R. Viswanathan vs Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid on 4 May, 1962

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 04/05/1962

Coram: J.C. Shah, S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah

In the matter titled R. Viswanathan versus Rukn‑Ul‑Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, decided on 4 May 1962, the Supreme Court of India heard the case before a bench consisting of Justices J. C. Shah, S. K. Das and M. Hidayatullah. The petition was filed by R. Viswanathan and the respondent was Rukn‑Ul‑Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid. The judgment cited authorities including the 1963 AIR 1 report, the 1963 Supreme Court Reports (3) 22, and several later citations, and it involved questions relating to the operation of the Foreign Judgment Act, the extent to which a judgment rendered by a court outside India could bind parties, the effect of such a judgment on property situated beyond the foreign court’s jurisdiction, procedural concerns about the conduct of the foreign proceedings, the requirements of natural justice, the concept of “coram non judice,” the scope of inquiry permissible, and the application of Hindu joint‑family law to property disposed of by a will, all within the framework of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The factual background was that a person named Ramalingam died in Bangalore leaving a will that devised a substantial amount of immovable and movable property situated in the States of Mysore and Madras. The executors of the estate obtained probate of the will from the District Judge in Bangalore, the Honourable P. Medappa. Subsequently, Ramalingam’s sons instituted three separate suits: one in the District Court of Bangalore, another in the District Court of the Civil and Military Station at Bangalore, and a third in the Madras High Court, each seeking possession of the properties that the will had supposedly allocated to the executors. Among the movable assets were shares in India Sugars and Refineries Limited, a company whose registered office was in Bellary, Madras State. The plaintiffs argued that all the said assets formed part of the joint family property of Ramalingam and his sons, and therefore Ramalingam possessed no authority to alienate them by testamentary disposition. The suit in Madras was stayed pending the resolution of the Bangalore suits. The Bangalore District Judge, after the retrocession of the Civil and Military Station, ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, holding that the property devised by the will belonged to the joint family and that the will was consequently inoperative. The executors appealed this decision to the Mysore High Court, where a two‑judge bench comprising Justices Balakrishnanaya and Kandaswami Pillai heard the matter; Justice Balakrishnanaya delivered a judgment allowing the appeal, while Justice Pillai dismissed it. Justice Balakrishnanaya then referred the appeals to a Full Bench of the Mysore High Court, consisting of the Acting Chief Justice P. Medappa, Justice Balakrishnanaya and Justice Mallappa. That Full Bench reversed the earlier decrees, holding that the property was self‑acquired by Ramalingam and that he had the right to dispose of it by will. In the subsequent Madras suit, the executors contended that the Mysore High Court’s decision bound the parties and barred the suit on the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiffs countered that the Mysore Court had no jurisdiction to decide the claim concerning the immovable property situated in Madras and, even if it did, the Mysore judgment was a foreign judgment and therefore not conclusive in the present proceedings.

In the view of the Court, the proceedings before the Mysore High Court were violative of natural justice as defined in section thirteen of the Code of Civil Procedure because the Acting Chief Justice Medappa and Justice Balakrishnaya displayed bias both before and during the hearing of the appeals, rendering them unfit to sit on the Full Bench; consequently, their judgment was rendered coram non judice. The trial judge consequently held that the Mysore High Court’s judgment was likewise coram non judice and therefore not conclusive under the same statutory provision, and he determined that every movable and immovable property disposed of by Ramalingam actually belonged to the joint family, prompting him to decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal, however, the High Court concluded that the allegation of the Full Bench being coram non judice had not been sufficiently established; it further affirmed that the properties in dispute were indeed joint‑family assets which Ramalingan was powerless to alienate by testamentary disposition, and it observed that the Mysore judgment did not affect the immovable property situated in Madras, although it was considered conclusive concerning the movable assets, even those located outside the State of Mysore. Accordingly, the appellate court modified the trial decree by dismissing the suit insofar as the movable assets were concerned, the movables principally comprising shares of India Sugars & Refineries Limited. The Court, speaking through Justices Das and Shah, held that the Madras High Court was correct in granting the plaintiffs possession of the immovable property located in Madras while dismissing their claim to the movable property. It was clarified that the Mysore High Court’s judgment was not binding between the parties regarding the immovable property in Madras, but it was binding concerning the company’s shares situated in the State of Mad‑as. The Court explained that a foreign court may render a judgment in rem that can be enforced or recognised by an Indian court provided the subject matter of the action is property, whether movable or immovable, within the foreign court’s jurisdiction. The Mysore courts, however, lacked the competence to issue a binding judgment concerning immovable property situated in the State of Madras and, in fact, had not passed any judgment relating to immovable property outside Mysore. The Court noted that no absolute rule of private international law precludes a court from exercising jurisdiction over persons, matters or property beyond its territorial limits. It further held that the Mysore courts possessed the competence to issue a binding judgment regarding the shares. The claim in the Mysore suit sought adjudication of title of the plaintiffs against the executors who had wrongfully retained the shares. Although the dispute between the company and the shareholders raised the question of the shares’ situs, which was the registered office of the company in Bellary outside Mysore, the share certificates were deemed to be in the possession of the executors. Accordingly, a decree could lawfully be passed by the Mysore courts directing the executors to retransmit the shares, and the Mysore courts were not incompetent to grant such a decree directing the

The Court observed that a decree ordering the transfer of the shares was binding on the parties in the Madras suits. It further held that, for a foreign judgment to be regarded as conclusive, it is not essential that the judgment be rendered prior to the institution of the suit in which it is pleaded. The Madras High Court was not authorized to examine the procedural propriety of the Mysore High Court’s decision to refer the matter to a Full Bench, and the judgment of that Full Bench could not be attacked on the ground of lack of competence because the referral occurred after the two judges who formed the Bench had each delivered separate and final opinions on the disputed points. The Court explained that the adequacy of the procedure of a foreign court, provided it does not violate the principles of natural justice, is a matter for that foreign court to determine and not for the court hearing the foreign judgment as conclusive. To be conclusive, a foreign judgment must be issued by a Court that is competent both under the law of the State that created it and in an international sense, and it must have directly adjudicated the “matter” pleaded as res judicata. The Court clarified that the term “matter” is not synonymous with “subject‑matter”; rather, it refers to the right that is claimed. Consequently, for a judgment to be conclusive, it must directly decide that right. The Mysore judgment was therefore conclusive only with respect to the issues that it actually decided. The suit before the Madras Court did not concern the succession to the estate of Ramalingam, nor did it address the personal status of Ramalingam and his sons. The principal dispute concerned the nature of the property devised by the will, and the Mysore Court held that the property devised under the will was self‑acquired property; it did not intend to decide any question of personal status of the parties. No evidence was established that the judgment of the Mysore Full Bench was rendered coram non‑judice. In view of clause (d) of section 13, a foreign judgment is not conclusive where the proceedings that produced it were contrary to natural justice. A judgment that results from bias or lack of impartiality on the part of a judge is deemed a nullity and the trial is treated as coram non‑judice. The Court affirmed that, when dealing with a foreign judgment, it will ordinarily presume that the foreign court’s procedure was fair, proper, and free from bias, and that the judges acted honestly. Even if the decision appears erroneous in fact or law, an inference of bias, dishonesty, or unfairness will not normally be drawn from the merits recorded by the foreign court. The estate devised by the will was identified as the joint family estate of Ramalingam and his sons, and the Madras High Court’s finding to that effect was supported by the evidence on record.

In the record, the findings of the Madras High Court were presented as prima facie findings of fact, and ordinarily the Supreme Court refrains from re‑examining the evidence that supports such findings. However, in this case the Supreme Court undertook a review of the underlying evidence because the Mysore High Court, addressing the identical issue concerning the nature of the property devised under Ramalingam’s will, reached a conclusion that differed from the Madras High Court’s determination. Justice Hidayatullah observed that the judgment of the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court was not rendered coram non‑judice and therefore was binding on the Madras High Court to the extent that it negated the coparcenary’s claimed right in the Kolar Gold Fields business, holding that the business constituted separate property of Ramalingam. The question whether the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court had breached principles of natural justice during the hearing of the appeal could not be entertained by the Madras High Court as if it were acting as an appellate court for the Mysore High Court. Moreover, the refusal by the Mysore High Court to adjourn the hearing for the purpose of allowing the appellants to engage an external counsel was held not to contravene any principle of natural justice, since the appellants already had three other counsels briefed on the appeals. In accordance with the customary practice of the Mysore High Court, the appeals had been properly escalated to the Full Bench by the Division Bench. A foreign court will not lightly deem that the proceedings in another jurisdiction were opposed to natural justice. The rule governing judicial conduct is ancient and exacting; a judge who is directly or indirectly interested in a case is incompetent to hear it, and a proven interest both disqualifies the judge and renders the judgment a nullity. No such interest was proved in the present matter. An objection to the jurisdiction of a foreign court on grounds other than international considerations must be raised in the country where the original trial occurred. Objections on an international basis may be raised in the court where the foreign judgment is sought to be enforced, but even then that court will examine, in rem, whether it possesses jurisdiction over the subject‑matter and the defendant, and, in personam, whether it has jurisdiction over the parties. When Indian courts address foreign judgments, they must be guided by the law codified in India. Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code renders a foreign judgment conclusive as to any matter directly adjudicated between the same parties or between parties claiming under the same title, and there is essentially no distinction concerning the competency of a foreign court between actions in rem and actions in personam. The subject matter

In this case the central dispute before the Mysore Courts concerned the legal status of Ramalingam, who was both a subject and a resident of Mysore State. A will executed by Ramalingam within that jurisdiction was admitted to probate by the courts of Mysore. The parties who appeared in the proceedings, including Ramalingam’s sons and other relatives, as well as those who were in actual possession of the property, all resided in Mysore. Consequently the Mysore Courts possessed full competence, both under domestic law and in an international context, to determine Ramalingam’s status and to resolve the rights that arose from the business carried on in the Kolar Gold Fields between the parties. The same factual and legal questions later emerged in a separate suit instituted in the Madras Courts. The issue that the Madras suit had to resolve was the effect that the earlier Mysore judgment would have upon the Madras proceedings, particularly in view of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 13 addresses the conclusiveness of judgments, whether they are in rem or in personam. The matters relating to Hindu co‑parcenary and the position of Ramalingam were fundamentally questions of status. The Mysore Courts had expressly held that Ramalingam was not conducting the Kolar Gold Fields enterprise as a co‑parcener but rather as an individual proprietor, and that determination was to be binding upon the same parties in the Madras suit.

The Court observed that the decision of the Mysore High Court regarding Ramalingam’s status with respect to the Kolar Gold Fields business must be treated in the Madras suit as a final and conclusive adjudication. Accordingly, the Madras Court could not revisit the question of Ramalingam’s status afresh, and any portion of its own decision that contradicted the earlier Mysore ruling was beyond its jurisdiction. On the basis of that finding, the Court concluded that the immovable properties situated in Madras were also the separate assets of Ramalingam, which he was entitled to dispose of by will, provided they derived from the Kolar Gold Fields enterprise. The only issue that remained justiciable in Madras was whether those properties indeed originated from the Kolar Gold Fields business. Moreover, the Mysore Courts were held to have had authority to order that the share scrips be delivered to the successful party and, if necessary, to direct the transfer of the shares; their judgment on that point was likewise binding upon the Madras Courts.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 277 to 283 of 1958. The appeals were taken by certificate from the judgments and decrees dated 15 December and 20 October 1954 of the Madras High Court in the original side appeals Nos. 127, 153, 156 and 158 of 1953. Counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 277, 279, 281 and 282/58 and respondents Nos. 1 presented arguments, while counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 278, 280 and 283/58 also appeared. Additional counsel represented respondent No. 6 in Civil Appeal No. 278/58, as well as respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 280 and 283/58 and respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 283/58. Further counsel represented respondent No. 2 in Civil Appeal No. 283/58.

On 4 May 1962 the Court delivered its judgment. The judgment of Justices Das and Shah was read by Justice Shah, while Justice Hidayatullah gave a separate opinion.

Justice Shah described Ramalingam Mudaliar, who lived in Bangalore, then part of the former State of Mysore, as having started his professional life as a building contractor. He succeeded in that trade and, over time, amassed a large estate that comprised numerous houses situated in the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore, in other parts of Bangalore city and also in the towns of Madras, Hyderabad and Bellary. In addition to his construction activities he carried on a timber business, established several picture‑theatre establishments, obtained an agency for selling motor cars and invested in plantations and coffee estates. He also founded a tile‑manufacturing factory and later set up a sugar enterprise, the Indian Sugars & Refineries Ltd., in which he acted as Managing Agent and bought a substantial block of shares.

The record shows that, for several years before his death, Ramalingam indulged in excessive drinking and suffered frequent coronary attacks. Those health problems were accompanied by a change of temperament; he became irritable, easily excited and his relationship with his wife and children grew strained. He felt deep disappointment in his eldest son, Vishwanath, because the son had borrowed money from money‑lenders at very high rates of interest, had attempted to evade payment of customs duties, had falsified accounts and, in the view of his father, displayed a complete lack of business capacity.

Ramalingam also developed a strong antipathy toward a religious ascetic known as Ramaling Swami. Despite his hostility, his wife Gajambal and his children continued to visit the sadhu regularly, which resulted in frequent quarrels between Ramalingam and the rest of his family. In response to these disputes he stopped providing any allowance for household expenses and revoked the authority he had previously given his son Vishwanath to operate a joint bank account. Shortly after taking these steps, Ramalingam left the family house.

On 2 June 1942 his wife, Gajambal, filed a petition before the District Judge of the Civil Station, Bangalore, seeking an order for an inquisition against Ramalingam under the Indian Lunacy Act. The petition prompted the court to direct that evidence be recorded and to require a medical report concerning Ramalingam’s mental condition.

While these proceedings were pending, Ramalingam executed a will dated 10 September 1942. By that will he made no provision for his eldest son Vishwanath. He bequeathed to each of his other two sons and to Thyagaraja, the son of Vishwanath, immovable property valued at Rs 55,000 together with shares in the Indian Sugars & Refineries Ltd. worth Rs 20,000. To his wife Gajambal he granted a life interest in three houses that were then under construction, with the remainder to pass to Thyagaraja upon completion, and he also ordered a monthly allowance of Rs 150 to be paid to her until the houses were finished.

Ramalingam’s will provided that five of his nine daughters should receive cash and immovable property valued at approximately Rs 25,000 each, while three other daughters were to receive cash amounts ranging from Rs 5,000 to Rs 7,500. He expressly excluded his daughter Bhagirathi from any benefit under the will. The will further made provision for the marriage expenses of his unmarried daughters and directed a payment of Rs 5,000 to Mukti, the daughter of Bhagirathi. From the balance of his estate the will directed that Rs 50,000 be spent on the construction of a gynecological ward in the Vani Vilas Hospital, Bangalore, and that the remaining funds be invested in a trust whose income would be applied to the encouragement and development of industry, education, medical research, the diffusion of medical knowledge, including work in nutrition and dietetics, and the granting of scholarships.

According to the will, a sum of money was to be spent on constructing a gynaecological ward in the Vani Vilas Hospital at Bangalore, and the remaining balance of the estate was to be invested in a fund whose income was to be applied “for encouragement and development of industries, education or medical research, diffusion of medical knowledge, including work in nutrition and dietry by the grant of scholarship etc.” The persons appointed as executors of the will were A Wajid, who was a retired Revenue Commissioner of the Mysore State, Narayanaswamy Mudaliar, and S L Mannaji Rao. The testator, Ramalingam, died on 18 December 1942, leaving three surviving sons—Vishwanath, Swaminath and Amarnath—together with his widow Gajambal and nine daughters. The executors applied to the District Court of the Civil & Military Station at Bangalore for probate of the will dated 10 September 1942. The widow and the children of Ramalingam entered a caveat, and the application was subsequently registered as Original Suit No 2 of 1943. The then District Judge, P Medappa, dismissed the caveat and by an order dated 27 November 1943 granted probate of the will. An appeal against that order was made to the Court of the Resident in Mysore, but the appeal was dismissed on 5 July 1944. Leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was subsequently granted and a petition of appeal was lodged. However, by an order dated 12 December 1949 the Judicial Committee declined to consider the appeal on its merits, holding that the Civil & Military Station of Bangalore had, before the filing of the appeal, been retroceded to His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore and was therefore within the jurisdiction of his State at the date of the hearing. Consequently, His Majesty‑in‑Council could not effectively exercise jurisdiction that had been expressly surrendered and renounced. The district court order granting probate therefore became final, and the validity of the will with respect to property situated in the Civil & Military Station, Bangalore, could not be challenged on the ground of a lack of proper execution.

Further applications for probate of the will, limited to property that fell within the jurisdiction of the District Court at Bangalore and of the Madras High Court, were also filed. Orders granting probate in those cases were made subject to the result of the pending proceedings before the Privy Council. While the probate proceedings were still pending, the sons of Ramalingam—collectively referred to in the subsequent proceedings as the plaintiffs—initiated three separate actions against the executors and other parties to establish their title to, and to obtain possession of, the estate that had been disposed of by the will. The first action was Suit No 56 of 1942/43 filed in the District Court, Bangalore, seeking possession of immovable property located in Bangalore, as well as the business carried on in Ramalingam’s name and movable assets such as shares, together with the profits and income that had accrued since 18 December 1942. The second action was Suit No 60 of 1944, also in the District Court of the Bangalore Civil & Military Station, in which the plaintiffs sought a decree for possession against the executor concerning immovable property that fell within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. The third action, referred to in the next portion of the record, concerned a suit in the Madras High Court and will be considered subsequently.

In this matter the plaintiffs instituted three separate suits. The first suit was numbered 56 of 1942/43 in the District Court at Bangalore, the second suit was numbered 60 of 1944 in the same court, and the third suit was numbered 214 of 1944 in the Madras High Court, where it was filed on its original side for a decree granting possession of immovable property situated in the town of Madras, together with a decree granting possession of “certain business” and of movable assets in Madras, including the shares of India Sugars Refineries Ltd. After the military station at Bangalore was transferred back to the Mysore State in 1947, the first suit, originally 56 of 1942/43, was renumbered as 61A of 1947 and was consolidated for trial together with the second suit, 60 of 1944. The Madras High Court ordered that the hearing of suit 214 of 1944 be stayed until the two Mysore suits had been heard and disposed of. In all three suits the plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to possession of the property devised by the will of Ramalingam dated 10 September 1942. Their claim was based on the allegation that the property formed part of the joint family of the plaintiffs and the testator, and that the executors acquired no title to it because the will was inoperative. The executors opposed the suits principally on the ground that Ramalingam was competent to dispose of the estate by his will, since the estate consisted of his self‑acquired property. In the Bangalore District Court the executors further contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief with respect to any movable or immovable property situated outside the Mysore State. This objection was raised because the original plaint had sought a decree for possession of immovable property located in the Province of Madras and also an order for the re‑transfer of the shares that had originally been held by Ramalingam in India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., shares that, after Ramalingam’s death, had been transferred to the executors. By amending the schedule to the plaint, the plaintiffs deleted the claim for possession of the shares but retained the claim for possession of immovable property that lay within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. The objection that a claim for possession of movables situated outside Mysore was not maintainable was apparently not pursued before the District Court. The District Judge at Bangalore held that the property devised by the will of 10 September 1942 belonged to the joint family of Ramalingam and his sons and therefore the will was inoperative. Accordingly, the judge decreed possession of the properties listed in the schedules that fell within his jurisdiction and ordered that a preliminary decree be drawn up to account for the management of those properties since Ramalingam’s death. The executors appealed the decrees in the two Mysore suits to the High Court of Mysore, where the appeals were heard by Chief Justice Paramshivayya and Justice Balakrishanaiya. After hearing the appeals for a period, the court adjourned the matter for six weeks to allow the parties to negotiate a compromise. The plaintiffs later claimed that a settlement had been reached between them and the executors.

In the proceedings before the Division Bench consisting of Balakrishanaiya and Kandaswami Pillai, the parties reached an agreement that the widow and the children of Ramalingam would receive three‑fifths of the estate that was covered by the will dated 10 September 1942, while the remaining two‑fifths would be allotted to the charity named in that will. The agreement further stipulated that, should the sons and the widow of Ramalingam succeed in the appeal then pending in the Probate Proceedings before the Privy Council, the executors would be required to surrender the two‑fifths share to the charity as well. After this settlement was reported, the appeals were placed before the newly formed Division Bench of Balakrishanaiya and Kandaswami Pillai. Before this Bench, the widow and the sons of Ramalingam claimed that a decree based on an alleged compromise between the parties had been settled. The Court, by order dated 15 March 1949, declined to conduct an enquiry into the purported compromise because it held that such a compromise would not be in the interest of the public trust created by Ramalingam’s will. The appeals were subsequently heard and, on 2 April 1949, the two Judges on the Bench expressed divergent views. Balakrishanaiya, exercising the authority conferred by section 15(3) of the Mysore High Court Regulation 1884, referred the appeals to a Full Bench for determination under section 15(3) of the High Court Act. The Full Bench that heard the matter comprised Medappa, Acting Chief Justice, together with Balakrishanaiya and Mallappa Judges. For reasons later explained, no arguments were put forward on behalf of the plaintiffs in support of the decree rendered by the District Judge, and the appeals were allowed, resulting in the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suits. An application for review of the judgment was filed by the plaintiffs on various grounds, but this application was likewise dismissed.

Following the disposal of the suits in the Bangalore Court, the executors instituted suit No. 214 of 1944 before the Madras High Court, contending that the earlier judgment of the Mysore High Court, which had dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for possession of immovable property and for an order directing the re‑transfer of shares of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., operated as res judicata between the parties and therefore the suit before the Madras Court should also be dismissed. The plaintiffs opposed this submission, arguing that the Mysore judgment could not be considered conclusive with respect to the immovable properties situated in Madras because the Mysore Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ title to those properties and, in fact, had not addressed the plaintiffs’ claim at all. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged bias on the part of Medappa, Chief Justice, and Balakrishanaiya, Judge, asserting that the Full Bench was therefore incompetent to sit and that its judgment was rendered coram non judice. The preliminary issue of whether the doctrine of res judicata applied was examined by Judge Rajagopalan, who held that the Full Bench judgment of the Mysore High Court did not preclude the hearing of the suit concerning the Madras immovable properties. He reasoned that the Mysore Court had not adjudicated the title to those specific properties and that, as a matter of law, the lex situs governing the immovable property located in Madras controlled the determination of rights in that jurisdiction. Consequently, the Madras Court retained the authority to hear the suit irrespective of the earlier Mysore decision.

The judge explained that the Mysore Court had not actually decided the title to the properties in question, and that the law of the place where the immovable property is situated (lex situs) governed the immovable properties located in Madras. He then clarified the limits of the enquiry that could be undertaken on the plea raised by the executors that the foreign judgment was conclusive. He observed that the Madras High Court was not authorised to investigate the allegations made against the judges of the Mysore High Court concerning how they conducted the appeal, or to examine the substance of the property issues or the correctness of the decisions rendered in those appeals or in any related legal proceedings. However, he identified two specific questions that lay outside the bar imposed by that rule. The first question was whether Mr Medappa had been using, and was continuing to use, a motor car that belonged to the estate and was held in the possession of the executors. The second question was whether Mr Medappa had summoned L.S. Raju, who was engaged to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs, and had attempted to persuade him not to conduct the case for the plaintiffs’ family. The judge noted that, if these two allegations could be proved, they might provide evidence that one of the Mysore High Court judges who heard the appeals was “interested” in the subject matter of the suit itself, and that such interest would fall within the exception (d) to section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, he ordered that the plaintiffs were permitted to present evidence on those two specific allegations, but that no evidence could be led on any of the other matters raised.

Both the plaintiffs and the executors filed appeals against this order under the Letters Patent, the plaintiffs challenging the judge’s limitation of the enquiry into allegations of bias, interest and partiality, and the executors arguing that the Mysore High Court’s judgment was final as to title to all movable and immovable property belonging to the estate of Ramalingam disposed of by the will, and that no enquiry whatsoever should be allowed into any allegation of bias, including proof of interest relating to the use of a motor car by Mr Medappa or his alleged attempt to dissuade Raju. The Madras High Court held that evidence concerning the attempts to dissuade Raju from appearing for the plaintiffs was admissible, but that evidence relating to Mr Medappa’s use of the estate’s motor car was not. The court observed that even if the “Mercedes car” of the estate had been used by Mr Medappa, such use occurred before he was appointed as a judge of the Mysore High Court, and the car had been sold more than three years before Mr Medappa sat on the Full Bench. Consequently, the court concluded that because the use of the car took place several years prior to his judicial service, it could not be said that his earlier use of the vehicle identified him with the executors in a manner that would render his participation in the Full Bench hearing contrary to the principles of natural justice.

The Court observed that, with respect to the principles of natural justice, the decision of the Mysore High Court would be regarded as conclusive of every disputed item of property in the suit unless the allegation that the case was “coram non judice” could be established. The only exception to this conclusive effect was the four immovable properties situated in the State of Madras, which were expressly excluded from the Mysore judgment’s reach.

Subsequent to that observation, the present suit was placed in the docket of Judge Ramaswami for trial. The trial proceeded together with five other related suits, namely Suit Numbers 91 of 1944, 200 of 1944, 251 of 1944, 274 of 1944 and 344 of 1946. Each of those suits directly concerned the interest claimed by the plaintiffs in the estate that had been devised by the will, and each plaintiff asserted that they were members of a joint family entitled to a share. By mutual consent, the parties agreed that the evidence recorded in Suit No. 60 of 1944 and Suit No. 61A of 1947, which lay in the file of the District Judge of Bangalore, would be admissible as evidence in the present proceedings. Moreover, the Court incorporated into the record the Mysore High Court’s civil‑suit files, the printed record of the Privy Council’s probate proceedings, and the documents filed in the petition for a writ of prohibition that sought to restrain enforcement of the Mysore judgment.

In the course of Suit No. 214 of 1944, the Court identified three principal questions that required determination. The first question asked whether the Mysore High Court’s judgment that the estate devised by Ramalingam through his will constituted his self‑acquired property could be treated as conclusive of title to both movable and immovable property that lay outside the jurisdiction of Mysore State. The second question concerned whether the Mysore proceeding, which had produced a judgment claimed to be conclusive, was tainted by a denial of natural justice. The third question examined whether Ramalingam’s will dated 10 September 1942 attempted to dispose of property that actually belonged to the joint family of Ramalingam and his sons, who were the plaintiffs.

Judge Ramaswami did not answer the first question expressly, apparently because, in his view, that issue had already been settled by the Division Bench’s judgment on the interlocutory order that defined the scope of the enquiry. However, on the second and third questions, he decided in favour of the plaintiffs. He held, after considering various reasons, that the Full Bench judgment of the Mysore High Court was “coram non judice” and therefore could not be regarded as conclusive under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further found that the evidence demonstrated that both the movable and immovable property listed in the plaint’s schedule, as well as the business activities carried out by Ramalingam, were assets of the joint family comprising Ramalingam and his sons. Accordingly, the Court decreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of all the movable and immovable property specified in the schedule, with the sole exception of the 1,650 shares of India Sugars and Refineries Limited. In addition, the Court ordered that an account be taken of the executors’ management of the properties from the date of Ramalingam’s death up to the time of delivery of possession to the plaintiffs.

In this case, the Court recorded that the business operating under the name of Oriental Films at 9 Stringers Street in G.T. Madras was held to be the sole proprietary concern of the joint family of Ramalingam and his sons. The Court further stated that the profits earned from the Palmgrove venture and the Vegetable Oil Factory formed part of the assets of Ramalingam’s estate, subject however to any equitable claims that might arise in favour of Narayanaswami Mudaliar on the basis of the doctrine of quantum meruit, a determination that would be made during the final decree or execution proceedings. The executors of the estate, dissatisfied with Justice Ramaswami’s judgment, appealed to the High Court. The High Court observed that the earlier decision of the Mysore High Court could not be given effect with respect to immovable properties situated in the State of Madras, although it could naturally affect moveable property located there. The Court explained that the immovable properties in Madras were not part of the Mysore suits; consequently, the members of Ramalingam’s family would first have to nullify the Mysore decision before they could any chance of obtaining the moveable properties of Ramalingam that were situated in Madras. After an extensive review of the evidence, the High Court concluded that the estate which Ramalingam had attempted to dispose of by his will was in fact a joint‑family estate, rendering him incompetent to dispose of it. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to the immovable properties in Madras, but regarding moveables the Mysore High Court’s judgment was held to be conclusive because there was no reliable evidence to establish that the decision was rendered “coram non judic”. The High Court therefore modified the trial Court’s decree, confirming it insofar as it related to immovable properties in Madras and dismissing it with respect to the remaining matters. It also declared that the sale proceeds from a property called Palmgrove, which had been excluded from the schedule to the plaint in the Bangalore suit, constituted assets of the joint family, and issued directions on that basis. Against this modified decree, two appeals—Nos 277 and 278 of 1958—were filed, the former by the plaintiffs and the latter by the executors. The plaintiffs contended that the Mysore Full Bench judgment was not conclusive in the Madras suit because the Mysore Court lacked jurisdiction over movable and immovable property located outside the territory of the Mysore State, that the judges of the Full Bench were not legally competent under Mysore law to decide the dispute, and that the judgment was “coram non judic” due to alleged bias and a breach of natural‑justice principles. On the other hand, the executors argued that the judgment was conclusive regarding the nature of the Kolar Gold Fields business, which was found to be a separate business of Ramalingam, and that the Madras High Court’s competence was limited to determining whether the immovable properties in Madras had been acquired from the earnings of that separate business.

