S. S. Munna Lal vs S. S. Rajkumar And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 130 of 61

Decision Date: 23 February 1962

Coram: SHAH, J.

In this case the petitioner, S. S. Munna Lal, brought a suit for partition of the joint family property belonging to a Digamber Jain family of the Porwal sect. The deceased patriarch, identified as G, died in 1934 leaving a widow, Smt. K, a son G who died in 1939, and three grandsons named M, P and R. In 1952 the son of M, identified as S, instituted the partition suit. During the pendency of the suit a person named Rajkumar asserted that he was a son of the late grandson P, who had been adopted by his widow. Rajkumar therefore claimed a one‑quarter share in the joint family property. The validity of this adoption was contested on the ground that P’s widow had not obtained any express authority from her husband to adopt a son. The trial court examined the customary law applicable to Jain widows and held that a Jain widow who had no sons could adopt a son without requiring the express authority of her husband, and consequently ruled that the adoption of Rajkumar was duly effected. Accordingly the trial court passed a preliminary decree that apportioned the family property into four equal shares, one each for Smt. K, the branch of M, the branch of R, and Rajkumar. The parties M and others appealed the trial‑court judgment before the High Court, challenging primarily the finding relating to the adoption. While the appeal was pending the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956) came into force, and shortly thereafter Smt. K died.

The High Court affirmed the trial‑court’s finding that the adoption of Rajkumar was valid, holding that the custom allowing a sonless Jain widow to adopt a son without her husband’s express authority was established by long‑standing judicial decisions, even though none of those decisions concerned the specific Porwal sect of Jabalpur to which the parties belonged. Regarding the share allotted to the deceased widow, the High Court observed that the interest declared by the preliminary decree was inchoate; Smt. K never became “possessed” of any share within the meaning of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, and the property remained part of the joint family estate, to be divided proportionately among the entitled parties upon her death. The appellants argued that the adoption was invalid because no custom specific to the Porwal sect empowered a widow to adopt without her husband’s authority, and that the one‑quarter share declared for Smt. K had become her absolute property under section 14, passing on her death to her grandsons M and R, thereby excluding the other claimants. The Court, however, held that the adoption was valid and that a sonless Jain widow could indeed adopt a son without express authorization from her husband. It further concluded that the relevant custom, although not peculiar to any single locality or Jain sect, was a general Jain custom recognized over a period of more than a century and, having been repeatedly cited before the courts, was deemed part of the law without the need for proof in each individual case.

The Court observed that the parties were governed by a general custom of the Jains that applied to them, rather than by any custom that was specific to a particular locality or to a particular sect of the Jains. The decisions considered did not rely on a custom peculiar to any single region or Jain community, but instead rested on a general custom that, through long‑standing acceptance, had become incorporated into the law applicable to Jains as a whole. The Court explained that when a custom is repeatedly brought before the courts, the courts may treat that custom as having been introduced into the law without requiring proof of its existence in each individual case. The Court relied upon the authorities in Pemraj v. Mst. Chand Kanwar, (1947) L. R. 74 1. A. 224 and Mangibai Gulabchand v. Suganchand Bhikamchand, A.I.R. (1948) P. C. 177, and also cited a long list of earlier cases that illustrate the recognition of such a general Jain custom. These cited authorities included Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj, A.I.R. (1921) P.C. 77; Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagadambal, (1953) S.C.R. 1939; Maharajah Govind Nath Ray v. Gulal Chand, (1833) 5 Sel. Rep. 276; Bhagwandas Tejmal v. Rajmal Alias Hiralal Lachmindas, (1873) 10 Bom. H.C. Rep. 241; Sheo Singh Rai v. Mst. Dakho and Morari Lal (1878) L.R. 5 1. A. 87; Lakhmi Chand v. Gatto Bai, (1886) I.L.R. 8 All. 319; Manik Chand Golecha v. Jagit Settani, (1889) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 518; Hararnabh Parshad alias Rajajee v. Mangil Das, (1899) I. L. R. 27 Cal. 379; Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Das (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 495; Asharfi Kumar v. Rupchand, (1908) I.L.R. 30 All. 197; Rup Chand v. Jambu, Prasad (1910) I.L.R. 32 All, 247; Jiwaraj v. Mst. Sheokuwarbai, A.I.R. (1920) Nag. 162; Banarsi Das v. Sumat Prasad, (1936) I.L.R. 58 All. 1019; and Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur, (1918) L. R. 43 1. A. 148, all of which were referred to in support of the proposition that the custom in question was recognised as part of the law.

