SREE RAGHUTHILAKATHIRTHASREEPADANGALAVARU SWAMIJI vs THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 537 of 1960

Decision Date: 18 April, 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, T.L. Venkatarama Sinha

In the case titled Sree Raghuthilakathirthasreepada Ngalavaru Swamiji versus The State of Mysore and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 18 April 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, and the bench also included Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K. N. Wanchoo, and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner was Sree Raghuthilakathirthasreepada Ngalavaru Swamiji, and the respondents were the State of Mysore together with other parties.

The dispute arose under the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, which was enacted to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants of agricultural land. Section 6(1) of that Act stipulated that, notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree, court order, or law, the maximum rent payable for any period by a tenant for the lease of land could not exceed one‑half of the crop or crops raised on the land, or its value as determined in the prescribed manner. Section 6(2) empowered the Government to, by notification in the Mysore Gazette, fix a lower rate of maximum rent for tenants of lands situated in any particular area or to fix such a rate on any other suitable basis it considered appropriate.

Exercising the power under section 6(2), the Government of Mysore issued a notification that fixed a “standard rent” for lands listed in Schedule I, which covered Maidan areas (plains) at one‑third of the produce, and for lands listed in Schedule II, which covered Malnad areas (hilly tracts) at one‑fourth of the produce. The appellant, who owned garden land in the Shimoga district of Mysore State and had leased that land to a tenant, challenged the validity of section 6(2) of the Act as well as the notification. The appellant argued that the statutory provisions and the notification violated Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 26, 31, and 31A of the Constitution of India. Additionally, the appellant contended that the notification was inconsistent with section 6(1) because it was based on section 6(2), which was an exception to the general rule of section 6(1) and could not be allowed to override that rule.

The Mysore Tenancy Act was modeled on the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and its section 6 closely resembled section 6 of the Bombay Act. In the earlier decision of Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay, reported in [1961] 1 S.C.R. 341, the Supreme Court had held that section 6 of the Bombay Act was valid. The appellant argued that this precedent should not apply because there were material differences between the two Acts, including the preamble of the Bombay Act, which mentioned improving the economic and social conditions of peasants—a reference absent in the Mysore Act; the distinction made in the Bombay Act between irrigated and non‑irrigated land, which the Mysore Act did not make; and the Bombay Act’s inclusion of both a maximum and a minimum rent, whereas the Mysore Act lacked a minimum rent provision.

The appellant contended that the decision in Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay was not applicable to the present dispute because there were material differences between the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952. He pointed out three specific distinctions. First, the preamble to the Bombay Act expressly stated that the Act was enacted, among other purposes, to improve the economic and social conditions of peasants, a purpose that was not mentioned in the Mysore Act. Second, unlike the Mysore Act, the Bombay Act made a clear distinction between irrigated and non‑irrigated land. Third, the Bombay Act, while prescribing a maximum rent, also provided for a minimum rent, whereas the Mysore Act omitted any minimum rent provision, a difference that the appellant claimed to be material.

The Court held that, despite these observations, the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 was substantially similar to the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Accordingly, the question of whether section 6(2) of the Mysore Act was valid fell within the scope of the Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala decision, which had upheld the corresponding provision in the Bombay Act. The Court therefore concluded that section 6(2) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 was valid. On a proper construction, the Court explained that section 6(1) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 was intended to apply to all agricultural leases until a notification issued under section 6(2) specified the particular areas where the leased lands were situated. Consequently, section 6(2) could not be treated as an exception to section 6(1). As a result, the notification issued under section 6(2) was held to be valid, and the earlier authority of Macbeth v. Ashley (1874) L.R. 2 Sc. App. 352 was considered and held inapplicable.

The judgment was delivered in a civil appellate jurisdiction, specifically Civil Appeal No. 537 of 1960, arising from a judgment and order dated 23 December 1959 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 229 of 1955. Counsel for the appellant and for the respondents were respectively instructed. The appeal concerned a writ petition filed by Raghutilaka Tirtha Sripadangalavaru Swamiji in the Mysore High Court, challenging the validity of section 6(2) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 and a notification issued under that section on 31 March 1952. The appellant claimed that the impugned section and the notification infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 26, 31 and 31A of the Constitution. The High Court rejected this contention, holding the section and the notification to be valid and constitutional. The appellant then sought a certificate from the High Court under Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution; the High Court granted a certificate under Article 133 but refused to do so under Article 132. Thereafter, the appellant applied to this Court for permission to raise a further question of constitutional interpretation, leading to the present appeal.