The Court observed that the earlier decision had determined that the Kolar Gold Fields enterprise was a distinct business belonging to Ramalingam, and that the Madras High Court possessed jurisdiction solely to decide whether the immovable property located in Madras had been acquired from the profits of that separate business. The Court then set out the language of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act V of 1908, which states: “13. A foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except— (a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction; (b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case; (c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise the law of India in cases in which such law is applicable; (d) where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice; (e) where it has been obtained by fraud; (f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.” By this enactment, a foreign judgment is binding on all matters directly decided between the parties, except in the circumstances listed in clauses (a) to (f). The plaintiffs argued that the Mysore High Court judgment was not conclusive because (1) it had not been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) it appeared on the face of the proceedings to be based on an erroneous view of international law, and (3) the proceedings that produced the judgment were contrary to natural justice. The matter under appeal by the plaintiffs primarily concerned the shares of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. and the movable assets situated in Madras. The Court noted that the Mysore Court’s decree concerning the immovable property located in Mysore was final and could not be challenged before this Court. It further held that the Mysore High Court was competent to adjudicate title to immovable property situated within the territorial limits of the State of Mysore in the suits filed by the plaintiffs against the executors. In determining whether a judgment of a foreign court is conclusive, Indian courts do not examine whether the findings are supported by evidence or are otherwise correct; the binding effect of such a judgment can be displaced only by demonstrating that the case falls within one of the six exclusions specified in Section 13, and not on any other ground. The registered office of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. was located in Bellary, Province of Madras, and the situs of its shares, being movable property, is normally the place where they can be effectively dealt with, as discussed in Erie Beach Co. v. Attorney‑General for Ontario and Brasssard v. Smith. Consequently, the situs of the shares of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. may be regarded as lying outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Mysore Court at the time the suit was instituted by the plaintiffs.

In this case the plaintiffs argued that at the time they instituted the suit the Mysore Court did not possess territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter. They submitted that, before the Constitution was enacted, the courts of the Indian State of Mysore—considered as courts of the Province of Madras—were foreign courts for the purpose of adjudicating title to movable property situated outside their own territory. Accordingly, they contended that an action seeking a declaration of title to such movables and an order for possession of them constituted, under the rules of private international law, an action in rem, and therefore any judgment rendered by the Mysore Court was a nullity. The plaintiffs further urged that the doctrine of submission to jurisdiction cannot be invoked in actions in rem because jurisdiction in rem depends wholly on the actual or legal presence of the property (the res) within the territory over which the court exercises power. They added that recognition of jurisdiction in transactions involving a foreign element rests on the doctrine of effectiveness of judgments, and that the parties’ willingness to submit to jurisdiction is irrelevant in an in‑rem proceeding. Expanding on this theme, they submitted that the shares of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. had, at the relevant time, their situs outside the jurisdiction of the Mysore courts; consequently, under private international law, an action to determine title to those shares—a classic action in rem—could not be properly entertained by Mysore courts because they lacked the ability to render an effective judgment granting possession of the shares. Assuming, in an international sense, that the Court of the District Judge in Bangalore was likewise incompetent to adjudicate title to the shares and other movable property or to award possession thereof, they argued that a suit for determination of title and possession of the shares and movables could be instituted only in the Madras High Court. By that reasoning, the plaintiffs could not confer jurisdiction upon the District Court of Bangalore to decide the conflicting claims of title. Thus, the argument was that the suit filed by the plaintiffs in the Bangalore District Court, being an action in rem, was, according to universally recognised principles of private international law, competent only to adjudicate title to property for which it could issue an effective judgment. Since the plaintiffs claimed title to and possession of shares of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. and other movables situated outside Mysore, the judgment of the Mysore High Court that those shares and movable property were the self‑acquisition of Ramalingam was not binding on the parties. The plaintiffs maintained that the Mysore Court was not a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and that for a foreign judgment to be conclusive between the parties it must be pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction.

In this passage the Court explained that the jurisdiction and competence referred to in section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood in an international context, not merely according to the law of the foreign State in which the delivering court sits. The Court illustrated this principle by referring to the decisions in Chormal Balchand v. Kasturhand, Panchapakesa v. Hussim and Pemberton v. Highes. The Court then emphasized that the term “private international law” does not denote the law that governs relations between sovereign States. Rather, private international law—also known as the “conflict of laws”—is a branch of the civil law of the State that is applied to achieve justice between parties who are litigating over transactions or personal status matters that contain a foreign element. Consequently, the rules of private international law differ from State to State, as shown by the authorities cited: (1) [1936] I.L.R. 63 Cal. 1083, (2) A.I.R. 1234 Mad. 145, and (3) [1899] C.B. 781. Nevertheless, because of the comity of nations, certain principles are recognised as common to civilized jurisdictions. Each State, through its judicial system, has adopted these common rules in order to adjudicate disputes that involve a foreign element and to give effect to foreign judgments, either under domestic legislation or pursuant to international conventions. The Court then turned to the Roman classification of rights as either a jus in rem or a jus in personam. It explained that, in literal terms, a jus in rem is a right concerning a thing, whereas a jus in personam is a right directed against a person. In contemporary legal terminology a right in rem imposes a duty on all persons generally to recognise the right, while a right in personam imposes a duty only on a specific person or a defined class of persons. Accordingly a right in rem is enforceable against the world at large, whereas a right in personam is enforceable only against particular individuals. Historically an action to enforce a jus in personam was treated as an action in rem, but over time the two categories acquired distinct meanings. When an action seeks to determine the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the subject matter, the action is characterised as in personam and binds only those parties. When the Court’s intervention is sought to determine a right or title to property in a manner that affects all persons, not just the parties, the action is characterised as in rem. Such an in‑rem action is exemplified by proceedings in the Admiralty Division of the High Court where process is served against a ship or its cargo within jurisdiction. The Court also noted another understanding of an in‑rem proceeding: a proceeding concerning personal status is treated as in rem because the judgment of the competent court in the domicile jurisdiction of the parties is recognised by other courts through comity of nations, as observed by Cheshire in his treatise “Private International Law”, Sixth Edition, page 109.

In Roman law an action in rem was a proceeding that was instituted to vindicate a jus in rem, that is, a right such as ownership that could be asserted against all persons. By contrast, English law recognises only one form of action in rem, namely the proceeding that is heard in an Admiralty court against a specific thing, for example a ship or some other thing such as cargo that is associated with the ship. Referring to the distinction between judgments in rem and judgments in personam, Cheshire observes on page 653 that a judgment in rem is a decision of a court that has proper jurisdiction which determines the status of a person or thing, distinct from the particular interest that any party to the suit may have in that thing. Such a judgment constitutes conclusive evidence that binds every person, whether a party, a privy or a stranger, with respect to the matter that has been decided. A judgment in rem therefore settles the fate of the thing itself and binds all persons who claim an interest that is inconsistent with the judgment, even though the judgment may have been rendered in their absence. By contrast, a judgment in personam, although it may also concern a thing, merely determines the rights of the litigants between themselves in relation to that thing. The former looks beyond the individual rights of the parties, while the latter is directed solely at those individual rights.

A foreign judgment that purports to operate in rem will not be recognised outside its own territory unless it has been issued by a court that is internationally competent to give a judgment binding all persons generally. English law therefore requires that the adjudicating court possess jurisdiction to issue a judgment that has effect upon all persons, not merely the parties to the suit. When the judgment concerns immovable property, the competent court is clearly the court of the situs, that is, the court where the property is situated. The situation is more complex where movable property is involved, because at least three different categories of judgments in rem may arise. The first category consists of judgments that immediately vest the property in a particular person against the whole world; an example of this is a foreign Admiralty court that condemns a vessel in prize proceedings. The second category comprises judgments that decree the sale of the thing in order to satisfy a claim that is directed against the thing itself. The third category includes judgments that order the sale of movables by way of administration. An action in personam, on the other hand, normally applies where the defendant is personally within the jurisdiction of the court, voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction, or, even though outside the jurisdiction, may be reached by an order of the court. Section 20 of the Mysore Code of Civil Procedure confers a general jurisdiction on courts for suits that are instituted within the local limits of their jurisdiction, subject to sections 16 to 19 which deal with suits relating to immovable property, movable property under distraint and certain incidental matters. Under this provision, the court has jurisdiction where (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are several, actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain at the time the suit is commenced; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are several, at

In this passage the Court explained that at the time a suit was commenced a defendant could be subject to the court’s jurisdiction if the defendant actually and voluntarily lived within the local limits, carried on business there, or personally worked for gain in that area. If a defendant did not satisfy any of those conditions, the court could still acquire jurisdiction provided that the court first granted its leave or the defendants who did not reside, carry on business, or work for gain gave their acquiescence to the institution of the suit. The provision also covered situations where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arose within the local limits. These rules governed the territorial jurisdiction of courts for all suits except those dealing with immovable property or with the recovery of movable property under distraint or attachment. However, the application of the rules extended to every person, irrespective of domicile, who was found within the jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Code therefore broadened the courts’ jurisdiction to reach persons or transactions that lay beyond the ordinary territorial limits. Such extraterritorial in‑personam jurisdiction was granted to courts by legislative enactments in many jurisdictions. For example, in England, Order XI, rule 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court allowed a court to exercise discretionary in‑personam jurisdiction by serving a writ of summons or a notice of a writ of summons on an absent defendant outside the jurisdiction, according to the classes specified in the rule. The Court further noted that a foreign court could issue a judgment in rem that could be enforced or recognised in an Indian court when the subject matter of the foreign action was property—whether movable or immovable—situated within that foreign country. It was also well settled that a foreign court lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment that could be enforced or recognised in another country where the subject matter concerned title to immovable property located outside the foreign court’s territory. Nevertheless, the Court rejected any general rule of private international law stating that a court could never exercise jurisdiction over persons, matters or property located outside its territory. Express provisions such as Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908) and Order XI, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules in England expressly negated that assumption. The Court described three common limitations that courts imposed on the exercise of their jurisdiction. First, a court would not exercise in rem jurisdiction over a thing situated outside its territory because such a judgment would not be recognised by other courts. Second, a court would not deal directly or indirectly with titles to immovable property located outside the jurisdiction of the state that conferred its authority. Third, a court would not assist in enforcing within its territory foreign penal or revenue laws. Finally, the Court turned to the facts of the present suit, which had been filed by the plaintiffs seeking possession of an estate that had been disposed of by the will of Ramalingam. The Court referred to paragraph three of the plaint filed in the Bangalore District Court, noting that this was the only foreign suit relevant for consideration because the averments in that proceeding were common to the present case.

Two separate plaints were filed, one in the District Court at Bangalore and the other in the District Court, Civil Station Bangalore, and these two suits were subsequently consolidated so that they could be heard together as a single proceeding. Both plaints asserted the same factual background, stating that the plaintiffs and their father, the late V. Ramalinga Mudaliar, were members of an undivided Hindu joint family and that the properties listed in the schedule formed part of that joint family estate. The plaint further declared that Ramalinga Mudaliar died on 18 December 1942 and that, by virtue of survivorship, the three plaintiffs became entitled to all of the properties mentioned in the schedule.

The plaint contended in paragraph 11 that because the listed properties were joint family assets, the deceased Ramalingam possessed no legal authority to dispose of them, and consequently any will purportedly executed by him was void and inoperative under the law and could not bind the plaintiffs. In paragraph 13 the plaintiffs alleged that the individuals claiming to be executors under the alleged will had entered the properties and businesses described in the schedule, thereby holding them in wrongful possession, and that the plaintiffs, as surviving members of the joint family, were entitled to recover those assets from the alleged executors. The reliefs claimed in paragraph 22 included several distinct orders: first, that the executors be commanded to deliver possession of all properties and businesses under their control together with any profits and income accrued since 18 December 1942; second, that defendants 17 and 18, who were employees of Ramalingam, be ordered to surrender possession of the assets and capital along with profits arising from the Kolar Gold Field contracts, military contracts, and cinema business; and third, that the executors and defendant 15, who were alleged to hold shares of India Sugars & Refineries, be directed to retransmit those shares to the plaintiffs. In paragraph 19 the plaintiffs explained that they had impleaded India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., Bellary as Defendant No. 16 so that the court could enforce an order transferring at least 19,000 shares from the names of defendants 1 to the plaintiffs.

The suit therefore sought a judicial determination of title, asserting that the plaintiffs were entitled to regain possession of property that the defendants had allegedly possessed wrongfully. The Court observed that such a proceeding is an action in personam, which is intended solely to settle the rights of the parties against each other and to affect only the parties themselves or those claiming through them, whether the dispute concerns an obligation or, as in a detinue action, chattels. Consequently, any decree rendered in this suit would be effective only between the parties to the suit. According to the Mysore Code of Civil Procedure, the District Court of Bangalore possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession of immovable property situated within its territorial limits and also to issue an order directing the executors to retransmit the shares of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. to the plaintiffs.

In the present case the suit sought not only possession of immovable property that lay within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court of Bangalore, but also an order directing the executors of the deceased to re‑transfer the shares of India Sugars & Refineries Ltd. to the plaintiff. The court noted that, for the purpose of determining the location or situs of the shares, the relevant place was the registered office of the company situated in Bellary, which lay outside the State of Mysore. Nevertheless, the plaintiff contended, as set out in the plaint, that the share certificates were in the possession of the executors and that any decree against the executors ordering re‑transfer could be enforced under the provisions of Order XXI, Rules 31 and 32 of the Mysore Code of Civil Procedure. The court further observed that no rule of private international law recognized by Indian courts would render the Bangalore Court incompetent merely because the shares had a situs that was the subject of a dispute between the company and its shareholders located beyond the court’s territorial reach.

The counsel for the plaintiff advanced the argument that the Mysore Court might be unable to render an effective judgment concerning the shares, yet affirmed that personal compliance with an order of re‑transfer could still give effect to a judgment in favour of the plaintiff. The court stated that, in the circumstances, it was unnecessary to pronounce on the theoretical question of whether the principle of effectiveness conferred a conclusive character on a foreign judgment. The court noted that legal writers were divided on this point and that there was a marked lack of persuasive authority on the matter. Referring to Dicey’s treatise, the court quoted Dicey’s definition of the principle of effectiveness, which holds that a court of any country is regarded by English law as having jurisdiction over any matter about which it can give an effective judgment, and is not regarded as having jurisdiction over any matter about which it cannot give an effective judgment. The court then cited a dictum of Lord Merrivale in Tallack v. Tallack, where Lord Merrivale expressed doubt that the Dutch tribunals could give effect to foreign judgments in personal actions against persons residing in the Netherlands, and concluded that a decree of the English court attempting to partition the respondent’s property would be “an idle and wholly ineffectual process.” The court further pointed out that, in the Tallack case, the court refused the husband’s petition for a settlement order concerning the wife’s estate after a decree of dissolution, on the ground that granting such relief would extend the English court’s jurisdiction beyond the material‑time domicile of the defendant.

The Court observed that allowing the English Court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who was not domiciled within its territory at the relevant time and who had appeared merely to contest an assertion of jurisdiction beyond territorial limits would amount to an improper extension of that Court’s jurisdiction. This consideration alone was sufficient to uphold the decision of the lower court, rendering any additional discussion of the principle of effectiveness unnecessary. Schmitthoff, in his third edition of “The English Conflict of Laws” (page 425), is cited as stating that the jurisdiction of courts is not determined by the actual or probable effect of their decisions, and that reasoning from the effect of a judgment to the existence of jurisdiction approaches the problem from the wrong perspective, analogous to the fallacious reasoning from the effect of a choice of law to the choice itself, as Lord Russell remarked. Graveson, in the fourth edition of “The Conflict of Laws” (page 338), notes that English jurists, within the doctrine of effectiveness, have attempted to provide a reasonable and adequate theory for determining the exercise of jurisdiction, and that the practicality of the theory guarantees its reasonableness, yet its complete adequacy is challenged by the existence of English jurisdiction over defendants outside the jurisdiction in matters governed by Order 11 of the Supreme Court Rules. He further explains that the basis of jurisdiction in English conflict‑of‑laws doctrine is broader than the principle of effective enforcement of judgments; it rests upon the administration of justice. In a personal‑action case, the Court possesses jurisdiction to issue orders for delivery of movables when the parties submit to its jurisdiction. A plaintiff who initiates proceedings in a foreign court and obtains an in‑personam decree cannot, after the judgment is rendered, claim that the court lacked jurisdiction, because a party present before the Court or who has submitted to its jurisdiction cannot later contest that jurisdiction. The Court referred briefly to authorities relied upon by counsel for the plaintiffs, who argued that the Mysore High Court judgment, insofar as it concerned movables located outside the State of Mysore, was not conclusive in the Madras suit. The Court cited Messa v. Messa, where the Alexandria Supreme Court’s judgment on the validity of a will was held not binding as a judgment in rem upon parties in an Aden litigation because the testator was not domiciled within the territory over which the Alexandria Court exercised jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the Messa case did not bear on the plaintiffs’ contention.

The Court observed that the opinion of the Judicial Committee in Sardar Gurdayal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (2) offered no assistance to the plaintiff. In that decision the Committee had noted that a monetary decree issued by a foreign court against an absent foreigner was, according to international law, a nullity. The Court quoted Lord Selborne at page 185, stating that territorial jurisdiction attaches, subject to special exceptions, to all persons who are permanently or temporarily resident within the territory while they are present there, but that such jurisdiction does not follow them once they have left the territory and are living in another independent country. He explained that jurisdiction always exists over land within the territory and may be exercised over movables situated in the territory; in matters of status or succession governed by domicile, jurisdiction may exist with respect to persons who are domiciled, or who were domiciled while living, within the territory. He further remarked that, as between different provinces under a sovereign authority, the sovereign’s legislation may distribute and regulate jurisdiction, but no territorial legislation can confer jurisdiction that a foreign court must recognise against foreigners who owe no allegiance or obedience to the sovereign that legislates. In a personal action where none of these bases of jurisdiction apply, a decree pronounced in absentia by a foreign court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not submitted, is by international law an absolute nullity. The defendant is under no obligation to obey such a decree, and it must be regarded as a mere nullity by the courts of every nation, except where special local legislation authorises recognition in the forum where it was pronounced.

The Court then turned to the facts of Castrique v. Imri (1). A bill had been issued by the master of a British ship against the ship’s owner for the cost of repairs and necessary supplies, and the bill was dishonoured. The endorsee, a French subject, sued the master in the Tribunal de Commerce at Le Havre. While this litigation was pending, the owner mortgaged the ship and subsequently became bankrupt. The Tribunal ordered the master to pay the sum due, describing the amount as “privileged on the ship.” Because payment was not made, the ship was seized and detained. Under French law the Tribunal’s judgment had to be confirmed by the civil court of the district, and consequently the civil court summoned the owner and the assignee in bankruptcy, but it did not summon the mortgagee or his assignee. In the absence of their appearance, the civil court decreed that the ship be sold by public auction. The mortgagee’s consignee, Castrique, then instituted an action described as being “in the nature of replevy” concerning the ship. The Court of Appeal, albeit erroneously, held that the bill of sale had not been registered and was therefore invalid, and that Castrique lacked locus standi to maintain the action. Following this decision, the ship was sold to a British subject, who subsequently brought further proceedings.

After the ship reached Liverpool, the purchaser registered it in his own name. The former mortgagee’s assignee, Castrique, then instituted a conversion action before the Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the French sale was void. The House of Lords held that a judgment in rem had been rendered by the French court and that the purchaser’s title to the vessel could not be disturbed by an English court. The French proceeding was clearly an in‑rem action because it sought to enforce a maritime lien, which under French law is an in‑rem proceeding, and because the ship lay within French territorial waters; consequently the English courts were required to treat the matter in the same in‑rem manner. These decisions did not support a contention that a foreign judgment concerning movables, rendered outside its jurisdiction, would be ineffective between the same parties in an Indian proceeding concerning those movables. The argument that a foreign judgment could serve as a bar only when it was delivered before the Indian suit was filed was also rejected as untenable. Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, expressly provides that a foreign judgment is conclusive between the parties as to any matter directly adjudicated, and it does not require that the judgment be pronounced before the commencement of the suit in which it is invoked. Section 13 therefore incorporates a branch of the doctrine of res judicata and extends its effect, within certain limits, to foreign judgments that are competent in an international sense to resolve the dispute between the parties. The rule of res judicata applies to all adjudications in a “former suit,” a phrase explained by Explanation 1 to Section II of the Code of Civil Procedure to mean any suit that has been decided prior to the suit in question, irrespective of whether it was instituted earlier. This explanation merely declares the law, and the decisions of Indian courts rendered before the enactment of the Code confirm this proposition conclusively, as illustrated in Balkishan v. Kishan Lal and Beni Madho v. Inder Shahi. The contrary dictum found in The Delta (Erminia Foscolo) is insufficient to overturn the clear language of the Indian statute. Another ground for questioning the competence of the Mysore High Court to set aside the judgment as a bar to the Madras suit, insofar as it concerns movables, also required attention. It was submitted that Justice Balakrishnaiya lacked authority to refer the appeals to a Full Bench after he and Justice Kandaswami Pillai had already delivered final opinions. To recap the material facts underlying this plea: Appeals numbered 104 and 109 of 1947‑48, filed by the executors against the judgment of the District Judge of Bangalore, had been heard by Justices Balakrishnaiya and Kandaswami Pillai.

After the parties had been heard, the two Judges on the bench expressed opposing views on virtually every issue that the appeals raised. Justice Balakrishanaiya advocated setting aside the trial Court’s judgment, whereas Justice Kandaswami Pillai argued that the trial Court’s decision should be upheld. In the concluding portion of his opinion, Justice Balakrishanaiya stated that, in his judgment, the orders and decrees issued by the learned District Judge could not be sustained and therefore should be vacated, with the suits dismissed and costs awarded against the respondents throughout. Following the delivery of Justice Balakrishanaiya’s opinion, Justice Kandaswami Pillai rendered his own judgment. He affirmed that the judgment and decree in the suits must be confirmed and ordered that Appeals Nos. 104 and 109 of 1947‑48 be dismissed, directing that the costs should be borne by the appellants—identified as defendants 1 to 3—drawn from the estate of Ramalingam. After expressing his view, Justice Balakrishanaiya referred the matter to a Full Bench in accordance with section 15(3) of the Mysore High Court Regulation of 1884, and thereafter signed his judgment. The procedural framework applicable at that time required the bench to follow specific statutory rules when the Judges differed. Section 98 of the Mysore Civil Procedure Code stipulated that an appeal heard by a bench of two or more Judges must be decided according to the opinion of the Judges or, where a majority exists, according to that majority. If no majority concurred in varying or reversing the appealed decree, the original decree had to be confirmed. Moreover, section 15(3) of the Mysore High Court Regulation, as amended by Act XII of 1930, provided that the decision of the majority of Judges forming any Full Bench of at least three Judges would constitute the decision of the Court. When a bench consisted of only two Judges and a disagreement arose on any material question, the question could be resolved either by applying the method prescribed in Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Code or Section 429 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as appropriate, or, at the discretion of either Judge, by referring the matter to a Full Bench. In such a referral, the decision of the majority of the Full Bench would become the decision of the High Court. Consequently, if the two Judges differed and no majority emerged to vary or reverse the appealed decree, the decree had to be affirmed; however, either Judge retained the authority under section 15(3) to refer the disputed questions to a Full Bench for resolution. The true rule embodied in section 15(3) therefore permitted such a referral whenever a difference of opinion existed.

The regulation governing the Mysore High Court required that when a reference was made under section 15(3), the Court or the Judge making the reference had to list the specific questions on which the judges differed, but it was prohibited for that Judge to state any view on the ultimate outcome of the appeal. In the present case the two Judges indeed disagreed on almost every issue that was relevant to the plaintiffs’ claim. Each Judge issued his own separate opinion, expressly indicating his dissent from the other, and each opinion also contained the final orders that the Judge believed should be made in the appeal. By drafting their opinions in this manner the Judges committed a procedural irregularity because they went beyond merely setting out the points of disagreement and ventured to dictate the result. Nevertheless, the Court held that this irregularity did not undermine the validity or competence of the larger Fall Bench that was constituted to consider the reference made pursuant to section 15(3). Both Justice Balakrishanaiya and Justice Kandaswami Pillai delivered distinct, self‑contained judgments in which they each set out the orders they thought appropriate. Their underlying purpose, however, was clear: the pronounced difference of opinion required that the matter be referred to a Full Bench, and Justice Balakrishanaiya issued an order for such a reference, apparently with the concurrence of Justice Kandaswami Pillai. The plaintiffs attempted to rely on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Lal Singh v. Ghansham Singh, arguing that the reference to a Full Bench was invalid and that the Mysore High Court therefore lacked authority to hear the appeal. In Lal Singh, the majority had held that where a two‑Judge bench issues judgments on an appeal without any reservation, the bench is not empowered to refer the matter to other Judges under section 575 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. That case involved a reference made on the basis of a difference of opinion that did not concern a question of law, and section 575(2) requires a legal question as a condition for such a reference; consequently the reference was deemed incompetent, a point emphasized by Justice Brodhust, who had been a member of the original two‑Judge bench. The present Court noted that the Mysore High Court regulation, section 15(3) of the 1884 enactment, contains no comparable limitation, and therefore the reasoning in Lal Singh does not apply. Moreover, the principle articulated in Lal Singh has not been endorsed by later authorities, such as Karali Charan Sarma v. Apurba Krishna Bajpeyi, Umar Baksh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, and Jehangir v. Secretary of State, where the focus was on the intention of judges who expressed differing views. Finally, the Mysore High Court itself, in Nanjamma v. Lingappa, affirmed that it is not unlawful to refer a case under section 15(3) after the judges have recorded their individual judgments, including the final orders, without any reservations.

The judges had recorded judgments that included the final orders they were to make, and they did so without any reservations. It was observed in a previous judgment that “The long standing practice of this Court is that one of the Judges makes a reference by a mere record in the order (1) (1930) I L.R. 58 Cal. 549. (2) (1931) I.L.R. 12 Lah. 725. (3) (1903) 6 Bom. L.R. 131, 206. (4) 4 L.R. Mys. 118. sheet after the judgements are separately pronounced.” This observation indicates that the Mysore High Court had a settled practice of referring cases under section 15(3) after the judges had delivered differing opinions together with the final orders intended for the appeal on those opinions. When assessing the competence of a foreign court, this Court could not ignore the established practice of that foreign court even if that practice was not strictly mandated by the procedural law of the foreign State. Whether the procedure of the foreign court, so long as it does not offend natural justice, is valid is a matter for the foreign court itself to decide, not for the court where the foreign judgment is pleaded as conclusive. In Brijlal Ramjidas v. Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria (1) the Judicial Committee, while examining the authority of the Indore High Court to transfer proceedings from the District Court of Indore, observed that the question of whether a foreign court is the “proper Court” to deal with a particular matter according to the law of the foreign country is for the courts of that country. The Committee affirmed that some court in Indore was unquestionably a court of competent jurisdiction and that it was for the High Court of Indore to interpret its own law and procedural rules, making its decision that the High Court was the “proper” court conclusive. Consequently, the Madras High Court could not investigate the propriety of the procedure followed by the Mysore High Court in referring the case to a Full Bench, and the judgment of the Mysore Full Bench was not vulnerable to attack on the ground of lack of competence because the referral occurred after the two judges constituting the bench had delivered separate and complete opinions expressing their views on the disputed points. In the plaint filed in the Bangalore District Court, the plaintiffs claimed possession of the property listed in the schedule on the ground that those and other properties belonged to the joint family of which they and their father Ramalingam Mudaliar were members, and that they were entitled to the property by survivorship upon Ramalingam’s death. Schedule “B” to the plaint identified the business at Kolar Gold Fields as the first item. The trial court decreed the claim, but the High Court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit. The Attorney‑General submitted that the judgment of the Mysore High Court was conclusive between the parties concerning all matters adjudicated therein, and that the Madras High Court, in considering the suit, should treat that foreign judgment as binding on the issues directly decided.

