State of Mysore vs S.S. Makapur
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: supreme-court
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 400 of 1960
Decision Date: 3 May 1962
Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, T. L. Venkatram Aiyar
In this case the Supreme Court recorded that the matter was titled State of Mysore versus S. S. Makapur and was decided on 3 May 1962. The judgment was delivered by a bench consisting of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, who also acted as the reporting author. The official citation of the decision is 1963 AIR 375 and 1963 SCR (2) 943, with subsequent references appearing in various reports such as R 1964 SC 708 (14, 15), D 1965 SC 719 (8), RF 1969 SC 983 (9), R 1970 SC 679 (12), R 1970 SC 1255 (19), and R 1976 SC 1080 (9). The case concerned the provisions of the Government Servant‑Enquiry rules, specifically the evidentiary treatment of witnesses in a preliminary investigation under section 545(8) of the Bombay Police Manual.
The factual background disclosed that, after an enquiry conducted pursuant to section 545 of the Bombay Police Manual, the respondent’s salary was reduced from Rs 125 per month to Rs 120 per month. During that enquiry the witnesses who had originally been examined at the preliminary investigation stage were recalled; their earlier statements were placed on record and they were subjected to a limited series of questions before being offered for cross‑examination by the respondent, which indeed took place in detail. The respondent appealed the dismissal order issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, but the appeal was dismissed and the officer, exercising his revisionary powers, affirmed the dismissal. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court of Mysore challenging the dismissal on the ground that the enquiry conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police disregarded the rules of natural justice. The High Court agreed, set aside the dismissal order, and held that section 545(8) of the Bombay Police Manual was invalid because it violated the principles of natural justice. The State of Mysore appealed that decision by special leave to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of an examination in the presence of the party against whom an enquiry is made is fulfilled when a witness who has previously given a statement is recalled, that statement is put to him, it is disclosed to the opposite party, and the witness is then tendered for cross‑examination by that party. The Court further observed that tribunals performing quasi‑judicial functions are not courts and therefore are not bound by procedural rules applicable to court trials nor by strict rules of evidence. Such tribunals may obtain all material information from any source and through any channel, provided they do not act on information unless it is put to the party against whom it will be used and the party is given a fair opportunity to explain it. The Court clarified that what constitutes a fair opportunity depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and when such an opportunity has been granted, the enquiry cannot be attacked on the ground of not following court procedures. Finally, the Court held that clause 8 of section 543 of the Bombay Police Manual is not invalid for contravening the rules of natural justice.
A fair opportunity to explain any material must be afforded to the party against whom information is to be used. What constitutes a fair opportunity depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, but once such an opportunity has been provided, the proceedings cannot be attacked on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in the same manner as a trial in a court. The Court further held that clause eight of section 543 of the Bombay Police Manual does not offend the principles of natural justice. The Court cited several authorities in support of this view, namely Union of India v. T. R. Verma [1958] S.C.R. 499, State of Bombay v. Gajanan Mahadev (1935) I.L.R. Bom. 913, Board of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179, Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120, New Prakash Transport Company Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Company Ltd. [1957] S.C.A. 98 and Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen [1960] 1 S.C.R. 32. The judgment records that the appeal arose under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 400 of 1960, filed by special leave from the judgment and order dated 26 March 1959 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 41 of 1958. Counsel for the appellants included the Additional Solicitor General of India and two other counsel, while counsel for the respondent appeared for the State. The judgment, delivered on 3 May 1962, was pronounced by Justice Venkatarama Aiyar. The appeal challenged the validity of an order of dismissal dated 5 July 1966 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Belgaum. The respondent had entered the police service as a constable in the Bharwar district in 1940 and, at the material dates, held the rank of sub‑inspector. A complaint lodged by one Machwe of Kurdiwadi led Inspector C.I.D. Majumdar to conduct a preliminary investigation, during which he examined several witnesses, recorded their statements and submitted a report recommending further action. Accordingly, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Belgaum, initiated proceedings, framed six charges and invited the respondent to explain. The respondent denied the charges and a regular inquiry was held on 4 November 1954. Clause 8 of section 545 of the Bombay Police Manual, which governs the procedure for such inquiries, requires the officer conducting the inquiry to recall all necessary witnesses, read any statements made in the preliminary inquiry in the presence of the defaulter, record any further statements, and then give the defaulter an opportunity to cross‑examine each witness, with the cross‑examination recorded below the witness’s statement. In compliance with this provision, the Deputy Superintendent recalled the witnesses examined by Inspector Majumdar, placed on record their earlier statements, and after putting a few questions to them, proceeded as the Manual directed.
