Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai And Others V vs State Of Bombay And Another
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Writ Petition No. 76 of 1957
Decision Date: 30 August 1962
Coram: J.C. Shah, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
The case titled Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Others versus State of Bombay and Another was decided on 30 August 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J. C. Shah, and the bench comprised Justice J. C. Shah, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice K. N. Wanchoo and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioners were identified as Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and others, while the respondents were the State of Bombay and an additional party. The official citation of the decision is reported in 1963 AIR 540 and 1963 SCR (3) 837, and the judgment has been subsequently referenced in numerous reports and citations spanning the years 1969 to 1990, covering a wide range of legal reporters.
The petitioners are Christians belonging to the United Church of Northern India and are members of a society that administers a large number of educational institutions, primarily for the benefit of the Christian community. The society operates forty‑two primary schools and a training college for teachers. Graduates of the training college are normally placed in the society’s primary schools; those who are not placed there are employed in other Christian mission schools run by the United Church of Northern India. The expenses required to maintain both the training college and the primary schools are met through donations received from the Irish Presbyterian Mission, fees paid by the students, and a grant‑in‑aid provided by the State Government.
On 28 May 1935 the Government of Bombay issued an order that, beginning with the academic year 1955‑56, eighty percent of the seats in the training college for teachers in non‑government training colleges would be reserved for teachers nominated by the Government. Subsequently, on 13 June 1955 the Educational Inspector issued a directive to the Principal of the society’s training college, instructing him not to admit, without the specific permission of the Education Department, private students whose numbers would exceed twenty percent of the total strength in any class. The Principal responded that he was unable to comply with the order. On 27 December 1955 the Educational Inspector wrote to the management, informing them that refusing admission to government‑nominated teachers was irregular and contrary to government policy, and warned that the society would not receive any grant for that academic year if the orders were disregarded. Later, on 29 March 1956 the Educational Inspector again directed the Principal not to admit private candidates to the first‑year class without obtaining specific permission, cautioned that failure to obey would result in severe disciplinary action, including possible withdrawal of recognition of the institution.
In this matter, the Court observed that the Educational Inspector had warned the society that failure to follow the earlier conditions could result in the withdrawal of recognition of the institution. A further notice dated 9 May 1956 informed the society that, because it had not complied with the previously set conditions, the college would not receive the education grant for that year. The petitioners subsequently filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court seeking a mandamus or any other appropriate writ that would restrain the State of Bombay and the Director of Education from compelling the society and the petitioners to reserve eighty percent of seats in the training college for “Government‑nominated teachers.” They also asked that the respondents not be forced to obey the provisions of rules 5(2), 11, 12 and 14, nor to have the recognition of the college withdrawn or the grant‑in‑aid withheld under rule 14.
The petitioners contended that their fundamental rights protected by Articles 30(1), 26(a), ( b), (c) and (d), and 19(1)(f) and (g) had been infringed by the letters issued on 28 May 1955, 27 December 1955 and 29 March 1956, which threatened to withhold the grant‑in‑aid and to withdraw the college’s recognition. The Court held that the impugned rules and orders did not violate any right to acquire, hold or dispose of property. It emphasized that interference with the bare management of an educational institution did not amount to a deprivation of property rights under Article 19(1)(f). The Court found that the State’s order did not seek to deprive the petitioners of their property and therefore did not infringe the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f). Likewise, the right to practice any profession, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) was not impaired by the rules and directions.
The Court distinguished the cases of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Phirtha Sivamiar of Sri Shiru Mutt and Sri Dwarka Nath Pewari v. State of Bihar. It further held that rule 5(2) of the Rules for Primary Training Colleges and rules 11 and 14 of the Rules for recognition of Private Training Institutions, insofar as they dealt with the reservation of seats and the threat to withhold the grant‑in‑aid and recognition, contravened the fundamental freedom guaranteed by Article 30(1). The Court explained that the right under Article 30(1) was a fundamental right declared in absolute terms, unlike the freedoms under Article 19, which are subject to reasonable restrictions. This right was intended to protect minorities in establishing educational institutions of their own choice and was to be effective, not diluted by regulatory measures aimed at the public interest. Consequently, any regulation imposed by legislation or executive action must satisfy a dual test of reasonableness and must be genuinely regulative of the educational character of the institution and conducive to making it an effective vehicle of education for the minority community.
