Ramkishore Lal vs Kamal Narain

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 523 of 1960

Decision Date: 22 November, 1962

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah

Ramkishore Lal filed a petition against Kamal Narain and the matter was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 22 November 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice K C Das Gupta and was delivered by a bench comprising Justices K C Das Gupta, Bhuvneshwar P Sinha, P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo and J C Shah. The case is reported in 1963 AIR 890 and 1963 S C R Supp (2) 417, with subsequent citations in later reports. The legal issue arose under the provisions governing the construction of documents, specifically concerning the effect of a partition award that assigned “Milkiyat” rights to one co‑sharer for the purpose of spending the income on a temple.

The registered partition award, made by the Panchas on behalf of all co‑sharers, declared that the Mouza Telibandha, together with all rights and interests of proprietorship, was given to an individual named Ramsaran Lal for the purposes set out in the award. The award directed that the profits and income generated by the Mouza would be used to meet the expenses of Shri Ramchandra Swami Math and Shri Dudhaaher Ji, and it required that these expenses continue to be met. It further provided that if the temple work failed, any co‑sharer who might benefit could take possession of the Mouza Telibandha and continue the temple work, while expressly stating that none of the co‑sharers, including Ramsaran Lal, would have any right to transfer the property. The award also declared that the Mouza Telibandha was reserved forever for the stated purpose. Some co‑sharers subsequently filed a suit seeking to set aside the award. The parties referred the dispute to a conciliator, Mr Bagchi, whose award led to the filing of a compromise petition and the dismissal of the suit. The appellants argued that the partition award effected an absolute dedication of the Mouza in favour of the temple, whereas the respondent contended that the award conveyed full proprietorship to Ramsaran Lal with only a charge to meet temple expenses, that a dedication could not be validly created by the partition award, and that the Bagchi award had modified the original partition award.

The Court held that the partition award created an absolute dedication of the Mouza Telibandha in favour of the temple. Although the use of the terms “Malik” and “Milkiyat” suggested the conveyance of an absolute estate, the Court emphasized that such terminology was not determinative in every case and that the surrounding context had to be examined. The Court explained that where the intention is to grant an absolute estate, any attempt to limit the owner’s powers by imposing restraints on alienation must be rejected as repugnant to the notion of absolute ownership. However, when the restrictions constitute the primary purpose of the document and are consistent with its overall tenor, they become a material circumstance that can displace the presumption of absolute ownership that is otherwise implied.

The Court observed that the expression “Malik” in the award did not alone create an absolute ownership interest. Although the opening clause of the award employed the terms “Kul haq haquq samet Milkiyat,” those words raised a presumption that the entire interest was granted to Ramsaranlal. The Court noted, however, that subsequent recitals in the award effectively rebutted that presumption. By analysing all the provisions contained in the award, the Court concluded that the intention was not to vest Ramsaranlal with absolute ownership, but rather to confer upon him the right to possess and manage the Mouza for the benefit of the temple. The Court referred to the authorities Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Rao Dhabal Deo, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 604; Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkuna Lal Roy, [1897] L.R. 24 I.A. 76; Mst. Surajmani v. Babi Nath Ojha, (1907) L.R. 35 1. A. 17; Sarjoo Bara Devi v. Jyotirmoyee Debi, (1931) L.R. 58 r. A. 270; Mohamed Shamsool v. Shewukram, (1874) L.R. 2 I.A. 7; and Rai Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Thakurain Bakhtrai Kuer, [1953] 3 S.C.R. 232, which supported the view that the award validly dedicated the Mouza to the temple. The Court explained that the act of the Panchas in issuing the award was, in substance, the act of the owners of the property, who possessed full authority to make such a dedication. Once an absolute dedication had been effected by the partition award, the former owners no longer held any legal right to override that dedication, and consequently the later Bagchi award could not disturb it.

