was not subject to judicial review. The Court explained that if the order of dismissal could be sustained on any finding of a substantial misdemeanour for which the rules permitted the punishment, the court was not required to inquire whether that particular finding alone would have been decisive in the authority’s decision to dismiss the public servant.

The judgment under review originated in a civil appeal numbered 213 of 1962, which sought to set aside the judgment and order dated 17 February 1959 of the Orissa High Court, Cuttack, in O.J.C. No. 216 of 1957. Counsel for the appellants comprised Mr R. Ganapathy Iyer and Mr P. D. Menon, while the respondents were represented by Mr G. B. Pai, Mr B. Parthasarthy, Mr J. B. Dadachanji and Mr O. C. Mathur. The opinion was delivered on 19 October 1962 by Justice Shah. The respondent, Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, was a permanent non‑gazetted employee of the State of Orissa serving in the Registration Department and, at the relevant time, held the post of Sub‑Registrar at Sambalpur. The State Government received information alleging that the respondent habitually accepted illegal gratification and possessed assets grossly disproportionate to his known income. Acting on this information, the Governor of Orissa referred the matter to an Administrative Tribunal constituted under rule 4(1) of the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951, promulgated under the authority of Article 309 of the Constitution. The Tribunal conducted an inquiry, in the presence of the respondent, on two distinct sets of charges: first, five specific heads alleging that the respondent had received illegal gratification, and second, an allegation that he owned means of wealth disproportionate to his remuneration as Sub‑Registrar. After evaluating the evidence, the Tribunal concluded that reliable proof existed for four of the five heads of the corruption charge and also for the charge of disproportionate wealth, and it consequently recommended the dismissal of the respondent from service. The Governor tentatively endorsed the Tribunal’s finding and issued a notice requiring the respondent to show cause why the recommended dismissal should not be effected. In his rejoinder, the respondent submitted a detailed defense, contending, among other points, that the Tribunal had conducted the inquiry in violation of the rules of natural justice. Subsequent to consulting the Public Service Commission, the Governor of Orissa issued an order on 26 September 1957 directing that the respondent be dismissed from service.

In response to the Governor’s order directing the respondent’s dismissal, the respondent instituted a petition before the High Court of Orissa invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The petition sought, inter alia, a writ that would set aside the entire proceedings before the Tribunal, beginning with the framing of the charges and culminating in the dismissal order, and also requested that the State of Orissa refrain from giving effect to the order of dismissal dated September 26, 1957. Furthermore, the respondent asked for a declaration that he should be deemed to have continued in his post as Sub‑Registrar. To support these prayers, the respondent submitted that the order of dismissal was void because the rules relating to the holding of an enquiry against non‑gazetted public servants, called the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951, were discriminatory and that, in holding the enquiry against him, the Tribunal had violated the rules of natural justice.

The High Court, following the view expressed in Dhirendranath Das v. State of Orissa (1), held that the impugned rules were indeed discriminatory and, on that account, void. Accordingly, it concluded that the respondent was entitled to a writ declaring the order of dismissal inoperative. However, because the decision in Dhirendranath Das (1) was under appeal before this Court, the High Court proceeded to consider the respondent’s second submission. It held that the Tribunal’s findings on charges 1(a) and 1(e) were vitiated because the Tribunal had failed to “observe the rules of natural justice”. By contrast, the Court found that the findings on charges 1(c), 1(d) and charge (2) were supported by evidence and were not shown to be vitiated by any failure to observe the rules of natural justice.

Consequently, the High Court directed that, should this Court disagree with the judgment in Dhirendranath Das (1), the findings in respect of charges 1(a) and 1(e) should be set aside as being opposed to the rules of natural justice, while the findings in respect of charges 1(c), 1(d) and charge (2) should not be disturbed. The Court further observed that the matter would then be left to the Government to decide whether, on the basis of those remaining charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintained or whether a lesser punishment would suffice. The State of Orissa subsequently appealed to this Court, securing a certificate of fitness under Article 132 of the Constitution. The High Court, in Dhirendranath Das’s case (1), had held that, at the material time, two sets of rules governed enquiries against non‑gazetted public servants: (i) the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951, referred to as the Tribunal Rules, and (ii) the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, together with subsidiary rules such as the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Service Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1935, collectively called the Classification Rules. These two frameworks provided for different punishments and justified commencement of proceedings for different reasons, and while there was a right of appeal against an order of a departmental head under the Classification Rules, no right of appeal existed against the order of the Governor under the Tribunal Rules.