After recalling the witnesses who had been examined by Mr Majumdar during the preliminary investigation, the Deputy Superintendent presented the earlier statements of those witnesses and then offered them for cross‑examination by the respondent. All of the witnesses were indeed cross‑examined by the respondent in great detail. On the basis of those proceedings the Deputy Superintendent concluded that the six charges framed against the respondent had been proved. Consequently, on 14 December 1954 he issued a notice to the respondent requiring him to show cause why his salary should not be reduced from Rs 125 per month to Rs 120 per month for a period of two years. The respondent answered the notice with an explanation, after which the Deputy Superintendent issued an order on 5 January 1955 reducing the respondent’s pay as specified in the notice. Although the respondent could have accepted that decision, he instead chose to file an appeal against the order. The appeal was brought before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Belgaum, who dismissed it and, exercising his powers of revision, issued a further notice to the respondent to show cause why he should not be removed from service. After hearing the respondent’s explanation, the Deputy Inspector General ordered the respondent’s dismissal on 5 July 1956. The respondent then filed a revision against this dismissal order to the Government of Bombay, and under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 the matter was transferred to the Government of Mysore, which dismissed the revision on 31 August 1957. Undeterred, the respondent instituted a writ petition in the High Court of Mysore; the present appeal arises from that petition and challenges the validity of the dismissal order dated 5 July 1956 on several grounds. The appeal narrows its focus to a single issue: whether the inquiry conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police was carried out in breach of the rules of natural justice, thereby rendering the dismissal order invalid. The High Court judges accepted this contention, relying on observations made by this Court in Union of India v T R Verma and by the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay v Gajanan Mahadev, which hold that natural justice requires that the evidence of witnesses supporting the charges be recorded in the presence of both the enquiring officer and the person against whom the evidence is to be used. The High Court therefore declared section 545(8) of the Bombay Police Manual to be contrary to natural justice, held that the inquiry was vitiated by the admission of statements made by the witnesses before Mr Majumdar without an independent examination by the Deputy Superintendent, and set aside the order of dismissal. The present appeal before this Court is limited to the question of whether the procedure adopted by the Deputy Superintendent in admitting the statements of witnesses examined earlier by Mr Majumdar indeed contravened the principles of natural justice.
The matter under consideration is of considerable significance because, as demonstrated by the authorities previously examined, the manner in which the Deputy Superintendent of Police conducted the enquiry parallels the procedure routinely employed by many tribunals that exercise quasi‑judicial powers. In order to appreciate the issue correctly, it is necessary to restate the well‑settled principle that bodies performing quasi‑judicial functions are not courts. Consequently, they are not required to adhere to the procedural rules that govern the trial of actions in courts, nor are they bound by the strict rules of evidence that apply in judicial proceedings. Unlike courts, such tribunals may obtain every piece of material relevant to the matters under enquiry from any source and through any channel, without being constrained by the procedural formalities that regulate court proceedings. The sole legal obligation imposed upon them is that they must not act upon any information they receive unless they present that information to the party against whom it is intended to be used and afford that party a fair opportunity to respond. What constitutes a fair opportunity depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case; however, where such an opportunity has been granted, the enquiry cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that it failed to follow the procedural regime applicable to court trials. The scope and content of the rules of natural justice have been examined in numerous decisions both in England and in this country, establishing a body of jurisprudence that guides the proper conduct of quasi‑judicial inquiries.
Addressing the question of the content of natural‑justice rules, the Court referred to the observations of Lord Loreburn, L.C., in Board of Education v. Rice (1911) A.C. 179. He explained that a board in such circumstances must determine both the law and the facts, and that in doing so it must act in good faith and listen fairly to both sides, a duty that rests on anyone who makes a decision. He further noted that the board is not bound to treat the matter as if it were a trial; it possesses no power to administer an oath and is not required to examine witnesses. Instead, the board may obtain information by any method it considers appropriate, provided it always gives the parties a fair chance to correct or contradict any statement that may be prejudicial to their position. This principle was reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Local Government Board v. Arlidge. The Supreme Court of India has also considered this issue in several cases. One of the earliest examples is New Prakash Transport Company Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Company Ltd (1957) S.C.R., wherein a tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act denied a company a permit to operate a bus service on a particular route. The aggrieved company subsequently filed a writ petition in the High Court of Nagpur, challenging the tribunal’s order on the ground that the tribunal had relied upon a police report.