The judgment was issued in Civil Appeal No. 523 of 1960, arising from the judgment and order dated 5 December 1957 of the former Madhya Pradesh High Court at Nagpur in First Appeal No. 112 of 1952. Counsel for the appellants included the Solicitor‑General of India and other senior lawyers, while the respondents were represented by the Attorney General for India and additional counsel. The Court noted that there existed, at Raipur in Madhya Pradesh, an ancient math known as Dudhadhari Math, which housed a temple where the idols of Shri Ramchandra, Sita, Laxman, Bharat, Shatrughna and Hanuman had been worshipped for many years. For the maintenance of worship and the temple’s upkeep, a village named Hirmi had been dedicated by Dinanath Sao, a wealthy local resident. The central dispute in the present proceedings concerned another village, Telibandha, also originally owned by Dinanath Sao, and whether it had been absolutely dedicated to the temple either by Dinanath Sao himself or later by his descendants. The two appellants, both descendants of Dinanath Sao, filed the suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking the removal of the respondent, Kamal Narayan, another descendant, from the trusteeship of the deity Shri Ramchandraji Swamy for the village of Telibandha, and also demanded an accounting. In their plaint, the appellants alleged that Telibandha had been dedicated to the temple as early as 1857 by Dinanath Sao, and that the dedication was reaffirmed and extended by the award made by the Panchas during the partition among the co‑sharers in 1896.

In the facts presented, the village of Telibandha was asserted to have been dedicated to the deities of the Dudhadhari Math in the year 1857 by Dinanath Sao himself. The record further states that when a partition of the co‑owners’ holdings occurred in 1896, the co‑sharers not only reaffirmed the original dedication made by Dinanath but also formally dedicated the village to the deities by accepting the award rendered by the Panchas. Dinanath died in 1862 leaving two sons, Sobharam and Keshoram. Sobharam’s three sons were Sarjoo Prasad, Gokul Prasad and Jamna Prasad; Keshoram’s three sons were Ramdin, Gajanand and Nand Kishore. By the time of the 1896 partition Sarjoo Prasad had already died, and the parties to the partition were his four sons—Ram Saran Lal, Ramhirde, Ram Krishna and Ramanuj—who represented Sarjoo’s branch, together with the other five grandchildren of Dinanath. The first appellant, Ram Kishore, was the son of Nand Kishore Sao, while the second appellant, Ramanuj, was one of Sarjoo Prasad’s sons. The respondent was the son of Ram Saran Lal. According to the plaintiffs, the 1896 award conferred on Ram Saran Lal no proprietary right in Telibandha; instead he was appointed merely as manager of the property on behalf of the deities. When Ram Saran Lal died in 1930 his son, Kamal Narayan, succeeded him as trustee. The plaintiffs described the temple as a public temple and the trust as a public trust and alleged that Kamal Narayan had committed several breaches of trust, including the sale of portions of Mouza Telibandha for a sum of Rs 1,06,774 / 1 ‑ and other violations. The plaintiffs initially approached the Additional District Judge of Raipur with a petition under section 3 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, seeking directions regarding Kamal Narayan’s conduct. The judge issued directions, which the respondent failed to obey. Consequently, the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs without first obtaining the consent of the Advocate‑General, as permitted by section 6 of the same Act. The relief sought comprised a declaration that Telibandha village was held in trust for Shri Ramchandra of the Dudhadhari Math, a finding that the defendant had breached that trust, his removal as trustee and the appointment of the first plaintiff in his place, an order requiring him to render accounts from 1936 onward, and a directive to deposit the sale proceeds of Rs 1,06,774 / 1 ‑ that he had obtained.

The defendant denied that Telibandha had ever been dedicated to the temple. Regarding the 1896 award, the defendant contended that the award did not accurately reflect the arbitrators’ decision and that it had been superseded by a later award dated 14 May 1898 rendered by Mr. Bagchi. The defendant asserted that the 1898 award was accepted by all co‑sharers as the final settlement of their interests, and that a suit challenging the earlier award had been dismissed on the ground of compromise. Accordingly, the defendant maintained that no express or implied trust concerning Telibandha had ever been created, that neither he nor his father had ever acted as trustees of the village, and that no breach of trust could be established against him.