In the suit filed in the Madras Court, the plaintiffs were prevented from examining whether the business of the Kolar Gold Fields formed part of the separate estate of Ramalingam. It was argued that the question of ownership of that business had already been directly decided by the Mysore High Court, a court that was competent both under the international law principles governing judicial authority and under the municipal law of Mysore. Accordingly, the parties contended that the Mysore judgment should be regarded as conclusive in the Madras proceedings. To support this contention, reliance was placed on the definition of “foreign judgment” found in section 2(9) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and on the use of the term “matter” in section 13 of the same Code. The submission emphasized that a foreign judgment is conclusive with respect to any issue that it directly adjudicates, but that the reasons articulated by the foreign court do not form part of the conclusive element. Section 13 therefore makes the final adjudication, that is, the judgment itself, binding, not the underlying reasoning, as illustrated by the decision in Brijlal Ramjidas v. Govindram Gordhandas (1). Section 13 effectively incorporates a branch of the doctrine of res judicata into the law relating to foreign judgments, yet it does not render every foreign judgment binding in Indian courts. For a foreign judgment to be conclusive, it must emanate from a court that is competent both under the law of the state that created the court and under international standards, and it must have directly decided the “matter” that is being pleaded as res judicata. The term “matter” in section 13 is not synonymous with “subject‑matter”; it refers to the specific right that is claimed. Consequently, a judgment will be conclusive only when it directly addresses the right in dispute, the adjudication involves the same parties, and the foreign court possesses the requisite jurisdiction. Supporting this view, Story, in his “Conflict of Laws” (Eighth Edition, p. 768, s. 551), observes that any attempt by a foreign tribunal to assert jurisdiction over immovable property is fundamentally futile and that such a decree can never be executed against the land. Likewise, Dicey, in “Conflict of Laws” (Seventh Edition, Rule 85), states that all rights concerning immovable land are, subject to certain exceptions, governed by the law of the country where the land is situated (lex situs). The exceptions are not material to the present case. Dicey further comments (p. 513) that the sovereign of the land‑situated country has absolute authority over that land, can alone confer effective rights, and that its courts ordinarily alone have jurisdiction. Hence, a decision by an English court that conflicts with the lex situs would, in most circumstances, be ineffective.

The Court mentioned the phrase “a brutum fulmen” and then turned to the decision in Compandia de Mocambique v. British, South C. De Souza v. Samb, where Justice Wright observed at page 366 that, as a general principle of jurisdiction, the title to land must be determined directly by the court of the country in which the land is situated, rather than merely applying the law of that country; he added that this principle was consistent with the rule normally adopted by the jurisprudence of other nations. Consequently, the title to immovable property could be determined only by the law of the State and by the courts of the State where the property is located. The Court explained that a decision of a foreign court that directly concerns the title to immovable property within that foreign court’s jurisdiction would be regarded as conclusive between the same parties by Indian courts; however, such a decision would have no effect on claims to immovable property that lie outside the foreign court’s jurisdiction, even when the parties alleged that the basis of title in both jurisdictions was the same. The Court further stated that because a foreign court lacked competence to try a suit involving immovable property not situated within its own territory, the reasons on which that foreign decision was based could not prevent an Indian court from examining the title to other property that fell within the Indian courts’ jurisdiction, even if the other property was claimed to be held under the same title. The Court emphasized that every issue and every component of an issue relating to the title of immovable property must be decided by the court that has jurisdiction over the location of that property; to accept the authority of a foreign court to decide even a part of that issue would amount to recognizing that foreign court’s authority to decide all components of the issue. The Court then referred to the case Boyse v. Colclough, in which the English Court of Chancery was asked to consider the effect of a decree of an Irish court that had declared a will of the deceased Colclough invalid; the will concerned lands situated in both England and Ireland. After the Irish court declared the will invalid, the plaintiff who had been devised the estate under that will filed a bill in the English Court of Chancery seeking a declaration that the will was valid and that the immovable property in England passed according to the will. The defendant argued that the Irish decree, being a judgment of a competent court between the parties on the validity of the will, should be conclusive. The Court, presided over by Justice Wood, rejected the defendant’s plea and observed that the foreign court in that case neither tried nor could try the effect of the testator’s will on land situated in England.

In the English proceedings, the Court of Chancery examined an alleged will that claimed to devise certain estates situated in Ireland. The Court ordered that an issue be framed to test the validity of that will, and the issue was finally decided against the will’s validity. Consequently, the Court concluded that the instrument could not operate as a devise of the Irish estates. The matter was later re‑presented before the same Court, and the judgment on that subsequent hearing was reported in (1855) K.& J. 502—69 E.R. 557. To avoid any misunderstanding, the Court directed that any order it issued concerning the establishment of the will must be expressly confined to the limits of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction.

The case of Chockalinga v. Doraiswamy arose when two parties each claimed the right to act as trustee of three religious endowments known as the Chidambaram, Mailam and Alapakkam charities. All the lands belonging to the Chidambaram charity were situated in British India, and the charitable activities were to be carried out in British India as well. The Mailam charity was intended to be administered both in British India and in Pondicherry, which was then a French territory; most of its immovable property lay in Pondicherry, with only a single parcel in British India. A suit filed in the Subordinate Judge’s Court at Pondicherry held that the first defendant, Doraiswamy, could not serve as trustee because the original trustee, Murugayya, lacked the power to appoint him. The appellate court reversed that decision and declared that Doraiswamy had been validly appointed. Thereafter, a suit was instituted in a British Indian court to question Doraiswamy’s authority to manage the immovable property located in British India. The British Indian court ruled that, with respect to the Alapakkam charities, neither the plaintiff nor the first defendant possessed any rights, since the deed of settlement provided that the trusteeship would descend to the sons of Mtirugayya. Regarding the Chidambaram charities, the court held that the Pondicherry court had no jurisdiction because all the properties were situated in British India and the charitable activities were to be performed there. Concerning the Mailam charity, Kumaraswami Sastri, J., observed that the order of the Pondicherry court was not binding on the property situated in British India, but, given the nature of the trust and the impracticality of maintaining separate management and income appropriation, the British Indian courts were justified in upholding the claim of the trustee appointed by the Pondicherry court. Finally, Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., held that, since the Mailam charity had its domicile in the French territory, the decision of the French Court concerning the appointment of the trustee and the restoration of the trustee’s office was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

In the judgment the Court explained the meaning of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision was based on the theory of the domicile of a trust, a theory that the learned judge described as “inappropriate”. Nevertheless the judge held that, when the principles of private international law are properly applied and appreciated, the court that is competent to determine questions relating to the office of trusteeship under section 13 is the court that can be regarded as the court of the situs of the trust. The author of this view, Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar, expressed an opinion that is difficult to accept. It is, however, significant that both learned judges agreed that a judgment rendered by a foreign court concerning the Chidambaram trust and the Alapakkam trust did not bind the Indian courts. The executors relied on several English decisions – namely Samson Ricardo and Johan Lewis Ricardo v. Garcias (1), Elizabeth Hendren v. Bathal Hendren (2) and Bank of Australia v. Nios (3) – but none of these cases involved a foreign judgment being treated as conclusive in a suit that dealt with title to immovable property in England. The decision in Dogliani v. Crispin (4) was likewise inapplicable to the executors’ plea.

The case of Dogliani v. Crispin involved a judgment of a Portuguese court that declared the defendant to be the illegitimate son of Henry Crispin and therefore entitled, under Portuguese law, to inherit Henry Crispin’s property. Henry Crispin was described as a plebeian rather than a noble and was domiciled in Portugal. That Portuguese judgment was held to be binding between the parties in an administration proceeding before the English Court of Probate concerning Government of England stock. The English court, however, was not called upon to decide any question of title to immovable property situated in England. The rule of conclusiveness of a foreign judgment embodied in section 13 operates differently from the rule of res judicata. Both rules arise from the principle that judgments rendered by competent courts must be respected, but the scope of each rule diverges. Res judicata applies to every matter that was raised, heard and finally decided in a previous suit between the same parties, including issues that could have been raised as a defence or a claim in that earlier suit. In contrast, the rule of conclusiveness of foreign judgments applies only to the matters that were directly adjudicated by the foreign court. Consequently, not every issue finally decided in a foreign jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties; only the final judgment itself has binding effect. Moreover, the question of whether a court is competent to apply the doctrine of res judicata is determined strictly by the municipal law of that court, whereas the competence of a foreign tribunal must satisfy a dual test of competence under the law of the state in which it sits and also in an international sense.

The Court observed that for a foreign tribunal to be competent, it must satisfy a two‑fold requirement: it must be competent under the law of the State in which it operates, and it must also meet the competence standard recognised in international law. The Attorney‑General had submitted that the plaintiffs’ claim in the Mysore proceedings concerned succession to the estate of Ramalingam, and that the decision of the Mysore Court on the right of succession was conclusive of every piece of property, whether within or beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The Court held that this submission did not bind it. In fact, the suit as framed did not seek to determine succession to Ramalingam’s estate. The plaintiffs asserted that, by virtue of the well‑known rule of coparcenary succession, they had acquired an interest in the property by birth, and that Ramalingam’s interest was extinguished upon his death. The law governing succession to immovable property is the lex situs, while succession to movable property follows the law of the deceased’s domicile. However, the appeals before the Court raised issues not of the law applicable to the devolution of the estate, but of the title that the testator could create by his will. Such title, the Court explained, must be decided by the courts of the country where the immovable property is situated, based on the evidence adduced before those courts. In examining whether the suit related to succession, the Court noted that earlier cases dealing with the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, and with the Federal Legislature’s power to impose estate duty on non‑agricultural land, chiefly addressed the legislative power over a co‑parcener’s interest in a joint Hindu family and therefore bore little relevance to the present dispute. Moreover, the suits did not concern the personal status of Ramalingam or his sons.

The plaintiffs had contended before the Mysore High Court that Ramalingam’s will was invalid because, under the Hindu law governing him, he lacked the competence to dispose of joint family property. The core of the dispute, therefore, was the nature of the property devised by the will. The Mysore High Court held that the property bequeathed under the will was self‑acquired by Ramalingam and did not attempt to resolve any question of the parties’ personal status. The Court then turned to the allegation that the judgment of the Mysore High Court was rendered coram non judice. The plaintiffs argued that the judges constituting the Full Bench were biased, had a personal interest in the controversy, and had denied the plaintiffs an opportunity to present their defence. They further alleged that Mr Medappa, who presided over the Full Bench, had previously tried the probate proceeding in which Ramalingam’s will was upheld and that, in the judgment in

In the appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court had been tainted by bias and vindictiveness. They contended that the presiding judge, Mr. Medappa, had previously acted as the probate judge who upheld the will of Ramalingam and, in that capacity, had issued severe criticisms against “the family of the plaintiffs” and against the witnesses who supported the caveators. The plaintiffs further asserted that Mr. Medappa was a close friend of A. Wajid, the first executor named in the will, and that, for many years before and after his appointment to the High Court, he had used a motor car belonging to the estate that was now the subject of the dispute. It was also alleged that Mr. Medappa had attempted to discourage Raju, the advocate representing the plaintiffs, from appearing for them in the suit concerning the estate.

The plaintiffs additionally challenged the participation of Mr. Balakrishnanayya on the Full Bench. They argued that he should not have sat as a judge because he was expected to be examined as a witness in a matter relating to the proof of settlement between the parties. According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Balakrishnanayya had already formed a definitive opinion on the merits of the appeal and therefore was prejudiced against them. They claimed that, while hearing the appeals together with Justice Kandaswami Pillai, Mr. Balakrishnanayya made numerous observations indicating an unwillingness to entertain argument, to reconsider his views, or to reach an independent conviction based on the merits of the dispute. The plaintiffs maintained that the entire proceeding in the Mysore High Court had been conducted in an atmosphere of vindictiveness toward them, and that the intermittent orders and observations issued by Mr. Medappa and Mr. Balakrishnanayya at various stages of the hearing left no doubt that the two judges were biased and had denied the plaintiffs a proper opportunity to present their case before the Court.

Before addressing these allegations, the Court found it necessary to consider the contention raised by the executors that the plaintiffs were not permitted to raise a challenge based on bias, prejudice, vindictiveness, or interest of the judges constituting the bench. The executors submitted that, according to recent developments in private international law, a plea that a foreign judgment is contrary to natural justice is admissible only where the party invoking the plea had not been duly served or had been deprived of a chance to be heard. Relying on the editors of Dicey’s “Conflict of Laws,” seventh edition, Rule 186, pages 1010‑1011, the executors argued that a foreign judgment could be attacked solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, not on the ground that the proceedings leading to the judgment were conducted in a manner opposed to natural justice. They further cited Cheshire’s “Private International Law,” sixth edition, pages 675‑677, which described the need to define precisely the scope of the expression “contrary to natural justice.” The executors emphasized that this expression should be confined to a glaring defect in the procedural rules of the foreign law, rather than to a broader allegation of bias.

In this case the Court observed that the expression “contrary to natural justice” had become prominent in judicial language, but its exact scope could be limited to a clear defect in the procedural rules of the foreign law. The Court cited an early observation of Denman, C.J., who had stated that injustice is not presumed unless it is evident that the foreign law, or at least part of the foreign proceedings, is repugnant to natural justice, and that such a question had often been examined by Indian courts. In other words, the courts were careful to ensure that a defendant had not been denied the chance to present his case. The maxim audi alteram partem was described as having universal application, not confined to domestic law. The Court noted that the problem had been narrowed to two situations: first, the assumption of jurisdiction over a defendant who was absent; second, a violation of natural justice when a litigant who was present at the hearing was unfairly prejudiced in presenting his case. The Court said that it was unnecessary to decide whether the passages relied upon could be interpreted in the suggested way, because private international law was merely a branch of the municipal law of the State whose court was called upon to enforce a foreign judgment. Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) provided that a foreign judgment was not conclusive if the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained was opposed to natural justice. Whatever the rule of private international law in England or elsewhere concerning natural justice – and for the purpose of argument the Court assumed that in other jurisdictions the plea that a foreign judgment was opposed to natural justice was limited to lack of due notice and denial of an opportunity to be heard – the plea had to be considered in light of Indian statutory law. The Court found that section 13 of the Code did not impose the suggested restriction. By that section a foreign judgment was conclusive as to any matter directly adjudicated between the same parties, but the Court emphasized that a judgment must be obtained after observance of the minimum requirements of natural justice. Those requirements included an impartial tribunal, fair and unbiased conduct, good‑faith deliberation, reasonable notice to the parties, and a reasonable opportunity for each party to present its case. Consequently, a foreign judgment of a competent court remained conclusive even if it was based on an erroneous view of the evidence or the law, provided that those minimum requirements of the judicial process were satisfied.

In this case the Court explained that a foreign judgment may be treated as conclusive only when the minimum requirements of natural justice have been satisfied during the judicial process that produced it. The Court emphasized that the correctness of the judgment in law or on the evidence is not a condition for recognition of its conclusiveness by the municipal court. Accordingly, the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction, and even the procedural law applied in the foreign trial, need not be the same or similar to the law governing the municipal court. The Court then quoted the observations of Charwell, J, in Robinson v. Fenner, stating that “In any view of it, the judgment appears, according to our law, to be clearly wrong, but that of course is not enough: Godard v. Gray and whatever the expression ‘contrary to natural justice’, which is used in so many cases, means (and there really is very little authority indeed as to what it does mean), I think that it is not enough to say that a decision is very wrong, any more than it is merely to say that it is wrong. It is not enough, therefore, to say that the result works injustice in the particular case, because a wrong decision always does.” The Court clarified that a judgment will not be conclusive if the proceeding in which it was obtained is opposed to natural justice. The statutory language makes clear that to exclude a judgment under clause (d) from the rule of conclusiveness, the procedure must be shown to be contrary to natural justice.

The Court further observed that a judgment that results from bias or a lack of impartiality on the part of a judge will be regarded as a nullity and described as a trial “coram non judice”, citing Vassilades v. Vassilades and Manik Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand. The Court then turned to the specific objections raised against the two judges, Mr. Medappa and Mr. Balakrishnan, who were alleged to have shown bias and partiality, both individually and collectively as a court. In considering the evidence, the Court noted that the judgment under review originated from a foreign tribunal constituted according to the laws of that foreign State for hearing the appeal. The Court also observed that the conduct of the plaintiffs and their counsel appeared, to the learned judges, to be seeking unreasonable indulgence or even deliberate obstruction. The judges, in issuing the various orders upon which the plea of bias, prejudice, and interest was based, were primarily concerned with achieving effective progress and disposal of the appeals. It was regrettable, the Court said, that all material evidence bearing on the allegations of bias, prejudice, interest, and hostility did not come on record because of certain orders passed by the Madras High Court. Additionally, the plaintiff’s advocate, Raju, could not be examined at the hearing of the suit because he was undergoing a long term of imprisonment, and the commission issued by the Madras High Court to examine him as a witness could not be executed.

Because, as Justice Ramaswamy remarked in his characteristic style, the case was hampered by “interminable legal obstacles and conundrums which arose,” the process of taking testimony was problematic. An order had been issued for the examination of Mr Medappa and a commission was appointed, but the executors ultimately failed to call him for examination. Similarly, Mr Balakrishanaiya was examined before the Court, yet his testimony remained incomplete because Justice Rajagopalan had issued an order limiting the scope of inquiry, a limitation that had been affirmed by the Appellate Court.

The record shows that the executors applied to the learned Judge seeking an order that the suit be heard on a preliminary issue, specifically that the suit was “barred as res judicata because of the judgment of the Mysore High Court.” They also requested that witnesses be examined in Bangalore on the allegation raised by the plaintiffs that Mr Medappa and Mr Balakrishanaiya displayed pronounced hostility and bias. The learned Judge responded by holding that, on the basis of the application against the two judges of the Mysore High Court, it was not permissible to investigate the manner in which the appeals had been conducted or to refer to the decisions rendered in other related or unrelated proceedings that the judges eventually heard. However, the Judge observed that on the specific plea of bias, prejudice and hostality, evidence concerning the way the proceedings had been conducted by the judges and the various orders they had made was, in the Court’s view, material.

Justice Rajagopalan allowed evidence to be led on only two matters: first, that Mr Medappa had been using a motor car belonging to the estate of the deceased; and second, that Mr Medappa had sent for Raju, counsel for the plaintiffs, and had allegedly attempted to dissuade Raju from taking up the plaintiffs’ case and appearing for the plaintiffs’ family. The executors appealed Justice Rajagopalan’s order, and the Madras High Court held that an enquiry into the alleged use of the “Mercedes car” belonging to the estate by Mr Medappa was not permissible. The High Court judges explained that the plaintiffs had not alleged that Mr Medappa, then Chief Justice, claimed ownership of the Mercedes car, which would have rendered him incompetent to decide on the title to the properties under section 13 (a). The allegation was merely that he used the car for himself, his wife and children, without any indication of whether the use was free or for hire. No claim for any dues in respect of the alleged use of the car had been made by the plaintiffs or any other party. The car was said to have been used during 1943‑45 when Mr Medappa, then a District Judge in Bangalore Cantonment, was hearing a probate application, and it was sold in 1945 or 1946, well before Mr Medappa, as Chief Justice, sat on the Full Bench. The judges concluded that, on the basis of these facts, it would be excessive to say that the Chief Justice was “coram” in the matter.

The Court observed that the allegation that the judge sat on the Full Bench while claiming to be a party to the estate, or that his participation violated principles of natural justice, was not supported by evidence. The plaintiffs contended that Mr Medappa had been a judge of the High Court at Mysore in 1944, a claim that was fully substantiated by the material placed on record. No evidence was presented that the Mercedes car had been disposed of in the period 1915‑46, and the evidence regarding the use of the motor car had been excluded by the earlier order. No direct proof was tendered concerning any attempt by Mr Medappa to persuade the advocate not to appear for the plaintiffs in the District Court. The only possible direct evidence of such alleged persuasion could have been the testimony of the advocate himself and of Mr Medappa; however, neither party was called for examination, and consequently their evidence did not enter the record. Nevertheless, indirect evidence was offered before the High Court relating to the purported persuasion. The advocate had filed an affidavit in June 1950 in these proceedings, which sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the execution of the decree dated from Appeals Nos 104 and 109 of 1947‑48 of the Mysore High Court, on the ground that Mr Medappa and Mr Balakrishnan, who sat on the Bench, were unfit to hear and determine the appeals, rendering the High Court’s judgment void. In that affidavit the advocate stated that he had acted for the plaintiffs who had instituted two suits against the executors of Ramalingam’s estate and that, during the latter part of 1945 and the early months of 1946, Mr P. Medappa, then a puisne judge of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore, had tried to dissuade him from representing the family of Ramalingam and had harshly criticized the family members. The Court noted that this affidavit could not form the basis of a finding, because the advocate was alive and could have been examined, no order had been made to accept affidavit evidence in lieu of testimony, and the executors had been denied any opportunity to cross‑examine the advocate on the statements made therein. The first plaintiff, Vishwanath, testified that before the hearing of the appeals before the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court, he had been told by the advocate that Mr Medappa had attempted to dissuade him from appearing for the plaintiffs in the Bangalore District Court. He further recounted that on 25 July 1949, during the hearing of the appeals before the Full Bench, the advocate had openly declared in Court that he was not competent to take up the case because of the persuasion by the Chief Justice, adding that Chief Justice Medappa had summoned him and persuaded him not to appear on behalf of Ramalingam’s family, which had caused Chief Justice Medappa to become upset and to refuse to hear the matter.

Medappa had refused to hear Raju. The plaintiff further testified that Mr. Puttaraj Urs, who had previously served as a judge of the Mysore High Court, told him that Raju had confided to Urs that Medappa had asked Raju not to appear for the plaintiffs’ family, had sent for Raju and had dissuaded him from representing Ramalinga’s family. Elaborate arguments were then presented to the Court concerning the veracity of the statements made by Vishwanath and by Puttaraj Urs. It was contended that the allegation of Raju’s dissuasion had first been asserted in the Madras High Court on 7 April 1950 and that Vishwanath had not made such a claim in the Mysore Court or in the petitions addressed to His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore seeking the constitution of an ad hoc Bench for hearing the appeals. The opposing side pointed out that there were at least two earlier occasions in the Madras High Court when Vishwanath could have raised the same allegations that he later relied upon in his affidavit dated 7 April 1950. Strong reliance was also placed on a letter dated 21 August 1952, written by the first plaintiff Vishwanath to the executor Abdul Wajid, in which Vishwanath asserted that the accusations set out in Application No. 444 of 1950 and in the affidavit filed in the Madras High Court—that the judges of the Mysore High Court were prejudiced and that Medappa had used the estate motor‑car and had asked Raju not to appear for the plaintiffs—had been urged by his advocates as the only means of challenging the Full Bench’s judgment. According to this letter, Vishwanath claimed that his advocates had assured him of the truth of those allegations and had promised to supply supporting evidence, and that, relying on those assurances, he had incorporated the allegations into his affidavit.

The plaintiff later stated that, when pressed for proof, he could not locate any credible evidence to substantiate the allegations and consequently withdrew them, proposing to place no evidence on those points for the determination of the preliminary issue. The Court observed that this matter did not require a detailed examination because there was no direct evidence that Medappa had attempted to dissuade Raju during the trial‑court hearing, and the indirect material presented was largely hearsay and otherwise infirm. The testimony of Puttaraj Urs was deemed of little probative value, as he possessed no personal knowledge of any such dissuasion and merely repeated what he had heard from Raju; consequently, the truth of the statement could not be established by this indirect method. Likewise, Vishwanath’s evidence concerning what Raju purportedly told him before the appeals were heard was considered without value. Regarding the incident alleged to have occurred in the court on 25 July 1949, Vishwanath’s account conflicted with the statements of the two executors, Abdul Wajid and Narayanaswamy, and no further questions were raised on that point.

After the inquiry was directed to Mr Balakrishanaiya, the Court examined the material that had been placed before it and concluded that it could not in good conscience depart from the view expressed by the High Court. The High Court had held that the allegation that Mr Medappa had persuaded Raju, who acted as counsel for the “plaintiffs, family,” was not proved by the evidence. The present Court agreed with that assessment. Nevertheless, the Court felt it necessary to address the argument advanced by the executors that a letter dated 21 August 1952 supplied proof of the claims concerning the alleged dissuasion of Raju and the alleged use of the estate’s motor car. The Court found that the letter could not be taken as reliable evidence of an after‑thought made by Vishwanatha at the behest of his own counsel. The letter in question had been written while Suit No 214 of 1944 was pending before the Madras High Court. In that suit the judgment of the Mysore High Court was challenged on the ground that the judges who had heard the appeals were interested and biased. Justice Rajagopalan had reserved to the plaintiffs the limited liberty to adduce evidence on only those two matters. In the circumstances, the Court was unable to accept that Vishwanatha, of his own volition, would have addressed a letter to the executor, Mr Wajid, which would substantially undermine the executors’ case for setting aside the Mysore High Court judgment.

Vishwanatha testified that he had prepared the August 21, 1952 letter at the request of Mr Wajid in order to “prove his bona fides with Medappa.” He explained that the letter was drafted in Bangalore, in the office of one Subramaniam, who was the brother of the executor Narayanaswami, and that it was written in the presence of Mr Wajid roughly two or three months before August 1952. Vishwanatha further stated that, at that time, there were meetings and discussions involving the commissioner and that Mr Wajid had told him that the letter was necessary to establish his good‑faith relationship with Medappa before any compromise could be reached. Mr Wajid, however, denied that he had persuaded Vishwanatha to write the letter. The Court found the story concerning the delivery of the letter to Mr Wajid’s residence to be highly improbable; Mr Wajid asserted that the letter had been handed to him by an unknown person while he was absent. Subsequently, a second letter, addressed to S N Subramaniam—brother of Narayanaswami—dated 25 August 1952, was produced. That letter referred to the earlier 21 August letter and stated that a copy of the earlier letter had been sent to Subramaniam. In it, Vishwanatha appealed to Subramaniam, described as a “well‑wisher of the family” and a friend of his father, to consider the family’s plight and to intercede with the executor so as to secure as much benefit as possible through compromise. A photostat of this second letter was also produced by Mr Wajid. Vishwanatha maintained that this second letter too had been prepared at Mr Wajid’s request. He affirmed that the first letter was intended to be shown to Mr Medappa, whereas the second letter had been composed by Mr Wajid. The record concludes with the words “Wajid, bad.”

The Court rejected the allegations that Vishwanatha had voluntarily composed the two letters in which he admitted that the accusations that Medappa was biased against him, and the basis for those accusations, were fabricated shortly before 7 April 1950 at the urging of the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Although Mr Medappa had presided over the probate proceeding and had dismissed the caveat filed by the plaintiffs, the Court found no basis to conclude that he possessed any interest in the matters under appeal or that he harboured bias against the plaintiffs. No portion of the probate judgment was pointed out to the Court that could provide a ground for inferring bias. The fact that some witnesses appeared in both the probate case and the suit for declaration of title submitted by the plaintiffs does not, by itself, establish bias, even though Mr Medappa, as District Judge, had earlier tried the suit limited strictly to the validity of the will and later served as a member of the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court that adjudicated the title question raised by the plaintiffs. The assertion that Mr Medappa and Wajid were close friends was not contradicted by the executors. In an affidavit filed in June 1950, the first plaintiff Vishwanatha claimed that Mr Medappa was a friend of the executors, that he held the position of Chief Steward of the Turf Club, and that the first executor, Wajid, was the Secretary, describing them as “intimate and bosom friends.” Wajid did not repudiate these statements; he merely explained that he had briefly acted as Honorary Secretary of the Bangalore Race Club for about three months as a temporary measure after the removal of the permanent secretary, and that he was a Committee Member appointed for that short period. He further noted that Mr Justice P Medappa had been appointed by His Highness the Maharaja as a steward of the club, and he submitted that it would be insulting and improper to suggest that a judge was biased merely because he associated socially with other gentlemen of the State in the course of his public and social duties. In an affidavit dated 5 July 1950, Vishwanatha reiterated that Mr Medappa and Abdul Wajid had been “very intimate friends, and chums for over a decade.” Although Mr Balakrishnanaiya indeed heard the appeals while sitting with Chief Justice Paramashivaiah, the plaintiffs contend that after a fortnight of arguments, Mr Balakrishnanaiya proposed that the parties consider a compromise. Mr Balakrishnanaiya denied making such a suggestion, stating that it was the parties themselves who chose to negotiate a settlement. Even assuming that he had suggested exploring a compromise, the Court held that such a suggestion does not, in itself, demonstrate bias on his part. The record also shows that, sitting with Justice Kandaswami Pillai on 15 March 1949, he declined to order an inquiry into a compromise proposed by the plaintiffs on the ground that recording the compromise would completely negate the testator’s intention; although that order may have been legally questionable, it does not justify an inference of bias against Mr Balakrishnanaiya.

The Court noted that a decree had been passed ordering an inquiry into the compromise proposed by the plaintiffs on the basis that recording the compromise would “result in the entire intention of the testator being completely negatived.” The Court assumed, without expressing a definitive opinion, that the order might have been legally erroneous; nevertheless, the Court held that the very existence of that order could not by itself give rise to a finding of bias on the part of Mr Balakrishanaiya.

Further allegations were recorded against Mr Balakrishanaiya. It was claimed that he never “disguised his hatred” toward the widow and children of Ramalingam and that he had “openly declared it by his frequent observations and interruptions in the course of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s arguments,” as stated in an affidavit filed in June 1950 in the proceedings before this Court for a writ of prohibition. In addition, an affidavit of Vishwanath dated 7 April 1949 alleged that from the outset Mr Balakrishanaiya had become “openly hostile” and that his hostility had intensified after the retirement of Chief Justice Paramshivayya.

