Pratap Singh And Another vs Gurbaksh Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 128 and 129 of 1959

Decision Date: 29 January 1962

Coram: S.K. Das, Subba Rao, K. Dayal, Raghubar Dayal

In the matter of Pratap Singh and another versus Gurbaksh Singh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 29 January 1962. The opinion was written by Justice S.K. Das and the bench was composed of Justice S.K. Das, Justice Subbarao and Justice K. Dayal. The decision is reported in 1962 AIR 1172 and 1962 SCR Supplement (2) 838, and it has been cited in later reports such as APR 1968 SC1513, D 1974 SC 642, among others. The case concerned a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, specifically section 3, which deals with contempt of court.

The factual background disclosed that both appellants were public servants who, after the respondent – also a government employee – instituted a suit in the Subordinate Judge’s Court at Amritsar, alleged that a certain sum was being illegally deducted from his salary and sought a declaration to that effect. Before filing the suit, the respondent had not exhausted the departmental remedies prescribed by an official circular. That circular instructed that any grievance arising out of a government servant’s conditions of service must first be presented to the appropriate departmental and governmental authorities, and that a servant who approached a court without first using those official channels would be acting contrary to propriety, subversive of discipline and could attract disciplinary action.

Feeling aggrieved by the departmental proceedings initiated against him, the respondent approached the High Court, alleging that the two appellants had committed contempt of court punishable under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. He argued that the appellants’ actions interfered with his legal right to seek judicial redress, exerted pressure on him to withdraw the pending suit, and thereby obstructed the judicial process of a case that was already before a subordinate court.

The High Court found that the appellants were clearly guilty of contempt. However, it observed that they were merely executing the instructions contained in the government circular. Consequently, the High Court directed the appellants to abandon the departmental proceedings against the respondent and warned them against further compliance with the same instruction.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that the circular, when fairly construed, did not impose an absolute prohibition on approaching a court. They maintained that the circular merely imposed an obligation on a government servant to exhaust departmental remedies before resorting to litigation, and therefore it could not be said to interfere with the course of justice.

Per Justice S.K. Das and Justice Subbarao, the Supreme Court held that any conduct which interferes with or prejudices parties while litigation is pending amounts to contempt of court. The Court clarified that the issue was not whether the conduct had actually interfered with the proceedings, but whether it possessed a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. Accordingly, the appellants were found guilty of contempt, and the defence that they were merely following executive directions was rejected.

In the present matter the Court observed that the actions of the appellants displayed a clear tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The proceedings that the appellants commenced, relying on the circular letter, were intended solely to coerce the respondent into withdrawing the suit that was then pending, or to discourage him from pursuing it. Accordingly, the Court held that the appellants were guilty of contempt of court and that the argument that they were merely implementing executive directions contained in the circular could not serve as a defence. The central question was not whether the circular letter was valid in the abstract, but whether the steps taken against the respondent, while the suit was pending, amounted to an interference with the due course of justice. The Court noted that the authorities Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht, A. I. R. 1956 All. 160; S. S. Roy v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 190; and Webster v. Bakewell Rural District Council, L. R. 1916 1 Ch. 300 were inapplicable to the present facts.

Justice Dayal, speaking for himself, remarked that exerting pressure on a party to a pending litigation to act in a particular manner would inevitably constitute contempt of court; however, the Court found that the initiation of the departmental proceedings by the appellants did not reveal such conduct. The charge‑sheet did not demonstrate an intention to pressure the respondent to withdraw the suit. Since the appellants were performing duties under a circular whose validity was not contested, they could not be held guilty of contempt. The Court approved the view expressed in Cheriyan Joseph v. Dr. James Kalacherry, A.I.R. 1952 Trav. Co. 75, and considered Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht, A. I. R. 1956 All. 160. It also referred to Perera v. The King, 1951 W.N. 208; Rizwan‑ul‑Hasan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 581; and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 1169. The Court explained that departmental proceedings against government servants for disciplinary reasons serve a public‑interest function and are distinct from contempt proceedings. Unless such departmental action directly affects the course of judicial proceedings, it cannot amount to contempt of court. Considerations such as whether the departmental action might tempt the respondent to withdraw the suit or deter other government servants from filing similar suits lie outside the scope of contempt and are therefore irrelevant. The Court cited In re the South Shields (Thames Street) Clearance Order, 1931, (1932) 172 L.T.J. 76, and distinguished In re William Thomas Shipping Co., (1930) 2 Ch. D. 368. It concluded that the departmental enquiry against the respondent did not constitute a parallel enquiry that interfered with the pending litigation, and consequently, no contempt of court had been committed. The judgment applied the principle articulated in Saibal Kumar Gupta v. B. K. Sen, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 460.