In the proceedings, the defendant contended that no trust, either express or implied, had ever been created concerning Telibandha village, and asserted that neither he nor his father had ever acted as trustees of that village, thereby denying any breach of trust. To explain how he came to possess the village, the defendant relied on a partition that took place in 1901 between the four sons of Sarjoo Prasad on one side and Jamuna Prasad on the other, claiming that under that partition Telibandha was allotted to the share of Sarjoo Prasad’s four sons. He further stated that a subsequent partition in 1913 between those four sons and his father, Ramsaranlal, resulted in Telibandha being allotted solely to Ramsaranlal. After evaluating the evidence, the trial court concluded that a valid dedication of Telibandha village for the Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple had occurred. Although the court was not convinced that the dedication had been made by Dinanath himself, it held that a dedication existed sometime before 1896 and that all co‑sharers had confirmed that dedication at the time of the 1896 partition. Regarding the award rendered by Mr. Bagchi, the trial judge opined that it appeared to revoke the dedication and to allocate the village to members of a particular family branch, imposing only a moral duty to look after the temple; however, that later award had never been implemented and did not affect the Panch Faisla award of 1896. Consequently, the trial court determined that a valid public religious trust had been created in favor of the temple, which was a public institution, and that the defendant was serving as the trustee of that trust. The court found that the defendant had breached his fiduciary duties by transferring trust property, appropriating its proceeds, and expressly repudiating the trust, and therefore ordered his removal as trustee. Accordingly, the court issued a decree declaring that the defendant had committed breaches of trust as trustee of Telibandha village for the Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple, removed him from the trusteeship, and directed him to deposit the sum of Rs.1,06,774/1/- with the court. The decree also appointed the first plaintiff, Ram Kishore Lal, as the new trustee and provided that a commissioner would later be appointed to investigate the alienations made by the defendant and to take accounts of the trust from the year 1936.

On appeal, the Nagpur High Court set aside the trial court’s judgment and decree and dismissed the suit, holding that the dedication of Telibandha village had not been proved. While the high court agreed with the trial court that Dinanath’s alleged 1857 dedication had not been established, it differed on the question of an absolute dedication by the Panch Faisla award of 1896, concluding that the award indicated only a partial dedication and that no trust arose from it. The high court therefore allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit without addressing other issues concerning the nature of the temple or the alleged breaches of trust.

The High Court observed that the allegation in the plaint that Dinanath Sao himself had made a dedication of the village by a Patha in 1857 had not been proven; consequently, disagreeing with the Trial Court, the High Court held that the Panch Faisla Award of 1896 did not constitute an absolute dedication of the village for the purpose of the temple and that no trust was thereby created. By construing the document, the learned judges concluded that it demonstrated at most a partial dedication of the village, which was distinct from an absolute dedication. On that basis, the High Court allowed the appeal and ordered that the suit be dismissed, without examining the other matters concerning the nature of the temple or whether the defendant had committed any breach of trust. The plaintiffs challenged this decision by filing the present appeal, obtaining a certificate of appeal from the High Court under Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution. The principal question before this Court is whether the Panch Faisla Award of 1896 effected an absolute dedication of the village of Telibandha in favour of the Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple, or whether the village was allotted in full proprietorship to Ramsaran Lal with only a charge imposed upon it to meet temple expenses. The portion of the award relevant to this issue appears in its second paragraph. The award is originally in Hindi, and the second paragraph has been rendered in English as follows: “2. Mouza Telibandha alias Karawatoti, sixteen annas, Asli Men Dakhli (i.e., village proper with the out‑skirts under control), in tahsil Raipur together with all rights and interests of proprietorship has been given to Ramsaran Lal with the consent of and at the instance of all the co‑shares for the under‑mentioned purposes. From the profits and income of mouza Telibandha, Ramsaran Lal shall incur the expenses of Samaiyas (probably occasions), celebrations, Bho‑Rag, Bal‑Bhog of daily routine and white‑washing and plastering, etc., and other work of Shri Ramchandra Swami Math Shri Dudhadharji, according as the same expenses have been continuing to be met up to this day from the time of Dinanath Sao, Sobharam Sao and Sarjoo Prasad Sao. If this work that is being done from long before, fails to be done, then out of all these six co‑shares, any co‑sharer, who may be fit to do that work and carry it on, shall take this Mouza Telibandha together with all rights and interests into his possession and carry on the work of the temple just as it has continued to be done from ever. None of the co‑shares and Ramsaran Lal have any right over it. Ramsaran Lal or any other co‑sharers have neither got, nor will they have, any right to transfer, either in whole or in part, Mouza Telibandha, proper, together with Dakhli, together with all the rights and privileges, by sale or mortgage or gift or will or in any other manner whatsoever, because mouza Felibandha has been reserved from ever for the aforesaid purpose and it shall continue to be so only.”