During the cross‑examination, Mr Balakrishanaiya denied any suggestion that he was hostile toward members of “the plaintiffs’ family.” The Court observed that an order of Justice Rajagopalan had prevented any inquiry into these matters, and consequently not all the material evidence was before the Court. Vishwanath’s testimony did not include any reference to the statements that were alleged to have been made by Mr Balakrishanaiya and from which bias might be inferred. Accordingly, the Court could not accept the plaintiffs’ plea that Mr Balakrishanaiya’s conduct at the hearing of the appeal, conducted with Justice Kandaswami Pillai, supported a finding of bias.

The plaintiffs had argued that, after they informed the Court that Mr Balakrishanaiya was to be examined as a witness in the compromise petition, he should not have sat on the Full Bench. The Court found no substance in that contention. The application for recording the compromise had been disposed of on 15 March 1949, and the Court, without investigating the truth or falsity of the compromise, declined to permit it on the sole ground that it was “contrary to the intention of the testator.” Once that decision was made, there was no longer any scope for an inquiry into the truth of the plaintiffs’ plea concerning the alleged compromise between them and the executors.

The Court considered that it would have been more in keeping with justice if the application for recording the compromise had been posted for hearing before a bench on which Mr Balakrishanaiya was not a member, especially since the plaintiffs had formally objected to his participation. Nevertheless, the mere fact that he was a member of the bench as constituted did not, on the record, give rise to an inference of bias. According to Vishwanath, Mr Balakrishanaiya had explained that he was “sitting for hearing the appeals” with Justice Kandaswami Pillai because he had been directed to do so by the Chief Justice, and that Mr Balakrishanaiya had given Vishwanath liberty to approach the Chief Justice for an order constituting another bench. Vishwanath further stated that he had indeed gone to see the Chief Justice, but the Chief Justice ordered him out of the chamber.

The Chief Justice ordered the petitioner out of his chamber when the petitioner went to see the Chief Justice. The final ground on which the allegation of bias was raised concerned the fact that Mr Balakrishanaiya had delivered a judgment on the merits of the dispute, had included in that judgment the ultimate order to be passed in the appeal, and then referred the case to a Full Bench while also sitting as a member of that Full Bench after having formed his mind on the merits of the appeal. It was argued that this course of conduct violated the principles of natural justice. Submissions were made that a judicial trial required the judge to be unbiased and to have no predilections for either party, and that the judgment already delivered by Mr Balakrishnanaiya served as strong evidence that he had already decided the case, rendering him incompetent to sit on the Full Bench for hearing the appeals.

The Attorney‑General drew the Court’s attention to a large number of decisions of courts in India and England supporting the proposition that, in the absence of a statutory provision, a judge was not prohibited from sitting in an appeal or in an application against his own judgment. The Attorney‑General also cited several decisions of the Allahabad High Court which held that, under section 575 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1882, judges who differed should sit together on a bench with other judges and decide the appeal. Illustrative cases mentioned included Rohilkhand and Kumaon Bank Ltd. v. Row. The Attorney‑General further referred to the practice in certain Chartered High Courts where judges presiding at a Sessions trial were associated at the hearing of a certificate granted by the Advocate‑General under article 26 of the Letters Patent, as in The King Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghosh and Emperor v. Fateh Chand Agarwalla. Additional authorities were cited in which, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court, judges who decided the proceeding at the first instance also sat in the Court of Appeal, such as Lyell v. Ganqa Dai, Daia Chand v. Sarfraz, Imam Ali v. Dasaundhi Ram, Nanak Chand v. Ram Narayan, Rup Kuari v. Ram Kirpa Shukul and Kallu Mal v. Brown. The statutory provision of Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, which permitted review before the judge who decides a suit or appeal, was also placed on record. Finally, reliance was placed upon R. v. Lovegrove, where it was held that, on an application or appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal in England, there was a general rule that no objection could be made to the trial judge sitting as a member of the Court to hear the application or appeal.

The judgment referred to a number of earlier authorities, namely 1924 Cal. 75 257, (3) (1916) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 477, (4) (1875) I.L.R. I All 60, (5) (1875) I.L.R. 1 All. 117, (6) (1877) I.L.R. I All. 508, (7) (1879) I.L.R. 2 All. 181, (8) (1880) T.L.R. 3 All. T41, (9) (1881) I.L.R. 3 All. 504 and (10) (1951) I.All. E.R. 804.

The Court observed that the fact a judge had delivered a decision did not, by itself, invalidate the judgment of the Court. In a narrow technical sense it was therefore correct to state that a judge was not legally disqualified from sitting on an appeal or an application that challenged his own earlier decision. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the judiciary was not intended to operate solely under a rigid legalism. It underscored that a fair trial required an atmosphere of calm detachment, dispassionate consideration and unbiased application of the mind.

The Court noted that since the Federal Court was created and subsequently given authority to hear appeals, no instance had been brought before it in which a judge who had tried a case in the High Court or elsewhere later sat on an appeal against his own judgment in the Federal Court or in this Court. It further observed that the practice, once common in several High Courts, of allowing a judge to sit on an appeal against a judgment he had rendered, had fallen into disuse and should continue to do so.

While acknowledging that historical reasons in England and certain technical views regarding the constitution of a bench might permit a judge to sit after expressing a final opinion, the Court held that such practice—allowing a judge to participate in an appeal against his own final decision—had little merit and should not be endorsed. Accordingly, the Court could not accept the argument that the fact Mr. Balakrishana iya had delivered a final opinion in the plaintiffs’ appeals and then sat on the Full Bench, even after the plaintiffs objected to his participation, could be entirely disregarded when assessing whether the plaintiffs received a fair trial and an adequate chance to present their case before an unbiased tribunal.

The Court further explained that if the surrounding evidence established a prima facie case of bias, the fact that Mr. Balakrishana iya, despite the plaintiffs’ objection, continued to sit on the Full Bench after expressing his final opinion must be taken into account. The Court then proceeded to examine the grounds raised by the plaintiffs, who claimed they were not given an opportunity to be heard before the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court, which they alleged was not composed of unbiased judges. The plaintiffs had previously succeeded before the District Judge in proving that …

In the probate proceeding, the Court found that the property disposed of by Ramalingam under his will dated 10 September 1942 constituted joint‑family property. The plaintiffs opposed this finding and filed appeals in December 1947. The appellate matter was taken up for hearing in September 1948, and the hearing extended for more than two weeks. On 20 September 1948 the Court adjourned the proceedings to give the parties an opportunity to negotiate a compromise. The plaintiffs allege that a settlement was reached, while the executors deny that any compromise was achieved. According to the plaintiffs, the terms of the alleged compromise were to be filed in Court on 22 November 1948; however, on that date Judge Paramshivayya was absent because he had been “compulsorily retired”. The Acting Chief Justice, Mr Medappa, was appointed in his place and was reportedly a friend of Wajid, the principal executor under Ramalingam’s will. The plaintiffs contended that Mr Medappa was biased against members of their family and that they did not wish the appeal to be heard by judges who had previously been involved in the case or who were close friends of a party.

On 5 January 1949 the plaintiffs filed an application urging the Court to request the Government of Mysore to constitute a special bench for their appeal. In that application they pointed out that Mr Balakrishanaiya would be required to appear as a witness in the compromise petition, that Mr Kandaswami Pillai had already delivered a judgment in a related proceeding, and that certain other judges had dissociated themselves from the matter. The Acting Chief Justice rejected this application on 10 January 1949. A second application dated 29 January 1949 sought the formation of an ad hoc special bench and also asked that the hearing be postponed; this request was dismissed on 7 February 1949 as “not maintainable”. The appeals were then scheduled for hearing on 14 February 1949, but at the request of the executors the Court adjourned the matter because the executors’ counsel was occupied with a case scheduled for that date in a Court in Orissa.

Another application dated 7 March 1949 asked for an adjournment to allow the Government to consider constituting a special ad hoc bench; the Acting Chief Justice rejected this request on 12 March 1949. On 15 March 1949 a bench composed of Mr Balakrishanaiya and Mr Kandaswami Pillai refused the plaintiffs’ request to record the purported compromise, and the appeals were subsequently taken up for hearing. At that stage the plaintiffs’ counsel filed an additional adjournment application, stating that an appeal against the probate order was pending before the Judicial Committee and that a decision on that appeal was awaited; this request was rejected on the ground that a similar application had already been dismissed. The plaintiffs maintain that during the hearing Mr Balakrishanaiya repeatedly observed, from time to time, that in his view there was no substantive merit to the plaintiffs’ case.

In an affidavit dated 7 April 1950, the plaintiff Vishwanath recounted the sequence of events that occurred in the Court. He explained that, according to his view, any further argument before Justice Balakrishanaiya had become practically impossible. He said his counsel, Mr N. R. Raghavachariar, had departed for Madras, and his other counsel, Sri L. S. Raju, had filed a memorandum requesting permission to retire because he believed he could no longer provide useful service to the clients under the prevailing circumstances. The opposing party objected to this retirement, and Sri L. S. Raju, who had already ceased presenting arguments, was asked whether he possessed the plaintiff’s consent to retire. Vishwanath was present in the Court at that moment, and Sri L. S. Raju replied that the retirement was made solely at Vishwanath’s request. At this stage Justice V. Kandaswami Pillai intervened, stating that he was newly joined to the case, had not yet formed an opinion, and asked Sri L. S. Raju to present the benefit of his arguments. Vishwanath further asserted in the same affidavit that Justice Balakrishanaiya had been openly hostile toward the plaintiffs. The Court, by an order of Justice Rajagopalan, prohibited the admission of any evidence on this portion of the case, so the record contains only the plaintiffs’ assertions and the executors’ denials. After the judgment delivered on 2 April 1949, the judges differed in opinion and consequently referred the matter to a larger Bench for further consideration.

Subsequent procedural developments were recorded by the Registrar of the High Court. On 23 June 1949, the Registrar notified that the appeals would be posted for hearing in the last week of July. On 4 July 1949, the plaintiffs submitted an application for adjournment, stating that Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, a leading member of the Madras Bar who had argued the appeals at an earlier hearing, was unable to attend the Court in July and requesting that the hearing be postponed so that he could appear and argue the appeals. The Registrar rejected this application on a technical ground whose precise nature could not be ascertained from the record. A further application was filed on 18 July 1949, accompanied by a letter from Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar explaining that he was proceeding to Delhi to attend meetings of the Constituent Assembly, of which he was a member, and therefore could not attend the July hearing. The application also indicated that the plaintiffs were engaging Mr Sarat Chandra Bose, a member of the Calcutta Bar, to appear in the appeals, but that he found September convenient. This second application was rejected as belated, and also because the parties had been litigating since December 1942, and the executors’ objections were deemed entitled to consideration. Finally, on 25 July 1949, another application supported by an affidavit was filed seeking an adjournment of the case and that an ad

According to the record, the bench that heard the matter did not include the Chief Justice or Justice Balakrishnanaiya. At the hearing of the adjournment application, there were reportedly heated exchanges in the courtroom between the Acting Chief Justice and the advocate L. S. Raju. In an affidavit dated 7 April 1950, Vishwanath described in paragraph 28 that the Officiating Chief Justice, P. Medappa, behaved very aggressively toward him and used rude language. Medappa allegedly threatened Vishwanath, insisting that he disclose to whom he had consulted in preparing the affidavit and warning that failure to do so would result in Vishwanath being “sent to fail.” Vishwanath stated that he was terrified and, when he mentioned that among other counsel he had consulted Sri L. S. Raju, Medappa responded, “I am glad you mentioned it; I know what to do for him.” Paragraph 29 records that, later on the same day, Medappa asked Messrs N. R. Raghavachariar and L. S. Raju to reveal what had been discussed between Vishwanath and them concerning the affidavit. Both lawyers refused, citing professional confidentiality. In paragraph 30 Vishwanath notes that, apparently disgusted and occupied with other matters, Mr. N. R. Raghavachariar left for Madras the same day and filed a memorandum of retirement, and Sri L. S. Raju also submitted a retirement memorandum. The order rejecting the adjournment application was pronounced in the afternoon of 25 July 1949, yet the hearing of the appeal was taken up in the same afternoon.

An affidavit dated 11 April 1950 was filed in the Madras High Court by the executors in response to the affidavit of 7 April 1950. That later affidavit made no denial of the allegations concerning the events of 25 July 1949. The testimony of Justice Balakrishnanaiya, although somewhat vague, appears to lend support to the description of that day as a “stormy session.” When questioned whether he recalled the first day, that is, 25 July 1949, being “very stormy,” he replied that he “did not understand.” On being asked whether Medappa had threatened the respondent to disclose the name of the advocate who drafted the affidavit, his answer indicated there was a question about whether the affidavit had been prepared by the party alone or with counsel’s assistance. He was then asked a composite question about whether Medappa had threatened to imprison him. He explained that the “storm” referred to the tumult of the courtroom, noting that the other counsel were so distracted that they could not hear what was being said between Medappa and others. He gave no direct answer to the first part of the question, and his recorded response was that, as far as they were concerned, they were “never distracted.” The witness also denied that Medappa had told the first plaintiff, Vishwanath, that when the disclosure was made… (the record ends incomplete).

In this case the record showed that the affidavit was prepared by Raju and that Mr Medappa asserted that he knew what should be done. When the Court required the appeal to be heard on 25 July 1949, both Raju and N R Raghavachariar, who was a member of the Madras Bar, submitted applications seeking leave to withdraw from the proceedings. An order refusing those applications was entered without delay. An order dated 25 July 1949 recorded the permission to retire from the case; however, for reasons not evident from the record, that order was not pronounced until 27 July 1949. Arguments were heard on 25 July, 26 July and 27 July 1919, and the plaintiffs’ advocates found themselves uncertain whether they remained counsel for the plaintiffs after those dates. After the executors had presented their arguments, an application was made to secure the attendance of Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar on behalf of the plaintiffs. That application was turned down, and the Court reserved judgment without hearing any further submissions from the plaintiffs. The judgment that was eventually delivered on 29 July 1949 at 4 p.m. extended to thirty tightly printed pages. From a summary of events that followed Mr Medappa’s appointment as Acting Chief Justice, it was clear that the judges of the Mysore High Court were unwilling to entertain any request by the plaintiffs for the constitution of a bench that would exclude Mr Medappa and Mr Balakrishanaiya. The judges also declined to consider the plaintiffs’ applications for adjournment with any sympathy. Although the attitude of the Court might appear rigid, the Court observed that such rigidity alone did not suffice to infer bias. Since the appointment of Mr Medappa as Acting Chief Justice, the plaintiffs had repeatedly applied for a bench in which Mr Medappa and any other judges who had previously been involved in the case would be excluded. The Court noted that a litigant is not entitled to choose the members of the Court who will hear his case, nor may he insist on an adjournment simply because the scheduled date is inconvenient for his counsel; the convenience of counsel must be subordinate to the broader interest of the administration of justice. The Court further explained that where an overly strict observance of procedural forms results in injustice by a tribunal that appears biased, the decision may be declared “coram non judice,” whether the tribunal is subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of the court or is a foreign tribunal. However, the only facts proven in support of a claim of bias were that Mr Medappa was a close friend of the executor, Syed Abdul Wajid, and that Mr Balakrishanaiya had expressed his view on the merits of the plaintiffs’ case. The Court indicated that it would have been consistent with the dignity of the institution had Mr Medappa and Mr Balakrishanaiya not sat on the Full Bench, yet it also reminded that unless the Government of Mysore had agreed to constitute an ad hoc bench, there were no other judges available to form a Full Bench to hear the appeals.

In the matter before the Court, it was noted that, because there was no ad hoc Bench, the Court lacked sufficient judges to constitute a Full Bench for hearing the appeals. The record showed that Mr Puttraj Urs had taken evidence in the suits from which the appeals originated, and that Mr Malappa was also involved in certain proceedings linked to the litigation. The only judge remaining, Mr Enkataramaiya, appeared in the capacity of an advocate for the plaintiffs, while Mr K Kandaswami Pillai had retired. The Court observed that it could not approve of the incidents that occurred in the courtroom before and during the hearing; however, those incidents might have been the result of deliberate provocation by the plaintiffs and their lawyer, Raju, who appeared to make repeated attempts to obstruct the effective hearing of the appeals. The High Court had carefully examined the circumstances and concluded that, based on the various acts attributed to Mr Medappa and Mr Balakrishanaiya, no inference of bias could be drawn. Although the present case involved the judgment of a foreign tribunal and the Court regretted certain orders—particularly those refusing a reasonable adjournment that would have allowed the plaintiffs’ counsel to appear and argue, as well as concerns about the composition of the bench and the manner of hearing—it found it difficult to disagree with the High Court’s assessment or to attribute bias to the judges who formed the Full Bench. The Court explained that, when dealing with a foreign judgment, it is ordinarily presumed that the foreign court’s procedure was fair, that the judges acted honestly, and that an inference of bias, dishonesty, or unfairness is not normally drawn from the merits of that decision. A party alleging that a foreign judgment is invalid because the proceeding violated natural‑justice principles bears the burden of presenting convincing evidence, and the Court found that such evidence had not been produced in this case. It was further observed that the judges had no financial interest in the dispute. The alleged bias in favor of the executors was based on the chief justice’s close friendship with one defendant, the other judge’s expression of opinion on the merits—an expression consistent with the court’s practice—and the refusal to allow the plaintiffs to secure their chosen counsel. Individually or collectively, these factors did not justify the Court in concluding, contrary to the High Court, that the judges had lost their independence and impartiality. The remaining issue to be decided was whether the estate created by the will dated 10 September 1942 was a joint family estate of Ramalingam and his sons.

The Court was required to determine whether the estate created by the will dated 10 September 1942 was a joint‑family estate of Ramalingam and his sons. If the property formed part of a joint family, the will would have been inoperative. To resolve this issue, the Court set out a series of largely undisputed facts. Vydialingam was employed in the Mysore Subordinate Judicial Service, receiving a monthly salary that increased from rupees seventy‑five to rupees one hundred twenty‑five. He initially served as a translator in the Mysore Chief Court, was appointed Sheristadar of the District Court at Shimoga in 1898, and was subsequently transferred to Bangalore. A close friend of Vydialingam was Loganathan Mudaliar, a building contractor who conducted business at the Kolar Gold Fields. Loganathan fell seriously ill in 1896, and his condition worsened in 1898, rendering him unable to manage his affairs. In that year Loganathan executed a will appointing Vydialingam and others as guardians of his children and as executors, and he died in 1900. Vydialingam had maintained an account with the Cavalry Road Bank at Kolar Gold Fields since 1891. By 1895 substantial sums were being credited to this account, amounts that could not have been derived from Vydialingam’s modest salary. In 1896 and 1897, deposits totaling more than one lakh rupees were made to the account. In May 1898 Vydialingam obtained a personal loan of rupees two thousand from the bank and gave the entire sum to his eldest son Shanmugam. Shanmugam opened his own Cavalry Road Bank account in October 1899, borrowing only rupees twenty‑five; the entries in this account were few and involved only small amounts. Records from the mining company show that the building work originally performed by Loganathan later passed to Shanmugam, and from 1901 large payments were made to Shanmugam, some of which were deposited in the Cavalry Road Bank account. From July 1904 onward, books of account kept in Shanmugam’s name for business, household, and other expenses became available.

Around the year 1904 the second son, Devraj, began assisting a building contractor’s business at Gadag, while Ramalingam, after completing his training at the Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute in Bombay, also joined the same trade. Vydialingam died in May 1905, leaving two houses that he verbally directed should be given to Ramalingam. The three brothers continued to live together after their father’s death, sharing household expenses jointly. In 1910 Ramalingam sold one of the two houses and received rupees four thousand. On 30 March 1912 Ramalingam and Devraj executed a deed of release under which each received rupees two thousand five hundred, and thereafter the Kolar Gold Fields business appeared to be carried on as a partnership between Shanmugam and Ramalingam. The father‑in‑law of Devraj, Manavalem, died in 1910, after which Devraj migrated to Madras to manage his father‑in‑law’s affairs. Shortly after April 1912 Shanmugam travelled to the United Kingdom.

It was observed that there was no clear evidence showing whether the individual in question participated in the business after his return from his foreign journey. Nevertheless, he continued to withdraw money from the account that was maintained for the business. By the year 1961, his withdrawals had resulted in an overdraft exceeding thirty‑five thousand rupees, an amount that was subsequently written off. Following this, he no longer retained any interest in the business. The records also show that Shanmugam died in 1924 and Devraj died in 1936.

The plaintiffs advanced the position that Vydialingam had been engaged in the occupation of a building contractor since approximately 1895 or 1896. According to their narrative, Shanmugam was the first of Vydialingam’s sons to be introduced into that business, after which Devraj and Ramalingam also joined. After Vydialingam’s death, the plaintiffs contended that the three brothers continued to operate the business jointly until the year 1910, each attending to it at different locations. Devraj is said to have overseen a portion of the business at Gadag, while Ramalingam managed affairs both at the Kolar Gold Fields and also at Gadag.

The plaintiffs further claimed that the business which Ramalingam ran from 1916 onward was directly connected with the enterprise inherited from Vydialingam, and that the assets derived from that enterprise were treated as joint‑family property. They asserted that Ramalingam disposed of two ancestral houses that he had received, using the proceeds to fund his commercial activities. In addition, they alleged that he obtained twelve thousand five hundred rupees from the Administrator‑General as his share of his wife Gajambal’s interest in the estate of Loganathan, who was her father. With these funds, Ramalingam continued the building‑contractor business, assisted by his sons, and through that activity he acquired the estate that is now in dispute.

Summarising the plaintiffs’ case, they argued that Vydialingam had operated a building‑contractor business, that his sons had assisted him in that venture, and that after Vydialingam’s death the business passed to his sons who continued it until 1910, when Devraj, the second son, ceased to be interested. Subsequently, Shanmugam, the eldest son, is said to have severed his connection with the business in 1916, leaving Ramalingam to conduct the ancestral business alone.

The executors, on the other hand, contested these assertions. They maintained that Vydialingam had never carried on a building‑contractor business. According to them, Shanmugam had started his own building‑contractor enterprise around 1898, and neither his father nor his brothers had any interest in it. They further claimed that it was only in 1912, when Shanmugam was preparing to depart for the United Kingdom, that he admitted Ramalingam as a partner in his own business, and that by 1916 Ramalingam had become the sole owner because Shanmugam had withdrawn his interest. Consequently, the executors argued that the business held by Ramalingam bore no connection to any ancestral business or to any estate that Ramalingam might have received from his father.

The trial judge addressed the matters raised by the parties under five headings. The first heading examined whether Vydialingam had indeed carried on a building‑contractor business. The judge noted that Vydialingam had left two unencumbered houses together with the contractor’s business, and that these assets were held to have become a joint‑family estate.

The trial Judge examined five propositions concerning the nature of the property devised by Ramalingam. First, he found that the family estate passed into the hands of Ramalingam’s son and that Ramalingam built his fortune from this estate. Second, he concluded that after the death of Rawalingain, his three sons continued a joint‑family business, each brother attending to the business at a different location, and that the joint acquisitions were divided in 1910, each brother receiving approximately Rs 34,000; the share received by Ramalingam was then used to acquire the estate devised by the will. Third, the Judge held that Ramalingam obtained a portion of the ancestral estate valued at Rs 40,000 and an additional amount of Rs 12,500 on behalf of his wife Gajambal from the estate of Loganathan, and that the entire sum was invested in his building‑contractor business, from which the disputed estate was subsequently acquired. Fourth, the Judge observed that Ramalingam and his eldest son Vishwanath were actively involved in the building‑contractor business and that the acquisitions made through that business formed a joint‑family estate. Fifth, the Judge found that Ramalingam, by his own declarations, gave his acquisitions the appearance of joint‑family property, thereby rendering the property joint‑family property. Accordingly, the trial Judge held on all five points that the property devised under Ramalingam’s will should be treated as joint‑family property.

On appeal, the High Court rejected the plaintiffs’ case on the fourth and fifth propositions, holding that they were not proved. Regarding the third proposition, the High Court observed that there was no clear evidence that Ramalingam had received an ancestral fortune of Rs 40,000 or the Rs 12,500 attributable to his wife Gajambal from Loganathan’s estate. Nevertheless, the High Court accepted that Vydialingam had been carrying on a building‑contractor business since 1896 and that his sons had been associated with that business as they matured. The Court noted that the business was conducted in the name of Shanmugam because Vydialingam, being a public servant, could not operate it in his own name. After Vydialingam’s death, the business continued as a joint‑family enterprise. In 1910, Devraj, who had been managing the Gadag branch, left the family and began working in Madras for his father‑in‑law, who died around that time, and Shanmugam completely severed his connection with the business in 1916. The High Court summarized its conclusion, stating that the business which Ramalingam later expanded descended from his father, his two brothers having successively abandoned it. It was probable, though not conclusively proven, that Ramalingam invested the proceeds from the sale of the Bangalore house and the money received under the 1912 release deed into the business. In the nominal partnership he formed with Shanmugam, he contributed Rs 5,000 as capital, representing a fragment of the old business, and also contributed the goodwill of the former enterprise.

In the circumstances described, the Court observed that Ramalingam never, up to the last few months before his death, attempted to exclude his family members from the business, despite the assertions he made in his will and other documents. He did not try to separate the assets that were clearly acquired through the joint‑family enterprise from those that might have been claimed as the result of his own independent effort. After considering all relevant facts, the Court agreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that the properties left by Ramalingam should be regarded as joint‑family property.

The plaintiffs sought to prove their case by presenting the testimony of five witnesses: Kuppuswamy Mudaliar, Sitharain Naidu, Varadaraja Mudaliar, Venugopala Mudaliar and Dharmalingam. Several of these witnesses had previously been examined before the District Judge in Bangalore. Through their evidence, the plaintiffs attempted to show that Vydialingam had been engaged, as early as 1898, in a building‑contracting business at Kolar Gold Fields and that, upon his death, this business passed to his sons.

Further documentary support was offered by extracts from the accounts of Ramalingam and Shanmugam kept with the Cavalry Road Bank at Nandidurg, as well as extracts from the records of the Nandidurg Mining Company that documented payments made to Shanmugam. Some of these payments were also reflected in Vydialingam’s account with the Cavalry Road Bank. Additional reliance was placed on the ledger entries maintained in Shanmugam’s name from 1904 onward, which recorded receipts from Devraj at Gadag, debits for amounts sent to Devraj at Gadag, rent collections from houses, and expenses related to building construction. These entries indicated that Devraj or Vydialingam participated in these transactions, and other household‑expense entries demonstrated that the account kept in Shanmugam’s name was, in reality, the account of the joint family.

The plaintiffs also produced certain letters written by Ramalingam and Devraj. The language of these letters, according to the plaintiffs, showed that the writers were not merely agents of Shanmugam but owners of the business. Moreover, the plaintiffs relied on the testimony of Masilamay Pillai, an advocate who later served as a judge of the Madras High Court. Pillai testified that, in arrangements made a few months before 30 March 1912, the goodwill of the Kolar Gold Fields business was allotted to Ramalingam.

The trial judge accepted the evidence of all the witnesses cited by the plaintiffs. He held that the extracts from Vydialingam’s account confirmed his activity as a building contractor and that the books kept in Shanmugam’s name were, in effect, family accounts. On appeal, however, the High Court limited its consideration to the testimony of only two of the five original witnesses—Varadaraja Mudaliar and Sitharain Naidu—who had testified that Vydialingam worked as a building contractor. The High Court deemed the evidence of these two witnesses reliable and did not accept the testimony of the remaining witnesses.

The High Court treated the testimony of two witnesses, Varadaraja Mudaliar and Sitharam Naidu, as reliable while disregarding the evidence of the remaining witnesses. Sitharam Naidu stated under oath that he had been engaged as a building contractor at the Kolar Gold Fields since 1898. He recounted that he had taken a tenement within the compound of Loganatha Mudaliar and that he was aware of Vydialinga Mudaliar’s responsibility for supervising Loganatha’s contract work. Sitharam further affirmed that Vydialinga was assisted by his three sons, that Shamingam also pursued a building‑contracting business, and that Shamingam was additionally helping his father Vydialinga. The High Court described Sitharam as a respectable individual who was “not readily corruptible” and who possessed “no ascertainable motive for giving false evidence.” Varadaraja Mudaliar testified that he had met Vydialinga Mudaliar in 1898 when he travelled to Oorgaum to visit his father‑in‑law, who was a Mistry employed in the Oorgaum mines under Loganatha Mudaliar. He added that his father‑in‑law initially worked under Loganatha and later under Vydialinga. The High Court also accepted Varadaraja’s evidence. Collectively, the statements of these two witnesses established that Vydialinga Mudaliar carried on the business of a building contractor. In addition, there was evidence that Loganatha had been seriously ill since 1898 and that he died in 1900. The testimonies of Sitharam and Varadaraja were corroborated by entries in Vydialinga’s account with the Cavalry Road Bank.

