Ram Autar vs State of U.P.
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1960
Decision Date: 3 May 1962
Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, J.L. Kapur, Raghubar Dayal
In the matter titled Ram Autar versus State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court rendered its decision on the third day of May, 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice K. C. Das Gupta, with Justices J. L. Kapur and Raghubar Dayal forming the bench. The official citation for the case appears as 1962 AIR 1794 and 1963 SCR (3) 9. The dispute concerned the trade of auctioning vegetables that the appellants conducted from a private residence situated in the Subzimandi quarter of the city. The vegetables were brought to the auction house in carts, and these carts were left on the adjacent public road, creating an obstruction to the normal flow of traffic. In addition, the process of auctioning generated considerable noise, which was complained of by residents living nearby as a source of discomfort. Accordingly, the municipal authorities, invoking section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (Act V of 1898), issued an order restraining the appellants from continuing to auction vegetables in their house. The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether such an order could be validly made under the provisions of section 133, given that the alleged obstruction and noise arose from the performance of a trade that was arguably beneficial to the community.
The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated the eighteenth of August, 1959, delivered by the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 947 of 1959, which had dismissed the appellants’ revision application under section 133. Counsel representing the appellants was C. L. Prem, while the State was represented by G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal. Justice Das Gupta delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court observed that the appellants’ business involved auctioning vegetables within a private dwelling, and that the carts containing the vegetables were necessarily parked on the public road immediately outside the building. Although the appellants indicated there was a dispute with the Municipal Board that may have motivated the petition for the order, the Court deemed it unnecessary to examine that dispute in detail. What required determination was whether the inconvenience caused to the public by the presence of the carts and the associated noise could be the basis for a magistrate to exercise the powers conferred by section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court ultimately concluded that the order under section 133 was not justified, emphasizing that the mere fact that the trade of auctioning vegetables inevitably produced some level of public inconvenience does not render the trade itself a public nuisance warranting prohibition.
The Court examined whether the activity of auctioning vegetables, which the appellants performed in their private house, could give rise to an action under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because it caused inconvenience to persons passing by the road. The High Court had expressed the view that when it was evident that the vegetable auction could not be conducted without creating obstruction to pedestrians, the conduct could be prohibited even though it was carried out in a private premises. The Court found that this proposition had been extended too broadly.
Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorized a District Magistrate, Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class to remove public nuisances in certain situations. The Court focused on the first two clauses of subsection (1) of that provision. The first clause allowed a Magistrate, after receiving a police report or other information and after taking such evidence as he thought fit, to remove any unlawful obstruction or nuisance from any way, river, channel or public place that was or might be lawfully used by the public. The second clause dealt with situations where the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or merchandise, was injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and therefore such trade or occupation ought to be prohibited or regulated, or the goods removed or regulated.
The Court considered that the first clause was difficult to apply to the present case. It observed that any unlawful obstruction, if it existed, was not caused by the persons who carried on the auctioning business. Even if the obstruction resulting from keeping carts on the road could be described as unlawful, the Court noted that the individuals who brought the carts were not the same from day to day. Consequently, the Court could not agree that, merely because the appellants organised the auction for which the carts were brought, they could be regarded as the persons causing the obstruction. In the Court’s opinion, the appellants could not be treated as the agents of the obstruction.
Turning to the second clause, the Court asked how the conduct of the auctioning trade could be considered injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community. It acknowledged that some noise, perhaps considerable, was produced during the auction. However, the Court held that such noise was a necessary concomitant of buying and selling large quantities of vegetables and that it would be unreasonable to deem the trade injurious merely because a certain amount of noise was generated. The Court concluded that the modest discomfort caused to a few persons passing by the road could not justify invoking section 133 to halt a trade that served the community’s needs.
The Court noted that noise caused by auction activity, which some people who prefer complete silence may dislike, is described as injurious to physical comfort or health of the community. The Court observed that conduct of such trades, and other similar trades in city localities where they are regularly carried out, inevitably generates some discomfort, although these trades may also bring benefits to the community. The Court explained that if a trade such as auctioning is necessary for the welfare of the community, then an amount of noise must be tolerated in the part of town where the trade occurs. The Court asserted that when the legislature framed section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it could not have intended to halt such trades in those areas merely because the noise causes some discomfort. Accordingly, the Court held that the slight inconvenience experienced by passers‑by or residents nearby does not ordinarily rise to a level that would warrant action under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court concluded that the orders issued by the Magistrate were not justified under section 133, and therefore the appeal was allowed and the magistrate’s order was set aside. By setting aside the order, the Court affirmed that the statutory provision is intended to address only more serious obstructions, not minor noise disturbances arising from ordinary commercial activities.