The Court observed that deciding the question before it required a proper construction of the paragraph taken from the Panch Faisala. It first explained that the phrase “together with all rights and interests of proprietorship” in the English translation corresponded to the Urdu expression “Kul haq haquq samet milkiyat ke”, and that the expression “from the profits and income of Mouza Telibandha” reflected the original words “Telibandha ke munafa wo amdani se”. The Court then reiterated the “golden rule” of construction, namely that the intention of the parties to a deed must be ascertained by giving effect to every word in its ordinary and natural sense. To discover that intention, the Court said, it was necessary to read the relevant portion of the document as a whole and to consider the circumstances in which the specific words were employed. The Court further noted that the status and training of the parties who used the words could be relevant, because many words acquire different meanings in different contexts. It warned that even where a word possessed a clear and definite meaning to a trained conveyancer, it would not be proper to impose that same strict interpretation on a person who was not equally skilled in conveyancing. The Court also addressed the situation where a document contains a conflict between an earlier disposition granting an absolute title to one person and later provisions that appear to curtail that title. It held that, as a settled principle, the earlier absolute disposition must prevail and the later, conflicting directions must be treated as ineffective attempts to diminish the already‑granted title, referring to the authority in Sahebzada Mohd Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that a harmonious reading of the two parts should always be attempted where possible. Only when the earlier grant of absolute title was expressed in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions directly trenched upon it would the later provisions be held void.

Turning to paragraph 2 of the Panch Faisala, the Court noted that the opening clause, while providing that the village Telibandha was to be given to Ramsaran Lal, employed the words “Kul haq haquq samet milkiyat ke”. The learned Attorney‑General, appearing for the respondent, contended that these words demonstrated an intention to vest an absolute interest of ownership in the property upon Ramsaran Lal. Accordingly, the Attorney‑General argued that the subsequent provisions in the same paragraph, which seemed to suggest that such absolute right had not been given, should be disregarded as ineffective attempts to take away what had already been conferred. He further maintained that the statements “none of the co‑sharers and Ramsaran Lal have any right over it”, the prohibition on alienation in the following clause, and the declaration that “Telibandha has been reserved for ever for the aforesaid purposes and it shall continue to be so only” could not be interpreted as limiting the amplitude of the grant made in the opening clause. The Court posed the question whether the use of the expression “Kul haq haquk samet milkiyat ke” necessarily indicated a full and absolute ownership. It concluded that such an inference could not be drawn automatically. The Court then indicated that the meaning to be attached to the word “Malik”, from which “Milkiyat” was derived, and to “Milkiyat” itself, required further consideration.

The Court observed that the passage cited from the report (1) (1960) 3 S.C.R. 604, 611 indicated an intention to confer an absolute ownership interest in the property on Ramsaran Lal. The Attorney‑General for the respondent maintained that any subsequent clauses in the same paragraph, which appeared to suggest that such an absolute right had not been granted, should be disregarded as an ineffective attempt to rescind the right already conferred. He further argued that the statement that “none of the co‑sharers and Ramsaran Lal have any right over it,” the prohibition on alienations in the next clause, and the declaration that “Telibandha has been reserved for ever for the aforesaid purposes and it shall continue to be so only,” could not limit the scope of the interest granted to Ramsaran Lal by the opening clause. The Court therefore posed the question whether the phrase “Kul haq haquk samet milkiyat ke” invariably signified an intention to bestow full and absolute ownership. The Court answered in the negative. It noted that the interpretation of the words “Malik,” from which “Milkiyat” is derived, had often been examined by the courts, and that the Privy Council’s pronouncements on the matter left no doubt that, although the terms “Malik” or “Milkiyat” usually expressed an intention to give an absolute and full ownership, this was not an absolute rule. In the case of Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1) the Court held that the language “shall become owner (Malik) of all my estates and properties” was sufficient to convey a heritable and alienable estate unless the surrounding context indicated otherwise. Similarly, in Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (2) the use of “Malik” was held to convey full proprietary rights unless contextual factors qualified it. In Saraju Bala Devi v. Jyotirmoyee Devi (3) the Privy Council examined the terms of two leases that named the lessee the “Malik” of the property and determined that, taken individually or collectively, the conditions did not diminish the absolute estate. The Court emphasized that in each of these authorities the Privy Council did not rely solely on the presence of the word “Malik” to infer an absolute interest; rather, it stressed the necessity of examining the surrounding context to ascertain the parties’ intention.