and the test that the regulation must concern the educational character of the institution and must be conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or for other persons who use it. In re, The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, (1959) S.C.R. 995, distinguished. JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 76 of 1957. The petition was filed under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Counsel for the petitioners included O. S. Pathak, J., B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vohra. Counsel for the respondents comprised H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor‑General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar. The judgment was delivered on August 30, 1962 by Justice Shah. The petitioners professed the Christian faith and were members of the United Church of Northern India. They belonged to the Gujarat and Kathiawar Presbyterian Joint Board, hereinafter referred to as “the society,” which operated forty‑two primary schools and a teachers’ training college known as the Mary Brown Memorial Training College at Borsad in Kaira District. Teachers who completed training at the college were normally absorbed into the society’s primary schools, while those not placed there were employed by other Christian mission schools run by the United Church of Northern India. The expenses of running the training college and the primary schools were met from donations received from the Irish Presbyterian Mission, fees paid by students, and a grant‑in‑aid granted under the education code of the State Government. Although the primary schools and the college served the religious denomination of the United Church of Northern India and Indian Christians generally, admission was not denied to students from other communities. The training programme lasted two years and originally admitted twenty‑five students in the first year and twenty‑five in the second year. Up to 1952, excess capacity after admitting students who would become teachers for the society’s primary schools was available for other students. The college had been recognised by the Government of Bombay to train students for the examination conducted by the Education Department for issuing certificates to trained teachers. In each district of the State of Bombay a District School Board existed, and in municipal areas a Municipal School Board functioned; these boards dealt with primary education matters and operated schools within their jurisdictions. To supply trained teachers for the schools run by these boards, the State maintained teacher‑training colleges. In November 1952 the Government of Bombay issued an order directing all private training colleges in the State to reserve sixty percent of seats for teachers nominated by the School Boards. The society protested this order, and negotiations between the Education Department and the society resulted in an agreement that the society would admit twenty students each year, ten in each class.
In June 1953 the Government nominated ten students for admission to the training college, and in the following year, June 1954, it nominated an additional ten students. Subsequently, on 28 May 1955, the Government of Bombay issued a new order that, beginning with the academic year 1955‑56, eight‑tenths of the available seats in non‑government training colleges should be reserved for teachers nominated by the District and Municipal School Boards. The order explained that at that time there were approximately forty thousand primary teachers employed by the District School Boards and authorized Municipalities who lacked formal training, and that further untrained teachers were expected to be appointed during the next academic year. To ensure that these untrained teachers received the necessary instruction without delay, the Government resolved to expand the existing training facilities, increase the “output of trained teachers,” open new training colleges, and allocate eighty percent of the seats in private training institutions for School Board teachers from the 1955‑56 session onward.
Following the May order, the Educational Inspector for Kaira District sent a letter to the college principal on 13 June 1955 stating that eight‑tenths of the total seats in the training college must be reserved for School Board teachers deputed by the Government. The letter also instructed the principal not to admit private students in excess of twenty percent of the class strength unless he obtained specific permission from the Education Department. The principal replied on 15 June 1955, indicating that the college was unable to comply with the directive. Subsequent correspondence between the society and the Education Department reiterated the Government’s insistence that the college reserve the prescribed percentage of seats for School Board teachers and that no new admissions be made without approval. On 27 December 1955, the Educational Inspector again wrote to the college management, describing the refusal to admit the School Board teachers as highly irregular and contrary to Government policy. The inspector warned that, because of the management’s defiant attitude, no grant would be released for the current year unless the college agreed to reserve eighty percent of the seats for School Board teachers starting in 1956‑57, to maintain only a single division of the second‑year class in that year, and to refrain from admitting fresh candidates to the first year without prior permission from the Director of Education, Poona. The notice further cautioned that failure to comply could result in severe disciplinary action, including the withdrawal of the institution’s recognition. In response, the society submitted a memorial on 10 February 1956 to the Minister for Education, protesting the threat of disciplinary measures and loss of recognition. The society received a reply on 12 March 1956 acknowledging its submission.