The High Court explained that the two sets of rules applicable to disciplinary proceedings differed principally in two respects: first, the character of the punishment that could be imposed, and second, whether an appeal against the order was permitted. Under the Tribunal Rules, the findings of the Tribunal and any recommended punishment were submitted to the Government only as recommendations, which the Government could either adopt or reject. Nevertheless, the Government was required to seek the advice of the Public Service Commission before issuing any final order. The Tribunal Rules also authorised the Government to impose compulsory retirement under sub‑rule (2) of rule 8, in addition to other penalties specified in rule 49 of the Classification Rules. By contrast, the right of appeal was expressly excluded by sub‑rule (3) of rule 9. The Tribunal Rules did not mandate that every case involving a Government servant, whether gazetted or non‑gazetted, who was accused of misconduct described in sub‑rule (1) of rule 4, be referred to the Tribunal. Consequently, when two non‑gazetted servants committed the same misconduct, such as failure to discharge duties properly, the Government retained unrestricted discretion to refer one case to the Tribunal for inquiry under the relevant rule, while allowing the other case to be dealt with departmentally by the servant’s immediate superiors under the provisions of the Classification Rules. The servant whose case was referred to the Tribunal would have no right of appeal, but his matter would be examined by an independent authority, namely the Member of the Administrative Tribunal, whose recommendation would subsequently be reviewed by the Public Service Commission, with the Government retaining ultimate authority to impose any punishment. The other servant, although his case would not be investigated by an independent body, would retain a statutory right of appeal.

The High Court further observed, after hearing the arguments presented, that for non‑gazetted servants the Tribunal Rules were less favourable and more severe than the Classification Rules. It held that granting the Executive an unfettered discretion to choose either set of rules for disciplining a non‑gazetted servant violated the equality guarantee enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. On that basis, the High Court set aside the dismissal order that had been passed against the public servant in question.

In this case, an appeal was filed before this Court seeking review of the order passed by the High Court. Counsel for the State of Orissa, appearing for the respondent, did not challenge the High Court’s finding on the question of discrimination. Neither the Tribunal Rules nor the Classification Rules were placed in the record books prepared for the Court’s consideration at the hearing. The sole argument advanced by the State’s counsel was that the Classification Rules were not in effect when the enquiry was initiated against the delinquent public servant. He further submitted that only the Tribunal Rules could then be applied, and consequently the equal‑protection clause of the Constitution was not violated. This Court found that at the material time two distinct sets of disciplinary rules were simultaneously in force in the public service. The Governor’s order directed that the enquiry be conducted under the Tribunal Rules, which the Court characterized as more drastic and prejudicial to the interests of the public servant. The Court held that this situation created a clear case of discrimination, rendering the order of enquiry and the subsequent proceedings violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal that had been filed by the State of Orissa, thereby upholding the High Court’s decision.

Subsequently, the State filed an application for review of the judgment, contending that the Bihar & Orissa Subordinate Services Discipline & Appeal Rules of 1935 were not statutory enactments and therefore did not constitute law. The State further argued that there had been a misunderstanding of the submission made at the Bar, which had apparently produced an error apparent on the face of the record. However, even at the stage of the review application, none of the counsel urged that the High Court’s view could not be sustained. The view in question was that the Tribunal Rules were more drastic and prejudicial to a public servant against whom an enquiry was directed, and the State did not argue that this interpretation was incorrect. The Court rejected the State’s application for review of the judgment, finding no merit in the arguments presented. In the present appeal, the parties produced copies of the Bihar & Orissa Subordinate Services Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1935, together with the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951. The Tribunal Rules define misconduct in the discharge of official duties in Rule 2(c), define failure to discharge duties properly in Rule 2(d), and define personal immorality in Rule 2(e). Under Rule 3(4), the Tribunal established by the Governor may, subject to the Governor’s directions, co‑opt an Assessor who is a departmental officer of higher rank than the official charged, to assist the Tribunal. Rule 4 authorises the Governor to refer to the Tribunal cases involving public servants that pertain to (a) misconduct in the discharge of official duties, (b) failure to discharge duties properly. The rule further includes (c) irremediable general inefficiency in a public servant who has more than ten years of service. The Court examined these provisions to determine whether the enquiry conducted under the Tribunal Rules was consistent with constitutional guarantees of equality. Having found that the Tribunal Rules were indeed more severe, the Court concluded that their application in this case resulted in differential treatment not justified by any reasonable classification. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the disciplinary proceedings violated Article 14 and ordered no further relief to the State.