In this matter the appellant sought the Court’s permission to raise a question concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, and the Court duly granted that permission, thereby bringing the present appeal before this Court. The appellant is the owner of a garden estate comprising six acres and thirty ghuntas situated in the village of Mulbagilu, which lies in the Thirthahalli Taluka of Shimoga district. The appellant’s tenant on this estate is identified as respondent number three, Ramappa Gowda. On the eleventh day of March, nineteen forty‑three, the appellant executed a registered lease deed in favour of respondent 3; according to the terms of that deed, the tenant agreed to deliver eighty‑two and one‑half maunds of areca nuts and to pay a cash rent of seventeen rupees and twelve annas each year. In the year nineteen fifty‑five, respondent 3 lodged an application before respondent 2, the Tehsildar of Thirthahalli, invoking section twelve of the Mysore Tenancy Act and requesting that the standard rent payable to the appellant be formally fixed, an application recorded as Tenancy case 85 of 1955‑56. During the same period, respondent 1, namely the Government of Mysore, exercised the authority conferred upon it by section six of the Act and issued notification number R9 10720‑L S 73‑54.2 on the twenty‑eighth or twenty‑ninth of March, nineteen fifty‑five. That notification purported to determine the standard rent applicable to lands of the same category as the appellant’s garden, fixing such rent at one‑third of the agricultural produce. Feeling aggrieved by the effect of this notification, the appellant instituted the present writ petition in the High Court on the sixteenth of December, nineteen fifty‑five, contending that section six sub‑paragraph two, together with the notification issued pursuant to that provision, were ultra vires, invalid and therefore inoperative. Before addressing the specific submissions made on behalf of the appellant by counsel, the Court found it necessary to outline briefly the overall scheme of the Mysore Tenancy Act. The Act was enacted by the Mysore Legislature because the legislature deemed it essential to regulate the relationship between landlords and agricultural tenants, to impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites and lands appurtenant thereto that are owned or occupied by cultivators, and to provide for other purposes enumerated in the Act, with the exception of the Bellary District, as indicated in the preamble. Consequently, the primary purpose of the Act is to furnish needed relief to agricultural tenants by governing their relations with landlords, a purpose that makes the Act closely resemble the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of nineteen forty‑eight. The substantive provisions relevant to this case are substantially similar to those of the Bombay legislation. Chapter I of the Act is dedicated to defining the key terms employed throughout the statute, while Chapter II contains the general provisions that regulate tenancies. Section 4 of the Act sets out the criteria for persons who are deemed to be tenants, and Section 5 stipulates that a tenancy cannot be created for a period of less than five years. Section 6 addresses the ceiling on the rent that tenants may be required to pay, and Section 8 provides the method for calculating the rent payable under the Act.

The Act stipulated that rent could be paid in kind only in the manner described in clauses (i) and (ii), and it barred the landlord from demanding rent calculated by any other method. The Act also prohibited the landlord from accepting rent in the form of service or labour. Section 11 eliminated all previous cases that conflicted with the Act, while Section 10 permitted tenants to claim a refund of any rent that had been collected in violation of the Act’s provisions. Section 12 concerned inquiries into what constituted reasonable rent, and sub‑section (3) of that section listed five factors that the authority must consider when an application for fixing reasonable rent is made. Section 13, as a direct outcome of Section 12, empowered the authority to reduce rent once a reasonable rent had been determined under Section 12. Section 14 addressed the suspension or remission of rent, and Section 15 dealt with the termination of tenancy. Section 18 created a statutory barrier against the eviction of a tenant from a dwelling house, and Section 19 gave the tenant the first right of purchase over the site on which the dwelling house stood. Likewise, Section 22 granted the tenant an option to purchase the leased land itself. Section 24 identified situations in which relief could be granted against termination of tenancy, and Section 25 provided relief against termination of tenancy for non‑payment of rent. Section 30 set out the procedure for recovering rent, and Section 31 protected tenants’ rights under any other law. Chapter III described the procedure and jurisdiction of the Amildar and provided for appeals against the Amildar’s decisions. Chapter IV dealt with offences and prescribed the applicable penalties, while Chapter V contained miscellaneous provisions. Taken together, these provisions formed the core framework of the Act, which was designed to give relief to agricultural tenants.