The Court further held that the one‑quarter share of Smt. K declared by the preliminary decree was “possessed” by her, and that on her death that share descended to her grandsons in accordance with sections 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court explained that the term “possessed” in section 14 of the Act was intended to be understood broadly, meaning the state of owing or having the property in one’s power. The Court noted that the rule formulated by the Privy Council, which stated that a Hindu wife or mother did not become the owner of a share declared in her favour by a preliminary decree until the actual division of the joint family property, could not be applied after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 4 of that Act made clear that the legislature intended to supersede the rules of Hindu law wherever the Act contained an express provision. In support of this view, the Court referred to Gumalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veerayya, (1959) 1 Supp. S.C.R. 968 and Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, (1935) L.R. 63 I.A. 33. The judgment was recorded in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 130 of 61, appealed by special leave from the decree dated April 25, 1959 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No. 139 of 1955. The counsel appearing for the appellants included the Attorney‑General of India and other senior lawyers, while the respondents were represented by counsel as indicated in the record.

In this appeal with special leave, the Court considered the decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that had confirmed the decree of the First Additional District Judge in Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 12‑A of 1952. The dispute had arisen out of a suit for partition of a joint family property. All the parties were members of the Digambar Jain community of the Porwal sect and resided in Jabalpur, which at the material time lay within Madhya Pradesh. The family pedigree was set out to explain the relationships: Garibdas and his wife Khilonabai (deceased on 24 July 1934) were the parents of Gulzarilal (deceased on 3 July 1956); Gulzarilal’s son was Munnalal, whose father was Padamchand (deceased on 10 January 1936). Ramchand, referred to as defendant 1 and defendant 2, was another branch of the family. Pyaribabu’s widow Bhuribai, identified as defendant 4 and also as the daughter‑in‑law of Chandrani (defendant 11) and of defendant 8, claimed an adopted son Rajkumar (defendant 12), who was supposedly adopted on 26 July 1952. Other family members listed were Saheblal, Ballu, Nand, Hiralal, Ishwari Kumar Prasad (the plaintiff, now deceased), and Rajendra Kumar and Abhay Kumar (defendants 9 and 10). Saheblal, son of Munnalal, filed the suit on 21 June 1952 seeking a decree of partition and separate possession of his one‑twelfth share in the joint family property. He contended that his father’s branch was entitled to half of the property, while the remaining half belonged to the branch of Ram Chand. The Additional District Judge ordered that the grandmother Khilonabai, the wives of Munnalal and Ram Chand, their sons, the widow Bhuribai, and the adopted son Rajkumar, who was claimed to be a son of Padam Chand by adoption by Bhuribai on 26 July 1952, be impleaded as defendants. During the trial, the court examined Saheblal’s right to a share and the central issue turned on the claim made by Bhuribai and her adopted son Rajkumar to a share in the property. Padam Chand had died before the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act of 1937 came into force, so his widow could not claim a share under that Act. Bhuribai and Rajkumar argued that their adoption was governed by the customary law of the Jains of Central India, Madhya Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh, North and Western India, and that, as an adopted son, Rajkumar became a coparcener in the joint family, thereby acquiring a right to a share and its accretions. The adoption’s validity was challenged on several grounds, but the appeal focused solely on the contention that Bhuribai had no express or implied authority from her husband Padam Chand to adopt a son, rendering the adoption invalid. The Additional District Judge rejected this contention, issued a preliminary decree of partition, and declared that Saheblal’s share amounted to one‑twenty‑fourth of the property.