By Rule 7 the Tribunal was required to conduct any enquiry it considered appropriate, and it was directed to carry out that enquiry in accordance with principles of equity and natural justice rather than by rigid procedural or evidentiary rules. Clause (3) of Rule 7 further required the Tribunal, before making any recommendation, to give a concise summary of the charges that were laid against the official. If the official was not absconding or otherwise untraceable, the Tribunal also had to provide him with an opportunity, either orally or in writing, to present his explanation within a time limit that the Tribunal itself would specify. After the enquiry was completed, Rule 8 mandated that the Tribunal prepare a written record of the case. That record had to set out the charges, the official’s explanation, and the Tribunal’s own findings. Where the Tribunal was satisfied that punishment should be imposed, it was also required to formulate a recommendation regarding the nature of that punishment. Rule 9 then empowered the Governor, after considering the Tribunal’s recommendation, to issue an order of punishment that he deemed appropriate. Sub‑paragraph (3) of Rule 9 expressly prohibited any appeal against the Governor’s order, thereby making the order final and unchallengeable by the official.

Rule 1(iii) of the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1935 provided that these Rules applied to every member of the Subordinate Services who was under the administrative control of the Governments of Bihar and Orissa, except for those whose appointments and conditions of service were governed by a special provision made by or under any law then in force. Under Rule 2, any penalty specified in an order could be imposed only for “good and sufficient reasons.” The procedure to be followed when an order of dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank was to be passed was the same as laid down in Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Moreover, the Department was instructed to conduct departmental enquiries in accordance with rules 172 to 178 of the Bihar and Orissa Board’s Miscellaneous Rules, 1928, unless more detailed instructions had been issued by the concerned Department. Rule 4 gave every member of a Subordinate Service the right to appeal to the authority immediately superior to the one who imposed any penalty listed in Rule 2, or to the authority that terminated his appointment for reasons other than the expiry of his term or reaching the age of superannuation. Finally, Rule 55 required that the official be given written notice of the grounds on which action was proposed, that these grounds be reduced to definite charge(s), and that the official be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, either by a written statement or by an oral hearing, with the accompanying rights to cross‑examine witnesses, present his own evidence, and call witnesses, subject to the discretion of the officer conducting the inquiry.

In the context of disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, the Court explained that the charges must be communicated to the person accused together with a clear statement of each allegation on which the charge is based and any other circumstances that may be considered when passing the order. The public servant was required to submit, within a reasonable time, a written statement of his defence and to indicate whether he wished to be heard in person. If the servant desired a personal hearing, or if the authority directed one, an oral inquiry was to be conducted. During such an oral inquiry, evidence on any allegation that the servant did not admit was to be led, and the accused was entitled to cross‑examine the witnesses, to give his own evidence, and to call any witnesses he considered necessary, although the officer conducting the inquiry could refuse to call a witness for special and sufficient reasons, provided those reasons were recorded in writing. Rule 55 further required that the proceedings contain a sufficient record of the evidence, a statement of the findings and the grounds for those findings, and it allowed that any provision of the rule might be waived in exceptional cases for special and sufficient reasons, also recorded in writing, when compliance would be difficult and waiver would not cause injustice to the person charged. The Court observed that the Tribunal Rules set out detailed provisions regarding the grounds on which an enquiry could be directed against a public servant, including misconduct in the discharge of official duties, failure to discharge duties properly, general inefficiency, or personal immorality, and that under the Classification Rules penalties could be imposed for “good and sufficient reasons.” Although the phrase “good and sufficient reasons” was somewhat vague, the Court held that it encompassed the charges described in Rule 4 of the Tribunal Rules. While the Tribunal Rules did not describe the enquiry procedure in detail, they clearly required that the servant receive a summary of the charges and be given an opportunity to submit his explanation orally or in writing, and that the Tribunal conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice and equity concerning procedure and evidence. The procedure prescribed by Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which is incorporated into the Classification Rules by reference to Rule 2, was set out in greater detail but was substantively the same as the procedure under Rule 7 of the Tribunal Rules. The Court further noted that, although the Tribunal Rules did not enumerate the punishments that might be imposed, the Classification Rules listed various penalties such as censure, withholding of increments or promotion, stoppage at an efficiency bar, reduction to a lower time‑scale, recovery of pecuniary loss caused to the Government, fine, suspension, removal from the Civil Service, and dismissal, and that the absence of an enumeration in the Tribunal Rules did not imply any substantive difference between the two sets of rules.