In the earlier case the tribunal relied on a police report that was produced at the hearing, but the petitioner was not given a sufficient opportunity to address or contest the report, thereby breaching the principles of natural justice. The learned judges of the High Court, agreeing with the petitioner’s contention, set aside the tribunal’s order. When this Court examined the matter, however, it reversed the High Court’s decision, holding that the police report constituted material on which the tribunal was properly authorised to act. The report had been read aloud during the inquiry while both parties were present, and the parties had been afforded a chance to be heard on its contents; consequently the required observance of natural justice had been satisfied. The Court then referred to its decision in Union of India v. T.R. Verma. That case arose from a writ petition filed in the High Court of Punjab by a government servant who challenged his dismissal on the ground that the inquiry which resulted in the dismissal had not been conducted in accordance with natural justice. The factual background was that, when the petitioner and his witnesses appeared to give evidence, the officer conducting the inquiry personally examined them, posed questions, and after completing the examination asked them to make statements. The petitioner complained that he and his witnesses should have been permitted to present their own evidence and to be cross‑examined, contending that the departure from the usual evidentiary procedure amounted to a violation of natural justice. In rejecting that contention, this Court observed that, in broad terms and without intending to be exhaustive, the rules of natural justice require that a party must be afforded the opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence on which he relies; that the opponent’s evidence must be taken in the presence of the party against whom it is offered; that the party must be allowed to cross‑examine the witnesses examined by the opponent; and that no material may be relied upon against a party unless he has been given a chance to explain it. The Court further explained that if these requirements are satisfied, the inquiry cannot be attacked on the ground that the procedural provisions of the Evidence Act concerning the taking of evidence were not strictly followed. The Court cited its recent decision in Now Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co., where the same issue was discussed. It noted that the observation that “the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence” formed the basis for the lower judges’ decision that witnesses’ statements must be recorded while the person against whom the statements are to be used is present. While a literal reading of the quoted passage could support that construction, the Court held that, when read in the factual context of the case, that meaning was not correct. No question arose in that case about the propriety of admitting into evidence a statement of a witness recorded behind the back of a party.
The Court explained that in the earlier case the entire oral testimony was taken before the enquiring officer while the petitioner was present, so there was no situation in which a statement was recorded behind the back of a party and then used against him. The matter before the Court concerned the procedure that quasi‑judicial bodies must follow when conducting enquiries, and the Court held that such bodies are not required to adopt the exact procedural rules of courts; they only need to observe the principles of natural justice. The Court then described what those principles entail, stating that the person against whom a charge is made must be made aware of the evidence presented against him so that he can give an explanation. Where the evidence is oral, the normal practice is that the full examination of the witness takes place before the charged party, who is given a full opportunity to cross‑examine. The same approach applies when a witness had previously given a statement out of the presence of the party; the prior statement is read to the witness, the witness is asked to confirm it, a copy is supplied to the charged person, and the person is allowed to cross‑examine. Requiring the witness to repeat the prior statement word for word would be a demand for a technicality rather than a requirement of substance, because the rules of natural justice are concerned with the fairness of the process, not with rigid form. Accordingly, the Court considered that natural justice is satisfied when prior statements are read to the witness, marked on admission, copies are provided to the party, and the party is permitted to cross‑examine the witness.
The Court then turned to the more recent decision in Philbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, where a workman identified as B N Das was dismissed after an enquiry into an alleged theft. The Industrial Tribunal had set aside the dismissal on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted. In that case the management first carried out an investigation and recorded statements of witnesses, but at the formal enquiry those statements were entered into the record without being put to the witnesses who were present, and copies of the statements were not supplied to the workman. The issue before the Court was whether such an enquiry complied with the requirements of natural justice. The Court answered in the negative, with Justice Wanchoo, speaking for the Court, observing that admitting prior statements under those circumstances did not conform to the principles of natural justice as laid down in Union of India v. T R Verma. The Court noted that this earlier decision did not assist the respondent, and it also referred to observations made by Chief Justice Chagla, which support the view that all evidence should be given in the presence of the person against whom action is proposed, and that merely making a statement behind a person’s back is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of a fair enquiry.
The Court referred to the decision in State of Bombay v. Gajanan Mahadev and quoted the passage: “Even assuming that a statement of such a witness is furnished to the Government servant, it is a sound rule that courts of law follow and which even domestic tribunals should follow that all evidence must be given in the presence of an accused person and in the presence of a person against whom action is proposed to be taken. It is one thing to make a statement behind the back of person; it is entirely a different thing to make a statement in front of the Court or a domestic tribunal and in the presence of a person against whom you are going to make serious charges.” The Court then explained that the purpose of examining a witness in the presence of the party against whom an enquiry is made is sufficiently satisfied when a witness who has already given a prior statement is recalled, that prior statement is put to the witness, the opposite party is made aware of the statement, and the witness is offered for cross‑examination by that party. In this view, the Court held that the order dated 5 July 1956 could not be set aside on the ground that the procedure followed at the inquiry by the Deputy Superintendent of Police violated the rules of natural justice. The Court added that it was hardly necessary to state that clause 8 of section 545 of the Bombay Police Manual could not be declared invalid for contravening natural‑justice principles. However, the Court noted that this finding did not resolve the entire dispute. The respondent contended that the Deputy Inspector General of Police was not authorized, in revision, to enhance the punishment, and that question had not been decided by the learned judges. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to remand the case for a fresh hearing on that issue and on any other issues that might arise. Consequently, the Court set aside the order on appeal and remanded the case for hearing on the remaining points. Costs of the appeal will follow the result of the hearing in the lower court.