According to the preliminary decree, the share of the plaintiff’s wife and three sons together amounted to five twenty‑fourths of the estate, the share of Ramchand and his sons was one fourth, the share of Khilonabai was one fourth, and the remaining one fourth of the estate belonged to Rajkumar. The decree was appealed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by Munnalal, Ramchand, Khilonabai, the wife and sons of Munnalal, and the wife and sons of Ramchand, who were designated as defendants 1 to 10. While the appeal was pending, Khilonabai died on 3 July 1956. Subsequently, Ramchand and Munnalal applied to be impleaded as her legal representatives to claim the interest in the property that the preliminary decree had awarded to Khilonabai. By an order dated 12 December 1957, the District Judge held that Khilonabai’s interest passed to the applicants by virtue of sections 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which had come into force on 14 June 1956, and that the sons of Munnalal, Ramchand and Padam Chand could not claim a share in Khilonabai’s interest. Before the High Court two questions were framed: first, the factum and validity of the adoption of Rajkumar; and second, the devolution of Khilonabai’s share as declared by the preliminary decree upon her death.

The High Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Rajkumar had indeed been adopted by Bhuribai as a son to her husband on 26 July 1952, and held that among Jains residing in the North‑West Province, Central India, Northern India and Bombay, a widow could adopt a son to her deceased husband without any express authority. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court relied upon the Privy Council judgments in Pemraj v. Mst. Chand Kanwar and Mangibai Gulabchand v. Suganchand Baikamcand. However, the High Court rejected the trial court’s view that the right of Khilonabai declared by the preliminary decree devolved solely upon Munnalal and Ramchand. The Court observed that Khilonabai’s interest under the decree remained “incohate” and was not possessed by her within the meaning of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; consequently, upon her death the interest merged into the joint family estate and did not become her absolute property. The Court therefore held that sections 15 and 16 of the Act were inapplicable to her interest, which continued to be part of the joint family property. Accordingly, the trial court’s decree was modified: one‑third of the joint family property was allotted to Rajkumar, one‑third to the branch of Munnalal, and the remaining one‑third to the branch of Ramchand, with adjustments made to the plaintiff’s share and to the shares of other family members. This appeal was filed by defendant 1 (Munnalal) and defendant 2 (Ramchand).

In this appeal, the court identified three separate contentions. The first contention asserted that, because Bhuribai had not obtained express authority from her husband, she could not lawfully adopt a son. The second contention claimed that the interest of Khilonabai, as described in the preliminary decree, had become her absolute property under section fourteen of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and that on her death this absolute interest had passed to her grandsons Munnalal and Ramchand, who were defendants one and two. The third contention alleged that the trial court had erred by delegating a judicial function to a commissioner, specifically the task of ascertaining the property to be divided and effecting the partition. The court found the third question to be straightforward. It noted that the trial court had indeed appointed a commissioner with the purpose of proposing a partition of the joint family property. To enable the commissioner to fulfil this purpose, the court authorised him to determine the extent of the property, to identify any debts owed by the family, and to assess each party’s individual liability for those debts. The commissioner was also empowered to record statements of the parties, to frame issues, and to take any evidence that might be required. In addition, the commissioner was directed to submit proposals concerning Bhuribai’s right to be maintained out of the joint family property. The order authorising the commissioner had been issued with the consent of all the parties, and no objection to that order appeared to have been raised before the High Court. Although the decree drawn up by the trial court did not strictly follow the directions given in the judgment, the court observed that the trial judge had merely instructed the commissioner to submit his proposals for partition and had authorised him to ascertain the property available for partition and the joint family’s liabilities. By giving this authority, the trial court had not abdicated its own functions; the commissioner’s role was limited to making non‑binding proposals, after which the parties would be heard and the court would adjudicate those proposals in light of the decree and the parties’ contentions. Because the commissioner’s proposals were not binding and the order had been made with the parties’ consent, the court found no ground to modify that part of the order. The parties to the dispute were identified as Digamber Jains belonging to the Porwal sect and residing in Jabalpur. The court noted that Jains are generally regarded as heterodox Hindus and, in the absence of a specific customary rule, they are governed by the same legal principles that apply to Hindus. Referring to the Privy Council decision in Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraff, the court reiterated that Jains are of Hindu origin, are Hindu dissenters, and typically adhere to ordinary Hindu law, even though they do not consider the Vedas as a divine authority and do not perform the Shradh ceremony for the dead.