Section 6, the provision directly relevant to the present appeal, read as follows: “6. (1) Notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a court or any law, the maximum rent payable in respect of any period after the date of coming into force of this Act by a tenant for the lease of any land shall not exceed one‑half of the crop or crops raised on such land or its value as determined in the prescribed manner: Provided that where the tenant does not cultivate the land the rent payable shall be the reasonable rent to be fixed by the Amildar. (2) The Government may, by notification in the Mysore Gazette, fix a lower rate of the maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands situate in any particular area or may fix such rate on any other suitable basis as they think fit.” The Court observed that the two sub‑clauses of Section 6 were substantially similar to Sections 6(1) and (2) of the corresponding Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. This similarity indicated that the Mysore legislation had closely followed the pattern established by the Bombay statute.

In the present case, the Court observed that the legislation under consideration was fashioned on the model of the Bombay Act and incorporated the majority of its significant provisions. The Court noted that section 6 of the Bombay Act had previously been contested before this Court in the decision of Vasantal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay, reported in 1961 S.C.R. 341, where the Court had upheld the validity of that provision. The Court further explained that the reasoning employed to sustain section 6 of the Bombay Act was equally applicable to section 6 of the Mysore Act, and therefore the challenge raised by the appellant against the impugned provision was already resolved by the earlier precedent.

The Court then turned to the argument advanced by counsel identified as Mr. Shukla, who contended that the preamble of the Mysore Act differed from that of the Bombay Act. According to that argument, the Bombay Act’s preamble expressly stated that the Act was enacted, among other purposes, to improve the economic and social conditions of peasants and to ensure the full and efficient use of land for agriculture. Consequently, Mr. Shukla suggested that the considerations of social justice, which had underpinned the Bombay Act’s provision, could not be invoked in the present appeal because the Mysore Act’s preamble did not contain a similar reference.

The Court rejected this line of reasoning. It acknowledged that the Mysore Act’s preamble merely declared that the Act was necessary to regulate the law governing the relationship between landlords and tenants of agricultural lands, without expressly mentioning social justice or the objective of ensuring full and efficient agricultural use. However, the Court held that it would be overly pedantic to disregard the substantive purpose of a law aimed at agrarian reform simply because the preamble does not spell out the concept of social justice. Having examined the overall scheme of the Mysore Act, the Court found that its principal provisions were clearly intended to enhance the economic and social conditions of agricultural tenants, thereby embodying a policy of social justice within the very face of the legislation.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the absence of a specific reference to social justice in the preamble did not create a material distinction between section 6 of the Mysore Act and the corresponding provision of the Bombay Act. The Court also addressed the contention that, unlike the Mysore Act, the Bombay Act distinguished between irrigated and non‑irrigated land, prescribing a maximum rent of one‑fourth of the crop for irrigated land and one‑third for other lands. The Court noted this difference but indicated that it was not of essential importance to the validity of the provision, a point that would be elaborated in the following discussion.

The provision under discussion states that the maximum rent shall be measured as a fraction of the crop of such land or its value as determined in the prescribed manner. It is true that section 6(1) of the Mysore Act makes no distinction between irrigated and non‑irrigated lands. The Court, however, held that this absence of classification is not of essential importance. Like section 6(1) of the Bombay Act, section 6(1) of the Mysore Act also seeks to establish a ceiling beyond which agricultural rent may not rise. In fixing a maximum ceiling, the legislature is not required to draw a line between irrigated and non‑irrigated lands; the purpose is merely to prevent rent from soaring. The provision prescribes a maximum rent and does not provide for a minimum rent. When prescribing a maximum, the legislature may choose a uniform ceiling applicable to all lands, whether irrigated or not, and that choice does not in itself create any infirmity in the statute. Consequently, the Court was not inclined to attach any importance to the lack of land classification in section 6(1). An argument was then raised that the Bombay Act, while fixing a maximum, also prescribed a minimum and that the omission of a minimum in the Mysore Act makes a material difference. The Court found this argument misconceived. It noted that section 8 of the Bombay Act, inserted by the Bombay Legislature in 1956, did indeed provide for both a maximum and a minimum rent, but the decision of this Court in the case of Sanjanwala (1) upheld the validity of the impugned Bombay provision without reliance on the minimum‑rent clause. Moreover, the minimum rent under the Bombay Act was fixed only after the decision of the High Court that was then under appeal before this Court, and the later fixing of a minimum was mentioned only incidentally in the judgment. Therefore, the absence of a provision fixing a minimum rent does not introduce any infirmity in the impugned provision. The Court was satisfied that the case of the impugned section is substantially similar to the case of section 6 of the Bombay Act considered in Sanjanwala (1), and that the challenge to the validity of the section in the present appeal is covered by that earlier decision. The Court then turned to the question of whether the impugned notification is invalid. The notification, issued under the powers conferred on the State Government by section 6(2), provides that the rate of maximum rent payable by tenants of lands situated in the areas specified in Schedule I and Schedule If shall be one‑third and one‑fourth respectively of the crop or crops raised on such lands, with effect from the year commencing on April 1, 1955.

