State of Maharashtra vs Laxman Jairam

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1961

Decision Date: 16 February 1962

Coram: J.L. Kapur, K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

In the case titled State of Maharashtra versus Laxman Jairam, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 16 February 1962. The opinion was authored by Justice J. L. Kapur, who was joined by Justices K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner in the proceedings was the State of Maharashtra and the respondent was Laxman Jairam. The official citation of the decision is reported in 1962 AIR 1204 and in the Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports, volume 3, page 230. The case is also referenced in later reports such as RF 1969 SC 381, R 1973 SC 246, and other citation indexes. The legal provisions that were central to the dispute included sections 66(1)(b) and 66(2) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, as amended by the Bombay Prohibition (Extension and Amendment) Act, 1959, as well as section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

The factual background, as set out in the headnote, recorded that the respondent was arrested by a police constable on the basis that he was smelling of liquor. A medical officer who examined the respondent testified at trial that, although the respondent had ingested an alcoholic substance, he was not under the influence of liquor. During cross‑examination the doctor explained that the consumption of tincture of neem could produce a blood ethanol concentration of 0.146 percent. When examined under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the respondent declared that he had not consumed any prohibited alcohol but had taken six ounces of neem, a preparation he habitually used. On the basis of this testimony, the Presidency Magistrate acquitted the respondent.

The State appealed the acquittal to the High Court of Bombay. The principal ground of appeal asserted that the respondent’s mere statement of having consumed six ounces of neem was insufficient to overturn the statutory presumption created by subsection (2) of section 66 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, as amended. The High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that the statement did not discharge the onus imposed on the accused. The State then sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the same ground.

The Supreme Court held that a statement recorded under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be considered when assessing the guilt or innocence of an accused person. If the court finds the accused’s explanation satisfactory, the accused is deemed to have discharged the burden of proof prescribed by section 66(2) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. The Court distinguished the earlier decision in O. S. D. Swamy v. State (1960) 1 S.C.R. 46. The judgment in this criminal appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1961) was delivered by Justice Kapur on 16 February 1962. The appeal was taken by special leave from the order dated 17 October 1960 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1235 of 1960. Counsel for the appellant was R. H. Dhebar, while the respondent did not appear before the Court.

In this case the respondent was taken into custody by Police Constable Laxman Sabaji on the evening of 8 August 1959 at approximately 8:15 p.m. The arrest was made on the basis that the respondent gave off the odor of liquor and therefore appeared to be in violation of the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, hereinafter called the Act. After his arrest the respondent was conveyed to a hospital where he was examined by Dr Dadlani Prabhu Rochiram, a public health officer. Dr Rochiram testified that although the respondent emitted the smell of liquor, his speech, behaviour, gait, coordination and memory were normal. From these observations he concluded that the respondent had indeed ingested some alcoholic substance but was not actually under the influence of liquor at the time of examination. During cross‑examination the doctor further stated that tincture of Neem would produce a blood concentration of 0.146 per cent by volume of ethyl alcohol. When examined under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent said, “I have not consumed prohibited alcohol. I had taken six ounces of Neem as I am used to it.” Relying on this statement, the Presidency Magistrate, Mr Lokur, acquitted the respondent. The magistrate observed that Neem is a medicinal preparation containing about 40 per cent alcohol and is readily available in the market, and he found no reason to reject the accused’s explanation that he had taken Neem to satisfy his craving for alcohol. He referred to the judgments of Bavdekar and Chainani, JJ., in Criminal Appeal No 1611 of 1954 dated 25 February 1954, which held that taking an excessive dose of a medicinal preparation does not amount to consumption of prohibited liquor, and to State v. Domnic Robert D’Silva, Criminal Appeal No 1562 of 1959, where a similar defence involving six ounces of essence of Neem was held not to constitute an offence. Applying these precedents, the magistrate concluded that the accused had not committed any offence and therefore ordered his acquittal.

The State appealed the magistrate’s order to the High Court, contending that the respondent’s mere assertion that he had consumed eight ounces of tincture of Neem was insufficient to rebut the presumption created by sub‑section (2) of section 66 of the Act. The High Court dismissed the appeal in limine. The State subsequently obtained Special Leave to appeal to this Court. The principal issue before this Court was whether, following the amendment introduced by the Bombay Prohibition (Extension and Amendment) Act 1959 (Act 12 of 1959), the burden of proof shifted to the accused under section 66(2) and whether that burden had been discharged in the present case. Section 66(2) provides: “Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), wherein in any trial of an offence under clause (b) of sub‑section (1) for the consumption of an intoxicant it is alleged that the accused person consumed liquor, and it is proved that the concentration of alcohol in the blood of”.

The provision of section 66(2) of the Act stipulated that when an accused person’s blood concentration of alcohol was not less than 0.05 percent by weight in volume, the onus of proving that the liquor consumed was a medicinal, toilet, antiseptic, or a flavouring preparation whose consumption did not violate the Act or any rules made thereunder rested upon the accused, and that in the absence of such proof the court was to presume the contrary. The State argued that once the prosecution established that the accused’s blood alcohol concentration exceeded 0.05 percent, the statutory burden shifted to the accused to demonstrate that the liquor ingested fell within one of the exempt categories, and that a mere statement by the accused was insufficient to meet that burden. The Court examined the scheme and several provisions of the Act and noted that the prosecution had proven that the respondent’s breath emitted an alcoholic odor and that laboratory examination of his blood revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.146 percent. The respondent explained that he had taken six ounces of tincture of neem, and a medical expert, Dr Dadlani Prabhu Rochiram, testified that the consumption of six to eight ounces of that substance could produce the observed blood concentration. Both the learned Presidency Magistrate and the High Court accepted this explanation as sufficient to satisfy the statutory onus imposed on the accused. Nevertheless, counsel for the State contended that a bare statement by an accused could not discharge the onus and relied upon a Supreme Court decision in C.S.D. Swamy v. State, wherein Justice Sinha observed that “no acceptable evidence, beyond the bare statements of the accused, has been adduced to show that the contrary of what has been proved by the prosecution, has been established… the words of the statute are peremptory, and the burden must lie all the time on the accused to prove the contrary.” The Court clarified that the judgment in that case meant that, in its particular circumstances, the accused’s statement alone was inadequate, but it did not preclude the possibility that, in other cases, a statement could be sufficient to discharge the statutory burden.

It was held that a statement made by an accused person can be sufficient to discharge the burden of proof when a statute expressly places that burden on the accused. Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorises a Court to examine an accused so that he may explain any circumstance that appears in the evidence against him. Under subsection 3 of the same section, the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration during the enquiry or the trial. The purpose of the examination authorised by section 342 is therefore to provide the accused with an opportunity to explain the case made against him. The Court noted that, according to the decision reported in [1960] 1 S.C.R. 461, 471, such an explanation may be considered when judging the innocence or guilt of the person accused. Consequently, if the courts below accepted the accused’s explanation, it follows that the respondent satisfied the burden of proof that had been placed on him by section 65(2) of the Act. On that basis, the appeal was dismissed. The order of dismissal was thereby affirmed.