Sankatha Singh vs State of U.P

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 1959

Decision Date: 25 January 1962

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, S.K. Das

In this case, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 25 January 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice Raghubar Dayal, who was joined on the bench by Justice S.K. Das. The petitioner was Sankatha Singh and the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh. The decision is reported in 1962 AIR 1208 and in the Supreme Court Reporter Supplement (2) 817, and it has been cited in several later reports. The matter concerned the powers of a criminal appellate court to rehear an appeal after the court had previously dismissed that appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically sections 367, 369 and 424. The headnote of the judgment set out the principal question: whether a criminal appellate court could order the rehearing of an appeal that it had earlier dismissed when neither the appellants nor their counsel had appeared, the court having merely noted that it had examined the record and found no ground for interference with the trial‑court order.

The Court held that the appellate court’s failure to prepare a detailed judgment in such a circumstance might not satisfy the requirements of section 367 of the Code and could therefore be liable to be set aside by a superior court. However, that deficiency did not confer upon the superior court the power to rescind the earlier dismissal and to rehear the appeal itself. The Court explained that, at a subsequent rehearing, the successor to the appellate court could consider, upon an objection raised by the opposing party, whether the appeal was properly before it. The Court stressed that section 369 read with section 424 expressly forbids a court from altering or reviewing its own order, and that a court’s inherent powers could not be invoked to do what the Code specifically prohibits.

The judgment concerned Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 1959, which had come to the Supreme Court by way of special leave from a judgment and order dated 19 March 1959 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1299 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant argued the case, while counsel for the respondent opposed it. The Supreme Court, through Justice Dayal, noted that the appeal by Sankatha Singh and others challenged the order of the Allahabad High Court that had dismissed their application for revision of a Sessions Judge’s order in Gyanpur. The High Court had held that the predecessor’s order directing the rehearing of an appeal that had earlier been dismissed was ultra vires and without jurisdiction, and it had directed the Magistrate to execute the order in accordance with law. The appellants had been convicted by the First‑Class Magistrate of Gyanpur of offences under sections 452 and 323 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and one appellant, Kharpattu, had also been convicted under section 324 of the IPC. Their conviction was appealed, and the appeal had been scheduled for hearing on 30 November 1956. On that date, neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared before the learned Sessions Judge, who dismissed the appeal after stating that he had perused the magistrate’s judgment, examined the record and found no ground for interference, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

On the scheduled hearing date of 30 November 1956, neither the appellants nor their counsel appeared before the Sessions Judge. Consequently, after noting that both the appellants and their counsel were absent, the Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal, stating that he had reviewed the magistrate’s judgment and the record and found no ground for interference. On 17 December 1956 the appellants filed an application requesting that the case be restored to its original number so that justice could be done to them. In explaining their absence at the November hearing, they stated that they had traveled by the Ekka, which overturned en route, causing them injuries and delaying their arrival at the court. The Sessions Judge, Sri Tej Pal Singh, allowed the application on 2 July 1957, thereby reversing his earlier dismissal of the appeal and ordering that the matter be restored to its original number. In his order the Judge explained that the affidavit accompanying the application demonstrated sufficient cause for the appellants’ non‑appearance at the scheduled hearing. He observed that section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure required the appellate court to dispose of an appeal on its merits after hearing both the appellant or his pleader and the public prosecutor. He noted that no notice had been issued to the appellants as mandated by section 422 of the Code, and that section 367 prescribed the contents of a judgment, which the November 30 judgment lacked. Accordingly, he concluded that the November 30 order did not constitute a proper judgment, was rendered without jurisdiction because the case had not been considered, and that a rehearing was necessary in interests of justice. Sri Tripathi, who succeeded Sri Tej Pal Singh as Sessions Judge and before whom the appeal was reposted for rehearing, held that he possessed no authority to review an appeal that had been disposed of. He therefore declared the July 2, 1957 order of his predecessor to be ultra vires and without jurisdiction, as it exceeded the powers granted to him. The appellants appealed this decision by filing a revision before the High Court, which concurred with Sri Tripathi’s view and dismissed the revision application. The only issue to be decided in this appeal was whether Sri Tej Pal Singh had the authority to set aside his own November 30, 1956 order dismissing the appeal. The question further required determining whether, in view of the absence of the appellants and their counsel, he could also order a rehearing of the matter. The Court held that Sri Tej Pal Singh could not set aside his earlier order and could not order a rehearing, and therefore affirmed the view taken by the High Court. It was further observed that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed merely because the appellants or their counsel fail to appear.