The notification distinguishes two types of land in the State. Schedule I applies to Maidan areas, where the maximum rent is limited to one‑third of the crop or crops produced on the land. Schedule II applies to Malanad areas, where the maximum rent is limited to one‑fourth of the crop or crops produced. The classification of land into Maidan and Malanad categories is well known in Mysore. Maidan lands are situated on the plains, while Malanad lands are situated on hilly tracts. The distinction reflects differences in rainfall patterns, the nature of cultivation, the living conditions of the inhabitants, the availability of labour, and the quantity and quality of agricultural produce. Although the notification does not set different maximum rent rates for each individual district, it seeks to prescribe a uniform maximum rent by classifying the entire State’s land into the two recognized categories of Maidan and Malanad.

Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Shukla, argued that the impugned notification is void because it conflicts with section 6(1) of the Act. He contended that section 6(1) establishes a general rule, while section 6(2) provides a limited exception to that rule. On that basis, he maintained that an exception cannot be allowed to eclipse the general rule, and that the notification effectively does so. This line of argument relies on the House of Lords decision in Macbeth v Ashley. The argument therefore raises the question of how the two sub‑clauses of section 6 should be interpreted.

Before addressing that interpretative issue, it is appropriate to summarise the authority on which the argument is based. In the Macbeth v Ashley case, the statutory scheme provided that eleven o’clock at night was the standard hour for closing public houses throughout Scotland, subject to a proviso permitting a different closing time in any particular locality where circumstances required it. The magistrates of Rothesay, however, ordered that all public houses in the burgh close at ten o’clock, thereby applying the deviation to the entire burgh rather than to a specific locality. The House of Lords held that the magistrates’ order exceeded their authority and was ultra vires, because the proviso expressly allowed discretion only for particular localities, not for an entire borough. The statutory provision in question was contained in the Act of Parliament 25 and 26 Vict. c. 35, which set the default closing hour at eleven o’clock and permitted, inter alia, opening hours no earlier than six and closing hours no later than nine in any locality that warranted a different schedule.

In this matter the Court considered the order that the Magistrates of Rothesay had issued under the authority granted by the proviso permitting justices and magistrates, in any particular locality that required different opening and closing hours, to “insert in the schedule such other hours, not being earlier than six or later than eight o’clock in the morning for opening, or earlier than nine o’clock or later than eleven o’clock in the evening for closing the same as they shall think fit.” Relying on that power, the magistrates had made an order that covered every public‑house in the burgh, thereby effecting a deviation from the hour fixed by the statute. When the validity of that order was examined, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns, expressed the view that an exception could not engulf the rule; if it did, it ceased to be an exception and the discretion envisaged by the Act was no longer exercised. Consequently, the order was declared ultra vires. Although it was conceded that the magistrates possessed a discretion, Lord Cairns observed that the language “conferring discretion” referred expressly to a particular locality and not to the entire burgh, a matter that Parliament alone had determined. He did not decide whether the discretion could be exercised more than once, but he held that the magistrates’ order amounted to an attempt to evade the statutory provision. Lord Chelmsford, agreeing with Lord Cairns, based his conclusion on the impossibility of treating the whole burgh as a particular locality within the meaning of the proviso, and therefore regarded the order as an evasion of the Act. Lord Selborne linked the participle “requiring” with the noun “locality,” interpreting it as a requirement arising from the specific circumstances of a place. He held that magistrates, acting in honest and bona‑fide judgment, must be satisfied that a particular locality, because of its special circumstances, truly required a departure from the ordinary rule. Thus, while the central premise—expressed by Lord Cairns—was that an exception could not swallow the rule, the decision was ultimately influenced by the requirement that discretion be exercised bona‑fide, after proper deliberation concerning a particular locality, a condition the order failed to satisfy.