The bank account in question had been opened in 1891. Vydialinga Mudaliar was employed by the State of Mysore, and his maximum salary never exceeded Rs. 125 per month. Between 1891 and 1894 the bank entries were for modest amounts, the largest credit being Rs. 478 ¼. In 1895 two credits each exceeded Rs. 1,000, and in 1896 the account showed very large credits and disbursements. An examination of the entries for the years 1896‑1897 indicated that sums aggregating to more than Rs. 1 lakh were credited to Vydialinga’s account, and correspondingly large withdrawals were also made. The High Court observed, and this judgment concurs, that such transactions were “too large to be referred to the emoluments of Vydialinga as Sheristadar.” The logical inference was that Vydialinga was engaged in some additional business activity. The executors did not contest the inference that Vydialinga was conducting a business, but they suggested that he might have been a money‑lender, using the bank funds as circulating capital for money‑lending operations. It was further asserted that Vydialinga was a Director of the Cavalry Road Bank and that, being on the account, he could help himself to the bank’s funds for his

The Court observed that no evidence had been placed before it to establish that Vydialingam was a director of the Cavalry Road Bank. The bank entries were of such considerable size and frequency that it was difficult to attribute them to a money‑lending operation. It also emerged that Vydialingam had mortgaged his house in 1892 for twenty‑five thousand rupees to Thirunaglingam Pillai and had discharged that mortgage by borrowing three thousand rupees from Loganathan on 31 August 1892, the loan being repayable in monthly instalments of fifty rupees. A further deed executed in 1894 further encumbered the same house for repayment of two thousand rupees, and both mortgages remained outstanding until 1903. Because his own dwelling was subject to mortgage and because he had agreed to meet the liabilities by instalments, the Court could not accept the contention that Vydialingam was carrying on a money‑lending business. The Cavalry Road Bank ledger also recorded amounts received from the Madras Bank; these entries indicated that Vydialingam had been presented with cheques, that the cheques were encashed at the Madras Bank and that the proceeds were received by him. Such transactions made the theory of a money‑lending enterprise implausible.

The entries in Vydialingam’s bank account, taken together with the testimony of two witnesses, namely Sitbaram Naidu and Varadaraja Mudaliar, demonstrated that Vydialingam was engaged in a business as a building contractor. According to the executors, before 1898 Shanmugam was not employing himself as a building contractor. The Cavalry Road Bank records show only small credits to Shanmugam’s account until April 1901, when for the first time he borrowed eight hundred rupees secured by jewellery. The Mining Company’s account contains no entries for payments made to Shanmugam for any construction work prior to 1901. Consequently, the bank entries supported the inference that Vydialingam was conducting a business while Shanmugam had no independent business at least until 1900. Subsequent entries after 1900 suggested that Vydialingam was operating Shanmugam’s account, and that part of the sums received from the Mining Company by Shanmugam was applied to satisfy loans taken by Vydialingam. It was further noted that, up to 1901, Shanmugam’s account recorded no large credits. The Mining Company’s ledger shows that on 18 January 1901 Shanmugam received five thousand rupees by cheque, and that within the next three months he received additional sums amounting to nearly seven thousand five hundred rupees in cash and cheques. Yet the Cavalry Road Bank statement for Shanmugam records only a total credit of seven hundred eighty rupees in the suspense account between October 1899 and April 1901. No books of account relating to construction work carried out in Shanmugam’s name for the period in question were produced.

During the period under consideration, certain entries in the ledgers of Vydialingam and Shanmugam demonstrated a clear interrelation between the two accounts. For example, on 9 January 1904, the Mining Company’s records show that Shanmugam received three separate payments: Rs 36/‑, Rs 362/14/1 and Rs 12,243/5/‑. Around the same time, Shanmugam was indebted to the Cavalry Road Bank for Rs 3,400/‑ on promissory notes. On 19 January 1904, he paid Rs 3,100/‑ into the bank, thereby partially satisfying that liability. Subsequently, the account of Vydialingam shows a credit of Rs 12,120/6/9 on 23 January 1904 and a withdrawal of Rs 12,000/‑ on 29 January 1904. Although there is no direct documentary evidence linking the movements in Shanmugam’s and Vydialingam’s accounts with the sums received by Shanmugam, the temporal proximity allows a reasonable inference. It can be inferred that the amount of Rs 15,900/‑ received by Shanmugam on 19 January 1904 was used to discharge his Rs 3,100/‑ liability to the bank, to pay Rs 12,120/ 619 into the Cavalry Road Bank, and to allocate Rs 305/‑ toward settling Vydialingam’s personal debts.

Further entries reinforce the mutual financial activities of the two parties. Vydialingam borrowed Rs 140/‑ on 1 February 1904 under a promissory note dated 18 February 1904, and the identical amount appears as a credit in Shanmugam’s ledger with the description “Receipt from V. S. Vydialinga Mudaliar.” Both the credit and debit entries share the same Chitta number, indicating a direct link. On 1 December 1904, Shanmugam received a cheque for Rs 10,000/‑ from the Mining Company, which was credited to the Cavalry Road Bank on 10 December 1904. On that same day, Shanmugam’s promissory‑note account showed an outstanding liability of Rs 2 625/‑.

Later in the month, on 19 December 1904, Shanmugam withdrew a total of Rs 8,733/2/0, recorded under Chitta entry No. 113. That very day, two separate entries under the same Chitta number record a payment of Rs 1,050/‑ into Vydialingam’s account. Additional evidence of coordinated transactions appears in Shanmugam’s bank ledger, where debits were made pursuant to directions given by Vydialingam. For instance, on 25 March 1903, Rs 500/‑ was debited following Vydialingam’s instruction; similar debits of Rs 500/‑ each occurred on 4 April 1903 and 10 April 1903. Vydialingam’s own ledger shows a payment of Rs 280/‑ for cart hire on 13 July 1903, an expense that suggests he was engaged in building‑contractor activities, as the nature of the charge is not otherwise explainable.

Further entries in the account kept in Shanmugam’s name record expenses incurred by Vydialingam and Devraj for travel related to the construction of the English Church. On 7 August 1904, a debit of Rs 20/‑ shows Vydialingam’s expenditure for a trip to Madras. Additionally, a debit of Rs 3/‑ dated 26 July (year inferred as 1904) records a travel expense for Devraj and Shanmugam. These interrelated entries collectively illustrate a pattern of financial cooperation and mutual indebtedness between Vydialingam and Shanmugam throughout the period under review.

In the year 1904 a debit entry was recorded for the travelling expenses incurred by Devrai and Shanmugam. The ledger that was kept in the name of Shanmugam for the period before July 1901 was not produced before the Court. The ledger that is on record continues up to the year 1907, after which there is a gap in the entries. An additional account book exists for the financial year 1910‑1911, but there is no account covering the interval immediately preceding 1 April 1912, the date on which a partnership was formed between Ramalingam and Shanmugam.

The entries that do appear in the available Shanmugam account show numerous transactions involving large sums received from Devraj in Gadag as well as amounts that were sent to him. For example, on 5 May 1905 a sum of Rs 1,000 was raised on a promissory note and forwarded to Devraj. On 19 July 1905 Shanmugam made a remittance to Devraj of Rs 1,001 and eight annas. A further similar remittance was made on 17 September 1905. On 26 September 1905 a payment of Rs 100 was effected through Ramalingam. The ledger also contains credit entries that record large receipts from Devraj. On 27 May 1907 Devraj is shown to have remitted Rs 7,000 from Gadag to the Kolar Gold Fields.

The Court noted that it was unnecessary to examine each of these entries in detail. In addition to the above financial movements, the Shanmugam account records several credit entries for house‑rent collected from tenants occupying the two houses that had been possessed by the late Vydialingam, as well as debit entries for the payment of municipal taxes. The ledger also shows numerous entries for sums collected by Ramalingam and subsequently deposited into the account.

Four letters were also produced that illuminate the relationship among the three brothers and their involvement with the Kolar Gold Fields business. The first letter, dated 5 October 1909, was written by Devraj to Ramalingam; it asked whether a previous correspondence had reached Gadag and set out several directions concerning business matters. A second letter, dated 6 October 1909 and also from Devraj to Ramalingam, stated that “Pariapa” (Shanmugam) had arrived from Bangalore and that Ramalingam was expected to join him as soon as his work there was finished. This letter further conveyed instructions for acquiring certain articles.

A later letter dated 18 January 1911, addressed by Ramalingam to Shanmugam, informed the recipient that the question of departmental employment in the Nandidurg Mining Company had been discussed and that the decision was ultimately not to pursue such employment, with the sundry works to continue as before. Ramalingam then reported that the Oorgaum Gold Mining Company had temporarily halted all its operations for “some unknown reasons.” He further referred to the Electricity Department’s work on installing concrete in “N’s Bungalow,” and mentioned ongoing efforts on drainage and compressor work. Regarding the Oorgaum Gold Mines, Ramalingam observed that all current works in the mines had been completed and that prospects for new work appeared bleak. He also made a reference to activities of the timber department.

The subsequent letter, dated 11 February 1911 and also addressed to Shanmugam, contained a statement from Ramalingam that Mr Bullen had summoned him and inquired whether he would be willing to undertake a small‑scale building contract at Manigatha, where gold prospecting was in progress. The letter indicated Ramalingam’s agreement to perform the work and his intention to be present to receive instructions, as well as his plan to return by the weekend after making the necessary arrangements and to inform Messrs. Moky & Cooke that Mr Ramaiah would oversee the business during his absence.

The correspondence revealed that Ramalingam had been approached to undertake a building contract at Manigatha, a site where gold prospecting activities were underway. In the letter, Ramalingam expressly agreed to perform the work and promised to be present to receive any instructions related to the contract. He further indicated that, after the necessary arrangements were finalized, he would return by the weekend. To facilitate his temporary absence, Ramalingam said he would take leave from Messrs. Moky & Cooke and would instruct them that Mr. Ramaiah would manage the business affairs during his period away. The content of these letters suggested that Ramalingam and Devraj held an ownership interest in the enterprise that was being described to Shanmugam; they were not merely acting as his agents.

In addition to the letters, the General Account contained numerous entries that demonstrated the account did not reflect only the personal transactions of Shanmugam. Rather, the ledger recorded expenses incurred by various members of his family, and these family expenses appeared alongside the business expenditures. On the basis of this evidence, the High Court had correctly concluded, in the view of this Court, that the General Account represented the financial affairs of the joint family rather than a separate personal account of Shanmugam.

The Attorney‑General, however, argued that certain circumstances, when considered together, established that the building business was carried on by Shanmugam as a distinct, separate concern. He highlighted that Vydialingam, Shanmugam’s father, was a public servant whose service record indicated that he was granted leave only for short periods in 1898. Moreover, when Vydialingam was posted far from the Kolar Gold Fields, the Attorney‑General asserted it would have been impossible for him to attend to any business requiring his continuous presence at that location. Only a few extracts from Vydialingam’s service record were reproduced in the proceedings. Exhibit 368, for example, showed that Vydialingam received a salary of Rs. 125 for twenty days of work designated as “Working no Nazir and Sheriatedar,” and that he was transferred to the District Court of Shimoga in September 1901. Another entry recorded his appointment as Munsif for twelve days in June 1900. Exhibit 370 listed the various salaries Vydialingam drew over time. These documents did not conclusively demonstrate that Vydialingam was incapable of attending to the building business.

It was also noted that the Mining Company’s accounts recorded payments for construction work credited to Loganathan up to the year 1900 and, after Loganathan’s death, to Shanmugam. Nevertheless, because Vydialingam was a civil servant, he could not openly present himself as a building contractor and receive payments in his own name. Consequently, the debit entries bearing Shanmugam’s name in the Mining Company’s books were not decisive, and they were insufficient to overturn the direct testimony of witnesses Sitharam Naidu and Varadaraja Mudaliar.

The Counsel further argued that the Cavalry Road Bank Account showed a debit of Rs. 2,000 in May 1898 to Shanmugam, and that the same account was credited by Shanmugam in December 1902, implying a repayment to Vydialingam. From this, it was suggested that Shanmugam had launched his building contractor business using a loan from his father Vydialingam and had eventually repaid the amount. The evidence of the two witnesses, however, confirmed that the building contractor business was conducted by Vydialingam, a conclusion reinforced by the entries in the Cavalry Road Bank Account.

In this case, the Court observed that although the two witnesses, Sitharam Naidu and Varadaraja Mudaliar, testified that the building‑contractor business was carried on by Vydialingam, the entries in the Cavalry Road Bank account also supported that testimony. The Court noted that a debit entry showing a payment of Rs 2,000 from Vydialingam’s account to Shanmugam, together with a corresponding credit entry for Shanmugam’s repayment, did not necessarily demonstrate that Shanmugam had borrowed the money to start his own contracting business. The Court further considered the argument that a bank account opened in July 1901 and continued until 1912 was the private account of Shanmugam. Having examined the numerous entries recorded in that account, the Court could not accept the contention that the account represented Shanmugam’s personal finances. The Court also acknowledged that Vydialingam owed money to Loganathan, secured by two houses, and that those debts were discharged in 1903. Relying especially on the direct testimony of the witnesses and the contemporaneous bank‑book entries, the Court concluded that it would be unreasonable to infer that Vydialingam did not engage in any business activity.

The Court also examined two documents that were heavily relied upon by the parties. The first was a sale deed executed by Ramalingam on 27 July 1910, concerning a house that Ramalingam had inherited from Vydialingam. That deed stated that Shanmugam and Devraj had acquired properties through their own earnings and were enjoying them, whereas Ramalingam claimed to have no personal earnings of his own. According to the deed, Vydialingam had allegedly given oral directions that his immovable property should be possessed and enjoyed solely by Ramalingam, and that Shanmugam and Devraj should have no right to it, subject to the permission of Ramalingam’s two brothers. The deed further recorded that Ramalingam was in possession and enjoyment of the property, that he had sold one of the houses for Rs 4,000, and that Shanmugam and Devraj had attested the document to confirm that they had no claim. The second document, dated 30 March 1912, was a “Release Deed” between Shanmugam on one side and Devraj and Ramalingam Mudaliar on the other. That deed described the three brothers as carrying on business as building contractors and contained recitals concerning the disposition of property and the relinquishment of any further claims.

In the year 1898 Shanmugam began his livelihood as a building contractor and merchant, relying solely on his own exertions and without using any funds of the joint family to which he belonged. He earned his living on the Kolar Gold Fields and in other places, and by his own effort he acquired the properties listed in the schedule annexed to the deed, which the deed expressly described as his separate property. The same deed further recited that before Vydialingam’s death on 3 May 1905, Vydialingam had given oral directions that his immovable and movable properties should be disposed of in favour of Ramalingam. Accordingly those properties were first applied to discharge Vydialingam’s debts, after which the immovable properties were taken over by Ramalingam, and the deed affirmed that no undivided Hindu joint‑family estate remained thereafter. The deed continued by stating that, in consideration of a sum of Rs 2,500 paid by Shanmugam to Devraj and another sum of Rs 2,500 paid to Ramalingam and his minor son Vishwanath, both Devraj and Ramalingam declared that they would not claim any manner of right, title or interest in the property of Shanmugam described in the attached schedule. They further agreed that they had never possessed any such right, title or interest, and that if any such right existed it would be deemed released, relinquished and quit‑claimed, thereby confirming that Shanmugam Mudaliar remained the sole and absolute owner. The schedule set out a bungalow located at Robertsonpet together with movable assets whose outstanding value amounted to Rs 1,79,000. At the foot of the document a receipt for Rs 2,500 was endorsed by Devraj and another receipt for the same amount was endorsed by Ramalingam.

The Attorney‑General argued that the admissions contained in these documents were unequivocal and therefore destroyed the plaintiffs’ case, asserting that no joint‑family estate survived Vydialingam’s death and that Shanmugam’s business could not be characterised as a joint‑family venture. Counsel, however, submitted that the trial Judge had constructed a theory unsupported by any pleading or evidence, specifically that the sale deed and the release deed formed part of a scheme to divide the joint‑family property of the three brothers. It was accepted that the recitals in the sale deed indicated that the house sold by Ramalingam had been given to him by Vydialingam under an oral direction, and that Ramalingam dealt with that house on that basis. It was also accepted that the release deed recorded that Shanmugam had been carrying on his contractor business since 1898 without any assistance from joint‑family funds and that the acquisitions described therein were his self‑acquired properties, further stating that no joint‑family property remained to be divided. Nonetheless, it was held that these two documents could not be regarded as decisive on the question of whether Vydialingam himself had been carrying on the business of a building contractor and whether that business had devolved upon his three sons.

It was observed that the contractor’s business originally belonging to Vydialingam later devolved upon his three sons. During Vydialingam’s lifetime the three brothers lived together as a single household, and the building‑contractor enterprise continued to be carried on throughout that period. The evidence had already demonstrated that Vydialingam had been engaged in a contractor’s business even before the year 1898. Both while Vydialingam was alive and subsequently until the year 1910 the brothers remained in joint residence, and the general accounts kept in the name of Shanmugam showed that their household expenditures were met out of a common fund. It also appeared that the rent received from the houses which Ramalingam eventually sold was recorded and combined with the family account. Substantial sums of money were forwarded to Devraj and similar amounts were received from him, indicating a pattern of financial inter‑change among them. Moreover, the evidence showed that Ramalingam took part in Shanmugam’s business activities.

The trial judge had constructed a theory of a partition of the joint‑family estate in the year 1910; after Devraj migrated to Madras that partition was purportedly effected by a deed of release dated 30 March 1912. However, this theory did not appear in any of the pleadings and there was no direct evidence to support it. The High Court, taking a different view of the material, concluded that the evidence indicated that the three brothers continued to operate the business as members of a Hindu joint family that had been inherited from their father Vydialingam. The High Court further observed that the business had expanded to places such as Gadag, Calicut and other locations, and that after Vydialingam’s death Shanmugam also ran an independent venture at Kalai in partnership with a man named Balakrishna. According to the High Court, the deed of release concerned property that Shanmugam claimed as his own separate acquisition, not property belonging to the joint family. The recitals in the release deed were therefore intended to create a record that Devraj and Ramalingam had no interest in Shanmugam’s property.

Regarding the admissibility of evidence that contradicted the recital that no joint‑family property existed, the Court held that section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act did not bar such evidence, because the present suit did not involve a dispute between the parties to the documents but rather between persons claiming under Ramalingam, the executant of the deed. In this context, the testimony of Masilamany Pillai, who had been examined for the plaintiffs in the District Court at Bangalore, acquired particular significance. The witness stated that in 1912 he had been consulted about the settlement of certain matters between Shanmugam Mudaliar and his two brothers. He recounted having discussions with Shanmugam and the latter’s lawyers concerning the family’s property issues as well as the business conducted at the Kolar Gold Fields. After ascertaining from the three brothers the various questions that required settlement, he gave advice and suggested that the release deed might be prepared to address those concerns.

In this matter, the witness explained that the proposed release deed was to be obtained from Devraj and Ramalingam, thereby causing them to release and relinquish any claim they might have to any property that Shanmugam asserted as his own self‑acquisitions; however, the witness stated that he himself had neither prepared the deed nor seen it at any time. The witness further testified that, during the interview, it was understood that the goodwill of the Kolar Gold Fields contract business was to be given to Ramalingam Mudaliar, and this portion of his evidence was not subjected to cross‑examination. The Court regarded this testimony as significant on two points: first, that the release deed concerned properties claimed by Shanmugam to be his self‑acquired assets; and second, that there was an understanding that the goodwill of the Kolar Gold Fields enterprise would pass to Ramalingam. The Court observed that if the Kolar Gold Fields business had been the exclusive undertaking of Shanmugam, which he had initiated, it was difficult to comprehend why that goodwill should be transferred to Ramalingam when, for a comparatively modest sum, Ramalingam and Devraj were relinquishing any possible interest they might have in that business and in the profits derived therefrom. Both the trial Court and the High Court had accepted this evidence. The accounts of the family, maintained in Shanmugam’s name immediately before April 1912, had not been produced by the executors. The executors contended that they could not locate those account books when they assumed control of the estate of Bamalingam, while the plaintiffs alleged that the executors deliberately withheld the books because their production would have undermined the executors’ defence. The High Court, based on the evidence, was unable to draw any definite inference on this point. It was admitted that the executors had taken possession of Ramalingam’s property right after his death, and it was surprising that no inventory of Ramalingam’s books of account or other documents, if any, prepared at the time of taking possession, had been produced. The executors were experienced businessmen, and the principal executor, Wajid, held a senior position in public administration; consequently, they would have been aware of the necessity to make an inventory of the documents and property placed in their custody. Had the books of account immediately prior to 1 April 1912 not been in their possession, the executors would have promptly produced the inventory they prepared when they assumed control of the estate. Even if no adverse inference is drawn from the executors’ failure to produce those books, other circumstances support the inference raised by the High Court. Finally, the release deed failed to take into account the Gadag business, which had been conducted by Devraj with assistance from Ramalingam.

The Court noted that, as previously observed, the continued operation of the business involved substantial transfers from the family account, and there was evidence that the business possessed assets. It pointed out that the General Account contained several entries relating to the accounts of Devraj that were not readily understandable. After a credit entry dated 5 March 1911 for Rs 280, there were debit entries dated 31 March 1911, four of which each exceeded Rs 1,000. These debits were described as follows: a debit of Rs 1,000 recorded as “given by V V S Mudaliar in connection with cheque”; a debit of Rs 15,000 described simply as “S R B cheque”; a debit of Rs 1,619 shown as “Electricity cheque”; and a debit of Rs 9,322 noted as “Nandidurgam cheque”. On the same date there were ten further entries, four of which each amounted to Rs 2,000 or more. The credits included a credit of Rs 12,142 described as “V V S Moodr given previously”; a credit of Rs 2,000; and two separate credits of Rs 10,000 each. Considering all of these circumstances, the Court held that the statements contained in the sale deed and the deeds of release were not, by themselves, sufficient to justify refusing to accept the factual findings recorded by the High Court after a careful appraisal of the evidence. The High Court had determined that the business which Ramalingam had conducted from 1 April 1912—initially apparently in partnership with Shanmugam until 1916 and subsequently on his own—was directly connected with the business that passed to the three sons of Vydialingam upon his death in 1905. Prima facie, these findings of fact were accepted as established, and ordinarily this Court does not re‑examine the evidence. However, a review was undertaken because the High Court of Mysore, on the identical issue concerning the nature of the property devised under Ramalingam’s will, had reached a different conclusion. The Court observed that a dispute remained regarding the nature of the property known as “Palm Grove” for the purpose of determining whether the Mysore High Court’s judgment was conclusive as to that property. It appeared, though without clear evidence, that at some point Ramalingam had agreed to sell “Palm Grove” in plots. In the earlier suit filed in the Bangalore District Court, “Palm Grove” had been one of the properties claimed by the plaintiffs, but that claim was withdrawn when the Madras properties were excluded, and consequently the District Judge had not rendered a decision on “Palm Grove”. Before this Court no argument was presented to show that, during Ramalingam’s lifetime, the property had acquired the character of movable property such that the Bangalore Court’s decision would be conclusive in the Madras suit. The Madras High Court had rejected the executors’ contention that the property should be deemed movable. The Court noted that it had not been invited to consider any further material on that contention.

In this case, the Court observed that the trial judge had specified that the money obtained from the sale of “Palm Grove” represented assets of Ramalingam, but that those assets were subject to certain equitable claims that might favor Narayanaswamy Mudaliar. The trial judge indicated that the claim of Narayanaswamy Mudaliar would be assessed on the basis of the doctrine of quantum meruit either in the final decree or during execution proceedings. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the precise meaning of that direction because Narayanaswamy Mudaliar, who was primarily concerned with it, had not appealed that part of the decree, and no counsel had asked the Court to interpret it. The High Court had further held that, with respect to the executors, the only reasonable request was that any disbursements made in good faith should be treated as properly debitable against the estate and that the executors should not be surcharged for such payments. Consequently the High Court qualified that the executors were not required to pay sums that had been honestly paid to Narayanaswamy Mudaliar in connection with that transaction, whether on a quantum‑meruit basis or as a partner in the business. In that view, the decree of the High Court, which awarded the plaintiffs only the immovable properties in Madras and denied any right to the movables, was confirmed. The appeals were thereby dismissed. The High Court at Madras, after examining the evidence, had concluded that the properties disposed of by Ramalingam under his will were not his separate estate but were joint‑family properties, whereas the Mysore High Court had taken the opposite view. On review, the Court agreed with the Madras High Court’s assessment. As a result of the Mysore decision, the heirs of Ramalingam had lost property of substantial value. Recognising the special circumstances, the Court ordered that the plaintiffs should not bear the costs of the litigation; therefore all costs incurred by the plaintiffs in the original suit, the appeals in the High Court and in this Court were to be charged against the estate managed by the executors. The remaining appeals were then dealt with briefly.

The Court noted that Civil Appeals Nos. 279 and 280 of 1958 arose from a proceeding for the revocation of probate granted by the Madras High Court. In the earlier probate application, identified as T. S. O. No. 52 of 1944, a judge of the Madras High Court had, on 17 July 1944, granted probate to the executors under the will of Ramalingam dated 10 September 1943, expressly stating that the grant was subject to the outcome of an appeal to His Majesty‑in‑Council against the order of the Resident’s Court at Mysore. After the Privy Council disposed of that appeal as explained in the principal judgment, the plaintiffs and Gajambal, the widow of Ramalingam, filed a petition for revocation of the probate, hearing it together with Suit No. 214 of 1944. The trial judge ordered that the probate dated 17 July 1944 be revoked. Two executors appealed that order to the Madras High Court. The High Court limited the effect of the revocation to the immovable properties situated in Madras and set aside the order concerning the movable assets. Against the High Court’s order, Appeals Nos. 279 and 280 of 1958 were filed. Appeal 279 was filed by the sons and widow of Ramalingam, seeking confirmation of the revocation order issued by Justice Ramaswami.

In this case the proceedings began in the Resident’s Court at Mysore, and after the appeal to the Privy Council was finally disposed of, the parties again sought relief by applying to the Madras High Court for revocation of the probate that had earlier been granted. By way of Petition No. 469 of 1953 the plaintiffs together with Gajambal, the widow of Ramalingam, moved the court for revocation of the probate order originally issued by the Madras High Court. The petition was heard jointly with Suit No. 214 of 1944, and the learned trial judge ordered that the probate dated 17 July 1944 be revoked. Two of the executors then appealed that order to the Madras High Court. The High Court, on review, limited the effect of the revocation to the movable property and left the revocation ineffective as to the immovable property situated in Madras, thereby vacating the trial judge’s order concerning the movables. Subsequently two further appeals, numbered 279 and 280 of 1958, were filed against the High Court’s order. Appeal 279 of 1958 was filed by the sons and the widow of Ramalingam, who asked that the revocation order pronounced by Justice Ramaswami be confirmed in full. Appeal 280 of 1958 was filed by the executors, who urged that the revocation order be set aside in its entirety. At the hearing of these appeals no substantial arguments were advanced before the Court. The executors did not contest the proposition that, even if this Court were to agree with the Madras High Court that the will of Ramalingam was ineffective insofar as it attempted to dispose of the immovable property of the joint family, the probate order concerning that immovable property should nevertheless remain operative. They admitted before the Court that an order revoking a grant of probate, when the order has become ineffective because of a decision in a suit concerning title to the property, may be lawfully made under section 263(d) of the Indian Succession Act 1925. The Court found that the claim of the sons and the widow of Ramalingam for a total revocation of the probate order could not be sustained because, for the reasons set out by the Court, they were unable to establish title to the movable assets of Ramalingam in Madras. Consequently the appeals were dismissed with costs. The appeal under discussion arose out of a suit filed by the executors under the will of Ramalingand, seeking a declaration that two thousand shares in India Sugars & Refineries Ltd., registered in the name of Vishwanath, were in truth the property of Ramalingam, having been purchased by him in his own right but held benami in Vishwanath’s name, and that, according to the will, those shares formed part of Ramalingam’s estate. Vishwanath contested the suit, contending that the shares belonged to the joint family comprising Ramalingam and his sons, and that upon Ramalingam’s death, his surviving co‑parceners—his sons—became owners of the entire joint‑family property, including the shares.

In the proceedings concerning the disputed shares, the trial judge dismissed the suit that had been brought by the executors. The executors then appealed to the High Court of Madras. The High Court examined the judgment of the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court dated 29 July 1949 and held that that earlier decision was decisive as between the parties on the question of title to the shares. Relying on that conclusion, the Madras High Court set aside the trial judge’s dismissal and allowed the executors’ appeal. Subsequently, Vishwanath challenged the decree of the High Court that rejected his claim. After considering the reasons set out in the principal appeals, the Court concluded that Vishwanath’s appeal must be dismissed. However, the Court expressed the view that the costs incurred by Vishwanath, including the fees of his advocate and all expenses incidental to the original suit and the subsequent appeals in both the High Court and this Court, should be recovered from the estate of Ramalingam, to be charged on the portion of the estate that remains in the hands of the executors.