Because the society refused to set aside seats for School Board teachers, the government withheld the grant for that fiscal year. On 22 March 1956, the society addressed a letter to the Minister for Education in which it asked permission to fill twelve places in each class year and to reserve the remaining places—constituting sixty percent of the total capacity—for School Board teachers.
Subsequently, on 29 March 1956, the Educational Inspector sent a communication to the principal of the college. The Inspector instructed the principal not to admit any private candidates to the first‑year class without first obtaining prior permission from the Director of Education. The Inspector also conveyed that the provisional grant of eight thousand rupees, which had been sanctioned for the college, was provided on “the distinct understanding that eighty percent of the seats are reserved for School Board teachers from 1956‑57 and necessary residential accommodation is made available for them.”
On 18 April 1956, the society received further instructions. The notice required that for the first‑year class, eighty percent of the seats be reserved each year for School Board teachers and that the same proportion be maintained in the second year for the following academic session. The notice also demanded that suitable hostel accommodation be arranged for those teachers, that college students be allowed to observe the major festivals of all religions provided such observances did not involve rituals as part of cultural programmes under community living, and that the college furnish a common space where all teachers, staff and students could gather to recite common prayers.
In a letter dated 9 May 1956, the Director of Education replied to the society, referring to the instruction of 18 April 1956. The Director observed that the society had failed to assure the government of its willingness to comply with the conditions set out in the earlier letter. Consequently, no deputations of teachers were made to the first‑year class of the college for the academic year 1956‑57, and the college would not receive the grant.
On 9 June 1956, the Director of Education issued another letter to the society. This correspondence again called upon the society to admit all School Board teachers who might be deputed, up to eighty percent of the seats in the first‑year class for the year 1956‑57, and to provide adequate hostel accommodation for those teachers. The Director warned that if the society did not communicate its willingness to comply within seven days of receiving the letter, the government would be compelled to withdraw the recognition granted to the first‑year class of the training college under Rule 11, which pertains to the recognition of non‑primary training colleges as framed by the Government under G.R. II dated 9 November 1949.
The Director explained that this demand was made under the authority conferred by two sets of rules enacted by the Government of Bombay: (i) the Rules for Primary Training Colleges, and (ii) the Rules for the recognition of the Private raining Institutions. Section 5(2) of the first set of rules stipulated that in non‑government institutions, the percentage of seats reserved for Board‑deputed teachers shall be fixed by the Government, while the remaining seats shall be filled by students deputed by private schools or by private candidates. The reference was also made to Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules for the recognition of Private Primary Training Institutions.
The rules governing private primary training institutions included several specific provisions. Rule eleven required that every institution remain open to all students regardless of caste or creed. It also gave the government authority to reserve seats for teachers deputed by the board whenever it deemed such reservation necessary, and it mandated that a proportion of the institution’s staff and students be drawn from backward classes as fixed by the government. Rule twelve dealt with the employment of women teachers in women’s training institutions. It stipulated that the head of such an institution must be a woman and that at least half of the assistant teachers must be women. In special circumstances, a men’s institution could admit women teachers only if it satisfied certain conditions: separate classes for women must be formed; each women’s class must have at least one trained graduate woman teacher; separate residential facilities for women students must be provided under the supervision of a woman teacher; satisfactory provision for teaching Home Science as an auxiliary craft to women students must be made; and separate sanitary facilities for women teachers and students must be arranged in both the college and the hostel premises. Rule fourteen empowered the department to withdraw recognition or to refuse payment of the grant to any private training institution that failed to fulfil any of the foregoing conditions, that exhibited inefficient management or poor quality of teaching, or that did not comply with any departmental regulation then in force or thereafter issued by the government or by the Director of Education acting on its behalf.