It was observed that Lord Cairns framed the issue regarding whether the delegated discretion could be exercised on more than one occasion, yet he deliberately refrained from providing a direct answer. nevertheless, the collective tone of the Law Lords’ speeches appeared to imply that such discretion was intended to be exercised only once and that any exercise must be specifically tied to the locality identified in the proviso. consequently, an order that covered an entire burgh could not be said to have been issued after a careful consideration of the needs of each individual locality. the reasoning emphasized that when the statute grants magistrates the power to deviate from the general rule on account of particular local circumstances, it is not readily apparent why that power should be limited to a single use.

in fact, practical circumstances might require magistrates to revisit the matter repeatedly for different localities, and if, upon reviewing each case, they determine that a departure from the general rule is warranted for each distinct locality, there appears to be no logical basis for the proviso to prohibit the issuance of separate orders for each specific area. alternatively, if the principal provision were read to apply uniformly with only a few exceptions expressly contemplated by the proviso, the analysis would differ. however, the court found it unnecessary to pursue that line of argument or to pronounce a definitive view on the broader proposition that an exception cannot absorb the general rule, because that principle was not applicable to the provisions of section six. in this context, the court noted that both Maxwell’s treatise on statutory interpretation (eleventh edition, page 121) and Craies’ work on statute law (fifth edition, page 75) cite the decision in Macbeth’s case as authority for the proposition that an order like the one issued by the magistrates constituted an evasion of the parliamentary statute, since it was not made in an honest and bona‑fide exercise of the delegated discretion. assuming, for argument’s sake, that the authority drawn from Macbeth’s case is sound, the court considered whether that principle extended to section six. the answer to that question would hinge on the construction of the two sub‑clauses contained in section six. it was observed that subsection one of section six sets a maximum amount beyond which no landlord may recover rent from a tenant, thereby establishing a ceiling at the moment the Act came into force.

According to the provision, once the Act became operative a landlord was prohibited from demanding rent from his tenant even when the amount might be justified by a contract, custom, a court decree, an order of a magistrate, or any other law. The rule set out in this sub‑section was intended to operate separately and cumulatively on every agricultural lease, thereby regulating the relationship between each individual landlord and his tenant with respect to the payment of rent. The purpose of fixing the maximum rent in sub‑section (1) was not to prescribe a universal formula for the amount a landlord could recover; rather, its function had to be understood in relation to sub‑section (2). In this connection the Court observed that there is one proviso to sub‑section (1) found in the case reported at (1874) L. R. 2 S.C App 352, which states that where the land is cultivated the rent shall be a reasonable rent to be fixed by the Amildar. However, the wording of sub‑section (2) shows that it cannot be regarded as a mere proviso to sub‑section (1); substantively it is neither a proviso nor an exception to the first clause.

The legislature, having established a ceiling beyond which agricultural rent could not rise in sub‑section (1), also empowered the Government to prescribe a lower ceiling for lands situated in particular areas, and to determine the manner of rent payment on any other suitable basis it deemed appropriate. In effect, the Government’s authority extended either to fixing a reduced rate of rent or to adopting an alternative basis for fixing rent. Because this power creates an independent rule, the two sub‑sections must be read as distinct, though coordinate, provisions of the statute. It would be incorrect to treat sub‑section (2) as a proviso or exception to sub‑section (1). While sub‑section (1) applies to every lease individually and sets a universal ceiling, sub‑section (2) is designed to prescribe a maximum rent by reference to different geographical areas within the State. Both provisions pursue a similar objective, yet they are not in a general‑rule‑and‑exception relationship. The Court further held that the argument that the Government’s notification amounted to an amendment of sub‑section (1) was unfounded. Sub‑section (1) continues to apply to all agricultural leases until a notification issued under sub‑section (2) covers the specific area where the leased land lies. The provision does not require the Government to fix lower rates for each individual parcel of land; consequently, it is permissible for the Government to set reduced rents on a district‑wise basis, as argued by the appellant.

The Government first classified the agricultural lands into two well‑recognised categories and then set lower rates on a district‑wise basis. By referring to those two categories, it prescribed the rates for the whole State. The Court observed that this notification could not be said to conflict with either section 6(2) or section 6(1). The scheme of section 6 did not require that, after notifications issued under section 6(2), some area must necessarily remain governed by section 6(1). To assume such a requirement would be contrary to the purpose of the provision. Section 6(1) had merely established a general ceiling for all areas without taking into account any special factors that might apply to particular lands. After fixing that general ceiling, the Legislature recognised that the ceiling might need to vary from one area to another, and therefore gave the Government the power to set a lower ceiling where appropriate. The Government examined the situation and concluded that the most equitable and reasonable method was to divide the agricultural lands into the two well‑known categories and to fix the ceiling according to those categories. In substance, the Legislature must have foreseen that the power under section 6(2) could be exercised to cover every area of the State, which would mean that the general ceiling prescribed by section 6(1) would not apply to any land covered by the notification. If section 6(1) is not a universal rule and section 6(2) is not an exception to it, then the effect of the impugned notification cannot be described as an exception that swallows the general rule. This reasoning aligns with the view taken by the Mysore High Court, which the Court considered correct. Accordingly, the appeal failed, was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents; the appeal was dismissed.