Civil Appeal No 281 of 1958 arose out of Suit No 200 of 1944. In that suit the executors sued Gajambal, the widow of Ramalingam, seeking a declaration that 2,695 shares of India Sugars and Refineries Ltd., which were held in her name, had actually been purchased by Ramalingam in his own name as a benami transaction and therefore constituted his self‑acquisition. The executors contended that, under the authority vested in them by the will dated 10 September 1942, they were entitled to those shares as part of the estate. They prayed for a declaration that the shares were held benami by Gajambal for the benefit of Ramalingam, the true owner. Gajambal admitted that she held the shares benami but asserted that they belonged not to Ramalingam but to the joint family comprising Ramalingam and his sons, and that on Ramalingam’s death the shares devolved upon the surviving co‑parceners, leaving the executors without any title or right. The suit was tried together with Suit No 214 of 1944. The trial judge held that the shares formed part of the joint family property of Ramalingam and his sons and that the executors had acquired no right to them under the will. On appeal, the High Court agreed with the trial judge’s view on the nature of the title, but nevertheless held that the Mysore High Court’s judgment concerning movable property, including the shares in dispute, was conclusive as to the rights between the parties. Accordingly, the High Court reversed the trial court’s decree and granted a decree in favour of the executors. Gajambal then filed an appeal in this Court, recorded as No 282 of 1958. After referring to the reasoning given in the principal appeals, the Court held that the Mysore High Court’s judgment was indeed conclusive as between the executors and Gajambal regarding title to the disputed shares. Consequently, Gajambal’s appeal failed and was dismissed. The Court also held that the costs incurred by Gajambal, including her advocate’s fees and all expenses incidental to the original suit and the appeals in the High Court and this Court, should be charged against the estate of Ramalingam, to be borne by the executors.

The appeal originated from a suit concerning the immovable property located at Nos. 1 and 2 Waddels Road, Kilpauk, Madras. In that property the second respondent, T. A. Ramchandra Rao, had previously been the owner. Earlier, a civil action identified as Suit No. 10 of 1940 had been instituted by Gajambal against T. A. Ramchandra Rao. That proceeding concluded with a compromise decree, and pursuant to the compromise, T. A. Ramchandra Rao conveyed the property to Gajambal by a deed dated 7 August 1940.

Subsequently, the executors of the estate of Ramalingam instituted Suit No. 91 of 1944 in the High Court of Madras against both Gajambal and T. A. Ramchandra Rao. The executors sought a declaration that the Waddels Road premises formed part of Ramalingam’s estate and that Gajambal was merely a benamidar holding the property on behalf of Ramalingam. They also asked for an order granting them possession of the property, together with mesne profits assessed at Rs 50 per month from the date of Ramalingam’s death until the date possession was delivered to the executors. In response, Gajambal asserted that the property belonged to her outright and that she had acquired it using her own money. T. A. Ramchandra Rao denied that the executors possessed any title and also rejected liability for mesne profits. The dispute was tried concurrently with Suit No. 214 of 1944. The trial court ruled in favour of the executors, but it also declared that the property belonged to the sons of Ramalingam and that those sons were entitled to possession and to the mesne profits.

The executors appealed the trial‑court decree to the High Court, but the High Court dismissed the appeal. In the present appeal filed by the executors, the main ground set out in the memorandum of appeal was that the sons of Ramalingam had not been made parties to Suit No. 91 of 1944, and therefore no decree could lawfully direct the executors to deliver possession to those sons. The Court had previously considered the related principal appeals, numbered 277 and 278 of 1958, and had held that the executors had not obtained any title to the immovable properties in Madras that were sought to be disposed of under Ramalingam’s will. While it was true that the sons of Ramalingam were not parties to Suit No. 91 of 1944, the view expressed in the principal appeals remained that the executors acquired no title to the property in question because the property formed part of the joint family to which Ramalingam belonged. Consequently, the Court deemed that no interference with the High Court’s decree was warranted. Counsel for the executors offered no argument in support of the appeal. The Court also observed that T. A. Ramchandra Rao had asserted a specific arrangement with Gajambal that allowed him to occupy the Waddels Road premises without paying rent, and he claimed that this arrangement had been confirmed after the issues were framed in Suit No. 91 of 1944.

It was noted that T. A. Ramchandra Rao had entered into an arrangement with Vishwanath, but he never filed any appeal before the High Court of Madras challenging the decree that the trial judge had issued, nor did he attempt to produce evidence in support of the alleged agreement. He also did not seek any further relief by filing an appeal against the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court. Consequently, the appeal that had been filed by the executors was dismissed. The Court observed that, for the purpose of resolving the present dispute, it was unnecessary to determine whether the arrangement purportedly created by T. A. Ramchandra Rao could be proved. The executors were therefore ordered to bear the costs of the first respondent, Gajambal, incurred in this appeal.

The deceased, Ramalingam, had been a prosperous contractor and businessman who died on 18 December 1942. Three months prior to his death, on 10 September 1942, he executed his last will, which expressly disinherited his eldest son Viswanathan and his daughter Bhagirathi, depriving them of any benefit. The will granted certain immovable properties and shares to his widow, made modest bequests to his other daughters, and left gifts to his grandson Tyagaraja, the son of Viswanathan, as well as to his granddaughter born to Bhagirathi. From the remaining portion of his extensive estate, the will directed that a sum of Rs 50,000 be spent on a ward in a hospital, and that the balance be applied to charitable purposes of a public nature. Ramalingam appointed three executors: A. Wajid, a retired official of the Mysore State; Narayana Awamy Mudaliar; and S. L. Mannaji Rao. Prior to his death, Ramalingam’s relations with his family had become strained, and on 2 June 1942 his relatives instituted proceedings under the Lunacy Act in the District Court of Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, seeking to have him declared of unsound mind. Evidence and medical expert testimony were recorded in that case. After Ramalingam’s death, the executors applied to the same District Court for probate of the will, identified as Suit No. 2 of 1913. The probate was granted by Mr P. Madappa on 27 November 1443. Two appeals against this probate order, listed as R A Nos. 1 and 2 of 1944, were dismissed by the Court of the British Resident, Mysore, on 5 July 1944. A further appeal to the Privy Council was initially admitted but was later held by the Judicial Committee to be incompetent following constitutional changes that returned the Civil and Military Station to Mysore State. An appeal numbered 53 of 1948 was decided in December 1949. In the meantime, ancillary applications for probate were filed in the District Court of Bangalore and the Madras High Court, where the properties covered by the will were situated. Those probate orders were granted, subject to the outcome of the pending appeal before the Privy Council. The Court then turned to consider other suits, some instituted by the sons and the widow of Ramalingam and others by the executor of the will, which had been filed in the courts of Mysore State and the Madras High Court. Two such suits were filed.

In the Bangalore district courts, two separate civil suits were brought by the sons of Ramalingam. The first suit was filed in the Bangalore Civil and Military Station Court and was recorded as Civil Suit No. 56 of 1942, while the second was instituted in the Bangalore District Court as Civil Suit No. 60 of 1944. Both actions sought possession of movable and immovable property as well as control of the business that Ramalingam had conducted within the jurisdiction of those courts. The plaintiffs asserted that Ramalingam had been a member of a Hindu coparcenary and that the business had been started with family funds, thereby rendering the property and business subject to joint family ownership. The defendants, who were the executors of Ramalingam’s will and other individuals said to be in possession of the assets, contended that the property and business were purely the personal estate of Ramalingam, over which he possessed absolute discretion to dispose. The two suits were later merged, and the merged proceeding was decided by the District Judge in favour of Ramalingam’s sons, confirming the plaintiffs’ claim that the property belonged to the joint family.

Subsequently, the sons of Ramalingam instituted a further suit in the Madras High Court (original side), designated as Civil Suit No. 214 of 1944, seeking possession of both movable and immovable assets alleged to be situated in Madras. The judgment in this matter will be examined in detail later. In addition to the above, numerous other suits were filed in the Madras High Court (original side) by various family members and by the executors of the will. These included Civil Suit Nos. 200 of 1944, 203 of 1945, 274 of 1944, 344 of 1946 and 91 of 1944. The present discussion does not require a detailed analysis of each of those suits, as each of them concerned possession of particular properties either under the will or on the basis that the properties formed part of a joint family. For the purpose of the present review, it is sufficient to note that the two Bangalore suits (Nos. 56 of 1942 and 60 of 1944) dealt with property located in the Mysore State, while the Madras suit (No. 214 of 1944) concerned property located in Madras, both movable and immovable. In each case the central question for determination was whether Ramalingam died as a member of a coparcenary, thereby holding joint family property and a joint family business.

The consolidated suit before the Bangalore District Judge was heard first and the Judge held that the properties were indeed joint family assets and that the will of Ramalingam was invalid. The decision was appealed to the Mysore High Court, where two appeals were entered as Revised Applications Nos. 104 and 109 of 1947‑48. Initially, the appeals were listed before Chief Justice Paramasiviah and Justice Balakrishaniah. During an early hearing the matter was adjourned because the parties claimed that a compromise might have been reached. The executors asserted that no compromise had been effected, whereas the family claimed that a settlement had been achieved. The appeals were subsequently scheduled for hearing on 23 September 1948. On 22 September 1948, Chief Justice Paramasiviah retired unexpectedly, and Mr. P. Medappa was appointed as the new Chief Justice. Following this change, the appeals were transferred to the panel of Justice Balakrishaniah and Justice Kandaswami Pillai for further consideration.

The matters were placed before Judges Balakrishaniah and Kandaswami Pillai, and the question of whether any compromise had been effected was raised. The High Court did not investigate this issue because it held that even if a compromise existed it could not be formally recorded. This observation was made on 15 March 1949. After hearing the appeals, the two learned judges differed in opinion and each delivered a separate judgment on 2 April 1949. Judge Balakrishaniah pronounced a judgment in favour of allowing the appeals, whereas Judge Kandaswami Pillai delivered a judgment dismissing them. Under the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in Mysore State, the decree of the District Court would ordinarily have been affirmed unless a judge of the Division Bench, or both judges together, referred the case under section 15(3) of the Mysore High Court Regulation 1884. Judge Balakrishaniah exercised that power and referred the appeals to a Full Bench.

At the time the Mysore High Court comprised five judges. One of those judges had previously appeared in the case and requested to be excluded from further consideration. Of the remaining four judges, Judge Balakrishaniah had already heard the appeals and had expressed his view on the factual and legal questions. The three other judges were: the Chief Justice, who had earlier decided the probate matter and had issued certain criticisms of the family in his judgment; Justice Puttaraja Urs, who had been appointed in place of Justice Kaildaswami Pillai and who had recorded the evidence in Civil Suit No. 60 of 1944 during the years 1945‑1947; and Justice Mallappa, who had little prior connection with the case. Consequently, the Full Bench constituted to reconsider the appeal consisted of the Chief Justice, Judge Balakrishaniah, and Justice Mallappa.

This Full Bench heard arguments presented on behalf of the executors, since the family chose not to participate and their counsel withdrew from the proceedings. The Full Bench, through Justice Mallappa, rendered a judgment allowing the appeals, and the other two judges concurring with this decision. The judgment was delivered on 29 July 1949, after the hearing had concluded on 27 July 1949. Subsequently, Civil Petitions Nos. 61, 62, 49 and 50 of 1949‑50 were filed seeking a review of the Full Bench’s decision; however, the Full Bench dismissed those petitions on 10 November 1949, thereby bringing the Mysore portion of the litigation to an end.

Prior to the Full Bench hearing, the sons of Ramalingam made unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Maharaja to appoint ad hoc judges to hear the appeals. They also appealed to the Chief Justice for additional time, hoping that state authorities might be moved against the case or that the appeals could be adjourned on other grounds. The sons expressed a desire to engage external counsel to argue the appeals, but their requests were refused. All of these matters are recorded in the proceedings and are not in dispute. It was alleged in the parallel Madras suit that there were unpleasant “scones” between Chief Justice Medappa and one Raju, counsel for the appellant; the court indicated that further commentary on those facts would be provided later.

The record indicated that the factual assertions of the parties were in dispute. Ultimately, the appellate court allowed the appeals and dismissed both suits. At this point, the Court found it appropriate to examine the pleas that had been raised in the Mysore proceedings and the reliefs that had been claimed therein. For that purpose, reference was made solely to Civil Suit No. 56 of 1942. The claim of the sons of Ramalingam was that their father had inherited a substantial paternal estate from his own father, comprising both movable and immovable assets. The immovable portion of that inheritance was sold, and the proceeds, together with other ancestral assets, were used to start several enterprises, beginning with a building‑contracting business in the Kolar Gold Fields. The sons contended that this venture was conducted as a joint‑family business and that all subsequent properties were acquired from that family nucleus, thereby becoming joint‑family property. They further asserted that even any assets that might have been initially separate were merged into the common stock and thus became part of the joint family estate. Accordingly, they claimed possession of all the items listed in the schedules to the plaint. Schedule A comprised, inter alia, houses numbered 1 and 2 on Waddells Road in Madras (Item 13), a property known as Palm Grove in Madras (Item 18), 18,566 shares of Indian Sugars and Refineries Ltd. held in the name of Ramalingam (Item 22), and 1,000 shares of the same company held in the name of A. Wajid (Item 24). Schedule B listed the Kolar Gold Field business (Item 1), a vegetable‑oil building contract (Item 5), and the Oriental Films concern (Item 6). The executors of the estate repudiated the allegation of any ancestral nucleus, property, funds, or business from which the estate had been built, denying the existence of a joint‑family business altogether. They maintained that Ramalingam, through his unaided enterprise, had conducted business for more than twenty‑six years and had acquired all the properties solely in his own name, with no other family member having any share. Subsequently, the plaint was amended to remove the immovable properties situated outside the State of Mysore. Issues were framed to address the competing allegations and counter‑allegations, and all of those issues were finally decided in favour of the executors. The District Judge had originally decreed in favour of the family, ordering possession of the properties to them, but the Full Bench later held that none of the properties had been acquired with the assistance of a joint‑family nucleus and that the Kolar Gold Field enterprise was in fact Ramalingam’s private business. Consequently, the earlier decree was set aside. The suit pending before the Madras High Court was stayed pending the decision of the Mysore suits. In that Madras suit, the claim was for possession of both movable and immovable assets located in Madras. The immovable assets claimed were: House No 1 on Waddells Road with its land, House No 3 on Waddells Road with its land, certain parcels of land, and House No 14 on Monteith Road, Madras. The movable assets claimed were the assets of Oriental Films, Madras, 18,366 shares of Indian Sugars and Refineries Ltd. from Hospet, 1,000 shares of the same company from Hospet, and the balance of a certain monetary amount.

In the plaint it was stated that the building constructed for the Mysore Vegetable Oil Company in Madras formed part of the dispute. The executors objected to the jurisdiction of the Mysore courts to entertain any claim involving the properties situated in Madras, and consequently they instituted another suit. The same pleas concerning the existence of a joint family, its nucleus and its members were raised, and the defence presented identical arguments. The executors relied on the judgment of the Mysore High Court, asserting that it was conclusive on the point of the jointness of the family, the existence of its nucleus and the joint character of the Kolar Gold Field business. The sons of Ramalingam, however, alleged that the judgment was not in accordance with the rules of natural justice, that it was rendered coram non judice, and that the Chief Justice and Balakrishnan J. were not competent to sit on the bench because of their bias and personal interest. In numerous affidavits, the eldest son Vishwanathan alleged that Medappa, C. J. displayed interest and prejudice, that his conduct both in and out of court violated the rules of natural justice, and that the Full Bench over which he presided was therefore compromised. Vishwanathan also contended that the presence of Balakrishnan J., who had already delivered one judgment in the case and had attempted to broker a compromise between the rival parties, rendered him incompetent to sit on the Full Bench. On the other hand, the executors claimed that the Mysore High Court had finally decided the issue of jointness with respect to all movable and immovable property, and that the questions of the family’s jointness, the character of the Kolar Gold Fields business and the absence of a nucleus had been conclusively settled in the Mysore suits and appeals and could not be reopened. The sons of Ramalingam denied that the Mysore court possessed competent jurisdiction insofar as the property in Madras was concerned. In short, the executors maintained that the Mysore judgment, insofar as any matter had been decided therein, was conclusive, whereas the family argued that the court was not a competent forum, that the judgment was rendered coram non judice, and that it violated the principles of natural justice. The initial confrontation therefore proceeded under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although numerous facts were alleged to show bias and interest on the part of the Chief Justice, the parties proceeded to trial on a single allegation. The allegations against Medappa, C. J., were that he was a close friend of A. Wajid, that he had decided the probate case, had heard the witnesses now relied upon, had already formed pronounced opinions about them, and that his judgment in the probate case was in danger of being annulled by the decision of the District Judge on appeal because the latter had held the family and the properties to be joint.

The record shows that one of the allegations against the Chief Justice, Medappa, concerned his conduct while he served as a District Judge. It was asserted that during that period he had used a motor vehicle that belonged to the executors of the estate, thereby creating a duty to them and an interest in the parties. In addition, it was alleged that he had made an effort to persuade Mr Raju, who was counsel for the sons of Ramalingam, not to conduct the case on their behalf. Judge Rajagopalan, who dealt with the suit in its early stages, examined the list of accusations and selected two of them as capable, if proved, of demonstrating an “interest” and a “bias” on the part of Medappa, Chief Justice. He therefore framed issues only on the matters of the car usage and the alleged attempt to dissuade Mr Raju, and declined to raise any issues concerning the remaining accusations.

Judge Rajagopalan also held that the judgment rendered by the Mysore High Court could not be said to operate as res judicata in respect of the immovable property situated in Madras. He gave two reasons for this conclusion: first, the question of the Madras property had not been considered by the Mysore High Court because the plaint had been amended before that court; second, the Mysore High Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that particular question. Both parties appealed against Judge Rajagopalan’s decision. The executors were dissatisfied with the part of the order that denied res judicata and with the limited inquiry into the conduct of the Chief Justice. The sons of Ramalingam were aggrieved by the same restriction on the inquiry into the Chief Justice’s conduct.

The appeal was heard by a Divisional Bench, which affirmed Judge Rajagopalan’s view on the issue of res judicata and confirmed that portion of his order. Regarding the allegation of the car usage, the Bench observed that even if the allegation were true, the incident was too remote in time to demonstrate a present interest or bias, and therefore it was not relevant to the matter at hand. The allegation concerning the attempt to dissuade Mr Raju, however, was allowed to stand as a viable issue.

Separate allegations were made against Justice Balakrishniah. It was claimed that he had suggested a compromise while sitting with Chief Justice Paramasiviah and had taken part in discussing the terms of that compromise, thereby rendering himself a witness to the negotiations. Further, it was alleged that during the hearings of the appeals, while sitting with Justice Kandaswami Pillai, he made strong adverse remarks against the family, which he reproduced in his judgment dated 2 April 1949. He was also accused of demonstrating bias by awarding costs not against the State but against the sons of Ramalingam, and of being unfit to sit on a Full Bench because of his already‑pronounced judgment. Additional general allegations concerned his refusal to adjourn the hearing at the request of the sons of Ramalingam, even when senior counsel Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar was engaged in public duties in the Constituent Assembly.

Subsequently, the parties proceeded to trial before Judge Ramaswami. During the trial, numerous affidavits and court‑affidavits were filed, and fresh evidence was introduced. By mutual consent, the evidence recorded in the two earlier Mysore suits, as well as the records of those suits and of the Privy Council, were admitted and marked as evidence in the present suit. The executors requested that the application of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure be decided as a preliminary issue, but that request was denied. The matter then proceeded to a Letters Patent Appeal to this Court.

In the proceeding, the affidavit that had been filed in this Court was also entered into the record and marked as part of the case file. The trial court examined several witnesses, including Vishwanathan, who was the eldest son of Ramalingam, and Puttaraja Urs, J., who testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, while Abdul Wajid, Narayanaswami Mudaliar and Balakrishniah, J., gave evidence for the opposing party; the names of Medappa, C.J., and Raju were cited in the pleadings but those individuals were not called to give testimony. After an extended and detailed trial, Justice Ramaswami concluded that the judgment rendered by the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court was rendered coram non judice and, consequently, could not be treated as conclusive under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Justice Ramaswami further determined that the properties which were the subject of the suit constituted the assets of a joint family, and therefore he decreed in favour of the sons of Ramalingam, ordering that possession be restored to them, that the executors be restrained from interfering, and that accounts of the property be prepared. In addition to those principal orders, ancillary orders addressing the related suits that had been tried together with the main suit were also issued. The executors, dissatisfied with that decision, filed an appeal under the Letters Patent, identified as Civil Suit No. 214 of 1944. The Divisional Bench that heard the appeal affirmed the finding that the suit properties belonged to a joint family, but it set aside the earlier conclusion that the Mysore judgment was coram non judice, thereby modifying the effect of that judgment. As a result of the Divisional Bench’s ruling, the Mysore judgment was held to bind the Madras Courts regarding movable property, while it was held not to bind them concerning immovable property situated in Madras. Following that judgment, Civil Appeals Nos. 277 and 278 of 1958 were filed, the former by the sons of Ramalingam and the latter by the executors. The sons of Ramalingam argued that the Full Bench judgment of the Mysore High Court was coram non judice and therefore could not be conclusive with respect to immovable assets, whereas the executors asserted that the Mysore judgment was conclusive on every point it decided, particularly the characterization of the Kolar Gold Fields enterprise as the private business of Ramalingam; they contended that the sole question left for the Madras High Court was whether any property had been acquired using funds not belonging to that private business. Although counsel for both sides presented extensive arguments, the appeals were reduced to two principal questions. The first question concerned the application of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, examined through the lenses of alleged violation of natural‑justice principles, alleged bias and interest of some judges of the Full Bench, and the competence of the Mysore courts to adjudicate the dispute; the second question asked whether Ramalingam died while still a member of the joint family and whether the estates he left, including his commercial enterprises, should be treated as belonging to that joint family, the surviving sons being the rightful heirs. Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or parties claiming under the same title, except where it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction or not given on the merits of the case.

Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates several exceptions to the rule that a foreign judgment is conclusive. Clause (c) states that a judgment may be set aside where the proceedings appear on their face to have been based on an incorrect view of international law or on a refusal to recognise the law of British India in cases where that law is applicable. Clause (d) provides that a judgment may be disregarded where the proceedings in which it was obtained are contrary to the principles of natural justice. Clause (e) allows refusal where the judgment was obtained by fraud. Clause (f) provides that a judgment may not be given effect where it upholds a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in British India. In the present matter, the sons of Ramalingam attempted to rely upon clauses (a), (c) and (d) of the section, whereas the executor denied the allegations and asserted that the introductory words of the statute should operate in his favour. Consequently, the Court first addressed these contentions and examined the evidence before determining the extent to which the foreign judgment might be regarded as conclusive, if at all. The Court organised its analysis in the same sequence as earlier outlined. The initial issue considered was whether, during the hearing of the appeal by the Full Bench, the principles of natural justice had been violated. This issue divided into two sub‑questions: the first dealing with the conduct of the actual hearing, and the second concerning the composition of the Bench. The first allegation asserted that the Full Bench had failed to provide a fair hearing and had effectively silenced the case of the sons of Ramalingam by refusing to grant the adjournments they sought. The Court noted that another court, which had not itself heard the appeal, could scarcely adjudicate whether the conduct of the judges of the foreign court amounted to a breach of natural justice unless the case presented an exceptionally clear and compelling factual foundation. Ordinarily, the manner in which a case is conducted is within the exclusive domain of the court hearing it. The record showed only that the sons of Ramalingam were hurried and that some adjournments they requested were denied. Deciding whether a particular request for adjournment should have been granted is not a matter for a reviewing court. Moreover, the conduct of the sons of Ramalingam could not be described as wholly proper. It was established that from the moment the names of the Full Bench judges were announced, there was no intention on their part to hear and decide the matter. The judges had, in fact, applied to the Maharaja and the Dewan for the appointment of ad hoc judges. The efforts to obtain adjournments were motivated by two reasons: first, to avoid hearing the case before the presiding judges or at least two of them; and second, to enable Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar to appear on their behalf. These attempts to secure adjournments were therefore intended not only to accommodate senior counsel but also to create time to have other judges appointed, if possible. As to the senior counsel, it suffices to note that the parties sought to influence the timing of the proceedings for strategic advantage.

In this case the Court observed that, although other counsel were engaged in the proceedings, the sons of Ramalingam had asked those counsel to withdraw. The Court said this request was not made in good faith but was intended solely to compel the Court to grant an adjournment that it had previously refused. The Court noted that the sons had been given ample notice of the hearing date and therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to retain other counsel if they wished. It was argued that the Full Bench had once adjourned the appeals to accommodate counsel for the executors, yet when Sir Alladi subsequently sought an adjournment, the request was denied, a situation portrayed as a double standard. The Court explained that it is generally accepted that an adjournment is granted when the request is made promptly, but not when it is delayed, a practice followed by all courts. While the Full Bench might have considered a short adjournment because the sons were anxious about the outcome, the Court held that such a refusal did not amount to a breach of natural‑justice principles. The Court pointed out that three other counsel had already been briefed on the appeals and that one of them had even argued before the Divisional Bench, concluding that there was no violation of natural justice sufficient to bring the judgment within the prohibition of clause (d) of section 13 of the Code. The next issue concerned the composition of the Full Bench and the conduct of its Judges. An objection was raised that Justice Balakrishniah was incompetent to sit on the Bench after having expressed dissenting views in his separate judgment. The Court clarified that two learned Judges had indeed differed and delivered separate judgments. It was contended that Justice Balakrishniah could not make a reference because Justice Kandaswami Pillai had already delivered his judgment, after which the District Judge’s decision, agreed with by the latter, became final under section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in Mysore State. In other words, Justice Balakrishniah was alleged to have missed the opportunity to refer the matter because he had already delivered his judgment, and the other Judge’s judgment triggered the statutory consequence. The action taken by Justice Balakrishniah under rule 15(3) of the Mysore High Court Regulation, 1884, was described as being too late to prevent the effect of section 98. The Court found this argument to be without merit and stated that it would have been untenable even in the absence of supporting authority. The Court further said that it was unnecessary to delve into the technical question of when a judgment becomes final—whether upon its oral pronouncement or upon signing. Consequently, the Court indicated that the particularly intriguing argument raised by counsel for the sons of Ramalingam could be reserved for determination in a more appropriate case.

In the present matter, the Court observed that accepting the proposed argument would lead to anomalous consequences. Either Justice Balakrishniah would have been required to refer the case to a larger Bench without awaiting the delivery of the judgment by his fellow judge, Justice Kandaswami Pillai, or he would have forfeited his right to refer because, as soon as Justice Kandaswami Pillai read his judgment, the District Judge’s decree would automatically become final. Consequently, the judge who pronounced his judgment first would lose the opportunity to make a reference. The Court found it evident that, out of professional courtesy, Justice Balakrishniah would wait for his colleague to finish his judgment before making any reference. The record shows that Justice Balakrishniah’s judgment concluded with an order for reference, and only thereafter did his signature appear. Although the official record does not disclose the exact sequence of events, affidavits submitted on the point indicate that the reference was made prior to the judgment being completed by signature; the Court considered those affidavits inappropriate for consideration in this context. The Court noted the existence of a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Lal Singh v. Ghansham Singh (1887 I.L.R. 9 All 625) but emphasized that the practice of the Mysore High Court had been definitively settled by a Full‑Bench judgment in Nanjamma v. Lingappa (1949 4 D.L.R. Mysore 118). In view of the procedural course established by that precedent, the Allahabad view could not be applied, and the Court held that the appeal had been properly referred to the Full Bench. The next issue raised was whether Justice Balakrishniah, having sat on the Full Bench after delivering a long and considered judgment on the merits, denied the sons of Ramalingam a fair hearing before a judge who had not already formed an opinion. The Court observed that considerable doubt remained on this point. It cited several earlier authorities where judges who had made a reference to a larger Bench subsequently sat on that Bench, even after expressing an earlier view, and some of those judges later altered their opinions. Accordingly, the Court stressed that the established practice of the Court must be given due weight. The learned Attorney‑General highlighted three Mysore High Court decisions that provide relevant precedents and also referred to analogous rulings from other Indian High Courts and from foreign jurisdictions. In certain foreign cases, judges have participated in a bench hearing after having rendered a decision in an appeal or rehearing. While such foreign practice is not binding, the Court noted that similar situations arise in India, particularly under clause 26 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Court, where judges who presided over a Sessions Trial have sat on a rehearing after obtaining a certificate from the Advocate‑General. Illustrative cases from the Law Reports were mentioned, including Emperor v. Fatehchand Agarwalla and Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghose. The learned Attorney‑General also referred to entries in the Encyclopedia of Laws and other precedent compilations.