The petitioners applied to this Court for a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, to restrain the State of Bombay and the Director of Education from forcing the society and the petitioners to reserve eighty per cent of the seats in the training college for government‑nominated teachers, and from obliging them to comply with the provisions of Rules five‑two, eleven, twelve and fourteen, or from withdrawing the college’s recognition or withholding its grant‑in‑aid under rule fourteen. The petitioners belong to a religious denomination that constitutes a religious minority. Their society runs educational institutions primarily for the benefit of the Christian community, although it does not refuse admission to students of other faiths. The society maintains a college that trains women teachers for its primary schools. The petitioners assert that letters dated 28 May 1955, 27 December 1955 and 29 March 1956, which threatened to withhold the grant‑in‑aid and to withdraw the college’s recognition, violate their fundamental rights under Articles thirty‑one, twenty‑six (clauses a, b, c and d) and nineteen (clauses f and g). It is uncontested that the Government of Bombay, under the Education Code, provides an annual grant of eight thousand rupees to the college. The Education Code is not a statute; it consists of a series of administrative directions issued by the Government of Bombay concerning educational matters and the regulations for making grants.
In this case, the Court described that the Government of Bombay issued a series of educational regulations which set out the procedure for granting financial assistance to institutions. It further explained that the Government conducts examinations that confer certificates on candidates who have successfully completed training as primary teachers, and that only students who have received instruction in institutions recognised by the Government are eligible to sit for those examinations. Consequently, the Court observed that if the Government does not recognise the College, the training provided there would have little practical value. The Court noted that the College is a non‑profit institution whose expenses are met chiefly through donations and the Government grant; without that grant the College would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to continue operating. The Court then turned to the argument raised on behalf of the society that Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution protected its rights. It stated that Article 19(1)(f) guarantees every citizen the freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of property, but the rules and orders that were challenged did not interfere with any such right of acquisition, holding or disposition. The Court held that merely interfering with the management of an educational institution does not amount to a violation of the property right protected by Article 19(1)(f). The Court further examined the precedent cited by the society, namely The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shiru Mutt ([1954] S.C.R. 1005). It explained that the earlier case involved an alleged infringement of the rights of a Mahant under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, XIX of 1951, and that the Court in that case observed that a Mathadhipati is more than a mere manager because the Mahant possesses personal beneficial interests sanctioned by custom, which are larger than those of a Shebait. The Court quoted that in the concept of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, the elements of office and property, duties and personal interest are blended and cannot be separated. It further noted that the Mahant’s personal interest in the endowments is reflected in his power to create derivative tenures over endowed property, giving the office a proprietary character. While recognizing that the term “property” in Article 19(1)(f) extends to recognized interests that have the hallmarks of proprietary rights, the Court concluded that the petitioners in the present case do not possess any such proprietary rights akin to those of a Mahant. Accordingly, the principle laid down in Sri Dwarka Nath’s case does not apply to the present dispute.
The Court noted that the principles articulated in Tewari v. State of Bihar (1) were applicable to the present controversy. It recalled that in the earlier decision known as the Dwarka Nath case, the Government of Bihar issued an executive order that purported to dispossess the trustees of a school of their rights in the land and building that belonged to that school. The Court observed that the managing committee, which held the land and building on behalf of the school, could not be divested of those rights merely by the fiat of a government official, as was held in A. I. R. (1959) S.C. 249. The Court further emphasized that the order issued by the State did not constitute an attempt to deprive the petitioners of their property rights, and consequently the fundamental freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution was not infringed. In the same vein, the Court held that the petitioners’ right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, which is protected under Article 19(1)(g), was not violated by the impugned rules and directions.
