Ram Lochan Ahir vs State Of West Bengal
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 134 of 1961
Decision Date: 10 December 1962
Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.R. Mudholkar
In the matter of Ram Lochan Ahir versus State of West Bengal, the judgment was rendered on 10 December 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and the bench also comprised Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The parties were identified as the petitioner, Ram Lochan Ahir, and the respondent, the State of West Bengal. The case is reported in 1963 AIR 1074 and in the 1963 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports, page 852. The dispute arose out of a criminal trial for murder in which the identification of a skeleton and the admissibility of a super‑imposed photograph were central issues. The court considered provisions of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, specifically sections nine and twenty‑seven, together with sections three hundred sixty‑four and three hundred two of the Indian Penal Code, to determine the legal questions presented.
The appellant had been tried before a jury for the offenses of kidnapping and the murder of a person named Pancham Sukla. The jury returned a guilty verdict under sections three hundred sixty‑four and three hundred two of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions judge accepted the jury’s finding and sentenced the appellant to death under section three hundred two and to rigorous imprisonment for life under section three hundred sixty‑four. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the appellant of the kidnapping charge under section three hundred sixty‑four but upheld the murder conviction under section three hundred two, reducing the death sentence to life imprisonment. The appellant then sought review by this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court. In the proceedings before this Court, the appellant challenged the identification of the skeleton as that of the deceased and contended that the super‑imposed photograph used for identification was not admissible under any provision of the Evidence Act. He also argued that the jury had been misdirected in relation to the statement he gave to the police, which led to the discovery of the skeleton, and he asserted that he had no intention to kill the deceased, claiming that any killing must have resulted from a quarrel between him and the victim. The Court examined the nature of a super‑imposed photograph and held that it was admissible in evidence under section nine of the Evidence Act. The Court explained that such a photograph is not a trick image designed to alter reality; rather, it consists of two existing photographs merged into a single view for comparative purposes, with both images enlarged to the same size and placed in the same plane. Consequently, both component photographs are admissible, and no objection could be raised to their combined examination. The Court further found that there was no misdirection to the jury regarding the statement made to the police that led to the discovery of the skeleton, and it rejected the appellant’s claim that the killing resulted from a quarrel. The jury’s finding of guilt for murder was therefore upheld. The Court noted that it was not required to pass judgment on the correctness of the High Court’s acquittal on the kidnapping charge under section three hundred sixty‑four of the Indian Penal Code. No suggestion has been
In the present appeal it was asserted before this Court that the Sessions judge had misdirected the jury in his charge, an allegation which the Court rejected, holding that there is no basis for an argument that the jury’s verdict should be interfered with or that the conviction based on that verdict should be altered on speculative considerations that are not founded on any facts recorded in the proceedings. The Court relied upon the earlier decisions Kotayya v. Emperor, A. 1. R. 1947 P. C. 67 and State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (19611 1 S. C. R. 14, which were cited by the parties. The judgment is rendered under the criminal appellate jurisdiction in Criminal Appeal No. 134 of 1961, arising from the order dated 28‑29 March 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 769 of 1960. The appellant was represented by counsel and the respondent by counsel, and the judgment was delivered on 10 December 1962 by Justice Ayyangar. The appeal proceeds on a certificate issued under Article 134 (1)(c) of the Constitution, challenging the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed for that offence. The factual background relates to the disappearance of Mr Pancham Sukla, who was employed by the Calcutta Port Commissioner, the same employer as the appellant. Mr Sukla attended his office for the last time on 10 March 1960 and, at about 5:30 p.m. that evening, was observed in the company of the appellant. He was not seen alive thereafter and failed to return home. Because he did not return, his brother‑in‑law and another relative filed a police report stating that Mr Sukla had been missing for two days, providing a description of his appearance and the clothing he had worn when he left his residence. A subsequent report, lodged on 13 March 1960, specifically noted that Mr Sukla had last been seen with the appellant. The appellant was arrested on 21 March 1960. During police interrogation he admitted that Mr Sukla was dead and that he had buried the body in the mud of a tank, describing the location. A search of the indicated tank uncovered a human skeleton partially covered by a torn dhoti, underwear and a torn kurta; in a side pocket of the kurta a flag was found. The appellant further informed police that he had thrown a knife into the same tank. When the tank was searched, investigators recovered not only a knife but also a shoe with a rubber sole and a human lower‑jaw bone, among other items. Following these investigations a complaint was presented before the Magistrate, who, after enquiry, committed the appellant to stand trial before the Sessions Court. The appellant was tried before a jury on two charges: (1) under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code for abducting Mr Sukla with the intention of murdering him, and (2) under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the substantive offence of murder.