In the earliest case that considered the word “Malik”, namely Mohamed Shumsool v. Shewukram, the issue arose as to whether a testator, by declaring “only Mst. Rani Dhan Kowar, the widow of my son is my heir and except Mst. Rance Dhun Kowari aforesaid none other is; nor shall be my heir and Malik”, intended to grant the widow an estate of inheritance that she could alienate absolutely. The Privy Council held that it was proper to take into account the ordinary notions and wishes of a Hindu with respect to the devolution of property and observed that every expression in the will must be read together, without giving precedence to any single clause. The Council concluded that the two Indian courts, which were substantially in agreement, correctly construed the testator’s intention as conferring on the widow a limited estate, not an absolute one, and that the estate was subject to her daughters succeeding her.

Subsequently, in Rai Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Thakurain Bakhtrai Kuer, this Court examined a will that employed the expressions “Malik Kamil” and “Naslan bad naslan” in reference to the younger son Dhuj Singh. Justice Mukherjea, speaking for the Court, explained that these words, taken alone, describe a heritable and alienable estate that conveys full proprietary rights unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that absolute rights were not intended. He emphasized that the testator’s true intention must be gathered by reading the will as a whole, without isolating individual expressions or treating any provision as redundant or contradictory. After considering the context, the Court concluded that Dhuj Singh possessed only a life interest in the properties. The Court further observed that where a testator intends to grant an absolute estate, any attempt to curtail the owner’s power of alienation would be repelled as repugnant; however, when the restrictions themselves constitute the primary purpose of the testator and are consistent with the overall tenor of the will, they constitute a material circumstance that can displace the presumption of absolute ownership implied by the word “Malik”. The Court stated that the principles articulated in this case for the construction of a will apply with equal force to the construction of any other document by which property is disposed of.

The opening clause of the Panch Faisla creates a presumption that an absolute interest in the property was granted to Ramsaran Lal, but that presumption must be examined in light of the subsequent provisions concerning the same property. When the entire document is read, it becomes clear beyond any doubt that the intention was not to make Ramsaran Lal the absolute owner of the village. Rather, the document intended to give him possession and management of the village for the benefit of the Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple. The clause that declares the village is given to Ramsaran Lal with the words “Kul haq haquq samet milkiyat” is immediately followed by a statement that the grant is being made for the purposes mentioned thereafter. The purposes are then specified as meeting the expenses of worship and the maintenance of the Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple.

The document further provides that if Ramsaran Lal fails to fulfil this purpose, any co‑sharer among those whose partition is being made may assume the responsibility, and that co‑sharer shall take possession of the Mouza Telibandha. Subsequently, the instrument declares that neither the co‑sharers nor Ramsaran Lal have any right over the village apart from the purpose set out, and it then imposes a prohibition against alienation. The High Court judges observed that the phrase “from the profits and income of Mouza Telibandha Ramsaran Lal shall incur the expenses …” suggests that only a portion of the income was intended to be used and therefore supports the presumption that an absolute interest was being given to Ramsaran Lal. However, this provision must be read together with all other clauses. In this Court’s view, it would be erroneous to allow the words “from the profits and income” to outweigh or neutralise the multiple other provisions that indicate that Ramsaran Lal was not intended to obtain absolute ownership of the village.