Turning to the religious dimension, the Court explained that Article 26 forms part of the group of provisions dealing with freedom of religion and is intended to safeguard the right “to manage religious affairs.” By clause (a) of Article 26, every religious denomination or any section thereof, subject to public order, morality and health, possesses the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; the Court observed that in a broader sense, an educational institution may be regarded as charitable. However, when considering the protection afforded by Article 30(1), the Court stated that it was not necessary to pass any opinion on the petitioners’ contention that their right under Article 26 to manage the college was infringed by the rules and orders issued by the Government of Bombay. The Court pointed out that the rules and orders issued by the Bombay Government made serious inroads upon the right vested in the society to administer the training college. Specifically, Rule 5(2) of the Rules for Primary Training Colleges authorised the Government to reserve, in non‑governmental institutions, a percentage of seats for “Board deputed teachers,” restricting the management’s authority to admit students only to the unreserved seats. Similarly, Rule 11 of the Rules for recognition of Private Primary Institutions conferred on the Government the power to reserve seats for “Board deputed teachers.” Moreover, Rule 14 empowered the Education Department to withdraw recognition and to refuse grant assistance to any private institution that failed to fulfil the conditions set out in the Rules, showed inefficient management, provided poor quality teaching, or did not comply with regulations issued from time to time by the Government or the Director of Education on the Government’s behalf. The Court found it manifest that the right of private training colleges to admit students of their own choosing was severely curtailed, and that the enforcement of these restrictions was secured by the threat of withdrawal of recognition and denial of grant assistance. Finally, the Court reiterated that Article 30(1) provides that all…
In this case, the Court observed that minorities possessed a constitutional right to establish and administer educational institutions of their own choosing. Article 30(2) required the State, when providing aid to educational institutions, not to discriminate against any institution merely because it was managed by a minority on the basis of religion or language. The Court explained that Clause (2) served only as a non‑discrimination provision and did not diminish the rights granted in Clause (1). The wording of Clause (2) was negative, directing the State not to deny aid on the ground of minority management, but it could not be interpreted to allow the State to impose restrictions that would affect the essential right of minorities to establish and run their institutions. Unlike the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19, the freedom in Article 30(1) was described as absolute; it was not subject to reasonable restrictions in the same manner as the freedoms in Article 19. Consequently, any law or executive direction that attempted to infringe the substantive content of the right in Article 30(1) would be void to that extent. However, the Court clarified that this absoluteness did not prevent the State from imposing regulations that related to the exercise of the right. The fundamental freedom involved the establishment and administration of genuine educational institutions that served the educational needs of citizens or particular sections of the community. The Court held that regulations aimed at ensuring efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and similar concerns could validly be imposed, because such measures did not curtail the substance of the right but rather secured the proper functioning of the institutions. The petitioners did not argue that the absolute language of Article 30(1) barred the State, especially when the State provided grants or recognition to an institution competent to train students for State examinations, from imposing reasonable regulations. Rather, they contended that any regulation must be intended to improve the institution itself and to achieve excellence in training, and must not be crafted for the benefit of outsiders. Counsel for the State of Gujarat, which had assumed responsibility for defending the petition after the formation of the new State, argued that the right extended to all regulations that the Government considered necessary in the national or public interest, provided such regulations did not destroy the character of the institution as a minority‑maintained entity.
Counsel submitted that the State was not legally bound to furnish a grant nor was it compelled to recognise a minority‑run institution for examinations conducted by the State. He argued that, whenever the State does decide to provide a grant or to extend recognition for such examinations, it acquires the authority to impose conditions concerning the admission of students and to withhold the grant or recognition if the institution fails to comply with those conditions, provided that the regulation serves the national or public interest. Counsel further conceded that if the effect of the imposed restrictions were to completely destroy the character of the institution as one administered by a minority, such restrictions would amount to a violation of Article 30(1); otherwise, they would not be regarded as infringing the constitutional guarantee. In support of his position, counsel relied upon the affidavit of Dr D.V. Chickermane, who affirmed that the State possessed a very large number of primary and basic schools – more than 8,900 primary schools – and that approximately 40,000 untrained personnel were employed in these schools, a situation that had to be reduced progressively in the public interest. He explained that the Government and the private colleges receiving grant‑in‑aid were therefore required to train a substantial number of qualified teachers for these schools, because if the private training colleges did not supply teachers for the school boards, the teachers they trained would not find placement in their own institutions and the additional training would be wasted. Dr Chickermane further testified that in 1955 the Government had resolved to expand its programme of teacher training for board schools to produce 2,000 teachers each year, with the aim of eliminating the untrained element in primary schools as swiftly as possible. To achieve this objective, the Government decided to deputise 1,600 teachers to private training colleges, a step that could be taken only if eighty per cent of the seats in those private colleges were reserved for such government nominees.