In this matter the Punjab High Court had earlier heard criminal appeals numbered 20 and 27 of 1957. Counsel for the appellants consisted of senior lawyers, while counsel for the respondents represented the opposite side. The judgment dated 29 January 1962 was rendered by Justices Das and Subba Rao, with Justice Das delivering the main opinion and Justice Dayal providing a separate judgment. The two appeals before this Court were filed for certificates that had been granted by the Punjab High Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. Because both appeals arose from the same order of the High Court dated 5 November 1958, they were heard together and the present judgment was intended to decide both appeals. That order had found the two appellants guilty of an offence punishable under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and had punished them by directing that they abandon the departmental proceedings that had been instituted against the respondent, Mr Gurbaksh Singh. The departmental action was said to have contravened an instruction contained in a circular dated 25 January 1953, which had been issued by the Chief Secretary of the Punjab Government, and the High Court had warned the appellants against complying with that instruction.

The factual background was as follows. Mr Gurbaksh Singh, who was the respondent in both appeals, served as a forester in the Punjab Forest Department. The first appellant, Mr Pratap Singh, who was challenging criminal appeal No. 128 of 1959, held the position of Chief Conservator of Forests, Punjab, at the relevant time. The second appellant, Mr Bachan Singh, who was the party in the other appeal, occupied the post of Divisional Forest Officer, Amritsar. In 1950 the respondent had supplied three lakh cubic feet of timber to various ordnance depots in accordance with directions issued by the then Chief Conservator of Forests. In 1954 the Chief Conservator sent a letter to Mr Singh alleging that the timber sent to the Ordnance Depot at Chhoke was short of the required quantity, resulting in a loss to the Government of Rs 11,366. By a subsequent order communicated through a letter dated 16 July 1956, the State Government instructed the Chief Conservator to recover ten per cent of that loss, amounting to Rs 1,136 and a few annas, from Mr Singh’s salary. The letter explained that the deduction was made pursuant to the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, and that Mr Singh had already been afforded an opportunity to submit an explanation, after which the recovery order was issued. In response, Mr Singh instituted a suit before the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, seeking a declaration that the recovery order was void and of no effect. He also filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which the Punjab High Court dismissed on 20 May 1957. When the summons in the suit before the Senior Subordinate Judge was served on the State Government, the Under‑Secretary of the Forest and Animal Husbandry Departments transmitted a memorandum drawing the Chief Conservator’s attention to the 25 January 1953 circular issued by the Chief Secretary.

In the matter before the Court, the Government of the Forest and Animal Husbandry Departments dispatched a memorandum to the Chief Conservator of Forests, drawing his attention to a circular letter that had been issued by the Chief Secretary on 25 January 1953. The complete text of that circular had been reproduced in the High Court’s judgment and read as follows: “I am directed to say that the question of Government servants having recourse to Courts of law in matters arising out of their employment or conditions of service has been engaging the attention of Government for some time past and it is considered necessary to lay down that in the matter of grievances arising out of a Government servant’s employment or conditions of service the proper course is to seek redress from the appropriate departmental and Governmental authorities. Any attempt by a Government servant to seek a decision on such issues in a Court of law (even in cases where such a remedy is legally admissible) without first exhausting the normal official channels of redress, can only be regarded as contrary to official propriety and subversive of good discipline and may well justify the initiation of disciplinary action against the Government servant. These instructions may, therefore, be brought to the notice of all Government servants of your department/office.” In his memorandum, the Under Secretary observed that the respondent, having failed to exhaust the departmental remedies available to him before approaching a civil court, had rendered himself liable to disciplinary action in accordance with the directives contained in the circular. The Under Secretary further requested an immediate indication of the action that the Chief Conservator intended to take against the respondent. Upon receipt of this memorandum, Pratap Singh, who was the appellant, forwarded a copy to the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, and instructed that the respondent be proceeded against pursuant to the circular’s instructions, with a request that the records of the proceedings and any orders be sent back to him. The Conservator of Forests, South Circle, acted on those instructions by issuing an office order that appointed Bachan Singh—who later appeared as the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 1959—to conduct an inquiry against the respondent for allegedly contravening the circular’s guidance. Bachan Singh subsequently prepared a charge‑sheet against the respondent, directing him to submit a written explanation within fifteen days. The charge‑sheet stated that the respondent had approached a court of law before exhausting all departmental remedies, an act described as contrary to official propriety and subversive of good discipline. This charge‑sheet was prepared on or about 30 August 1957. On 14 September 1957, the respondent filed an application before the High Court alleging that the two appellants, Pratap Singh and Bachan Singh, had committed contempt of court punishable under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In that petition the respondent contended that Pratap Singh had…