The Tribunal Rules do not contain a list of the punishments that may be imposed upon a delinquent public servant, whereas the Classification Rules do provide an exhaustive enumeration of such penalties. Under the Classification Rules, the punishments include censure; withholding of increments or promotion; stoppage at an efficiency bar; reduction to a lower post or time‑scale; reduction to a lower stage in a time‑scale; recovery from pay of all or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government by negligence or breach of order; a fine; suspension; removal from the Civil Service, which does not disqualify the servant from future employment; and dismissal from the Civil Service, which ordinarily does disqualify the servant from future employment. The fact that the Tribunal Rules do not enumerate these penalties does not therefore create any substantive difference between the two sets of rules. Rule 2 of the Classification Rules merely sets out the diverse punishments that may be imposed, and this list is considered exhaustive; no penalty other than those listed is ever imposed on a delinquent public servant. In contrast, the Tribunal Rules leave the selection of the appropriate punishment to the discretion of the Governor, who, after considering the report of the Tribunal, may choose a penalty that reflects the gravity of the delinquency. The Supreme Court, in Sardar Kapur Singh v. The Union of India (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 569, held that even if the procedural details prescribed under a particular method of enquiry are more elaborate than those prescribed by Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, there is no discrimination so long as both sets of rules require that notice of the charges and the material on which the charges are based be given, and that the public servant, if he desires, may demand an oral hearing and the examination of witnesses. In that case, it was argued that an enquiry conducted under the procedure prescribed by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 was void on the ground of discrimination because an enquiry could have been conducted under the procedure of Rule 55. The Court observed that the procedure under Rule 55 is described in flexible terms, and that the procedure under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 is not substantially different; consequently, directing an enquiry under the latter procedure does not amount to discrimination that would invalidate the proceedings. The Court further noted that, absent proof of any prejudice to the public servant, the mere choice of one permissible procedure over another does not justify an inference of unlawful discrimination. Under the Classification Rules a public servant has a right of appeal from an order imposing a penalty passed by a departmental head to that head’s superior, whereas no such right of appeal exists against an order of penalty imposed by the Governor. Nevertheless, the Court held that this difference alone cannot constitute a ground for a plea of unlawful discrimination. The judgment also referred to the decision in Jagannath Prasad v. State, underscoring the principles discussed, though the citation was incomplete in the record.

In this case the issue was whether directing an enquiry against a public servant under the Uttar Pradesh Rules that resembled the Orissa Tribunal Rules—rules that did not provide a right of appeal from the Governor’s order imposing punishment—was discriminatory when compared with directing an enquiry under rules that resembled the Orissa Classification Rules, which did provide a right of appeal against an order dismissing a public servant employed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court examined the facts of a particular police officer who faced an enquiry that had been started before the Constitution came into force and that, after the Constitution took effect, resulted in an order of dismissal. The enquiry was initiated under the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, by a Tribunal appointed by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. At the same time the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, made under the Indian Police Act, also authorised the Governor to dismiss a police officer of the State. The Tribunal Rules were framed pursuant to the powers conferred by section 7 of the Police Act. Both the Police Regulations and the Tribunal Rules, insofar as they were not inconsistent with the Constitution, continued to operate after the Constitution commenced, sustained by article 313. Consequently, at the relevant time two separate sets of procedural rules existed for conducting an enquiry against a police officer. The police authorities could choose to conduct an enquiry under the Police Regulations, the procedure for which was set out in Regulation 490, or they could, alternatively, direct an enquiry under Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules. The existence of these two distinct procedural regimes, and the power of the State authorities to commence an enquiry against the officer under either regime for the charges specified in Rule 4 of the Tribunal Rules, formed the basis of the contention that the choice to use the Tribunal Rules amounted to discrimination and that it deprived the officer of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