In this case, the Court noted that the proper performance of Shradhs, which are religious ceremonies for the dead, underlies the religious theory of adoption, and that Jains, having generally adopted Hindu law, are therefore subject to the Hindu rules of adoption unless a contrary usage is shown. Nevertheless, a custom enabling a widow to adopt a son to her husband without the husband’s express authority has been recognised by judicial decisions spanning more than a century. In Pemraj v. Musammad Chand Kanwar, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after reviewing the case law, observed that “in many other parts of India (parts other than the Provinces of Madras and the Punjab) it has now been established by decisions based on evidence from widely separated districts and from different sects that the Jains observe the custom by which a widow may adopt to her husband without his authority.” The Committee explained that this custom is rooted in religious tenets common to all Jain sects, particularly their disbelief that the spiritual welfare of a deceased husband may be affected by the adoption. Although none of the decided cases involved parties of the Khandelwal sect, the Committee held that no distinction had been drawn between one sect and another, and it was “no longer premature to hold that the custom prevails generally among all Jains except in those areas in which there are special reasons, not operative in the rest of India, which explains why the custom has not established itself.” Mayne, in his treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, at page 209, endorsed the proposition that among Jains, except in the Madras Presidency, a sonless widow can adopt a son to her husband without his authority or the consent of his sapindas. This view was reiterated by the Privy Council in Mangibai Gulabchand v. Suganchand Bhikamchand. The Attorney General for the appellants, however, contended that there was no evidence of a custom authorising the widow of a Porwal Digamber Jain residing in Jabalpur to adopt a son to her husband without express authority. Counsel submitted that the observations in the two cited cases should be confined to the sects to which those parties belonged, and that any attempt to extend the custom to all Jain residents in India outside Madras and the Punjab amounted to mere dicta and was not binding on this Court. In Pemraj’s case the parties belonged to the Khandelwal sect and were domiciled in Ajmer, while in Mangibai’s case the parties were Marwari Jains of the Vis‑Oswal sect who, having migrated from Jodhpur, had settled in the Thana District of the Bombay Province. Nevertheless, the Judicial Committee’s opinion expressly proceeded on the basis of a well‑recognised custom applicable to all Jains in the territory of India (excluding Madras and the Punjab) and not on proof of a restricted custom limited to the particular sects of the parties involved.

In the appeal, the Court observed that the opinion of the Judicial Committee was based on a well‑recognised custom that applied to all Jains throughout the territory of India, with the sole exceptions of Madras and the Punjab. The Committee did not rely on any evidence of a restricted custom limited to the particular sects of the Jains to which the parties belonged. The Court then referred to its earlier decision in Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagadamhal, noting that when a party seeks to invoke a custom, that party must allege and prove the specific custom relied upon. The Court quoted the earlier ruling, stating, “it is incumbent on a party getting up a custom to allege and prove the custom on which he relies and it is not any theory of custom or deductions from other customs which can be made a rule of decision but only any customs applicable to the parties concerned that can be the rule of decision in particular case.” The Court emphasized that theory and custom are opposites, that a custom must be established as a factual matter rather than a theoretical one, and that one custom cannot be inferred from another. It further explained that a community in one district may develop a particular custom, but that does not automatically mean that a community in another district follows the same practice. Accordingly, the Court held that the custom in question was not applied to the parties by way of analogy or deduction; rather, it directly governed them because the custom had, over a long and uninterrupted period, become part of the law applicable to Jains in India, except in Madras and the Punjab.