The petitioners did not deny the truth of the statements contained in Dr Chickermane’s affidavit, but they contended that the State’s projected need for a large number of trained teachers in the near future could not justify an infringement of the society’s fundamental right under Article 30(1) to administer its educational institution. They argued that the restrictions imposed by the Rules and the directions issued against the society’s right to manage the training college were clearly not devised in the interests of the college itself. The Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the State, responded by stating that this Court had previously held, in the Kerala Education Bill case, that the State may validly impose restrictive measures in the national or public interest upon the right of a minority to administer its educational institution, provided that such measures do not annihilate the essential character of the minority institution.
The Court observed that the guarantee contained in Article 30(1) of the Constitution is intended to ensure that any regulatory measures imposed on minority educational institutions must not destroy the essential character of those institutions. The matter arose in the Kerala Education Bill case, which was referred to the Court by the President under Article 143 of the Constitution. The Court was required to examine, among other issues, whether sub‑clause (5) of clause 3, sub‑clause (3) of clause 8, and clauses 9 to 13 of the Bill, or any other provisions therein, violated clause (1) of Article 30. The challenged clauses of the Bill stipulated that the establishment of a new school or the opening of a higher class in any private school could occur only in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder; any school or higher class established otherwise would not be eligible for recognition by the Government, as reflected in clause 3(5) and the decision reported in [1939] S.C.R. 995. Clause 8(3) required that all fees collected from students in an aided school be transferred to the Government irrespective of any prior agreement, scheme or arrangement. Clause 9 directed that the salaries of teachers in aided schools be paid by the Government. Under clauses 10 and 11, the Government was authorized to prescribe the qualifications of teachers in private schools and the Public Service Commission was empowered to prepare a list of teachers for appointment in aided schools. Clause 12 stipulated that the conditions of service applicable to teachers in Government schools—covering scales of pay, pension, provident fund, insurance and retirement age—would also apply to teachers in aided schools; furthermore, managers of aided schools were prohibited from dismissing, removing, demoting, or suspending any teacher without prior sanction of the Government, and the conditions of service for teachers in aided schools were to be prescribed by the Government. Clause 14 empowered the Government to take over any aided school if the management failed to perform duties imposed by the Act or its rules, or if the Government was satisfied that such takeover was necessary for standardising general education in the State, improving literacy in a particular area, more effectively managing aided educational institutions in any region, or bringing education of any category under direct governmental control. Consequently, clauses 14 and 15 provided that the schools would thereafter vest absolutely in the Government. By these provisions, the Bill effectively removed the power of the management to administer the educational institution. Managers of certain minority schools argued before the Court that the protection afforded by Article 30(1) to minority educational institutions is absolute and that the State cannot lawfully impose any restrictions on the exercise of the right of administration or management. Counsel for the State of Kerala presented the opposite view.