As noted earlier, the words “from the profits and income of Mouza Telibandha” in the translation correspond to “Telibandha ke munafa wo amdani se” in the original language. It is not correct to conclude that the original phrase necessarily means “from the profits and income of Mouza Telibandha.” The same words could equally be rendered as “with the profits and income of Mouza Telibandha.” The plaintiff’s witness, Mathura Prasad, testified that when asked by the Court he stated: “At that time there was no question as to what should be done with the savings from the income of the village Telibandha, after meeting the requirements of the temple, because the income those days was not much while the expenses which used to be incurred on the temple were far in excess of the income from the village.” This testimony was not contradicted on cross‑examination. The phrase “at that time” was understood to refer to the time of the partition in 1896. Consequently, the use of “Mouza Telibandha ke munafa wo amdani se” likely meant that the purposes mentioned would be carried out using the income and profits of the village, without an expectation of any surplus remaining.

The Court observed that the witness’s statement had not been contested during cross‑examination and therefore gave it full effect. From the phrase “at that time,” the Court inferred that the witness was referring to the period of the partition that occurred in 1896. By employing the expression “Mouza Telibandha ke munafa wo amdani se,” the Court concluded that the Panchas intended to convey that the purposes mentioned would be carried out using the village’s income and profits and that no surplus was expected to remain. Consequently, the Court felt no hesitation in construing paragraph 2 of the Panch Faisala to mean that, by virtue of that award, the village of Telibandha was dedicated absolutely to the temple of Shri Ramchandra Swamy and that Ramsaran Lal was appointed as manager and trustee of that temple. The learned Attorney‑General, however, contended that a partition award of this character could not, under Hindu law, effect a valid dedication in favour of a deity. The Court noted that this argument had not been raised by the defendant in his written statement nor had it been seriously advanced before the lower courts. Assuming that the defendant was entitled to raise the point at this stage, the Court said that the question must be decided on the basis that the factual premises underlying the dedication provision in the award were correctly stated. The award itself recorded that the dedication was made “with the consent of” and at the instance of all the co‑sharers. Accordingly, the act of the Panchas was, in effect, the act of the owners of the property, and as owners they possessed the full authority to make a valid dedication to the deity; therefore, the dedication embodied in paragraph 2 of the Panch Faisala was held to be valid. The Court then examined whether any subsequent event might have invalidated that dedication. It found that immediately after the award was passed, it was presented to the Sub‑Registrar in Raipur for registration. Within a few days an application concerning the matter was filed before the Civil Judge of Raipur, in which Ramsaran Lal objected to the award on the ground that the Panchas had not read the award to him and had only asked him to set out his objections in writing, without taking any evidence. The Civil Judge dismissed Ramsaran Lal’s objection, returned the award to the Sub‑Registrar with a direction to register it promptly, and ordered the Panchas to file the award in a civil court after registration. The award was subsequently registered. In November of the same year, three brothers of Ramsaran Lal instituted suit before the Civil Judge at Raipur seeking to set aside the registered award. Ramsaran Lal and the other co‑sharers were impleaded as defendants. After certain evidence had been recorded, the hearing was adjourned at the request of the parties, who expressed a desire to resolve the dispute amicably.

In this case the parties orally asked Mr Bagchi, who represented some of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the award made by the panchas was proper and, if it was not, to make any changes that might be necessary. Acting on that request, Mr Bagchi issued his own award on 14 May 1896. On the same day an application for compromise was filed in the Court, and the Court consequently dismissed the suit on the ground that it had been compromised. The respondent argued vigorously that Mr Bagchi’s award of 14 May 1896 entirely superseded the earlier award and that the question of whether the village of Telibandha formed the trust property of Shri Ramchandra Swamy had to be decided by construing this later award. The Court found no merit in that contention. It noted that the 1896 award had not been set aside by any judgment; the suit had merely been dismissed as compromised. The mere fact that the compromise appeared to follow Mr Bagchi’s award did not, in law, amount to a setting aside of the prior award. The Court agreed with the learned Attorney‑General that Mr Bagchi’s award granted the property absolutely to Ramsaran Lal, subject only to a charge on the property for the temple’s expenses, and did not constitute an absolute dedication of the village to the temple. Nevertheless, the Court held that Mr Bagchi’s award could not affect the dedication that had already been made. Once an absolute dedication of the property had been effected in December 1896 in favour of the Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple, the former owners no longer possessed any legal authority to undermine that dedication, a position to which the Attorney‑General conceded. The Attorney‑General further argued that if the award effecting the dedication were legally infirm, the dedication itself should be declared invalid. The Court responded that no legal infirmity had been shown in the award. Although the plaintiffs in the 1897 suit alleged certain infirmities, the Court did not need to consider whether the temple was a necessary party, and it dismissed the suit without addressing the alleged infirmities. The parties’ reference to Mr Bagchi was limited to an oral request, as reflected in the preamble to his award, which invited him to decide whether the panchas’ award was proper and, if not, to make necessary changes. A reasonable reading of those words shows that Mr Bagchi was not asked to assess any legal infirmity in the original award. Moreover, the award itself contains no statement indicating that, in Mr Bagchi’s opinion, the earlier award suffered any legal defect. On the contrary, he accepted the previous award, interpreting it to mean that, by including the mouzas of Borsi and Telibandha in the partition, the panchas had given the lands to Ramsaran Lal and his brothers, and he added that he too, by means of his award, caused the same to be given to them, together with certain directions. This demonstrates that he proceeded on the assumption that the earlier award was valid and operative. Consequently, the Court concluded that the validity and force of the dedication made by the Panch Faisla remained unaffected by the Bagchi award, and that any subsequent dealings by Ramsaran Lal or, thereafter, Kamal Narayan with the village of Telibandha or its income could not alter the absolute nature of the dedication.