The Court referred to several secondary authorities, namely the report in (1906) Vol. 23 p. 588, the entry in American Jurisprudence (1958) Vol. 30A p. 76 paragraph 187, the case of William Cramp & Sons v. International Curtis Marine Purbine Co., and Rex v. Lovegrove (4). The Court observed that in many earlier decisions the practice of appointing ad hoc judges was quite common, principally because the number of judges then was very small. Illustrative authorities cited included Rohilkhand & Kumaon Bank v. Row (5), The Queen Empress v. Saminda Chetti (6), Seshadri (1) (1917) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 477, (2) A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 257, (3) (1912) 57 L. Ed. 1003, (4) [1951] 1 All. E.R. 804, (5) (1884) 6 All. 469, (6) (1883) I.L.R. 7 Mad. 274, and Ayyangar v. Nataraja Ayyar (1). The Court stressed that there is no statutory rule prohibiting such appointments, and in a small court with a limited bench it may be unavoidable. It further observed that it is reasonable to expect that ad hoc judges would be called upon whenever such a situation arises. However, the Court emphasized that the appropriate guide is the practice prevailing in the courts under consideration. If that practice was long‑standing and widely accepted, no litigant could reasonably fear that justice would be denied. The Court noted that at least four judgments of the Mysore High Court had followed a similar procedure, in addition to those already mentioned. In the Court’s opinion, given the size of the bench and the established custom, the judgment of the Full Bench could not be described as violating the principles of natural justice. The next allegation advanced in support of the claim that the Mysore High Court’s decision was rendered coram non judice and contravened natural justice implicated the learned Chief Justice and Justice Balakrishniah with claims of unjudicial conduct, bias, and, in the Chief Justice’s case, a personal interest in the executors. The Court found it convenient to consider the accusations against the Chief Justice and Justice Balakrishniah separately. Regarding the Chief Justice, it was recalled that evidence was permitted only on the question of whether Mr Raju had been discouraged from appearing before the court; no direct evidence on that point was actually presented. What, if anything, transpired between the Chief Justice and Mr Raju could be testified to only by one of them, as no other person was present at any such meeting and neither party was examined on the matter. By that time Mr Raju had already been incarcerated following his trial and conviction for attempting to take the life of the Chief Justice, and therefore he was unavailable for examination. The record indicates, citing (1) (1898) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 179, that no serious effort was made to secure his testimony, and the explanation offered was that legal difficulties prevented his examination. Nevertheless, the sons of Ramalingam voluntarily withdrew Raju as a witness, and it is now too late for them to complain of legal difficulties. They also cannot argue that the worse appears better for that reason. The other party likewise withdrew Medappa C. J. Indirect evidence was sought to be introduced, but it did not assist the case.

In this proceeding, the party that had advanced the allegation was required to prove it, and consequently the party that could not meet that burden must fail. The sons of Ramalingam, who were the parties alleging misconduct, faced an additional difficulty because Viswanathan himself had written letters stating that the allegations were false and that they had been made under the advice of another person, most likely Mr Raju. When the letters were produced, Viswanathan initially denied that they existed and later claimed that he had written them only because he was pressured by Wajid. Since the original allegation had never been substantiated by any evidence, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the letters had been written under undue pressure. Moreover, the Court observed that even if some portions of Wajid’s testimony appeared unreliable, Viswanathan’s conduct impressed it even less. The dispute over whether Mr Raju had been discouraged from appearing in the case therefore resulted only in a stalemate, and at best was unfavorable to the sons of Ramalingam. After they failed to establish the single issue that had been specifically raised, an attempt was made to revive other allegations for which no evidence had been admitted. References were made to certain passages in the cross‑examination of Wajid and to Viswanathan’s testimony concerning the alleged use of a car belonging to the estate by Mr Medappa several years earlier, when Medappa was the District Judge. That allegation rested on affidavits sworn by Viswanathan, who seemed to have filed an affidavit each day. The opposing side countered those affidavits with affidavits filed by Wajid, creating a fierce “war of affidavits” that produced only the self‑interested testimonies of Viswanathan on one side and Wajid on the other. The Court noted that this material required careful examination, but the evidence presented was not linked to any specific issue because no such issue had been raised in the case. Most of the material consisted of unauthorised affidavits that had not been ordered as evidence and therefore could not be treated as proof. The limited evidence that existed was highly self‑interested and lacked corroboration from any independent source. Even assuming the events were true, they were so remote in time that they could not establish a bias sufficient to disqualify a judge from hearing the matter. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the alleged case could not be said to have been proved. The judgment then turned to another allegation, namely that there existed a friendship between Chief Justice Medappa, A Wajid, and Manaji Rao. The Court observed that Manaji Rao, having faded from his role as executor and shown little interest in his duties, could not be considered a significant factor capable of influencing Medappa. To support the claim of friendship, Viswanathan had sworn several affidavits, including a lengthy affidavit numbered 440 of 1950, which had been reproduced in full by Justice Ramaswami in a High Court judgment. Additional affidavits were also sworn in this Court during proceedings for a writ of prohibition and were subsequently read in the High Court.

The affidavits that had been read were distilled into several specific allegations. First, it was asserted that Medappa, who served as Chief Justice, also held the position of Chief Steward of the Bangalore Race Club, and that A. Wajid acted as his Secretary in that capacity. It was further alleged that A. Wajid had visited the Chief Justice at his residence while the probate proceedings were in progress and that the two men were great friends. Another claim stated that the Chief Justice’s attitude throughout the probate case was extremely hostile toward the family, a hostility allegedly manifest in the final judgment. In addition, it was alleged that when Viswanathan requested that the Chief Justice refrain from sitting on a Full Bench, the Chief Justice reacted with great anger, compelled Viswanathan to disclose the name of the counsel who had advised the request, and warned that he would consider what action to take against that counsel. All of these allegations were expressly denied by A. Wajid, both in his sworn affidavits and in his oral testimony before the Court. When the Court examined the conduct of Justice Balakrishniah, he was questioned about the events that had transpired in the courtroom, but his answers were noted to be evasive and without clarification.

The Court reiterated that the rule of law governing judicial conduct is both strict and longstanding. No judge may be regarded as competent to adjudicate a case in which he has a direct or indirect interest; a proven interest not only disqualifies the judge but also renders any judgment rendered by him a nullity. A further principle of judicial conduct requires that a judge remain calm, impartial, and even‑handed, even when his patience is severely tested and court time appears to be wasted. This principle rests on the maxim that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, ensuring that no litigant departs from the courtroom feeling that his case was not considered on its merits. If such a feeling arises, the administration of justice is said to fail despite any substantive decision. The Court therefore examined whether the Chief Justice’s conduct amounted to the level of interest that would disqualify him or to a denial of justice. Apart from A. Wajid’s denial of any personal familiarity—though not of mere acquaintance—with the Chief Justice, there was no evidence of any undue favoritism toward the executors. The Court observed that the events in the probate case appeared to have been orchestrated by Mr. Raju, as suggested by letters written by Viswanathan. The family, lacking knowledge of how to align themselves with the steadfast father‑figure of the Chief Justice, behaved in a manner that mirrored the same antagonism toward the Court. Their conduct, beginning with the announcement of the Full Bench, seemed designed to provoke and irritate a judge who prized his reputation. Consequently, the more the Chief Justice displayed irritation, the greater the publicity value obtained by Mr. Raju and his clients, who hoped to exploit the situation with the Maharajah. In the Court’s opinion, the actions of Viswanathan’s sons were deliberate, studied, and intended to advance their request for a different bench, reflecting a calculated strategy to influence the judicial process.

The Court observed that the allegation that Raju had been discouraged was unsupported by any evidence, and likewise there was no proof concerning the alleged use of the estate car; consequently only a vague charge of a deep friendship remained, which the opposing side denied and which was not established by any independent evidence. The Court explained that independent evidence is required because the testimony of Justice Puttaraja Urs regarding a conversation he claimed to have had with Chief Justice Medappa about this matter cannot be regarded as disinterested, since Justice Urs himself harboured a personal grievance against the Chief Justice, a grievance that he had openly aired to all and even reported to the Chief Justice of India. The Court noted that it was not required to pronounce on the truth or falsity of Justice Urs’s personal aspersions against Chief Justice Medappa, but it was evident that he could not be treated as a witness who had taken no side. Consequently, the only remaining fact was that Chief Justice Medappa had heard and decided the probate case involving the family. The Court, however, held that this circumstance by itself was insufficient to disqualify him from sitting on a bench to hear a case in which additional evidence had been led, observing that such situations occur frequently in all courts. The same conclusion was reached when the allegations concerning the conduct of Justice Balakrishniah were examined. Those allegations, set out in affidavits, claimed that Justice Balakrishniah had made hostile remarks against the case of the sons of Ramalingam while hearing the appeal together with Justice Kandaswami Pillai. The Court warned that if every remark made from the bench were to be construed as indicating prejudice, most judges would fail the exacting test. It is recognised that during arguments judges may express opinions, sometimes tentatively formed and sometimes even strongly, without necessarily having prejudged the case. An argument in court would be ineffective if judges never pointed out apparent fallacies in the plausibility of a party’s position, and a lawyer or litigant who formed an apprehension on that basis could not be said to be acting reasonably. The Court further observed that a judge’s objection often collapses on closer scrutiny, and that judges sometimes publicly acknowledge that they were mistaken. Nevertheless, if a judge unreasonably obstructs the flow of an argument or refuses to allow it to be raised, a fair hearing may be denied. The remarks attributed to Justice Balakrishniah, which were quoted in the proceedings, did not suggest such obstruction. He appeared to have formed opinions as the arguments progressed, and if he had kept those opinions to himself there would have been no complaint; the complaint arose precisely because the opinions were expressed. There was no doubt that he expressed his opinion in his judgment and then sat on the Full Bench. The Court noted that, due to the retirement of Justice Kandaswami Pillai, the choice of a replacement judge was between Justice Balakrishniah and Justice Puttaraja Urs, and that either selection might have been objected to by the opposite side, as subsequent events later revealed. In sum, the Court concluded that the allegations did not satisfy the requirements for disqualification, and therefore the bench on which the matter was heard remained valid.

The Court observed that because one learned Judge had previously acted as a lawyer and was regarded as incompetent, the only available options for the rehearing were that judge or Puttaraja Urs, J. The Court noted that the opposite side might also have raised objections to that choice, as later events indicated. It further stated that a rehearing was scheduled and that, even if the Chief Justice, including Balakrishniah, J., sat on the bench in accordance with the long‑standing practice of the Court, it would be an overstatement to describe the judgment as rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction (coram non judice) or to contend that the principles of natural justice had been violated. The contention that Balakrishniah, J., had become a witness because the terms of a compromise were discussed before him was said to lose all significance in view of an order that any compromise, if it existed, could not be recorded for the interest of the estate. After reviewing the allegations, the Court was not persuaded that the sons of Ramalingam had presented an acceptable case. Consequently, the Court concluded that sections (a) and (d) of Section 13 were not applicable and that the judgment of the Mysore Full Bench remained conclusive. The Court clarified that this should not be read as a finding that the hearing occurred without any incident or that the conduct of the two judges was invariably correct. It observed that the factual record was clouded by exaggeration and perjury, preventing any definite conclusion on those points. Nevertheless, the Court was certain that the evidence fell far short of the level of proof required for another Court to declare a foreign judgment as coram non judice or as having been rendered in violation of natural justice.

The Court then indicated that it would examine the competence of the Mysore Courts and the extent to which the Full Bench judgment was binding under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To address those issues, the Court said it must critically analyse the pleas raised in the Mysore proceedings and the decisions on those pleas. In so far as the decision is concerned, the Court limited its analysis to the Full Bench judgment because that was the final judgment and therefore the only one that could be regarded as conclusive. The suits in question were filed on identical pleas. Two separate suits were necessary because the property lay in the jurisdiction of two different courts. After the Civil and Military Station was returned to the Mysore State, both suits were consolidated. The suits sought a declaration that the properties were joint‑family property, that Ramalingam had no authority to dispose of them by will, and also sought possession and accounts. The executors, on the other hand, contended that the properties had been self‑acquired. The Court quoted the basis of the claim made by the sons of Ramalingam, which stated that V. Ramalinga Mudaliar had taken possession of movable and immovable assets, including several houses on Arunachala Mudaliar Road in the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore, which had previously belonged to his father, Vaidyalinga Mudaliar. The claim further alleged that Ramalinga Mudaliar sold those properties and that the sale‑proceeds…

The proceeds from the sales were invested in a number of commercial enterprises. Around the year 1928 the first plaintiff, Vishwanathan, entered the family business and began to work closely with his father, providing active assistance in the various enterprises that the family conducted. The plaintiff asserted that, in addition to a core of ancestral property that served as the basis for the businesses, the adult members of the family—specifically the first plaintiff and the late Mr V Ramalinga Mudaliar—were both actively engaged in the family’s commercial activities and that Ramalinga Mudaliar treated all of the properties involved as family property. In examining the matter, the Full Bench set out several specific findings. First, it held that Vaidyalinga Mudaliar, who at the time was stationed in Shimoga and Mysore serving as District Sheristadar, had no connection with the contract work carried out at the Kolar Gold Field Mines. Second, the Bench found that Shanmuga had borrowed two thousand rupees on a promissory note, a loan in which his father also participated, from a bank and had successfully conducted business with that amount. Third, it was determined that Shanmuga returned the borrowed money to his father. Fourth, the other brothers formally acknowledged in writing that they possessed no title or interest in Shanmuga’s business, which the Court recognised as Shanmuga’s own self‑acquired ventures. Fifth, the Court observed that Ramalingam entered into a partnership with Shanmuga and later withdrew his interest. Sixth, it held that Ramalingam never came into possession of any movable property belonging to his father. Seventh, the Bench concluded that even if Ramalingam sold the houses that had been left to him by his father, those houses were his exclusive property, bequeathed to him by Vaidyalingam as self‑acquired assets. Eighth, the Court rejected the claim advanced by the sons of Ramalingam that the properties had been obtained with the assistance of the joint‑family nucleus and were therefore joint‑family property. In sum, the findings led the Court to determine that the business and the possessions in question were not assets of a joint family but were the separate property of Ramalingam.

The subsequent issue was whether the findings, or any part of them, were conclusive in later litigation filed in Madras. The sons of Ramalingam, seeking to avoid the judgment rendered in Mysore, raised the matter in connection with 18,366 shares of the Indian Sugars and Refineries Ltd., while the executors of the estate invoked the same findings to claim benefit in respect of immovable property in Madras under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the principal dispute centered on the interpretation of section 13, the arguments were bolstered by citations to texts on private international law and decisions of English courts. The provision in section 13 had evolved over time. In the Code of Civil Procedure of 1887, matters relating to foreign judgments formed part of the doctrine of res judicata. Section 14 was enacted to provide that “No foreign judgment shall operate as a bar to a suit in British India— (a) if it has not been given on the merits of the case; (b) if it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or any law in force in British India.”

The provision declared that a foreign judgment would not be given effect if, in the opinion of the court before which it was produced, it was contrary to natural justice; if it had been obtained by fraud; or if it supported a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in British India. The section was intended to reflect the character of the preceding section thirteen, which dealt with res judicata, a point made clear by the Eleventh Explanation to that section. The Explanation stated that when a foreign judgment is relied upon, the production of the duly authenticated judgment is presumptive evidence that the court which rendered it possessed competent jurisdiction, unless the record shows otherwise, and that this presumption may be removed by proving lack of jurisdiction. Another provision, section twelve, dealt with the doctrine of lis alibi pendens, but it was not relevant to the present discussion. In the Code of 1882 an Explanation added by Act VII of 1888 required courts in British India, in a suit based on a foreign judgment from any foreign court in Asia or Africa, to examine the merits of that judgment when it was pleaded as a bar, except where the foreign court was a court of record established by Letters Patent of Her Majesty or a predecessor, or a Supreme Consular Court established by an Order of Her Majesty in Council. This requirement was designed to prevent judgments of the courts of Indian States from being placed on an equal footing with those of European countries. The Governor‑General in Council, however, was empowered to declare which courts of the Indian States could have their decrees executed in British India as if they were decrees of a British Indian court, and several states, including Mysore, were so declared. In the Code of 1908, which is the statute under consideration, the prohibition against the judgments of Indian States was removed; section fourteen was re‑enacted as section thirteen, and Explanation VI was re‑enacted with slight linguistic modifications as section fourteen. The shift from the old negative wording of section fourteen to the affirmative wording of section thirteen, which now states that a foreign judgment shall be conclusive, reflects contemporaneous developments in English private international law. Nonetheless, the proper approach to foreign judgments in India must be guided by the law as codified domestically. That law attaches a rebuttable presumption of the competency of the court that rendered the foreign judgment and makes the judgment conclusive as to any matter directly adjudicated between the same parties or between parties claiming under the same title.

The Court observed that the conditions precedent for recognizing a foreign judgment are set out in six clauses, the first of which requires that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. At this point the Court noted that section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act declares a final judgment, order or decree issued by a competent court exercising probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction to be both relevant and conclusive proof of certain legal attributes. The executors had argued that section 41 governs only judgments in rem, whereas section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs judgments in personam, and that the only judgments in rem are those listed in section 41. The Court indicated that it would address that contention later. The immediate question, the Court said, was whether the courts of Mysore possessed the competence to decide the dispute before them. Competence, the Court explained, can be examined from two perspectives. First, there is the internal competence of a court, which depends on the procedural rules applicable to that court within the state to which it belongs. Second, there is competence in the sense recognized by international law, which requires both subject‑matter jurisdiction over the controversy and jurisdiction over the parties as defined by international legal rules. The Court then referred to the explanation given by Justice Blackburn, speaking for the judges, in response to a question referred by the House of Lords in Castrique v. Imrie. Relying on Story’s “Conflict of Laws,” Justice Blackburn noted that English lawyers often use the terms “in rem” and “in personam” without attaching precise meaning, and that the true principle is to determine first whether the subject matter lies within the lawful control of the sovereign state under which the court sits, and second whether that sovereign authority has granted the court jurisdiction to dispose of the matter, with the court acting within that jurisdiction. If both conditions are satisfied, the adjudication is conclusive against the world. The Court quoted Story’s exact words from paragraph 586, emphasizing that for a foreign judgment to be recognised, it is indispensable to establish that the court rendering the judgment had lawful jurisdiction over the cause, the thing, and the parties; lacking any of these, the judgment is treated as a nullity with no binding effect.

The Court observed that a foreign judgment is entitled to no respect beyond the domestic tribunals, and this principle applies equally whether the proceedings are in rem, in personam, or both. The opinion expressed by Story derives from the earlier authority of Boullier in his Treatise on the Personality and Reality of Laws, Customs or Status, published in 1766 (Vol. I, pp. 618‑620). The rule articulated by Blackburn, J., has been universally accepted by courts in English‑speaking countries and was recently quoted with approval by the Privy Council in Ingenohl v. Wingh On and Co. (1). No distinction in approach to the question of competence is made between cases in rem and in personam. In Pemberton v. Hughes (2), Lindley, M.R., explained the law on competency as follows: where no substantial injustice, according to English notions, is offended, English courts concern themselves only with the finality of the judgment and the jurisdiction of the court, that is, its competence to entertain the type of case it dealt with and its power to require the defendant to appear. If the court possessed jurisdiction in this sense, the courts of this country never inquire whether the jurisdiction was properly or improperly exercised, provided that no substantial injustice has been committed. It is clear that the courts of this country will not enforce decisions of foreign courts that lack jurisdiction in the sense explained above—that is, jurisdiction over the subject‑matter or over the persons brought before them. Authorities supporting this view include Schibsby v. Westenholz (3), Rousillon v. Rousillon (4), Price v. Dewhurst (5), Buchanan v. Rucher (6) and Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (7). The crucial jurisdiction in these matters is the competence of the court in an international sense—its territorial competence over the subject‑matter and over the defendant. Competence or jurisdiction in any other sense is not regarded as material by the courts of this country. This principle is noted by Mr. Westlake (International Law, 3rd ed., s. 328) and by Foote (Private International Jurisprudence, 2nd ed., p. 547), and is illustrated by Vancuelin v. Bouard (1). Writers on international law safely conclude that the jurisdiction or competency of a court does not depend on the exact observance of its own procedural rules. Accordingly, a judgment of a foreign court that has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject‑matter—meaning it can summon the defendant and decide the matters before it—cannot be impeached in this country on its merits, as held in cases such as Castrique v. Imprie (2) (in rem) and Godard v. Gray (3) (in personam).

The Court noted that the cases cited as Messine v. Petrococchino (4) (in personam) and the earlier authorities are inconsistent with the proposition that a foreign judgment may be impeached in this jurisdiction merely because of a procedural error, and that this approach also conflicts with Vanquelin v. Bouard (1). In Castrique v. Imprie (2) Lord Colonsay had stated that no inquiry should be made on that ground. The Court further observed that the dictum of Lindley, M. R., goes too far when it reduces an internal lack of jurisdiction to nothing. While it is possible that a foreign judgment could be a nullity, it would be excessive to require that full faith be given to every such judgment. The Court pointed out that English authorities did not apply that portion of the dictum, referring to Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulas (5). In the Court’s view, the passage quoted earlier adequately summarizes the law concerning the competency of foreign courts. The Court emphasized that mere irregularities of procedure in the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign court are insufficient to set aside the judgment, citing Ashbury v. Ellis (1). However, a complete lack of internal jurisdiction may be recognised if it is pleaded in answer to the foreign judgment. The Court held that, as far as competency is concerned, there is no real distinction between actions in rem and actions in personam. In certain actions in personam the necessity of jurisdiction over a particular thing does not arise, whereas jurisdiction is always required in actions in rem involving immovable property. Moreover, a judgment in personam binds only the parties to the suit, while a judgment in rem is intended to bind third parties as well. Consequently, any objection to the jurisdiction of a foreign court on grounds other than international considerations must be raised in that foreign country, a principle settled in Vanquelin v. Bouard (2). Objections raised in the forum where the foreign judgment is produced may be considered, but the court there will examine, in actions in rem, whether the foreign court possessed jurisdiction over both the subject‑matter and the defendant, and, in actions in personam, whether jurisdiction existed over the subject‑matter and the parties. The approach therefore makes no distinction between the two classes of actions. In the latter class, English courts deem a defendant bound by a foreign judgment when any of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the defendant is a national of the foreign country in which the judgment was obtained; (2) the defendant was resident in that foreign country at the commencement of the original action; (3) the defendant, as plaintiff, selected the forum in which he was later sued; (4) the defendant voluntarily appeared before the foreign court; and (5) the defendant contracted to submit himself to the forum that rendered the judgment, as reflected in the authorities [1893] A.C. 319, 344, (1863) 15 C.B (N.S.) 341, and others. The Court expressly omitted the sixth ground introduced by Becquet v. MacCarthy (1) because it has not been universally accepted.

In the judgment the Court noted that the issue “has been said to go to the verge of the law.” In addition to this observation, English courts also consider the conduct of the party who raises an objection to a foreign judgment. When the objecting party is the plaintiff and that plaintiff has previously invoked the jurisdiction of the foreign court, the courts hold that the plaintiff may not later complain that the foreign judgment was rendered without competence. This rule was set out in unequivocal terms by Blackburn, J., in Schisby v. Westenholz (2), where he declared: “Again we think it clear, upon principle, that if a person selected, as plaintiff, the tribunal of a foreign country as the one in which he would sue, he could not afterwards say that the judgment of that tribunal was not binding upon him.” A contrary approach is seen in General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillon (3), where the conduct of the defendant was not regarded as binding. More recently, in Harris v. Tayalor (4), a conditional appearance by a defendant in a foreign court to contest jurisdiction was held not to be the type of conduct that would bind him, while in Travers v. Holky (5) Donning, L. J., in his then capacity, made certain obiter remarks criticizing the reasoning in the latter case. Since the present discussion is concerned with the conduct of a plaintiff before a foreign court rather than that of a defendant, the Court did not elaborate further on those latter authorities. (1) (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 951. (2) (1870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 155. (3) (1843) 11 M. & W. 877. 894. (4) [1915] 2 K. B. 580. (5) [1953] P. 246.

Applying these principles to determine whether the courts of Mysore possessed the competence to adjudicate the dispute both domestically and internationally, the Court found that they did possess such competence. The controversy centred on the legal status of Ramalingam, who was a subject and resident of the State of Mysore. His will, executed within that jurisdiction, had been admitted to probate there. The parties to the litigation, including his sons and other relatives, as well as those who were in possession of the property, all resided in Mysore. The property that gave rise to the dispute comprised the Kolar Gold Fields business located in Mysore, while the shares in Indian Sugars and Refineries Ltd., whose situs was contested, were expressly excluded. The sons of Ramalingam initiated two separate suits and invoked the jurisdiction of the Mysore courts, asserting that the Kolar Gold Fields business formed part of a joint family property rather than being the sole inheritance of Ramalingam. Although the plaintiffs succeeded at the first instance, they were defeated on appeal. In light of these facts and guided by the dicta of Blackburn, J., and Lindley, M. R., the Court concluded that the Mysore courts were unquestionably competent, both internally and in the international sense, to determine the status of Ramalingam and to resolve the rights relating to the Kolar Gold Fields business among the parties directly involved. The Court further emphasized that competence must be assessed with reference to the subject matter of the suit before the foreign court, and not by reference to the subject matter of any other suit brought in a different jurisdiction.

In the present dispute the Court examined whether the judgment rendered by the Mysore Court could affect proceedings that were pending in Madras. The Court observed that, on its face, the Mysore Court did not have jurisdiction over the property situated in Madras because that property was never the subject of the suits filed in Mysore. The fact that the Mysore suits dealt with other matters was therefore irrelevant to the question of the Mysore Court’s competence. What required consideration, the Court held, was the effect of the Mysore judgment on the Madras litigation in accordance with section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Assuming that the Mysore Courts were properly constituted courts of competent jurisdiction, the next issue was how far their judgments were conclusive in the present matter. The assets under dispute were identified as the roughly sixteen thousand shares of Indian Sugars and Refineries Limited and certain immovable properties located in Madras. The executors of the estate argued that, with respect to the shares, the Mysore decision settled the dispute between the parties, and that, with respect to the immovable property, the status of Ramalingam and the ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business could not be reopened in view of the Mysore judgment. The opposite party, however, sought to avoid the operation of the Mysore judgment altogether. Both sides relied on numerous decisions from English law reports and on standard legal texts dealing with private international law, also known as the law of conflict of laws, to support their respective positions.

The Court then turned to the comparative treatment of foreign judgments in India and England. It explained that, in India, the binding force of a judgment derives partly from substantive procedural law and partly from the law of evidence. The principle of res judicata, which is rooted in a public‑policy rule stated by Coke on Littleton as “interest of the state that there be an end to litigation,” is primarily codified in the Code of Civil Procedure, whereas the evidentiary value of judgments is governed by the Indian Evidence Act. By contrast, English law treats res judicata mainly as a rule of evidence, describing a prior judgment as creating an estoppel by record. The question of whether a foreign judgment is conclusive is therefore handled in India through procedural law, while England treats it as a matter of private international law. The Court emphasized that there is no universal “law of the world” on the reception of foreign judgments; no common consensus exists, although reciprocal agreements between states are common. Each country determines for itself the extent to which foreign judgments are enforceable. Consequently, foreign judgments receive varied treatment internationally. Apart from reciprocal arrangements, many jurisdictions have their own approaches. In some countries, a foreign judgment that has been registered in the country where it originated may be enforced directly, analogously to the provisions of sections 44 and 44A of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure. In other jurisdictions, enforcement is not automatic and may require additional steps unless a reciprocal treaty governs the matter.

The discussion continued with a reference to the principle that a judgment may be sued upon, raising the further question of whether the original cause of action is absorbed into the judgment‑transitu in rem judicature or whether it persists independently. The text noted that in certain jurisdictions, such as France, a foreign court’s judgment is subjected to judicial scrutiny before it can be recognized, whereas in some Nordic countries the foreign judgment is considered to have no legal effect at all. An illustration of the latter approach was provided by the case of Tallack v. Tallack (1), where the court refused to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that an English judgment would not bind the parties in the foreign country. The passage then observed that numerous rules have been developed in England and other English‑speaking countries, primarily by judges, to delineate the extent and conditions under which foreign judgments are received. It added that in the United States the Restatement of the Law has attempted to bring some clarity to the issue, yet even that effort has been deemed insufficient. The complexity of the field has prompted a learned author to remark that, “In one respect the law of Conflict of Laws is nothing but an unmitigated nuisance, serving no useful purpose whatever” (Leflar The Law of Conflict of Laws (1959) para 8 of Introduction). The passage identified the central point of English law on the matter as the categorisation of all judgments into two broad classes: judgments in rem and judgments in personam. The most authoritative definitions of these terms were said to appear in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 22, p. 742, para 1605, which described a judgment in rem as a determination by a competent court of the status of a person or thing or the disposition of a thing, distinct from the particular interest of any party to the litigation. By contrast, a judgment in personam was defined as one that determines the rights of the parties inter se with respect to the subject matter in dispute—whether corporeal property of any kind, a liquidated or unliquidated demand—without affecting the status of persons or things, without disposing of property, and without declaring any interest except as between the litigants. The text noted that judgments in personam encompass all judgments that are not judgments in rem, and that because many judgments in the latter class deal with the status of persons rather than things, the term “judgments inter partes” is often preferred to “judgment in personam”. The definition in Halsbury was said to restate a definition originally given by Bowers and to have been accepted and applied by Evershed, M. R., in Lazarus‑Barlow v. Regents Estates Co. Ltd. (1). Further, Phipson on Evidence (8th Ed., p. 401) was cited as holding that judgments in rem are conclusive against the parties, their privies, and strangers, whereas judgments in personam are conclusive only against the parties and their privies. Regarding foreign judgments, the passage explained that the rule concerning judgments in rem has been partially narrowed in one direction and expanded in another in recent English jurisprudence. It concluded by noting that, in relation to the status of parties, the rule has been extended, as reflected in the case cited as (1) (1949) 2 K.B. 465, 475.