The Court then reviewed the judicial pronouncements that demonstrated the general applicability of the custom across India. It noted that a review of cases decided by various courts showed that the custom was recognised for Jains throughout the country, with the only exclusions being Jains domiciled in Madras and the Punjab. The earliest reported case was Maharaja Govindnath Bay v. Ray Chand, decided by the Saddar Court of Calcutta in 1933. In that case, the validity of an adoption by a Jain widow of a son without express authority from her husband was challenged, and after consulting Pandits, the Court held that, under Jain law, a widow without a son could adopt a son in the same manner as her husband for the purpose of performing religious rites, and that the involvement of priests was not essential to the adoption. The Court also referred to Bhagwandas Tejmal v. Rajmal alias Hiralal Lachmidas, in which the Bombay High Court opined that a Jain widow possessed either express or implied authority to adopt a son, but she could not delegate that authority to another person to adopt a son on behalf of her husband after her death. Finally, the Court cited Sheo Singh Rai v. Mussumut Dakho and Moorari Lal, decided in 1878, where the Privy Council affirmed the view of the North West Provinces High Court that a Jain widow who had no son possessed the right to adopt without the permission of her husband or his consent. The Court listed the citations for these authorities as (1) (1833) 5 Scl Rep 276 and (2) (1873) 10 Bom. H.C. Rep. 241, underscoring the long‑standing judicial acceptance of the custom.

In the case reported as (3) (1878) L.R. 5 I.& 87 of his heirs, the trial before the Subordinate Judge and subsequently before the High Court recorded evidence concerning the custom that applied to Jains generally in several locations, including Delhi, Jaipur, Mathura and Banaras. The court held that this custom was established by the evidence presented. Although the parties to the suit were Agarwal Jains residing in Meerut District, the Board’s decision rested on a custom that the evidence showed to be common to all Jains. A later decision, Lakhmi Chand v. Catto Bai (1) decided in 1886, again affirmed that a Jain widow possessed the power to adopt a son for her deceased husband. In Manik Chand Golecha v. Jagat Settani (2) decided in 1889, the High Court of Bengal upheld a similar custom concerning adoption by a widow who was an Oswal Jain, explaining that the ruling did not depend on any custom peculiar to the Oswal sect. The case of Harnabh Pershad alias Rajajee v. Mangil Das (3) decided in 1899 examined both judicial decisions and oral testimony and concluded that the custom allowing a sonless Jain widow to adopt a son for her husband without the latter’s permission or the consent of his kinsmen was sufficiently established. The court further observed that there was no material difference in this custom among the Aggarwal, Choreewal (Porwal), Khandwal and Oswal sects of the Jains, and that Jains in Arrab were no different from Jains elsewhere. The judgment was based on an elaborate examination of numerous instances that demonstrated the custom’s establishment.

Subsequent cases continued to confirm the same principle. In Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Das (4) and in Asharfi Kumar v. Rupchand (5) the court held that a similar custom was established. In the latter case, a large number of witnesses were examined at various locations, and after reviewing the decisions and the evidence, the court declared the custom proved. The judgments of the Allahabad High Court in these cases are recorded as follows: (1) (1886) I.L.R. 8 All. 319; (2) (1889) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 5 1 8; (3) (1899) I.L.R. 27 Cal. 379; (4) (1907) 1.L.R. 29 All. 495; (5) (1908) I.L.R. 30 All. 197. The decision in Asharfi’s case was later affirmed by the Privy Council in RupChand v. Jambu Prasad, indicating that the right of a Jain widow to adopt without the authority of her husband was never questioned before the Privy Council. In Jiwraj v. Mt. Sheokuwarbai, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Nagpur, held that a Jain widow did not require her husband’s permission to adopt a son; this judgment was also taken to the Privy Council and affirmed in Sheokuarbat v. Jeoraj (3). In Banarsi Das v. Samat Prasad (4) a similar custom was again held established. All these decisions were not based on any custom peculiar to a particular locality or Jain sect, but rather on the view that, being Jains, they were governed by a common custom that had, through long acceptance, become part of the law applicable to them.