There is not a single word in the award made by Mr Bagchi that indicates, even remotely, that he thought the earlier award suffered any infirmity. On the contrary, Mr Bagchi accepted the earlier award and gave his own interpretation of it, stating that the award, after “including mouzas Borsi and Telibandha in the partition, the Panchas caused the same to be given to Ramsaran Lal and his brothers.” He further added the words “I too by means of this award cause the same to be given to them” and then issued certain directions. This shows clearly that he proceeded on the basis that the earlier award was a good and valid award. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that the validity and force of the dedication made by the Panch Faisla have not been affected in any manner by the Bagchi award. It is likewise clear that the manner in which Ramsaran Lal, and subsequently Kamal Narayan, dealt with the village of Telibandha or its income cannot affect the force or validity of the absolute dedication. The fact that Ramsaran Lal used the income from Telibandha to credit the Gharu Khata, which was maintained for the general family expenses, or that he made certain alienations of the property, does not convert an absolute dedication into a partial dedication. It may be that Ramsaran Lal was himself led by the terms of the Bagchi award to believe that the property belonged to the family with only a charge on it for the temple. Whether this belief arose from such interpretation or from a deliberate neglect of duty is irrelevant for the present purpose. As the High Court correctly observed, the conduct of the parties is irrelevant for the construction of a document that is itself unambiguous. In the Court’s view, the document known as the Panch Faisla Award of 1896 clearly and unambiguously demonstrates an absolute dedication of the village to Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to examine oral or documentary evidence concerning how the property or the income of Telibandha was handled. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court’s decision, which held that the plaintiff’s case of absolute dedication of Telibandha in favour of Shri Ramchandra Swamy had not been established, was incorrect. Accordingly, the order of the High Court that the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed must be set aside. Because the High Court had decided that absolute dedication had not been proved, it had not addressed several other issues framed in the suit, and without deciding those issues the suit could not be properly disposed of. The Court therefore allowed the appeal, held that the village of Telibandha has been absolutely dedicated to Shri Ramchandra Swamy temple, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court, and remitted the case back to the High Court for disposal of the remaining issues.

The Court directed that the matter be returned to the High Court for further consideration, specifically instructing that the High Court should address and determine all remaining questions that were identified in the suit and that must be resolved in order to achieve a complete and proper disposal of the case. The direction emphasized that the High Court should not limit its enquiry only to the issue of dedication but should also examine each of the other matters that had been raised and that were essential for a thorough adjudication of the entire suit. In addition, the Court said that the question of costs would be decided in accordance with the final outcome of those further proceedings; that is, the party to whom the result ultimately favours would be entitled to costs, and the appropriate cost order would be made after the High Court has rendered its final decision on the outstanding issues. Finally, the Court concluded by granting the appeal, thereby allowing the petitioner's request for relief and setting aside the earlier judgment of the High Court insofar as it had dismissed the claim of absolute dedication of the village. The appeal was therefore allowed, and the case was remitted for the remaining issues to be finally resolved.