It was argued that Article 30(1) granted minorities only the fundamental right to create and run educational institutions of their own choosing, and that this right could be exercised only as long as the minorities relied on their own resources. The argument further contended that the guarantee of Article 30(1) did not include a right to receive financial assistance from the State. Consequently, if a minority‑run institution wished to obtain State aid, it had to accept the same conditions that the State imposed on any other institution established by persons who were not minorities. The Court dismissed the extreme positions put forward by the managers of the minority schools as well as by the State. It held that the right to administer an institution did not include a right to mismanage it, and that a minority could not seek aid or official recognition for a school that operated in unhealthy circumstances, that lacked teachers with any reasonable qualifications, that failed to maintain even a minimal standard of instruction, or that taught material contrary to the welfare of the students. The Court observed that the constitutional right to administer an institution of one’s choice did not automatically prevent the State from insisting that, as a condition of granting aid, it may prescribe reasonable regulations aimed at ensuring the quality of the institutions that receive assistance. However, the State could not provide aid in a way that would extinguish the fundamental right of the minority community protected by Article 30(1). The Court also noted that the Directive Principles of State Policy, particularly Articles 41 to 46, impose on the State a duty to support educational institutions and to promote the educational interests of minorities and other weaker sections of society. In the prevailing circumstances of the country, no educational institution could realistically operate without some form of State assistance; if an institution could obtain aid only by surrendering its rights, it would, because of financial pressure, be forced to abandon the right guaranteed by Article 30(1). The Court warned that the State could not sidestep or override the fundamental right by employing indirect methods that achieved the same effect, and that even the legislature could not accomplish indirectly what it was expressly prohibited from doing directly. The effect of certain provisions of the Bill, the Court said, was essentially to supplant the safeguards of Article 30(1). The Court then examined clauses 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Bill and found that they represented serious encroachments on the right of administration and were “perilously near violating that right.” Nevertheless, because those clauses applied uniformly to all educational institutions, and because the challenged parts of clauses 9, 11 and 12 were intended to protect under‑paid teachers serving the nation and to safeguard backward classes, the Court was prepared to regard clauses 9, 11(2) and 12(4) as permissible regulations that the State could impose on minority institutions as a condition for granting them aid.
The Court observed that the State could, as a condition for granting aid to minority educational institutions, impose certain regulations. However, it held that the provisions which permitted the State to take over the management of such schools and to vest them completely in Government effectively aimed to destroy the institutions of the minorities’ choice and therefore could not be sustained under article 30(1). The Court further stated that, despite the absolute wording in which the fundamental freedom of article 30(1) was guaranteed, the State was nevertheless permitted by legislation or by executive direction to impose reasonable regulation. The Court did not lay down any specific test for the reasonableness of a regulation, nor did it decide that public or national interest was the sole measure of reasonableness. It also declined to hold that a regulation would be unreasonable only when it totally destroyed the minority’s right to administer an educational institution. No general principle for testing the reasonableness of a regulation was formulated. Consequently, the Court declared that the Kerala Education Bill case could not be relied upon for the proposition advanced by the Additional Solicitor General that every regulative measure which was not destructive or annihilative of the character of a minority‑established institution, provided it was in the public or national interest, would be valid.
The Court emphasized that the right guaranteed by article 30(1) is a fundamental right expressed in absolute terms. Unlike the freedoms under article 19, it is not subject to reasonable restrictions. The purpose of this right is to give minorities a genuine means of establishing and maintaining educational institutions of their own choice. It is intended to be effective and must not be diminished by regulatory measures that are framed in the interests of the public or the nation rather than the minority institution itself. If every order that, while preserving the formal appearance of a minority institution, destroys its power of administration were upheld merely because it served a public or national aim, the guarantee of article 30(1) would become a mere illusion, a promise without reality. The Court therefore held that any regulation lawfully imposed—whether by legislation or by executive action—as a condition for receiving grant‑aid or recognition must be aimed at making the institution function effectively while preserving its character as a minority institution. Such regulation must satisfy a two‑fold test: it must be reasonable and it must be directed at the educational character of the institution, thereby ensuring that the institution serves as an effective vehicle of education for the minority community and others who seek its services. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that Rule 5(2) of the Rules for Primary Training Colleges, and Rules 11 and 14 relating to the recognition of private training institutions, insofar as they pertain to
In this matter, the Court held that the policy requiring reservation of seats in the college pursuant to orders of the Government, together with the directions mandating that eighty percent of those seats be reserved and the accompanying threat to withdraw grant‑in‑aid and to revoke the college’s recognition, violated the fundamental freedom that the petitioners enjoyed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The Court therefore concluded that the petitioners were entitled to the relief specified in prayers (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the original petition, but only to the extent that those prayers related to the reservation of seats under Government orders. The Court also ordered that the reference to clause 12 of the applicable rules, which had been included in the original prayers, be removed from the writ that would be issued. In addition, the Court decided that the petitioners should be awarded the costs incurred in bringing the petition before the Court. Accordingly, the petition was allowed in its entirety.