S. S. Garewal vs Messrs. Bhowra Kankanee Colleries

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 526/59

Decision Date: 26 April 1962

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the case of S. S. Garewal versus Messrs. Bhowra Kankanee Colleries, decided on 26 April 1962, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment. The opinion was written by Justice K.N. Wanchoo and the bench consisted of Justices K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner was S. S. Garewal and the respondent was Messrs. Bhowra Kankanee Colleries. The decision was reported in 1966 AIR 853 and in 1963 SCR (2) 475.

The matter arose under the Mines Act 1952. Section 24 of that Act authorised the Government of India to order an inquiry into a disaster that had taken place in the respondent’s colliery. Accordingly, a Court of Inquiry was constituted. The Court of Inquiry submitted its report on 26 September 1955. The report found, among other things, that the accident had occurred because of negligence on the part of the management. In accordance with Rule 22 of the Mines Rules 1955, the report directed the owners to pay the expenses of the inquiry. However, the report did not quantify the amount of expenses to be paid.

At the request of the Chief Inspector of Mines, the judge of the Court of Inquiry issued a separate order on 7 September 1956 that quantified the expenses after giving due notice to the parties. The respondents filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging that quantifying order on three grounds. First, they argued that the Court of Inquiry became functus officio after submitting its report and therefore the judge no longer possessed the power to issue a further order. Second, they contended that even if the later order were treated as a review of the original expense order, it would be invalid because the Court of Inquiry had no power of review. Third, they maintained that the two assessors who assisted the inquiry were not present when the quantifying order was passed and therefore the judge could not lawfully pass the order alone.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that it was not interfering with the expense order that had been incorporated in the judge’s report of 26 September 1955. The Supreme Court clarified that when a Court of Inquiry orders payment of expenses without specifying an amount in its report, the order necessarily implies that the appointed officer will later determine the exact sum in materials placed before him; otherwise the order would be ineffective. Because no deadline was fixed for the Court of Inquiry to submit its report, the period of appointment did not automatically end with the submission of the report, and the Court of Inquiry did not become functus officio at that stage. The Court further held that the later order of 7 September 1956 was a legitimate quantification of the earlier expense order and not a review or a variation that required the participation of the assessors.

When the original report of the court of inquiry already contained an order directing payment of the inquiry expenses, any later order that specifies a monetary amount merely serves to quantify that earlier directive. Such a quantification is comparable to the routine practice in ordinary courts where decrees are issued together with costs, yet the judgment itself does not set out the precise amount of costs. Accordingly, the order dated 7 September 1956 cannot be characterized as a review or as a modification of the order that appeared in the report dated 26 September 1955, because the judge who prepared that report possessed no authority to alter the substance of the initial order. The Court also held that the judge presiding over the court of inquiry was fully empowered to determine the exact sum of the expenses and that the presence of the assessors was not a prerequisite for the judge to make such a quantification. Section 24(1) of the Mines Act provides that the inquiry is to be conducted by a competent person, and the assessors are appointed merely to assist that person. The assessors need not be involved in every ministerial-type order, and the act of quantifying expenses falls within the category of a ministerial order.

The judgment concerned a civil appeal, numbered 526/59, filed by special leave against a decision of the Patna High Court dated 3 March 1958 in Miscellaneous Judgment case 940 of 1956. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondents appeared before Justice Wanchoo, who delivered the opinion on 26 April 1962. The factual background relevant to the appeal is as follows: the respondents owned the Allabad colliery located in the Dhanbad district. On 5 February 1955 a tragic accident at the colliery resulted in the death of fifty‑two persons. Under section 24 of the Mines Act, No. 35 of 1962 (hereinafter “the Act”), the Government of India ordered a formal inquiry into the disaster. The court of inquiry was headed by Mr. Justice B. P. Jamuar, with two assessors appointed to assist him. The inquiry’s report was submitted on 26 September 1955 and subsequently published on 17 December 1955. The inquiry considered whether, pursuant to rule 22 of the Mines Rules, 1955 (hereinafter “the Rules”), the management should be directed to bear the costs of the inquiry. Rule 22 provides that if a court of inquiry determines that an accident resulted from negligence or carelessness on the part of the management, it may order the mine owners to pay all or part of the inquiry expenses in a manner and within a time frame it specifies. The inquiry’s report concluded that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the management and therefore ordered the owners to pay the expenses of the inquiry, although it did not specify the exact amount.