In the present case the respondent contended that the charge‑sheet which had been framed and served on him, together with the enquiry being held by the second appellant, Bachan Singh, amounted to an unlawful interference with his legal right to obtain redress in a court of law. He further claimed that the actions of the two appellants were intended to exert pressure on him so as to restrain him from pursuing his suit, thereby obstructing the judicial process and interfering with the course of justice in respect of a suit pending before the Senior Subordinate Judge of Amritsar, a court subordinate to the High Court. After issuing notice to the appellants, the High Court heard the parties and concluded that, although the appellants were clearly guilty of an offence punishable under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, they were merely attempting to comply with Government instructions whose legality and propriety they had no reason to doubt. Accordingly, the High Court expressed the view that the ends of justice would be amply met if the two appellants were directed to abandon the departmental proceedings that had been instituted against the respondent and if they were warned against complying with the instructions contained in the circular letter issued by the State Government.

The appellants, through their counsel, advanced three points in support of their contention that they were not guilty of contempt of court. First, they argued that the petition dated 14 September 1957, by which the respondent sought action against the appellants, referred to contempt in relation to the High Court where a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution had been filed and subsequently dismissed on 20 May 1957. They pointed out that the charge‑sheet against the respondent was drawn up on about 30 August 1957, roughly three months after the dismissal of the writ petition, and maintained that when contempt is of a criminal nature the specific offence must be clearly stated and each step in the proceedings must be fairly, properly and strictly observed. They further asserted that the respondent’s grievance concerned interference with the due course of justice in the matter of the writ petition, whereas the High Court had found the appellants guilty of a different offence, namely interference with the course of justice in respect of the suit pending before the Senior Subordinate Judge of Amritsar. The second point raised by the appellants was that, on a fair construction of the terms of the circular letter on which they acted, the circular did not constitute an interference with the course of justice because it imposed no absolute ban on a government servant seeking relief from a court of law; rather, it required the servant to exhaust departmental remedies before approaching the court. They contended that, viewed in this light, the actions taken against the respondent did not interfere with the course of justice in the pending suit before the Senior Subordinate Judge. The third point advanced was that the first appellant, Pratap Singh, who had merely endorsed the memorandum of the Under‑Secretary and taken no further action, could not be held guilty of contempt of court. The Court indicated that it would now consider these three points in the order in which they were presented, noting that the first point could be disposed of swiftly.

In this case, the Court observed that the circular letter did not create an absolute prohibition on a Government servant seeking relief from a court for grievances arising out of his employment or service conditions; rather, it imposed a duty on such a servant to first pursue departmental remedies before approaching a judicial forum. Accordingly, the Court held that interpreting the circular in this manner meant that the actions taken by the appellants against the respondent could not be said to interfere with the course of justice in relation to the suit pending before the Senior Subordinate Judge in Amritsar. The Court further noted a second contention that appellant Pratap Singh, whose involvement was limited to endorsing the memorandum of the Under‑Secretary, should not be found guilty of contempt of court. The Court then set out its plan to consider these three matters in the order in which they had been raised.

The Court stated that the first point could be disposed of quickly. It recorded that the respondent had filed two petitions on 14 September 1957 in the Punjab High Court, which were assigned case numbers 20 of 1957 and 27 of 1957 and were heard together. In the petition that gave rise to case 20 of 1957, the respondent alleged interference with the course of justice concerning the writ petition that the High Court had dismissed on 20 May 1957. In the second petition, identified as case 27 of 1957 and filed on the same date, the respondent expressly set out in paragraph 9 of his pleading that he had previously moved this Court under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act with respect to the same charge‑sheet, arguing that the charge‑sheet related to the writ petition (Civil Writ no 528 of 1956). He then alleged that the respondents were now claiming the charge‑sheet concerned the separate suit pending before the Subordinate Judge in Amritsar. From these submissions, the Court inferred that the High Court was faced with two distinct petitions against the appellants: one alleging interference with the course of justice in connection with the writ petition, and the other alleging interference with the course of justice in connection with the pending suit.

The Court further recorded that the respondent maintained that by compelling the petitioner to withdraw his suit or by otherwise preventing him from pursuing it, the appellants were obstructing the course of justice and thus committing contempt of court punishable under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Having identified the precise allegations in both petitions, the Court concluded that the first contention raised by the appellants—that the circular letter did not amount to an interference with the course of justice—required rejection in light of the respondent’s detailed pleadings in the second petition.