The Court either had to postpone the hearing of the appeal so that the parties could appear, or it had to consider the appeal on its merits and issue a final order. The record shows that Sri Tej Pal Singh understood this requirement, as his own order reflects. He did not dismiss the appeal on the ground of default. Instead, he examined the magistrate’s judgment and the case file and addressed the merits, stating in his order, “I find no ground for any interference.” The fact that he did not set out the reasons for reaching that conclusion does not indicate that he failed to consider the material on record before deciding that there was no case for interference. His failure to render a detailed judgment may not satisfy the requirements of s. 367 of the Code and could be liable to be set aside by a higher court, but that deficiency does not give him authority to set aside his own order and to rehear the appeal. Section 369, read with s. 424 of the Code, makes clear that an appellate court may not alter or review a signed judgment except to correct a clerical mistake. Sri Tej Pal Singh erred in believing that s. 423 of the Code obliges the appellate court to dispose of the appeal after hearing the appellant or his pleader and the public prosecutor. He failed to notice the qualifying words “if he appears” that follow the phrase “and hearing the appellant or his pleaders.” When none of those persons appear, the appellate court may proceed to dispose of the appeal on its merits. Nonetheless, giving notice of the hearing date to the appellant or his counsel is a prerequisite for the hearing, as required by s. 422 of the Code. In his order dated 2 July 1957, Sri Tej Pal Singh observed, “It will also appear that the conditions of s.422, Cr. P. C. were also not fulfilled, as no notice was ever issued to the appellant.” He again overlooked the fact that the notice of the hearing need be given either to the appellant or to his pleader, and need not be served on both. He did not state in his order that no notice of the hearing date had been given to the appellant’s counsel. Customarily, notice of the appeal hearing is sent to the counsel, who then informs the appellant, rather than being served directly on the appellant. The application for restoration demonstrates that the appellant was aware of the hearing date. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that Sri Tej Pal Sigh could, by exercising the inherent powers of every court to promote justice, order a rehearing of the appeal, and that Sri Tripathi was not entitled to sit in judgment over Sri Tej Pal Singh’s order.

In this case the Court examined the order issued by Sri Tej Pal Singh, who was then Sessions Judge, and noted that although the order was passed within his jurisdiction it was nevertheless erroneous. The Court considered the argument that the Sessions Judge might rely on his inherent powers to order a re‑hearing of the appeal. It held that such an exercise of inherent power was not permissible because section 369, read with section 424, of the Code expressly prohibits a court from altering or reviewing its own order. The Court emphasized that inherent powers cannot be invoked to do something that the statute specifically forbids. The Court then turned to the role of Sri Tripathi, who was the judge hearing the matter after the objection was raised by the opposite party as to whether the appeal was validly before him for re‑hearing. It found that Sri Tripathi was fully competent to consider that objection, that he carefully examined the issue and that his decision on the matter was correct. The appellants also contended that Sri Tej Pal Singh possessed jurisdiction to pass orders on the application filed on 17 December 1956, which sought a re‑hearing of the appeal, and therefore his order could not be said to be wholly without jurisdiction. The Court disagreed with that submission. While it acknowledged that the Sessions Judge indeed had jurisdiction to dispose of the application presented to him, it reiterated that section 369 of the Code categorically bars a court from reviewing or altering its own judgment. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the point raised, to set aside the order dismissing the appeal, or to direct a re‑hearing. On the basis of these findings the Court held that the appeal possessed no merit and accordingly dismissed it.