In this case the owners of the mine were directed by the court of inquiry to pay the costs of the inquiry, but the September 26, 1955 report did not specify the amount. On July 27, 1956 the Chief Inspector of Mines asked Mr. Justice Jamuar to fix both the sum to be paid and the schedule for payment. After serving notices, on September 7, 1956 Mr. Justice Jamuar ordered the owners to pay Rs 17,778‑½ as the inquiry expenses, demanding payment within two months of that order. The respondents then filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the September 7, 1956 order. They conceded that Rule 22 of the Mines Rules, 1955 authorised a court of inquiry to direct an owner to pay all or any part of the inquiry costs and to set the time for payment. Nevertheless, they raised three separate grounds of challenge. First, they argued that the court of inquiry became functus officio after submitting its report on September 26, 1955, and therefore Mr. Justice Jamuar no longer possessed the authority to issue the September 7, 1956 order. Second, they contended that if the later order were treated as a review of the earlier report, it would be void because the court of inquiry was not vested with any power of review. Third, they maintained that the assessors who had assisted the court were absent when the September 7, 1956 order was passed, and consequently Mr. Justice Jamuar could not validly make the order without them. The High Court accepted all three contentions, allowed the writ petition, and expressly stated that it was not interfering with the expense‑related direction contained in the September 26, 1955 report. The respondents now appealed this High Court decision, maintaining that once the court of inquiry became functus officio, it could not quantify the expenses by the September 7, 1956 order. Before addressing that principal argument, the Court briefly considered the other two submissions that the High Court had accepted. Regarding the second contention, the Court observed that the September 7, 1956 order could not be characterised as a review because the original report already incorporated an order that the owners should pay the inquiry expenses, albeit without a specified amount. The later order merely quantified the sum and therefore did not constitute a review or a variation of the earlier order. Consequently, the Court concluded that the September 7, 1956 order was a permissible quantification of an expense direction already present in the report, rather than an unauthorised exercise of review jurisdiction.

In this case, the Court observed that the order issued on September 7 1956 merely quantified the amount of expenses that had already been ordered to be paid by the owners in the report dated September 26 1955. The earlier report contained an unquantified directive that the owners should bear the costs of the inquiry, and the later order did not alter, review, or vary that directive; it simply assigned a specific monetary figure to it. Consequently, the Court held that the September 7 1956 order could not be characterised as a review because a review would require a change to an existing order, whereas here there was no change—only a clarification of the amount. The Court noted that the situation would have been different if the September 26 1955 report had omitted any instruction regarding expenses; in such a circumstance, a subsequent order might have been construed as reviewing an omission. However, because the report itself already mandated payment of expenses, the later order functioned like the routine cost quantification that courts perform after rendering a decree. The Court explained that ordinarily a judgment does not specify the exact costs; those costs are calculated later by the court’s office, any disputes are resolved, and the final cost figure is incorporated into the decree. The September 7 1956 order performed an analogous function, and therefore it was not an impermissible review. On this ground, the respondents’ contention that the order was a prohibited review failed.

The Court then turned to the respondents’ second argument, which claimed that the September 7 1956 order was invalid because the two assessors were not present with Justice Jamuar when the order was made. Referring to section 24 (1), the Court explained that an inquiry is conducted by a competent person appointed for that purpose, and assessors are appointed merely to assist the presiding officer. The presiding officer remains the sole authority to issue orders, and the presence of assessors is not required for every order, particularly those of a ministerial nature such as the quantification of expenses. The Court observed that the assessors had indeed been associated with Justice Jamuar when the September 26 1955 report was prepared, which included the order that the owners should pay the inquiry’s expenses. That association satisfied the statutory requirement for the original expense order. The later September 7 1956 order, being only a quantification of that pre‑existing obligation, did not necessitate the assessors’ participation. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the absence of the assessors at the time of the quantification did not render the order invalid, and the respondents’ contention on this point also failed.