The discussion noted that while foreign decrees have been given increasing confidence, the opposite trend has also been observed in certain respects. Regarding determinations of rights or title to things, except for immovable property which would be addressed later, judgments in rem are now limited to Admiralty actions. Nevertheless, a small portion of rem judgments concerning movable property still exists, and this is captured in the three rules set out by Westlake (a. 149). The first rule concerns judgments that immediately vest the property in a particular person against the whole world. The second rule involves judgments that order the sale of a thing to satisfy a claim directed against that thing itself. The third rule pertains to judgments that command that movables be sold through administration. Holmes, C. J., summed up the distinction in Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, observing that when the technical purpose of a suit is to establish a claim against a specific individual, the resulting judgment binds that individual and the action is characterised as in personam, even though the matter may involve the right to or possession of a tangible object. Conversely, if the purpose is to bar all possible objections to the right sought, so that anyone in the world could assert an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is classified as in rem. Holmes further explained that all proceedings, like all rights, are ultimately against persons, and the classification as rem or personam depends on how many persons are affected. This classic exposition, lauded by textbook authors and cited by the Privy Council in Ingenoul v. Wing On & Co. (1), elegantly differentiates the two types of judgments. The author indicated an intention to apply these principles to the law of England and America, where the rules are largely comparable, and then to examine how Indian statutes have treated the issue. The analysis would deliberately avoid discussion of reciprocal arrangements and arbitral awards, which constitute separate categories. The first prerequisite for recognising a foreign judgment is the competency of the foreign court, a point already addressed. The next requirement is the absence of fraud or collusion in the foreign proceeding. Additionally, the foreign judgment must not contravene English public policy or the principles of natural justice. Provided these conditions are satisfied, foreign judgments may be invoked in actions and given effect, subject to the distinction between rem and personam judgments. The author noted that this point had already been demonstrated earlier.

The Court explained that judgments in rem relate to a thing, referred to as “res,” but that the term “res” is given a very broad meaning. Lord Dunedin, speaking in Salvesan v. Administrator of Austrian Property (2), observed that the question of what constitutes a judgment in rem was being debated. He noted that all agreed a decree of divorce was a judgment in rem, yet the arguments before the Court of Sessions turned on the distinction between divorce and nullity. He first observed that, strictly speaking, neither marriage nor the legal status of marriage could be called a “res” as the term is used for judgments in rem. A “res” is a tangible object within the court’s jurisdiction, such as a ship or other chattel. By contrast, the status of marriage is a metaphysical idea; it is not a concrete “res,” although, to borrow a phrase, it “savours of a res” and has historically been treated as one. The learned judges therefore distinguished the two suits: in a divorce action, they said, the court deals with a “res,” namely the status of marriage, whereas in a nullity action there is no status of marriage to be dealt with, and consequently no “res.” The Court further remarked that celibacy is as much a status as marriage. Lord Haldane’s observations at pages 652‑653 of the same report were cited in support of this view. Cheshire, in his commentary (op. cit. 8UP) at page 657, explained that the word “res” in this context includes human relationships such as marriage, which do not arise merely from contract but constitute institutions recognised by the State. The Court then turned to the treatment of foreign adoptions, noting that adoptions once unrecognised in England are now being accepted. It referenced Dicey’s Conflict of Laws, seventh edition, pages 460‑461, where Dicey’s original view is described as obsolete. The subject of adoption is being treated as analogous to legitimation. Cheshire’s own analysis (pages 442‑443) likened adoption to the case In re Goodman's Trusts (1), arguing that the principles applied to one type of case should extend to another substantially similar case. In forceful language, Cheshire warned that the common law’s vitality would wither if the traditional practice of applying established principles to analogous cases were abandoned. He concluded that the legal status of a person Y, as fixed by the law of the domicile common to him and his adopter, must on principle be recognised in England. The Court also mentioned that judgments in personam ancillary to judgments in rem were once considered binding, citing Phillips v. Batho (2), but that this view has since evolved somewhat concerning the extent of conclusiveness of foreign judgments.

The discussion on the conclusiveness of foreign judgments was divided into two parts. Regarding judgments in rem, the Court referenced Foote’s treatise on Private International Law, which states that a foreign judgment in rem is conclusive in all courts and against all parties for any matter that it decides. Foote explained that the principle is uncontested for facts directly adjudicated, but difficulty arises when applying it to facts that are inferred or to the expressed or implied grounds of the decision. He described the safest expression of English law as follows: the truth of every fact that the foreign court has found, whether as part of its actual adjudication or as one of the stated grounds of its decision, must be taken as conclusively established. Foote added that the foreign court will not be regarded as having established any fact that it has not expressly found in the judgment relied upon. Consequently, not only the actual decree but also every adjudicative fact is treated as conclusively decided. Rattigan, in his work on Private International Law, echoed this view, observing that the conclusiveness extends to every fact the foreign court has found, either as part of its adjudication or as a stated ground of its decision. Dicey, in his Conflict of Laws, summarized the rule succinctly: a foreign judgment is conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon and cannot be impeached for error of fact or of law.

With respect to judgments in personam, the Court noted that any matters decided inter partes are binding on the parties and privies, but not on strangers. This follows the firmly grounded rule that a foreign judgment will be examined for competence rather than for its errors, subject to exceptions where there is fraud, collusion, breach of natural‑justice principles, violation of English public policy, or a wrong apprehension of English law if that law is involved. The Court further observed that penal laws of another country or judgments involving a penal decree are excluded from the doctrine of conclusiveness. It quoted Chief Justice Marshall’s well‑known dictum in the Antelope case: “The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.” The same exclusion applies to decrees, orders, or judgments concerning taxation and penalties under taxing laws. The Court remarked that American courts follow this English position, and cited Goodrich’s summary of the American approach: “A valid foreign judgments should be recognized and given effect…”.

The modern doctrine holds that a judgment rendered in one State must be treated as a conclusive determination of the parties’ rights and obligations. Goodrich explains that, in principle, a foreign judgment is conclusive because it has decided, according to the law of the State that rendered it, whether a plaintiff possesses certain rights and whether the defendant bears corresponding legal duties. Those rights and duties continue to exist in the State of origin as long as the judgment remains in force. Consequently, when the same judgment is presented to a court in another State for recognition and enforcement, it should receive treatment no less favorable than a suit founded on foreign operative facts. Goodrich further observes that the contemporary approach to immovable property situated outside the forum is liberal. He cites, at page 217, instances where foreign judgments have been recognized in matters that would normally lie beyond the jurisdiction of the court. For example, in the case reported as (1825) 10 M. I. at 123, 6 L. Ed. 268, the plaintiff sought to compel a defendant who was before the court to execute a conveyance of land located in another State. The court could not directly make its decree convey the land, nor could it effectively authorize a master to do so if the defendant were unwilling. However, if a deed executed elsewhere would be recognized as effective at the site of the land, the court may order the defendant, who is present before it, to execute such a deed. This power has been exercised since the historic litigation of Penn v. Baltimore and is affirmed in countless decisions. Similar views have been expressed by Stumberg in the second edition of Conflict of Laws, by Nussbaum in his Principles of International Law (1943), and by other scholars. In India, the law governing the conclusiveness of judgments is set out in sections 40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act and sections 11 to 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 41 of the Evidence Act makes certain special categories of judgments conclusive, while section 11 deals with judgments rendered in India and section 13 addresses foreign judgments, each subject to specified conditions. Section 40 provides that the existence of a judgment, order or decree—whether from an Indian court or a foreign court—that by law bars any court from taking cognizance of a suit or conducting a trial is a relevant fact when determining whether such a court should proceed. This provision enables a judgment, order or decree to be produced for the specific purpose of establishing the bar on jurisdiction. Section 42 then states that judgments and similar instruments, other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant when they relate to matters of a public nature pertinent to the inquiry, though they are not conclusive proof of their contents. The illustration accompanying this provision clarifies what is meant by matters of a public nature. Section 43 provides that judgments not covered by sections 40, 41 or 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgments is itself an issue in the case or they are relevant under another provision of the Evidence Act. Finally, section 44 allows any party to a suit or proceeding to demonstrate that a judgment, order or decree relevant under sections 40, 41 or 42, which was proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a court lacking competence or was obtained by fraud or collusion. Section 41, which was omitted earlier, sets out the relevance and conclusiveness of certain kinds of judgments, stating: “A final judgment, order or decree of a competent court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or …”

Section 42 provides that judgments, orders or decrees which are not covered by Section 41 are still relevant when they pertain to matters of a public nature that are material to the enquiry; however, such judgments are not regarded as conclusive proof of the statements they contain. The accompanying illustration in the statute clarifies what is meant by matters of a public nature. Section 43 then stipulates that judgments, orders or decrees which are not mentioned in Sections 40, 41 or 42 are to be treated as irrelevant, unless the existence of those judgments forms a fact that is actually in issue, or unless they become relevant under some other provision of the Evidence Act. Section 44 adds that any party to a suit or other proceeding may demonstrate that a judgment, order or decree which is relevant under Sections 40, 41 or 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party was either rendered by a court lacking the authority to do so, or was obtained through fraud or collusion. The omitted Section 41 deals with the relevance and conclusiveness of certain categories of judgments. It states: “A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character to which it declares any such person to be entitled accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.” The judgments referred to in this provision are classified as judgments in rem. Historically, as early as Yarakalamma v. Ankala, a distinction was drawn between judgments that bind only the parties to them and judgments that also bind strangers. This distinction originates from Roman law concepts of quod ad res pertinet and quod ad personas pertinet, and has been adopted as a foundational principle. In Kanhya Lal v. Radha Charan, Chief Justice Peacock listed the categories of judgments in rem, and that list formed the basis for framing Section 41. Subsequent treatises, such as Taylor on Evidence, have expanded the list, and contemporary private international law encompasses all questions of status within it.

James Stephen is reported to have stated that he limited his reference to those judgments for which the law of evidence could confer conclusiveness. According to his view, such conclusiveness attached only to a specific matter of fact that was relevant to the issue and that could be proved directly from the judgment. He further observed that it was evident that other statutes or provisions of other branches of law might also give a judgment a conclusive effect, although those possibilities were not the subject of his enumeration. The Court noted that Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act does not forbid the enactment of additional laws that could confer similar effect. For example, the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cited in (1) 2 M H.C.R. 276 and (2) (1667) 7 W.R. 338, extend much farther than either Section 40 or Section 41 of the Evidence Act. Section 40 merely touches the fringe of the doctrine of res judicata, whereas Section 11 of the Code provides a far more exhaustive rule on the same subject. The Court explained that the essential distinction between the rules of evidence and the rules of procedure is that the former determine how a fact may be proved, while the latter may create a bar to instituting a new suit. Consequently, a fact that can be proved from a judgment that is deemed conclusive for evidential purposes need not be proved again; the judgment itself suffices as proof. By contrast, a subsequent suit can be barred by the principle of res judicata only if the applicable law expressly provides such a bar, because that bar concerns the adjudication of a controversy that has already been decided.

The Court further held that the list of subjects enumerated in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be expanded except by legislative amendment. Conclusiveness under that section attaches only to the subjects specifically mentioned therein, and a fact established by a competent court on any of those subjects is deemed proved and remains established in all later proceedings without the need for fresh proof. The Judicial Committee, in Appa Trimbak v. Waman Govind (1) A.I.R. 1941 P C. 85, did not extend the principle of Section 41 to a case involving adoption. The earlier judgment on adoption was examined under Section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than under Section 41 of the Evidence Act, and it was not accepted under Section 11 of the Code because it did not fall within that provision’s scope. As a result, the fact concerning adoption was allowed to be proved anew. The reason given for the non‑applicability of Section 41 was that decisions on adoption had been expressly excluded by Sir Barne Peacock in Kanhya Lal v. Radha Charan (2) (1867) 7 W.R. 338 and likewise excluded by the language of Section 41 itself. From these authorities, the Court concluded that the evidential conclusiveness of a judgment, order or decree attaches only when the judgment falls within the categories listed in Section 41. Once a judgment meets that criterion, the law dispenses with the need to prove the fact again, and the conclusion of the earlier judgment is taken as definitive in subsequent proceedings.

The Court observed that a judgment, together with the legal character it confers or declares and any consequent declarations of property arising from that character, is final. In the present case, the Court held that the conclusiveness provided by section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act could not be invoked with respect to the judgment of the Mysore High Court because the specific status of being a joint or separate coparcener in a Hindu coparcenary property is not among the legal characters enumerated in that section. Hence the Court was required to examine whether section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies only to judgments that fall outside the scope of section 41, that is, whether it is limited to judgments in personam as argued by the learned Attorney General. The language of section 13 does not indicate such a limitation; the provision sets out a general rule concerning foreign judgments and declares them to be conclusive between the same parties or between parties who claim to litigate under the same title. Although the reference to parties and their privies might suggest, using the expression of Halsbury, that the provision is confined to inter partes judgments, a comparison with sections 40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act reveals a different interpretation. Section 41 of the Evidence Act speaks of a judgment rendered by a competent court, and section 44 permits a challenge on the ground that the judgment was obtained by fraud or collusion. However, sections 40 to 44 do not contain the pre‑condition clauses that are present in section 13 as prerequisites for a foreign judgment to be treated as conclusive. The Court found it unimaginable that a foreign judgment in rem, of the type covered by section 41, was intended to be conclusive if it violated the principles of natural justice, was not decided on the merits, was based on an erroneous view of international law or Indian law, or breached any law in force in India. Because section 13 imposes these prior conditions and the Evidence Act does not, the Court concluded that section 13 contemplates both in rem and in personam foreign judgments. The distinction lies in the fact that the Code makes foreign judgments conclusive only between the parties, whereas section 41 renders certain determinations conclusive even against third parties. Nevertheless, any foreign judgment, even one falling within the class of determinations referred to in section 41, must satisfy the conditions laid down in section 13; otherwise the judgment will not bar a suit. The Court therefore stated that it would examine the present appeals from this perspective, noting that no alternative approach was permissible. Consequently, the Court concluded that the judgment of the Mysore High Court could not be brought within the ambit of section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The Court observed that the only situation in which the present controversy could arise would be if the probate decree issued by the Mysore Court were set aside. Since that probate has never been cancelled, the Court held that it need not entertain the hypothetical cancellation, although it noted that even in such a case certain difficulties might still occur. The judgment of the Mysore High Court had been rendered between the very same parties who are now before this Court litigating under the identical title in Madras. The executors, just as they had done in Mysore, placed reliance on the will of Ramalingam, while the sons of Ramalingam asserted that he was a member of a Hindu coparcenary. The effectiveness of the will depended upon whether it dealt with Ramalingam’s separate property or with property that belonged to the coparcenary. The questions concerning the ownership of those assets had been finally determined with respect to the properties situated in Mysore, including Ramalingam’s business and both movable and immovable assets located in Mysore State. No determination, however, had been rendered regarding the property situated in Madras. Consequently, the dispute in this proceeding centered on the status of the Hindu coparcenary and on the legal position of Ramalingam, matters that the Court characterized as questions of status, and it proceeded to explain why they were to be treated as such.

Ordinarily, a judgment that decides a question of status is regarded as a judgment in rem, a principle that finds expression in the classic definition of a judgment in rem found in Smith’s Leading Cases, a definition that has remained unchanged through successive editions. Nevertheless, there is no settled definition of the term “status.” Paton, in his 1946 work on jurisprudence (page 256), quoting Dr. Allen’s analysis in Legal Duties, described status as “the fact or condition of membership of a ground of which the powers are determined extrinsically by law, status affecting not merely one particular relationship, but being a condition affecting generally though in varying degree a member’s claims and powers.” Dr. Allen further defined it as “the condition of belonging to a particular class of persons to whom the law assigns certain peculiar legal capacities or incapacities or both.” He also emphasized the need to distinguish three separate concepts: status, which is the condition that gives rise to certain capacities or incapacities; capacity, which is the power to acquire and exercise rights; and the rights themselves, which are acquired by the exercise of capacity. In this framework, status leads to capacity, capacity leads to rights, and those rights can be said to be embedded in, and to spring from, status. Scrutton, L.J., in In re Luck’s Settlement Trusts (1) stated that “status is in every case the creature of substantive law.” According to Salmond, the totality of a person’s proprietary rights constitutes his estate, his assets or property, whereas the totality of his personal rights constitutes his status. Salmond therefore divided substantive civil law into the categories of property, obligations, and status, distinguishing between domestic status—defined in an appendix to his book as “the law of family relations, dealing with the nature, acquisition and loss of all personal rights, duties, liabilities and disabilities involved in domestic relations”—and extra‑domestic status. The Court further observed that the law of conflict ordinarily recognises status as a legal concept created by the law.

The Court observed that the concept of status as understood in foreign law, for example in the case reported in In re Luck’s Settlement Trusts at page 891 and in Salvesan v. Administrator of Austrian Property, is applicable to the Australian context. Within the realm of domestic status, which excludes marriage, the Court noted that there is no contractual element, and it quoted Maine’s statement in Ancient Law that the historical progression of legal relations has moved from status to contract. The Court referred to Hollond’s discussion in the 1940 case (1) Ch. 864 at page 890 and to the 1927 decision [1927] A.C. 641 at page 662, indicating that jurisprudence lists sixteen instances of status, one of which is ‘patria potestas’, a concept closely resembling the karta of a joint Hindu family. The Court pointed out that these definitions have been recognized and applied by the Australian High Court in interpreting section 35 of the Judiciary Act 1903, which permits an appeal without leave from any State Supreme Court judgment that “affects the status of any person”. In the earlier case Daniel v. Daniel, Griffith, C. J. defined status as “a condition attached by law to a person which confers, affects or limits a legal capacity of exercising some power that under other circumstances he could not or could exercise without restriction”. This definition was affirmed in Shanks v. Shank, and in Ford v. Ford the Court considered the same definitions together with the analysis of Dr. Allen, which it approved. Consequently the Court concluded that when the source of rights is birth and the domestic relationship creates rights without conferring ownership of property, those rights must be regarded as arising from status. It explained that a coparcener in a Hindu coparcenary cannot acquire the right by contract because the right is obtained by birth; even an infant “en ventre sa mère” is considered a coparcener under Hindu law, and his rights are therefore determined by status. The Court noted that early legal systems emphasized rights that follow from birth and that scholars have observed the difficulty of rising above birth‑based hierarchies in such societies. Although the terms “status” and “estate” once shared a common origin, they have acquired distinct legal meanings over time, as discussed in Pollock and Maitland’s History of English Law, volume II. In the law of Hindu coparcenary there is no ownership of property apart from the coparcenary itself, and the rights in the property are defined by status. Thus, where domestic relationships determine status, all disputes and claims—whether concerning inheritance, survivorship, partition, or maintenance—are based on status rather than on proprietary ownership. Accordingly, a coparcenary functions like a corporation that arises from status, and any issue concerning it is first a question of status; only after status is established does a source of material rights emerge.

The Court explained that a right to material property becomes effective only after the relevant status has been established. It said that, had the issue been examined solely through the lens of contemporary private international law, the decision of the Mysore High Court could have been described as partly in rem and partly in personam. This characterization would stem from the question of whether Ramalingam acquired the Kolar Gold Fields business jointly or separately, a question that arose out of his status and therefore bore the character of an in rem determination. The Court noted that such composite actions are not rare. It referred to an earlier passage by Story that discussed them and observed that the Court of Appeal in England, in In re Trepca Mines Ltd. (1), similarly held the action to be partly in rem and partly in personam. Consequently, the Mysore High Court’s decision, being a determination of status, possessed the flavor of an in rem judgment. The Court acknowledged that the judicial approach is limited by the existence of section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act and the Judicial Committee’s ruling in Appa Trimback’s case (2), yet it nevertheless expressed this view. It further observed that private international law is evolving through reciprocity, and an increasing number of foreign judgments are now treated as conclusive—judgments that, twenty years earlier, would not have been regarded as such. The Court warned that if foreign judgments on matters such as adoption, family status, and related domestic relations are not given effect, other nations may likewise disregard Indian judgments. It found it remarkable that a judgment on adoption issued in Ceylon, for example, might not be considered binding in India, and vice versa. Although adoption is not listed among the subjects in section 41, the Court held that, if adoption is treated as a decision on status and thus as an in rem judgment, it becomes conclusive between the parties and their privies under section 13. The same principle, the Court said, applies to judgments concerning joint‑family status or the position of any individual member in relation to the family, aligning with modern notions of conflict of laws. Even when viewed from the perspective of an in personam judgment, the Court found it evident that the substantive issue decided by the Mysore High Court was whether Ramalingam was a member of a coparcenary and consequently acquired the Kolar Gold Fields business and other properties in that capacity. That was the principal question decided; the disposition of the properties was merely ancillary to that core determination. The Court noted that counsel had argued, relying on the Judicial Committee’s ruling in Brijlal Ramjidas v. Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria (1), that the term “judgment” in section 13 of the Code refers to “an adjudication by the foreign Court upon the matter before it” and does not include the reasons for the judgment. The language of the provision, the Court observed, states “directly adjudicated thereby.” Accordingly, the Privy Council intended that the adjudicative portion of a judgment is conclusive, and the portion of the Mysore High Court judgment that is conclusive is that Ramalingam was not carrying on the Kolar Gold Fields business as

The Court explained that the Mysore High Court had held that Ramalingam was not a coparcener acting in that capacity, but rather was conducting the Kolar Gold Fields business independently. The Court noted that if the portion of the judgment under discussion were not the adjudicative part, then there would be very little else to consider, as reflected in the citation (1) (1947) L. R. 74 I.A. 203, 210. The language of section 13, the Court observed, does not speak of the judgment itself but of the “matter thereby directly adjudicated upon,” and the word “any” indicates that all adjudicative portions of a judgment are equally conclusive, a view described by Foote, Rattigan and other authorities.

It was then argued that the subject‑matter of the suit filing in Madras concerned immovable property, over which the Mysore Court neither had nor could exercise jurisdiction. Reference was made to Decey’s Conflict of Laws and to the case Castrique v. Imrie (1) to demonstrate that only the courts of the country where immovable property is situated possess jurisdiction, and that the lex situs principle applies. The Court further examined Cartrique v. Imrie (1), where the issue was whether the sale of a chattal—a ship—under a claim against the ship itself bound parties who had not submitted to the French courts. That case held that a judgment ordering such a sale was a judgment in rem provided the ship was, at that time, within the territory of the foreign State. The ship had taken provisions on board for which payment was demanded, and the French tribunals had entertained an action against Commander Benson, who was required to pay “par privilege sur ce Navire.” Although the owner Clause or the purchaser Castrique did not appear before the French tribunal, jurisdiction was based on the ship’s presence in French waters at Havre.

The Court then emphasized that a similar question is unlikely to arise with respect to immovable property because only the courts of the country where the immovable is located can have jurisdiction, and no foreign court can effectively decide or enforce a dispute concerning such property. Moreover, even in England, the distinction between real and personal property has not been strictly observed when the English courts (1) (1870) L.R. 4 H.L. 414 specify immovable property for the purposes of Private International Law, indicating that the distinction does not fall within the scope of section 13 of the Code. The Court stated that, had the Mysore High Court attempted to decide an issue concerning immovable property situated in Madras, or had it applied a different law to the family, the argument would have been accepted. However, the Court warned that the argument conflated jurisdiction with the law on one hand and the “matter decided” on the other.

Finally, the Court referred to the rule in British South Africa Company v. Companhia De Mocambique (1), which permits a court to entertain actions concerning immovables located in a foreign country. The Court clarified that this rule does not prevent, under section 13, the inter‑partes conclusiveness of a judgment on any matter that has been adjudicated therein. That principle differs when the adjudication concerns proprietorship based on status. The Court noted that the rule in the cited case would have rendered the decree of the Mysore High Court a nullity only if that court had attempted to decide a question of immovable property in Madras, which it had not done.

In this matter, the Court noted that the Mysore High Court had not decided any issue relating to immovable property situated in Madras. Instead, the Mysore High Court had adjudicated a question concerning the status of Ramalingam and the ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business, exercising full jurisdiction over the same parties who were litigating under the same title. The Court held that this decision must be treated as a conclusive adjudication in the subsequent suit filed in Madras. Accordingly, the Madras Court was not entitled to re‑examine the ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business anew, nor could it, as a subsidiary consideration, determine the right to property located in Madras. While the Madras Court remained free to consider other issues and to entertain defenses such as arguments as to why the judgment of the Mysore High Court might not apply to the specific properties before it, the fundamental question of ownership of the Kolar Gold Fields business could not be tried again. The Court further expressed the view that even the evidence cited in the Madras suit attempting to reopen that ownership question, including the reference to (1) [1893] A.C. 602, was inadmissible; however, evidence intended to demonstrate bias, interest, or similar improprieties on the part of the learned judges was properly allowed. The Court emphasized that the Madras High Court did not have jurisdiction to revisit the question of Ramalingam’s status de novo, and that portion of the Mysore judgment must be regarded as outside the Madras Court’s authority. Consequently, the Court declined to engage with that question or to consider the related evidence. Before addressing the issue of the shares of the Indian Sugar and Refineries Ltd., Madras, the Court referred to a Privy Council decision that had been heavily relied upon, namely Maqbul Fatima v. Amir Hasan (1). The reported judgment in the All India Reporter originates from the Allahabad High Court, whose headnote states that it had been “confirmed by” the Privy Council. The Court cited the headnote as follows: “A obtained judgment in the sub‑Court Bareilly (British Indian Court) declaring his title to the properties of the deceased situate within the jurisdiction of that Court. Subsequently B instituted a suit against A in Rampur, a Native State, for recovery of possession of the properties of the deceased situate within the Native State. Thereupon A filed the present suit for a declaration that the judgment of the Bareilly Court would operate as res judicata in the Rampur Court and for a perpetual injunction restraining B from proceeding with the suit therein. The High X X Court held that, as the courts in British India were not competent to try suits concerning property situated in a Native State, the judgment of the Bareilly Court would not operate as res judicata.” (1) A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 136. The Court observed that, although it was argued that under section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code the rule was applicable in Rampur and that the Bareilly judgment was conclusive between the parties, the High Court held that such a rule applied only in proceedings concerning foreign judgments, and therefore the question of the effect of a foreign judgment could arise only in that limited context.

The Court noted that the second reason advanced by the High Court was both sufficient and valid, and therefore there was no necessity to address the first point, which was a matter for the Rampur Courts to determine. Nevertheless, the High Court proceeded to decide whether its own judgment would operate as res judicata under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, assuming that the code applied in Rampur was identical to that in British India. It concluded that the expression “directly adjudicated thereby” referred to the actual decretal portion of the judgment. The Court emphasized that this question was not within the competence of the High Court but rightly belonged to the Rampur Court. The suit in question was an injunction suit of a very unusual type, apparently resorted to in the seventeenth century, for which no reports exist except for Lord Nottingham’s manuscripts recorded in volume three of Swanston at pages 603‑607(46), a source that has long fallen into desuetude. The Privy Council’s decision on the matter was quoted as follows: “Their Lordships do not see their way to reverse the decision appealed from and will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the appeal. As the respondents have not appeared there will be no order as to costs.” After dealing with this historical and procedural background, the Court turned to the remaining point concerning the shares of Indian Sugars and Refineries Ltd.

The counsel contended that the shares should be deemed situated where they could be most effectively dealt with, namely in Madras, the location of the Company’s head office. Although counsel relied on several English cases to support this position, the Court found it unnecessary to cite those authorities. It observed that disputes between a company and its shareholders concerning shares are ordinarily adjudicated in the country where the business operates. However, where rival claimants, both within the jurisdiction of a court, dispute ownership of shares, the court possesses jurisdiction over the parties and over the share certificates presented before it. The Mysore High Court was therefore in a position to order that the share certificates be delivered to the successful claimant and, if required, to direct the transfer of the shares and enforce the order by the coercive processes of law. The situation would be different only if the Company refused to register the transfer; the Court was informed that the Company had complied with the decision and had accepted the executors as the shareholders. Consequently, the Mysore Court’s judgment on the ownership of the shares was ancillary to the principal decision. The Court therefore declined to consider Mr Desai’s argument that jurisdiction attaches on the principle of effectiveness propounded by Dicey, an argument that has been criticized by contemporary editors and by Cheshire. In the Court’s view, this controversy did not arise in the present case, which must be decided by applying the plain wording of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court explained that, for the reasons set out earlier, it would dismiss the appeal filed by the sons of Ramalingam, which is recorded as Civil Appeal No 277 of 1958. At the same time the Court would allow the appeal filed by the executors, identified as Civil Appeal No 278 of 1958. In addition, the Court ordered the dismissal of Civil Suit No 214 of 1944 and directed that the costs of that suit be awarded throughout to the appropriate party. The Court further observed that, having reached these determinations, it would have been prepared to consider the remaining appeals that were pending and to pass appropriate orders on each of them. However, the Court found that such further consideration was unnecessary because the two principal appeals had already been decided on opposite conclusions by the members of the bench, and the dissenting judges had taken a different view from the majority in those main appeals. Accordingly, the Court refrained from issuing any additional orders concerning the other appeals. Finally, the Court recorded that, in accordance with the majority judgment, a decree would be entered in the terms specified in that majority judgment, thereby giving effect to the directions set out by the majority opinion.