At trial the prosecution presented the dhoti, shirt, underwear, shoe and a flag that had been recovered from the tank, and each of these items was identified as having belonged to and been worn by the deceased Pancham Sukla at the time he was last seen. The jury accepted the prosecution’s evidence and returned a verdict of guilty on both the charge of kidnapping under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code and the charge of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge affirmed the jury’s verdict, sentencing the appellant to death for the murder charge and imposing rigorous imprisonment for life for the kidnapping charge. The appellant appealed to the Calcutta High Court. The High Court set aside the conviction for kidnapping, acquitting the appellant of that offence, but it upheld the conviction for murder, reducing the death sentence to life imprisonment. While the Court noted the arguments raised by counsel on appeal, it limited its review to two specific points: first, whether the skeleton discovered in the tank could be positively identified as that of Pancham Sukla, and second, whether the photograph that superimposed a picture of the deceased upon the skeleton was admissible as evidence for identification. The Court observed that the identification of the skeleton relied on three distinct strands of evidence: the appellant’s statement to police under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which led to the discovery of the remains; the matching of the clothing, shoe and other articles found with the skeleton to those known to have been worn by the deceased; and a photograph that placed the image of Pancham Sukla over the image of the recovered skeleton. Counsel for the appellant challenged the admissibility of this superimposed photograph and argued that its use had corrupted the jury’s verdict.
The Court expressed the view that even if the superimposed photograph were held to be inadmissible, the conviction and the jury’s verdict could not be set aside because the remaining evidence was sufficiently cogent to establish the identity of the skeleton as that of Pancham Sukla. Nonetheless, because the High Court had granted a certificate of fitness for appeal, acknowledging that the photograph had been admitted, the Court considered it appropriate to comment on the matter. The Court therefore concluded that the presence of the other substantial proof—namely the appellant’s own admission, the recovered garments and shoe, and the corroborating circumstances of their discovery—rendered the identification of the remains reliable irrespective of the photographic evidence. Consequently, the appeal on this ground was dismissed, and the conviction for murder was upheld.
In this case the Court observed that even assuming the superimposed photograph were admissible, the jury’s verdict and the appellant’s conviction could not be overturned because the evidence other than the photograph was sufficiently strong to establish the identity of the skeleton. Nevertheless, the High Court had granted a certificate of appeal despite being aware that ample additional evidence supported the conviction. Consequently the Court considered it appropriate to state its view on the admissibility issue. The process for preparing the superimposed photograph was explained by the Assistant Chemical Examiner of the West Bengal Government, who was recorded as Plaintiff Witness eighteen. He first obtained a photograph of Pancham Sukla, produced a quarter‑plate negative of that image and enlarged the negative. He then obtained the skull, reconstructed the broken fragments, and took an enlarged photograph of the reconstructed skull, also producing a negative. This second negative was enlarged to match the size of the first negative, keeping the angle and position identical, and the two negatives were then superimposed. The method employed for the superimposition was described in detail: the ground glass of the camera was removed, the negative of the Pancham Sukla photograph was placed on it, and prominent points on that negative—such as the nasion‑nasomental line, the malar bones and their prominences, the two outer and two inner canthi of the eyes, and the inner ends of the supra‑orbital ridges—were carefully marked on the ground glass. The ground glass was re‑inserted into the camera, the skull was oriented so that all marked points coincided with the corresponding points on the skull when its photograph was taken, and then the two negatives were aligned on a sensitive bromide paper under an enlarger so that the marked points corresponded. The resulting image was the superimposed photograph submitted to the Court.
The photographer who carried out the work under the supervision of Plaintiff Witness eighteen was Tapendra Nath Mazumder, who was examined as Plaintiff Witness nineteen. The superimposed photograph displayed the shape and contour of the facial bones of the skull beneath the living appearance of Pancham Sukla’s face. The prosecution sought to use this document to prove that the skull belonged to the deceased and, at a minimum, to counter any claim by the defence that the skull was not that of the deceased. Counsel for the appellant contended that the photograph was not admissible under any provision of the Indian Evidence Act, arguing that if the counsel’s position were correct the evidence should be excluded as inadmissible. The Court, however, was clearly of the opinion that the photograph was admissible in evidence.