In view of the allegations contained in the second petition filed on 14 September 1957, the Court held that the first point raised on behalf of the appellants had to be dismissed. The Court then turned to the second point, which it regarded as more substantial. The Court had already reproduced the wording of the circular dated 25 January 1953. A dispute arose as to whether that circular merely conveyed executive instructions or whether it established a rule that formed a condition of service. The Court observed that certain government institutions and departments have, in similar terms, framed a rule as a condition of service stating that it is improper for a government servant to approach a court of law before having exhausted the normal official channels of redress. However, the counsel for the parties agreed that no rule governing the conditions of service of government servants in the department to which the respondent belonged imposed an obligation analogous to that contained in the circular. Consequently, the Court proceeded on the basis that the circular comprised only executive instructions and did not embody a rule regulating conditions of service. Because of this approach, the Court did not deem it necessary to examine the hypothetical situation in which such a rule were made a condition of employment for certain government servants, a scenario that would raise further questions about the authority of the rule‑making power to enact such a rule. The Court expressly clarified that it was not expressing any opinion on those additional considerations.

Assuming that the circular indeed contained only executive instructions, the Court considered the resulting position. It was emphasized at the outset that the issue before the Court was not the abstract validity of the circular, but rather the propriety of the action taken against the respondent on the basis of the circular while his suit was pending before the Senior Subordinate Judge in Amritsar. The Court was careful not to hold that the circular was valid in a blanket sense such that compliance with it could never amount to contempt of court. The argument presented was that the circular did not impose an absolute prohibition on a government servant seeking judicial redress of grievances arising from his employment or service conditions. Instead, the circular merely requested that government servants first exhaust the normal official channels of redress before approaching a court of law. The emphasis, according to the submissions, was on propriety and discipline in the conduct of government servants, and from that perspective the circular could not be said to constitute interference with the course of justice in any court of law.

In the abstract, the principle that a circular letter merely advises a government servant to exhaust departmental remedies before approaching a court may appear reasonable, and no objection could be raised to such advice. Generally, a government servant does not approach a court unless he believes that departmental authorities have failed to provide justice. However, the present case presented a different issue: the respondent faced disciplinary action while his litigation was still pending, as if the mere act of filing a suit before exhausting departmental remedies warranted punishment in every instance. The court considered the definition of contempt of court, noting that contempt may be described as any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or that interferes with or prejudices parties, litigants, or their witnesses during ongoing proceedings (Oswald’s Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition, page 6). The focus here was on the second limb—interfering with or prejudicing litigants during the litigation. In the matter before the court, the respondent had instituted a suit before the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, alleging that an illegal deduction was being made from his salary. The respondent claimed that no further departmental remedies remained because the Punjab Government had issued a final order, after considering his explanation, to deduct a portion of his salary. The appellants argued that the respondent still possessed a remedy by filing an appeal to the Governor, but the court noted that this issue was not central to determining whether the respondent had breached the circular letter; the central question was the action taken against him on the premise, whether correct or not, that he had violated the circular’s instructions.

When the summons for the suit was served on the government, the Under‑Secretary to the Government drew the attention of one of the appellants to the circular letter and asked that appellant to indicate what action the government proposed to take against the respondent. The appellant, Pratap Singh, then forwarded the Under‑Secretary’s memorandum to the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, and in his endorsement directed that the respondent should be proceeded against in accordance with the circular letter’s instructions, and that copies of any proceedings and orders should be sent to him. This shows that Pratap Singh was not satisfied merely with passing on the memorandum; he explicitly instructed his subordinate officer to initiate action against the respondent, thereby linking the disciplinary step to the alleged breach of the circular’s directions while the suit remained pending before the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar.

The instruction to take action against the respondent resulted in the preparation of a disciplinary proceeding. In compliance with that instruction, a proceeding was framed against the respondent and the officer identified as appellant Bachan Singh was directed to investigate the matter. Acting on this direction, appellant Bachan Singh prepared a charge‑sheet, and within that charge‑sheet it was asserted that the respondent had approached a civil court before fully utilizing all the remedies available under the departmental machinery.

The Court considered the possible impact of these disciplinary proceedings on the litigation that was already pending before the Senior Subordinate Judge in Amritsar. From a practical standpoint, the initiation of a disciplinary proceeding at a time when the respondent’s suit was still pending could only serve to exert pressure on the respondent to abandon his suit or to face the threat of disciplinary sanction. The Court held that such pressure unequivocally amounted to contempt of court. It observed that any conduct which perverts the course of justice, whether performed by a party to the litigation or by a stranger, constituted contempt. Examples of such conduct included the use of threats, whether by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit remained pending, or the making of abusive statements in letters addressed to persons likely to be witnesses in the matter, all of which had been recognized as contempt in the authority referred to as Oswald’s Contempt of Court, third edition, page 87.

