Sewa Singh vs State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1962

Decision Date: 27 April 1962

Coram: Das Gupta

The case was titled Sewa Singh versus State of Punjab and was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 27 April 1962. The petitioner, Sewa Singh, was the appellant, while the respondent was the State of Punjab. The judgment was delivered on the date indicated and the matter was heard by a bench of the Court. The dispute arose under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deals with the offence of murder. The primary issues that the Court examined concerned the nature of the gunshot wound inflicted on the deceased, the distance from which the shot was fired, the relevance and credibility of medical evidence, and the value of the testimony of eyewitnesses. The headnote of the decision recorded that the appellant had been tried and convicted for murder and sentenced to death. Two eyewitnesses had testified that the appellant fired the fatal shot from a shop while the victim, Gurdev Singh, was passing on a motorcycle. A medical doctor who performed the post‑mortem examination stated that the wound indicated the projectile had been discharged from a distance of three to four feet. That medical testimony had not been contested during cross‑examination. The High Court, on appeal, affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. The matter subsequently reached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition. The appellant contended that the High Court had failed to consider characteristics of the wound that would suggest a firing distance of only a few inches, contrary to the witnesses’ statements, and that such omission should cast doubt on the reliability of the eyewitnesses. The Court held that the nature and features of a fatal wound must ordinarily be taken into account when assessing the evidentiary value of eyewitness testimony.

The Supreme Court noted that, after reviewing all the wound characteristics described by the medical expert, the doctor’s opinion—that the shot had been fired from a distance of three to four feet—remained unchallenged and therefore should be accepted as correct. The Court therefore concluded that the medical evidence supported the version of events presented by the prosecution and the eyewitnesses. The formal judgment recorded that Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1962 was heard by a bench comprising Justice Das Gupta, who delivered the opinion. The appellant had earlier been convicted by the Sessions Judge at Patiala for murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, resulting in a death sentence. The Punjab High Court had dismissed the appellant’s appeal and upheld the sentence. The Supreme Court’s special leave to appeal was granted, and the parties were represented by counsel, with the appellant’s advocates and the State’s counsel making submissions. The prosecution’s case, as recounted by the Court, described that on 18 November 1960 at approximately 2.30 p.m., the deceased, Gurdev Singh, was riding a motorcycle past the tea‑stall of Charan Singh, situated near the courts at Barnala. At that moment, the appellant, who was present in the shop armed with a double‑barrel gun, stood up and fired a shot that struck the victim on the right side of the chest, resulting in his immediate death. The Court’s reasoning emphasized that, given the unchallenged medical testimony regarding the distance of fire and the consistency of the eyewitness accounts, the conviction and the death sentence were affirmed.

In the incident, the gunshot struck the victim instantaneously, after which the appellant and a man named Gogar Singh fled the scene. The accused entered a plea of not guilty. The fact that Gurdev Singh died from a gun‑shot wound at the time and place alleged was not contested; the only dispute was whether the appellant was the person who fired the shot. The prosecution asserted that the occurrence was witnessed by three persons: Charan Singh, the owner of the tea‑stall; Mukhtiar Singh, a student; and Bakhtawar Singh, who was having tea in the shop. During the trial Charan Singh denied any knowledge of who discharged the firearm and the prosecution subsequently had him declared hostile. The other two witnesses, Mukhtiar Singh and Bakhtawar Singh, testified that they saw the appellant, a person they knew from before, fire a double‑barrel gun at the victim. Their testimony was accepted by the Trial Judge and was also upheld by the Punjab High Court. On behalf of the appellant, counsel argued that the appellate Court should examine the evidence afresh because the High Court had apparently failed to consider the characteristics of the injuries caused by the shot. He referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zora Singh v. State of Punjab (Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 1957, judgment dated 10 May 1957). According to counsel, the medical evidence clearly indicated that the firearm had been held in direct contact with the victim’s body or within two or three inches of it. He contended that this finding contradicted the eyewitnesses’ version, which described a greater distance between the gun and the victim. It was observed that the High Court’s judgment contained no discussion of this issue and that the learned judges had not been drawn to the injury characteristics that now required a finding that the shot was fired from a very close range, not exceeding a few inches. Nevertheless, the Court deemed it appropriate to hear counsel on this point and expressed the view that such injury features should ordinarily be taken into account when evaluating the value of eye‑witness testimony. The doctor’s evidence was outlined as follows: the wound was roundish, measuring approximately one and a half inches by one and one‑quarter inches, and communicated with the right chest cavity; the wound was plugged with cork wadding and a cardboard disc from a 12‑bore cartridge; the fourth and fifth ribs on the right side were blown off beneath the wound; the right lung was punctured over an area of roughly two and a half inches by two inches in the middle lobe, with the interior margin of that area also blown off; and the woollen coat that was on the deceased’s body was found blood‑stained with a corresponding torn and blackened area.