The Court held that even after the Constitution had taken effect, the continuation of the enquiry against the delinquent public servant under the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, did not constitute unlawful discrimination infringing the protection guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. Although the Police Regulation allowed an appeal from a subordinate police authority to a superior authority, no appeal was available from the order issued by the Governor after he accepted the Tribunal’s recommendations. In considering the effect of this difference, the Court observed that merely applying one of two permissible procedures, when both were validly existent and authorized by law, could not be said to create an unlawful distinction. The mere absence of an appeal provision in the Tribunal Rules, in contrast with the existence of an appeal route under the Police Regulations, did not, by itself, give rise to a conclusion that the officer was denied equal protection. Accordingly, the enquiry carried out under the Tribunal Rules was held to be non‑discriminatory and consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law.

The Court examined the reliance placed by the appellant on the decision in State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das (1). It observed that that decision did not establish the proposition that, when two different sets of rules were simultaneously in force, the authorities could select one of those rules to conduct an enquiry against a public servant charged with a misdemeanor and that the existence of an appeal right in only one of the two rule‑books would automatically create unlawful discrimination. The Court noted that the only point resolved in State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das (1) was the factual finding that, at the relevant time, two separate rule‑books were operating concurrently and that the Tribunal Rules, under which the enquiry had been launched, were described as “more drastic” and “prejudicial to the public servant.” The Court then held that the procedure prescribed by the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, was substantially the same as the procedure followed under the enquiry begun under the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations. Consequently, the mere presence of a right of appeal against a penalty imposed by a subordinate police authority, contrasted with the absence of such a right against an order of the Governor that accepted the Tribunal’s recommendations, did not create a distinction sufficient to amount to discrimination warranting the striking down of the Tribunal Rules under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The Court further referred to the observations made in Jagannath Prasad’s case (1). It stated that Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations laid down the procedure to be followed in an enquiry conducted by police functionaries, while Rules 8 and 9 of the Tribunal Rules set out the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal. It found no substantial difference between the two procedural frameworks and described the enquiry in its true nature as quasi‑judicial. The Court emphasized that the enquiry required a judicial approach to the material placed before the enquiring body. Although Regulation 490 required oral evidence to be direct, the Court explained that even under Rule 8 of the Tribunal Rules the Tribunal was guided by principles of equity and natural justice and was not bound by formal evidentiary rules. The argument that the Tribunal could admit hearsay evidence whereas the Police Regulations prohibited it was rejected. The Court held that the Tribunal, despite not being bound by strict procedural rules, could not rely on pure hearsay because doing so would contravene the rules of equity and natural justice that govern such enquiries.