The Court emphasized that the crucial inquiry was not whether the action had actually interfered with the proceedings, but whether it possessed a tendency to interfere with the proper administration of justice. In the present case, the disciplinary action taken against the respondent could only have one tendency: namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent into withdrawing his suit or to discourage him from pursuing it further. The Court concluded that if the tendency of the proceedings was clear and unmistakable in that direction, then, irrespective of the fact that the appellants were merely following the instructions set out in the circular letter, they were guilty of contempt of court.

While the Court noted that a large number of decisions dealing with various aspects of contempt of court existed, it considered it unnecessary to cite each one, because the principle that any conduct which interferes with or prejudices a party who is litigating was unmistakably contemptuous was well settled. However, the Court found it appropriate to refer to a particularly relevant decision. In Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht (1), the Allahabad High Court held that when a threat or any action amounting to a threat was directed at a person who had approached the civil courts for redress, with the intention of inducing that person to forgo the assistance of the civil courts, such action amounted to contempt of court. In that case, an employee of the Public Works Department of Uttar Pradesh had approached the High Court for a writ, and the High Court’s decision was invoked to illustrate the point.

While the writ petition was pending before the High Courts, the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department of Uttar Pradesh, claiming to be acting in accordance with certain directions set out in a circular letter, demanded from the employee an explanation as to why he had filed a writ application with the High Court. The learned judges examined this conduct and expressed the unequivocal view that the action taken by the Chief Engineer, based on the instructions contained in the circular letter, constituted a threat intended to induce the employee to abandon the assistance of the civil courts. After the employee offered an unqualified apology, the matter was closed without any further proceedings being initiated. On behalf of the appellants, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in S. S. Roy v. State of Orissa (2). In that precedent, a First Class Magistrate, having misconstrued his powers, exercised a jurisdictional act vested in him by law and, without any justifying circumstances, issued an order under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that restrained a civil court peon from executing a warrant of arrest issued by an Additional Munsif in connection with the execution of a money decree; the magistrate was not influenced by any extraneous consideration or dishonest motive, and the Court held that the magistrate was not guilty of contempt of the Court of the Additional Munsif because there was nothing to suggest any wilful culpability on his part. The Court is unable to agree with the learned advocate for the appellants that the principle stated in that decision should be applied to the present case. The appellants in the present matter were not judicial officers who had misconceived their powers. Though they were undeniably carrying out executive instructions given by their employer, they executed those instructions at a time when a civil suit was pending and did so in a manner that exerted pressure on the respondent to withdraw the suif. The High Court, on the basis of its findings, concluded that the appellants were clearly guilty of contempt of court. The decision in Webster v. Bakewell Rural District Council (1), which the learned advocate for the appellants also relied upon, is not applicable. That case involved the yearly tenant of a cottage and adjoining land who issued a writ against the local authority for an injunction to restrain an alleged trespass; the solicitor of the tenant for life wrote to the local authority to arrange the matter and simultaneously wrote to the tenant stating that the tenant for life required him to withdraw the writ and that, if he did not comply, his tenancy would be determined. It was held that the solicitor had not committed a conr tempt of court, the decision proceeding on thefootings that the tenant for life had the right to turn out.

The Court concluded that the appellants were guilty of contempt of the Senior Subordinate Judge in Amritsar. In determining the sentence, the High Court had correctly taken into account that the appellants were merely following the instructions set out in the circular letter. Although that circumstance did not provide a complete defence to the contempt charge, the Court recognised it as a factor relevant to the quantum of punishment. Regarding the third issue, the Court observed that appellant Pratap Singh had done more than simply endorse the memorandum of the Under‑Secretary; he had also instructed the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, to commence proceedings against the respondent for allegedly violating the circular’s instructions. Having addressed each of the points raised on behalf of the appellants, the Court found no basis for interfering with the judgment and order of the High Court dated 5 November 1958. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed.

Justice Raghu Bar Dayal, after reviewing the judgment of Justice S. K. Das, expressed disagreement with the view that the appellants were guilty of contempt of Court. He noted that the facts leading to the conviction had been fully detailed in the majority opinion and need not be repeated. For the purposes of the present cases, he assumed the validity of the Government circular issued in 1953, which had not been challenged by the opposite party. He held that if an employee contravenes the directions in the circular, disciplinary action may be appropriate; however, to deem such action automatically contempt of Court would render the circular ineffective and undermine its authority. Justice Dayal observed that the charge‑sheet presented by Divisional Forest Officer Bachan Singh concerned misconduct and indiscipline, not contempt of Court. The charge alleged that Gurbaksh Singh had approached a civil court without first exhausting the avenues prescribed in the circular, thereby violating official propriety and rendering him liable to disciplinary measures. Justice Dayal emphasized that the charge‑sheet made no reference to the merits of the civil case, nor did it direct any specific action to be taken by Gurbaksh Singh in connection with that case. The charge centred solely on the procedural breach of going to court without using the prescribed official channels.