The physician testified that the deceased’s body was covered with blood and that the area of injury displayed a rent which was blackened and charred; similarly, the shirt worn by the deceased was reported to be blood‑stained and to exhibit a corresponding rent that was also blackened. The medical expert further expressed the opinion that the projectile was likely discharged from a distance of three to four feet. During the proceeding in the Committing Court, the doctor underwent a limited cross‑examination, but no party challenged the correctness of his opinion. The doctor did not appear before the Sessions Court; nevertheless, the deposition recorded by the Committing Court was admitted as evidence in the Sessions Court pursuant to section 509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Turning first to the dimensions of the wound, the Court observed that, contrary to a theory of a contact shot, the size of the wound suggested that the shot had been fired from approximately a yard’s distance. In discussing the behaviour of ordinary shot‑guns, the Court referred to Sir Sidney Smith’s text Forensic Medicine, ninth edition, page 182, which states: “At about a yard the charge of shot will enter as one mass, making a hole with irregular edges about an inch in diameter.” The Court also cited Major Sir Gerald Burrard’s work Identification of Firearms and Forensic Ballistics, page 73, which provides the following guidance: “It may be assumed for all practical purposes that if the diameter of the wound is an inch, or less, then the distance of the shot was eighteen inches or under, irrespective of the gauge of the shotgun or the degree of choke. Up to two feet there is very little difference in the spread between guns of various and different bores, the hole at this distance being slightly over an inch in diameter. At three feet the hole is nearly one‑and‑a‑half inches in diameter, and the difference between the two extremes of boring, true cylinder and full choke, begins to be evident.” Additionally, Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence, tenth edition, page 279, records that “At a distance of three feet the shot mass begins to spread, the wound is an inch or slightly more in diameter.” The Court further examined the statement in Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, eleventh edition, page 334, which explains: “In the case of shot‑guns the distance from which the weapon was fired may be deduced from the amount of scattering of the charge. Up to about a yard the whole of the charge enters in a mass, producing a round hole about the size of the bore of the weapon.”

In light of these authorities, the Court concluded that, even without knowing whether the shotgun employed an unchoked or a choked barrel, a roundish wound measuring approximately one and a half inches by one and one‑quarter inches would be consistent with a discharge from a distance of about a yard. The Court could not accept the doctor’s observation that the clothing was burnt and blackened as proof that the shot was fired from a distance of only a few inches. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Sethi, had drawn the Court’s attention to statements in several textbooks that, when a gun is fired from a very short range, the wound is surrounded by a zone of blackening and burning. The Court found that, in the present case, no such blackening or burning was observed on the skin around the wound or within the wound itself; the blackened areas were confined to the rents in the woollen coat and the shirt.

In this case the medical opinion was that a gun discharged at a distance of only a few inches would produce a wound surrounded by a zone of blackening and burning. The doctor who examined the victim, however, reported that no blackening or burning was noticed on the skin around the wound nor in the deeper portions of the wound. The only evidence of such markings was that the tear in the woollen coat was found blackened and charged and that the tear in the shirt was also blackened. On this point the Court found it appropriate to refer to the view expressed in the tenth edition of Taylor’s Principle and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, page 441, where the author explains that the extent to which the clothing and body may be burnt by a near discharge of firearms has become a matter for medico‑legal inquiry. The author further states that the facts in any case can be ascertained only by experiments with the actual weapon, loaded in a manner as close as possible to that used in the incident under investigation, and that it is impossible to lay down precise rules about the distance at which burning marks may appear because the result depends on the quantity and nature of the powder, the method of charging and the character of the weapon. The author does add, however, that it is unusual to obtain burning marks beyond a yard or a yard and a half when a shotgun is used, or beyond half a yard when a revolver is used. Accordingly, the Court understood that marks of burning may be found on clothing or on the body when the shot is fired at a distance of about a yard to a yard and a half with a shotgun. Although this observation is not repeated in the eleventh edition of Taylor, the Court considered that the presence of burning marks on the clothing could not, on a reasonable basis, be taken as proof that the firearm was discharged at the very close range of a few inches in the present case. The Court then turned to the fact that a cork fragment was discovered lodged in the victim’s body. Referring to Glaister’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, ninth edition, page 265, the Court noted that the author states that when a shot is fired close to the body surface, up to a few inches, the wad may be forced into the wound. It appears clear that in a contact wound the wad is likely to enter the body. Nevertheless, the authorities do not specify the maximum distance at which the wad may enter. The nearest relevant statement was found in Sir Sidney Smith’s Forensic Medicine, ninth edition, page 182, which says that “the wads enter with the projectile in near discharges.” Interpreting this remark in the light of the preceding discussion, the Court understood that the learned author considered a discharge up to a yard to be a near discharge. Consequently, the fact that the wad was lodged in the wound is consistent with the shot having been fired from a distance of about a yard.

The Court observed that the fact that the wad was lodged in the wound was quite consistent with a shot having been fired from a distance of about a yard. It then turned to the medical description that the doctor had given of a “blowing off” of the ribs and a part of the right lung. The Court noted that such a description, if accurate, would indicate that gas had entered the wound, and that gas entry ordinarily occurs only when a shot is fired within a few inches of the body. However, the Court also pointed out that the size of the wound itself clearly showed that the shot had been fired from a distance of roughly a yard. This created an apparent inconsistency between the implication of the wound’s dimensions and the doctor’s statement about the “blowing off” of the ribs and a portion of the right lung. The Court reasoned that it was less likely for an error to occur in measuring the wound than in the doctor’s interpretation of the “blowing off” of the ribs. Consequently, the Court held that the doctor’s description of “blowing off” did not provide a reliable basis for concluding that the shot had been fired only a few inches from the body. After considering all the features of the wound as described by the doctors together, the Court concluded that the doctor’s opinion, expressed in his examination‑in‑chief and not challenged during cross‑examination before the Committing Magistrate, that the shot may have been fired about three to four feet away, should be accepted as correct. The Court found no reason to disturb the High Court’s assessment of the evidence or its order of conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.