In this matter, the Court observed that the procedure for requiring a delinquent public servant to provide an explanation under Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations is essentially the same as the procedure prescribed in rule 8 of the Tribunal Rules. The petitioner argued that the Tribunal Rules depart in important respects from the Police Regulations and therefore prejudice the person against whom an enquiry is conducted under those rules. Specifically, the petitioner contended that the Tribunal Rules deny a right of appeal that exists under the Police Regulations, that the Governor is bound to act solely on the recommendations of the Tribunal, and that, even when a case is sufficiently complex to justify the assistance of counsel, the Tribunal Rules prohibit such assistance at the enquiry. The petitioner maintained that these three differences render the Tribunal Rules discriminatory and prejudicial. The Court rejected this plea, holding that both the Tribunal Rules and the Police Regulations, insofar as they relate to enquiries against police officers, are promulgated under section 7 of the Police Act and that neither set of rules provides an appeal against a dismissal or reduction in rank order made by the Governor. The Court noted that the fact that an order issued by a police authority is appealable whereas an order passed by the Governor is not does not, in itself, constitute a basis for challenging the validity of the Tribunal Rules, because the ultimate authority in both cases rests with the Governor, who decides the matter independently. The Court further explained that the principle of equal protection of the laws does not require identical treatment of all persons in every circumstance; the legislature may draw distinctions between persons or transactions where a real differential exists, and such differentiation is not prohibited by article 14 of the Constitution. Consequently, providing a right of appeal against an order of police authorities under the Police Regulations while denying a similar right against a Governor’s order does not amount to discrimination invoking article 14. The Court cited the decision in Jagannath Prasad v. State of U. P. to support the view that the existence of an appeal right in one context and its absence in another does not, per se, violate the equal protection clause. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the argument of discrimination on these grounds could not be sustained.

In this case the Tribunal examined the allegations placed against the respondent under two separate sets of charges. Under Charge 1 the Tribunal acquitted the respondent of the allegation labelled 1(b); consequently that particular allegation was not presented to the Governor for further consideration. Regarding the allegations labelled 1(a) and 1(e), the High Court observed that the procedural safeguards prescribed by the rules of natural justice had not been observed in the Tribunal’s proceedings. The Tribunal’s overall recommendation, however, was based upon its findings on allegations 1(a), 1(e), 1(c), 1(d) and the separate Charge 2. The High Court expressed the view that the findings on two of the heads contained in Charge 1 could not be sustained because the Tribunal had, in arriving at those findings, breached the rules of natural justice. Accordingly, the High Court directed the Government of the State of Orissa to determine, on the basis of those charges, whether the penalty of dismissal should be retained or whether a lesser punishment would be appropriate.

The present Court found that it was unnecessary to adjudicate on whether the High Court was correct in holding that the Tribunal’s findings on allegations 1(a) and 1(e) were vitiated, because the order of the High Court directing the Government to reconsider the punishment could not be sustained. If the order of dismissal had rested solely upon the findings on 1(a) and 1(e), the Court would have been entitled to declare the dismissal illegal. However, the Tribunal’s findings on the remaining three heads of Charge 1 and on Charge 2 were not liable to interference by the High Court, and those findings established that the respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency. In view of this, the High Court possessed no authority to direct the Governor of Orissa to revisit the dismissal order. The Constitution guarantees that a public servant may not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him, and that he must be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause before any such action is taken, the opportunity being governed by the rules made under Article 309. Nonetheless, when an order of dismissal is challenged in court, the judiciary does not examine whether the imposed penalty, provided it conforms to the applicable rules, is appropriate in view of the seriousness of the misconduct. The reasons that motivate the punishing authority after a proper enquiry are not justiciable, and the penalty itself is not open to judicial review. Even if the High Court were satisfied that some, but not all, of the Tribunal’s findings were unassailable, the Governor’s order, exercised under powers not limited by any rule as to the determination of appropriate punishment, remains final and beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to direct reconsideration.

The Court noted that the statutes provided no limitation on the authority’s power to determine the appropriate punishment, and consequently the dismissal order was deemed final. Accordingly, the High Court possessed no jurisdiction to direct the Governor of Orissa to review the penalty imposed on the public servant. The Court reiterated that, as previously observed, a dismissal order issued by a competent authority, provided that the constitutional safeguards prescribed under Article 309 were observed, is not subject to judicial review. Thus, if the dismissal may be sustained on a finding of substantial misconduct for which the law authorizes the penalty, the Court is not required to examine whether that sole ground influenced the authority’s decision. The Court further held that it lacks jurisdiction to compel the authority to reconsider the order when the findings of the enquiry officer or the tribunal, taken prima facie, establish a case of misconduct. Even if certain individual findings appear to breach the rules of natural justice, the Court cannot intervene because the overall findings support the dismissal. In the present case, the Court found that the High Court erred in directing the Governor of Orissa to revisit the question of the penalty. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the order issued by the High Court was set aside. Considering the circumstances, the Court ordered that no costs be awarded against either party in either court. The appeal was allowed.