The charge‑sheet against Gurbaksh Singh did not address the merits of the civil suit he had filed, nor did it direct him to take any specific action in connection with that suit. For the purpose of the charge, the merits of the pending civil case were immaterial. The allegation concerned only misconduct and indiscipline arising from the fact that he approached the civil court without first exhausting the ordinary official channels of redress prescribed by the Circular. The charge could have been avoided if Gurbaksh Singh had simply documented that he had already exhausted all official avenues available to him, thereby showing that his conduct did not run counter to the Circular’s directions. The charge‑sheet made no threat of any disciplinary consequence on the basis of his continuing the suit, and the continuation of the suit, by itself, did not contravene the Circular. Consequently, the charge‑sheet could not be read as an attempt by the department to pressure him to withdraw the suit or to threaten disciplinary action should he persist. Even if he were to maintain the suit, the charge would remain in force and he would have to answer to it if the department chose to proceed. There was no indication, either in the charge‑sheet or elsewhere, that a withdrawal of the suit would result in the dropping of the charge. The record shows that he committed an act of indiscipline, and he is required to answer for that act should the department deem it appropriate to take departmental action.

The Court acknowledged the well‑settled principle that any attempt to exert pressure on a party to influence his conduct in pending litigation would amount to contempt of the Court in which the matter is pending. However, the Court found no evidence of such conduct on the part of the appellants in their actions against Gurbaksh Singh. The Court then referred to several authorities that illuminate this principle. In the cases of Hrishikesh Sanyal v. A. P. Bagchi and Radhey Lal v. Niranjan Nath, it was held that a person does not incur contempt by resorting to other judicial proceedings that are open to him during the pendency of a first proceeding, even if those proceedings cause loss to the opposite party, because every individual is entitled to seek legal redress. The decision in Baldeo Sahai v. Shiva Datt clarified that a notice served by a plaintiff’s son demanding payment of damages for a purported defamatory statement, and threatening a defamation suit if payment was not made, did not constitute contempt of Court. Similarly, in Kamta Prasad v. Ram Agyan, the Court ruled that a party cannot be said to be interfering with the course of justice or be guilty of contempt merely by making a settlement offer or suggesting the withdrawal of pending litigation, provided the conduct is exercised as a legitimate exercise of legal rights.

The Court observed that a person did not incur contempt of Court simply by proposing an out‑of‑court settlement of a dispute, by recommending that the existing litigation be dismissed, and by warning that, should the other party refuse, the proposer would commence lawful legal proceedings. The Court relied on the decision in Webster v. Bakewell Rural District Council (1) to support this view. The underlying principle distilled from those authorities is that an individual acting to enforce his legal rights in a court of law, or merely demanding that the opposite party remedy his own conduct, does not constitute interference with the administration of justice, even though such conduct may compel the other party to take steps in a separate judicial proceeding, because every party is entitled to protect his legal interests. The Court noted that the case reported as Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht (2) appeared to be adverse to the appellants, but it rejected the conclusion reached in that case. Specifically, the Court disapproved the view that requiring an employee to explain why he had filed a writ in the High Court, in contrary to directions issued in the Government Circular of 1952, amounted to a threat of departmental action intended to force the employee to withdraw the writ that he had filed to protect his constitutional rights. In contrast, the Court referred to a different perspective expressed in the case reported as Cheriyan Joseph v. Dr. James (3). In that matter, the plaintiff instituted a suit seeking a declaration that a particular resolution was not binding upon the church or the parish where he lived, and also sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from acting upon that resolution. One of the defendants was the Vicar of the church, and the Bishop sent a letter to the plaintiff threatening excommunication and claiming damages if the plaintiff did not immediately withdraw his suit. The plaintiff was subsequently excommunicated and then instituted contempt of Court proceedings against both the Bishop and the Vicar, alleging that the letter and the excommunication were intended to interfere with and obstruct the course of justice by intimidating the plaintiff into abandoning a suit that he was lawfully entitled to prosecute. While considering this issue, the Court observed: “On the other hand the contents of the letter indicate that it was conceived by respondent 1 (the Bishop) and that he was acting in the exercise of his legitimate right of safeguarding the interests of the church. We are not prepared to assume as the petitioner's learned counsel wants us to assume that respondent 2 (the Vicar) was responsible for the despatch of this letter. He was legally bound to obey the commands of”.