In this case the Court observed that the absence of the assessors from the subsequent action of Justice Jamuar did not make that action invalid, because it was merely the execution of the order contained in the report dated 26 September 1956 which directed the owners to pay the expenses of the inquiry, and in that earlier report the assessors had been associated with the inquiry. Consequently the contention on that ground was dismissed. The Court then turned to the principal submission advanced on behalf of the respondents, namely that the court of inquiry had become functus officio on the date it issued its report, 26 September 1955, and that thereafter Justice Jamuar was not empowered to make any order quantifying the expenses. The Court noted that it was undisputed that no specific time limit had been fixed for the court of inquiry to submit its report. Because no such time limit existed, the Court held that it could not be said that the period for which the court of inquiry was appointed necessarily ended on 26 September 1955, and therefore the court of inquiry did not automatically become functus officio on that date. The Court further explained that, had the court of inquiry, when it submitted its report on 26 September 1955, ordered the owners to pay the inquiry expenses and expressly added that the amounts would be quantified later by the person conducting the inquiry, there could be no argument that the appointed person lacked authority to make a later quantification. Although it was submitted that the 1955 report, while ordering the owners to pay the expenses, did not state that the amounts would be quantified later by the appointed person, the Court examined what the order necessarily implied. It was clear that the intention of the court of inquiry was that the owners should bear the expenses, and that at the stage of the report it might not be possible to determine the precise sum. Ordinarily, a quantification of expenses would be made after the report, when the necessary material is before the officer. The Court therefore concluded that an order directing the owners to pay the expenses inherently carries the implication that the officer appointed to conduct the inquiry will later quantify those expenses once the requisite material is placed before him. This implication was borne out in the present proceedings. After the court of inquiry’s order became known to the Chief Inspector of Mines, he directed that the expenses be quantified, and Justice Jamuar issued the quantifying order. Accordingly, the order dated 7 September 1956 was a consequential step stemming from the decision of the court of inquiry on 26 September 1955, and the earlier order implicitly authorized such a later quantification.

The Court observed that the order issued on September 26, 1955, inherently included the expectation that the individual appointed to conduct the inquiry would determine the amount of expenses as soon as the relevant materials were placed before him. Consequently, the report dated September 26, 1955, did not need to restate in exhaustive language that the expenses would be quantified later, once the necessary documents were provided to the appointed officer. The Court emphasized that if such an implication were absent from the September 26, 1955, order, the order would be rendered purposeless because it would fail to indicate any recoverable expense amount. Accordingly, the Court held that whenever a court of inquiry issues an order within its report, the order necessarily carries the implication that the appointed officer will quantify the expenses after the appropriate materials are placed before him; otherwise the order would be wholly ineffective. The Court further examined Section 24 and found no provision that forbids a later quantification of expenses by the officer who had been appointed to hold the inquiry, and therefore saw no reason why such a quantification could not be made at a subsequent stage. In addition, the Court noted that the original order appointing the court of inquiry in the present case did not specify any deadline for the submission of the inquiry report. In view of the absence of a fixed reporting date, the Court concluded that it was permissible for Mr. Justice Jamuar to proceed with the quantification of expenses without the necessity of involving the assessors at that stage. The Court therefore determined that it could not be said that the officer appointed to hold the inquiry was functus officio and therefore barred from quantifying expenses in accordance with the direction contained in the September 26, 1955, report. On this basis, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and noted that the High Court had not awarded any costs. Consequently, the Court ordered that each party bear its own costs of these proceedings. Appeal allowed.