In this case the Court observed that the Jain community was governed by a custom that, through long‑standing acceptance, had become part of the law applicable to them. The Court reiterated the well‑settled legal principle that when a custom is repeatedly brought before the courts of a country, the courts are entitled to treat that custom as part of the law without requiring fresh proof of its existence in every individual dispute. The Court cited the earlier authority of Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur (5) in support of this proposition. On the basis of this principle, the Court held that the contention asserting the invalidity of the adoption of Rajkumar by Bburibai could not succeed and therefore must be rejected.

Turning to the statutory framework, the Court noted that Khilonabai died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force on 14 June 1956. Section 2(1)(b) of that Act expressly extends its applicability not only to Hindus but also to persons who profess the Jain religion. The Court further recorded that a preliminary decree dated 29 July 1955 had already declared Khilonabai entitled to a one‑fourth share in the family’s property. The Court then set out the relevant provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 14(1) provides that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as a full owner and not as a limited owner. The explanation attached to this subsection defines “property” to include movable assets acquired by inheritance, devise, partition, maintenance, gifts (whether from relatives or strangers), skill, exertion, purchase, prescription, or any other mode, and also property held as stridhana immediately before the Act commenced. However, sub‑section (2) clarifies that the rule in sub‑section (1) does not apply to property obtained by gift, will, other instrument, or a decree, order, or award that imposes a restricted estate on such property. Section 15 then prescribes the order of devolution of a female Hindu’s property when she dies intestate. Sub‑section (1) lists the primary hierarchy: first to her sons and daughters (including children of any pre‑deceased children) and her husband; second to the heirs of the husband; third to her mother and father; fourth to the heirs of the father; and lastly to the heirs of the mother. Sub‑section (2) adds that, notwithstanding the general scheme, property inherited by a female Hindu from her own parents shall, in the absence of any son or daughter (or their surviving issue), devolve to the heirs of the father rather than to the other categories specified in sub‑section (1).

The Court explained that when a Hindu female dies, any property that she had received from her husband or from her father‑in‑law shall, if she left no son or daughter (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter), pass not to the other heirs mentioned in subsection (1) but directly to the heirs of the husband. Section 16, which sets out the order of succession and the method of distribution among the heirs of a Hindu woman, provides a rule that among the heirs listed in subsection (1) of section 15, those appearing in an earlier entry are preferred to those in any later entry, and all heirs listed in the same entry succeed simultaneously. Counsel for Rajkumar admitted, and the Court accepted, that if the share awarded to Khilonabai by the preliminary decree constituted property that she actually possessed at the time of her death, that share must descend to her grandsons, Munnalal and Ramchand, thereby excluding the claim of Rajkumar, who is the adopted son of Padam Chand. The Court cited the decision in Gumalapara Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva, observing that the term “possessed” in section 14 is employed in a broad sense and signifies ownership or the actual power to control the property. The preliminary decree had declared that Khilonabai was entitled to a share in the family estate; since the estate remained in the joint family of which she was a member and was enjoyed jointly, the Court held that such estate was possessed by her under the decree.