In the course of the proceedings it was observed that respondent 2, the Vicar, acted solely in obedience to the direction issued by respondent 1, the Bishop. The Vicar’s conduct was described as being carried out in the most innocuous manner possible, indicating that he simply followed the order he had received without adding any independent element. Accordingly, the Court concluded that respondent 2 could not be held responsible for executing an instruction that originated from respondent 1, and therefore no liability could be attached to the Vicar for merely complying with the Bishop’s directive.

The Court then turned to the question of whether the Bishop’s letter amounted to contempt of Court. It noted that the factual situation closely resembled the precedent set in Webster v. Bakewell Rural District Council (L.R. 1916 1 Ch. 300), where it was held that a threat to assert one’s legal rights against another, even if the other party chose to continue the litigation, did not constitute contempt. In the present matter, the Bishop’s threat was that the petitioner had already incurred a censure from the church and that, should the petitioner persist in pursuing the suit he had instituted before the District Munsif of Alleppey, the Bishop would lawfully exercise his right to excommunicate the petitioner for what the Bishop regarded as a wrongful act. The Court observed that the Vicar was not found guilty of contempt. It expressed the view that the judges in the earlier case had correctly applied the law, and that the present case presented an even stronger basis for concluding that no contempt had occurred, because the action taken against Gurbaksh Singh did not compel him to withdraw the suit he had filed. The Court further referred to the Privy Council’s observations in Perea v. The King, where Mr. Perera, a member of the Ceylon House of Representatives and Visitor of the Jail, had entered remarks in a Visitor’s Book that were initially deemed contemptuous by the Supreme Court of Ceylon. On appeal, the Privy Council held that the order against Mr. Perera should not have been made, emphasizing that his conduct did not fall within the definition of contempt. The Council explained that contempt requires an act or publication that is calculated to bring a court or a judge into contempt, to lower the court’s authority, or to obstruct the due course of justice, as articulated in Reg. v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36. The Privy Council found that Mr. Perera acted in good faith, fulfilled what he believed to be his legislative duty, and made no public use of inaccurate information, merely recording his comments in the appropriate visitor’s log and writing to the responsible minister. The Court inferred that, similarly, the actions of the respondents in the present case were undertaken in good faith and as part of their governmental duties, without any reference to the merits of the case, the judge, the Court, or the judicial process, and thus did not constitute contempt of Court.

In the earlier discussion, the Court observed that no reference was made in the charge to the Court, any judge of the Court, the course of justice, or the process of the Courts, and that the criticism expressed was honest criticism concerning a matter of public importance. The Court further stated that when these circumstances and no others attend the act complained of, contempt of Court cannot be found.

The present case was explained by noting that the appellants acted in good faith and performed what they believed to be their duty as government officers in complying with the directions contained in a Circular. The Circular had been brought to their attention by a letter from the Under Secretary to the Government, which inquired about the action to be taken against Gurbaksh Singh. The appellants responded by taking departmental action. No publicity was given to this action, and the language used in the charge did not refer to the merits of the case, to any judge, to the Court, to the course of justice, or to the process of the Courts. The action was undertaken in the interest of service discipline and therefore in the public interest.

The judgment then referred to the decision in Rizwan‑ul‑Hasan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1), quoting that, as observed by Rankin C.J. in Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson (I.L.R. 58 Cal. 884, 895), contempt jurisdiction should not be invoked unless there is real prejudice amounting to a substantial interference with the due course of justice, and that the purpose of the court’s action must be practical. The authorities make it clear that the court will not exercise contempt jurisdiction on a mere question of propriety. Consequently, even if the appellants’ action were considered improper, it could not render them guilty of contempt of Court because their conduct did not prejudice the trial of the suit.

The Court then cited Bradima Prakash Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2), emphasizing that the object of contempt proceedings is not to protect judges personally from imputations they might face as individuals, but to protect the public whose interests would be seriously affected if any party’s act or conduct lowered the authority of the Court and weakened public confidence in the administration of justice.

It was further explained that contempt of Court proceedings serve the public interest, as do departmental proceedings against government employees for acts of indiscipline. Only when departmental action directly affects the course of judicial proceedings can it amount to interference with the course of justice and therefore constitute contempt of Court. If such action does not affect the judicial process, no case of contempt of Court arises. The discussion concluded by referring to Re the South Shields (Thames Street) Clearance Order, 1931 (1), which examined similar principles.