In this case the Court considered the relevance of the material under section nine of the Evidence Act. The provision reads: “9. Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity of any thing or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose.” The matter that required determination was the identity of the skeleton discovered in the investigation. The Court observed that such identity could be proved by a physical or visual examination of the skeleton, focusing on any distinctive characteristics that would link it to a particular individual. Features such as the size of the bones, their angularity, curvature, prominences or recesses could all be used for comparison and could satisfy the requirement of establishing “the identity of a thing” as contemplated in section nine.
The evidence before the Court comprised first a photograph of the skull itself and second a photograph of the deceased taken while he was alive. There was no dispute that the skull could be admitted to prove its identity, nor that the photograph of the deceased could be admitted to prove his facial features, given that both matters were facts in issue or relevant facts. The expert witness identified as P.W. 18, assisted by P.W. 19, combined the two images into a single super‑imposed photograph. In that composite image the outlines of the skull displayed the nasion prominences, the width and shape of the jaw bones, the general contours of the cheek bones and the position of the eye cavity. By comparing these outlines with the corresponding features visible on the photograph of the face of the deceased, the experts sought to demonstrate that the skeletal features and the facial features were identical or at least not dissimilar. The Court held that such a method fell squarely within the ambit of section nine because it served to establish the identity of the thing in question.
The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the super‑imposed photograph should be excluded on the ground that it was not a photograph of any existing object. The Court rejected this contention as a fallacy. It explained that a super‑imposed photograph is not a deceptive trick meant to misrepresent reality; rather it is simply two genuine photographs placed together, each representing an existing object, and merged onto the same plane at the same size for the purpose of direct comparison. No distortion of truth was involved, and therefore the material satisfied the requirements of relevance and admissibility under section nine of the Evidence Act.
If a photograph of the deceased while alive were printed on a transparent sheet and that sheet were placed over a photograph of the skull, with both images being of the same dimensions, the combined view would resemble the document that had been challenged as inadmissible. In such a situation, each of the two photographs would be admissible in evidence, and no objection could be raised to examining them together. To illustrate further, suppose that instead of a two‑dimensional photograph, a hollow model of the deceased’s head were created from a photograph using a transparent or semi‑transparent material. Such a model would be admissible provided it could be shown that the model had been constructed accurately. If the model were then taken apart into sections and positioned on the skull so as to demonstrate that the curves, angles, prominences and depressions matched precisely, this would be an unquestionable method of establishing identity. Accepting that method, a superimposed photograph—being merely a substitute for the described model experiment—would likewise be admissible as evidence for establishing the identity of an object. It was observed that this was the first instance in India where an identity of a skeleton was attempted to be proved by means of superimposed photographs, and that Plaintiff Witness 18 had performed the experiment based on reading in books on the subject, leading some to argue that the evidence could not be accepted. The Court noted that any lack of scientific precision might affect the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury, but the present issue was confined to whether the evidence was excluded as inadmissible. The Court answered that the superimposed photograph was admissible in evidence.
The next matter raised was the allegation that the jury had been misdirected when the statement of the accused to the police, which led to the discovery of the skeleton, was presented. After a careful review of the charge to the jury, the Court found no substance in that objection. The Sessions judge had quoted passages from the Privy Council decision in Kotayya v. Emperor and from this Court’s decision in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, where the scope of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act was explained, and had highlighted to the jury only the portion of the accused’s statement that resulted in the discovery of the skeleton and the knife. Finally, it was contended that the reasons on which the learned judges set aside the appellant’s conviction under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code would inevitably lead to the conclusion that he could not be held guilty of an offence under section 302. The Court considered these submissions and, after review, concluded that they did not establish a basis for overturning the conviction.
In this case, the Court recorded that the appellant had been found guilty of an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The argument presented by the appellant’s counsel was structured on three propositions. First, it was contended that a quarrel had taken place between the appellant and the deceased, Pancham. Second, it was argued that, because of that quarrel, the appellant was entitled to claim the right of private defence. Third, it was submitted that, consequently, the killing was either fully protected by that right or, at most, could be characterized as an offence under section 304 Part 1 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court examined these submissions and concluded that they lacked any factual foundation. The trial had been conducted before a jury, which had returned a verdict that the appellant was guilty of murder. The Court clarified that it was not now required to reassess the correctness of the High Court’s earlier acquittal of the appellant on the charge under section 364 of the Indian Penal Code, nor to reconsider the reasons underlying that decision. Moreover, the Court observed that, apart from the points already discussed, there was no indication of any misdirection by the Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury. Consequently, the Court found no basis for interfering with the jury’s verdict or for altering the conviction on speculative grounds unsupported by the record. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.