However, counsel for Rajkumar contended that the interest granted to Khilonabai by the preliminary decree was merely inchoate because it represented only a right to maintenance from the estate and not an absolute ownership right. He argued that this inchoate right would continue to exist until the estate was actually divided and the share specified in the decree was physically separated to her. Accordingly, on her death before the actual division, the inchoate interest would revert to the undivided estate from which it had originally been carved. To support this position, counsel referred to the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Pratpamull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, which held that under Mitakshara law a wife or mother, although entitled to a share when the family estate is divided, is not recognized as the owner of that share until the division is effected, because she possesses only a right of maintenance and no pre‑existing proprietary right. Counsel further asserted that this rule of Hindu law was not displaced by any provision of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court noted that section 14(1) was intended by the legislature to transform the limited interest that a Hindu female held under the classical Sastric Hindu law into an absolute estate, and that the explanatory provision gave the term “property” its widest meaning, encompassing property acquired by a Hindu woman through inheritance, devise, partition, or any other mode of acquisition.

Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act was drafted to include any property that a Hindu woman might acquire through a wide variety of sources. The provision expressly covered property obtained as maintenance or arrears of maintenance, as a gift from any person whether a relative or not, before or after her marriage, as well as property acquired by her own skill or exertion, by purchase, by prescription, or by any other manner whatsoever. By introducing section 14(1), the legislature clearly intended to transform whatever limited interest a Hindu female possessed under the Sastric Hindu law into an absolute estate. In the earlier decision of Pratap mull’s case the court had held that, until the actual division of the share declared in her favour by a preliminary decree for partition of a joint family estate, a Hindu wife or mother could not be recognised as the owner of that share. The present judgment, however, held that this rule could not continue to apply after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The Act was a codifying statute that effected far‑reaching changes in the structure of Hindu law relating to inheritance and succession. It conferred upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance and removed the traditional limitations on their powers of disposition that had previously been regarded as inherent in their estate. Consequently, a Hindu woman was, under the Act, treated as a fresh line of descent with respect to property she possessed at the time of her death. It was also acknowledged that, under the Sastric Hindu law, the share allotted to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or grandsons was merely in lieu of her right to maintenance and that she was not entitled to claim partition. The legislature, however, by enacting the Hindu Women’s’ Right to Property Act, 1937, effected a significant departure from that rule. That Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in her husband’s property as existed at his death, and if the estate were partitioned she became the sole owner of her share, subject to the usual restrictions on disposition and the specific rule concerning extinction of the estate upon death, whether actual or civil. In light of this development, it could not be said that, in enacting section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the legislature merely intended to restate the rule articulated by the Privy Council in Pratap mull’s case. Section 4 of the Act provided an overriding effect to its own provisions, expressly stating that, except as otherwise provided in the Act, any rule of Hindu law, custom or usage in force immediately before the commencement of the Act would cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which the Act made a provision. This language made it manifest that the legislature sought to supersede the rules of Hindu law on all matters expressly covered by the Act. Ordinarily, a right declared in an estate by a preliminary decree would be regarded as property, and there was nothing in the context of section 14 that suggested otherwise.

In considering the wording employed by the Legislature, the Court observed that the statutory language does not support the view that a right granted in respect of a joint‑family estate to a Hindu widow falls outside the definition of “property” under section 14 of the Act. When the overall scheme of the legislation and its declared purpose are taken into account, it would be difficult, without contradicting the express terms of the enactment, to accept that a right declared as property in favour of a person under a decree of partition is not in fact a right to property. Accordingly, if a preliminary decree treats a right granted to a Hindu male as property, the same treatment must logically extend to a right granted to a Hindu female. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court erred in holding that the right declared in favour of Khilonabai was not possessed by her, and it could not accept the argument advanced by counsel for Raj Kumar that such a right was not property within the meaning of section 14. On this basis, and by operation of sections 15 and 16 of the Act, the interest that had been declared in favour of Khilonabai was to devolve upon her sons, Munnalal and Ramohand, thereby excluding her grandson Raj Kumar. Consequently, the decree issued by the High Court was modified with respect to this point and the decree originally passed by the trial Court was restored. In view of the partial success achieved by both parties, the Court ordered that no costs be awarded in this appeal or in the proceedings before the High Court. The appeal was thus partly allowed.