In the matter before the Court, it was reported that certain newspaper articles alleged that the appellants, by pursuing their appeal, were preventing tenants from occupying newly constructed houses, were obstructing the progress of housing development in the borough, and were causing the corporation to lose rental income from those houses. The argument advanced by the appellants was that these articles amounted to contempt, not because they might influence the mind of the Court that would hear the appeal, but because they were intended to discourage the appellants and other persons from approaching the Court and presenting their appeals, thereby allegedly affecting the course of justice. The Court declined to grant relief on the basis of a writ of attachment, observing that such an order would expand the Court’s jurisdiction over contempt beyond what could be justified. It was noted that, in the cited precedent, the discussion did not address the merits of the appeal itself; rather, it merely referred to the adverse consequences that the pendency of the appeal might have on tenants, the corporation, and the progress of housing. The predecessor judgment had further suggested that, because of the publicity surrounding these adverse effects, the appellants and other parties might be deterred from bringing similar matters before the Court, and therefore the articles were said to obstruct the course of justice. The Court rejected that contention, holding that accepting it would improperly extend the Court’s contempt jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court stated that the mere possibility that a particular act might influence the conduct of a party or a few interested persons in the future did not constitute contempt of Court. The Court also observed that the charge‑sheet contained no threat to Gurbaksh Singh regarding the withdrawal or non‑withdrawal of the suit. Any consideration that the appellant might be induced to withdraw the suit to avoid departmental action, or that other government servants might be discouraged from instituting similar suits, was deemed beyond the scope of determining whether the appellants had committed contempt. The Court then referred to the decision in In re The William Thomas Shipping Co. H. W. Dillon & Sons Ltd. v. The Company, In re Sir Robert Thomas, which held that publishing injurious misrepresentations against a party to the action, especially when such misrepresentations foster hatred or contempt, could affect the course of justice by causing a plaintiff to abandon his claim out of fear of public dislike or by prompting a defendant to settle when he otherwise would not. The Court clarified that such publications would amount to contempt if they tended to cause the party to reach a compromise that he would not otherwise have reached. Finally, the Court concluded that the facts of the present case did not correspond to that precedent, even if Gurbaksh Singh, on his own, decided to discontinue the suit to avoid departmental action, because the conduct described did not involve any injurious misrepresentation that would hold him up to hatred or contempt.

In this matter, the Court observed that even if Gurbaksh Singh were to discontinue his suit on his own initiative in order to avoid departmental proceedings, such an act would not constitute an injurious misrepresentation capable of exposing him to hatred or contempt. The Court then turned to the earlier decision rendered in Saibal Kamar Gupta versus B. K. Sen. In that case, a revision petition was filed against a Sessions Judge’s order that had directed a further inquiry into a complaint lodged by Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury against B. K. Sen under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. The proceedings were pending before the Calcutta High Court. B. K. Sen, who was then serving as Commissioner of the Calcutta Corporation, was among several officials alleged to have abused their positions to conduct business in their own names. The Corporation responded by constituting a Special Committee composed of three councillors to investigate the allegations. This Committee sent a questionnaire to B. K. Sen, asking about his appointment of certain individuals who were related to witnesses in the case, his sanctioning of a punishment previously imposed on one person who was assisting his defence, and his role in facilitating the appointment of another potential prosecution witness. The High Court deemed the Committee’s actions to be a gross contempt of Court and convicted its members. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside that order. In the majority opinion, the Court held that the record did not show that the appellant had made any public comment on the pending case or on any matter arising from it in the Calcutta High Court. Moreover, the questionnaire did not allege that the appointments were made to suborn witnesses or to prevent Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury from presenting evidence. The Court explained that the Special Committee was acting on the Corporation’s directive to uncover misconduct among its servants, which could include improper appointments, and that determining the motive behind those appointments was merely ancillary to the main investigative purpose. Consequently, it would be improper to conclude that the Committee was conducting a parallel inquiry into matters awaiting judicial determination, thereby interfering with the administration of justice. The Court emphasized that the same reasoning, with even greater force, applied to the present dispute. It concluded that the departmental inquiry initiated against Gurbaksh Singh did not interfere with the course of justice, and that the enquiry conducted by the appellant, Bachan Singh, was undertaken in accordance with the orders of Pratap Singh and under governmental authority, and therefore did not amount to contempt of Court.

The judgment first addressed the orders that had been issued by Pratap Singh. It noted that Pratap Singh had initiated the enquiry in accordance with instructions that had been received from the Government. The Court observed that, in carrying out those instructions, neither Pratap Singh nor the Government could be said to have committed contempt of Court while performing their respective duties. On that basis, the Court formed the opinion that the material facts of the case did not demonstrate that the appellants, by the conduct alleged against them, had engaged in contempt of Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the individual judge stated that the appeals filed by the appellants ought to be allowed.

Nevertheless, the Court went on to record the disposition of the appeals in accordance with the view expressed by the majority of the judges hearing the matter. The Court therefore entered an order that the appeals were dismissed, and it reiterated that the appeals were dismissed.