Prabhu vs State Of U. P

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 1962

Decision Date: 03/05/1962

Coram: S. R. Das

In the matter titled Prabhu versus State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the third day of May, 1962. The case was listed before a bench of the Supreme Court, and the petitioner was identified as Prabhu while the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh. The legal question that arose concerned the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, specifically section 27, and its application to the admissibility of certain statements made by the accused and the recovery of a blood‑stained axe and clothing. The factual backdrop involved a charge of murder, with the accused contesting the validity of his own statements to a police officer and the relevance of the recovered items to the prosecution’s case. The headnote of the judgment recorded that the appellant had been tried and convicted for the murder of a person identified only as B. The prosecution’s case was circumstantial and rested upon three main pillars: first, a motive that the appellant shared with his father to kill B; second, the discovery, at the appellant’s own request, of an axe, a shirt and a dhoti that were stained with human blood; and third, statements that the appellant allegedly made to a Sub‑Inspector of Police prior to the recovery, in which he purportedly admitted that the axe was the weapon he used to kill B and that the shirt and dhoti belonged to him. No independent evidence was presented to establish ownership of the axe, shirt or dhoti by the appellant. The Court held that the statements made to the police officer were inadmissible because they were incriminating statements covered by sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, and they did not qualify for admission under section 27 as they did not lead to any discovery within the meaning of that provision. The Court further concluded that, in the absence of admissible statements and without independent proof of ownership of the recovered articles, the remaining circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court relied on the precedent set in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 65, while distinguishing the earlier case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhya [1961] 1 S.C.R. 14.

The criminal appeal, numbered 50 of 1962, was filed by special leave after the appellant’s conviction and death sentence had been affirmed by the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, in criminal appeal number 494 of 1961. The appellant was represented by counsel, while the State was represented by its own legal team. The learned Sessions Judge of Rae Bareli had originally tried Prabhu on the charge of murdering his own uncle and had found him guilty, imposing a death sentence. Following the conviction, a reference for confirmation of the death sentence was made, and the High Court considered both the appeal and the reference together in a single judgment. The High Court accepted the reference, dismissed the appeal, and upheld both the conviction and the death sentence. The appellant then secured special leave to appeal to this Court, and the present appeal was heard pursuant to that leave. In brief, the factual narrative presented to the trial court described that Bhagwan Ahir, who was the step‑brother of the appellant’s father Budhai, resided in the village of Bandi in Rae Bareli district. The appellant and his father lived in another village called Gulariya, situated two to three miles from Bandi. Bhagwan owned approximately four bighas of pasture land and seven bighas of cultivated land, and he was an elderly man, about eighty years of age, with no male heirs. He had several married daughters who lived with their husbands elsewhere. Because Bhagwan lacked a male member to assist him with agricultural work, the appellant and his mother had moved to Bhagwan’s residence about four years before the alleged murder, with the intention that the appellant would help Bhagwan with cultivation. However, the prosecution alleged that the appellant provided little assistance, and after roughly one year Bhagwan expelled the appellant and his mother from the house, after which they returned to Gulariya.

In this case, the Court described the circumstances surrounding Bhagwan Ahir, who was the step‑brother of Budhai, the appellant’s father. Bhagwan lived in the village of Bandi in the Rae Bareli district and owned approximately four bighas of pasture land together with seven bighas of cultivated land. He was an elderly man, about eighty years old according to the testimony of a witness named Marka, and he had no surviving male heirs. He did, however, have several daughters who were married and lived with their husbands at various locations, and he also had a few grand‑daughters, one of whom, a five‑year‑old girl named Kumari Sarju, was residing with him at the time of the incident. Because Bhagwan lacked a male member in his family to assist with agricultural work, he faced difficulty in managing his fields. Budhai, the appellant’s father, apparently did not remain in his own village of Gulariya throughout the year, as he was employed in Burdwan, Bengal. Approximately four years before the murder, the appellant and his mother moved to Bhagwan’s household in the expectation that the appellant would help with cultivation. In practice, the appellant offered little assistance, and, according to the prosecution’s narrative, Bhagwan expelled the appellant and his mother after about a year of their residence, after which they returned to Gulariya. The prosecution further alleged that, about one and a half months before Bhagwan’s death, the appellant and his father visited Bhagwan and the father requested that Bhagwan transfer some of his land to the appellant. Bhagwan responded that he had already permitted the appellant to stay for a year without receiving any help and therefore refused to convey any portion of his property. Bhagwan expressed an intention to bequeath his land to his granddaughter Sarju. On the night of 19 to 20 March 1961, Bhagwan was sleeping on a cot in front of his house along with the young girl Sarju. A neighbor named Naiku, identified as witness 1, was sleeping a short distance away. At around midnight, Naiku heard a noise and called out to Bhagwan, but received no answer. He then heard the sound of shoes, as if someone were fleeing the scene, and summoned other persons before proceeding to the spot where Bhagwan lay. Upon arrival, Naiku discovered that Bhagwan had sustained a large number of injuries to his head and neck, most of which were incised wounds, and that Bhagwan was already deceased. The little girl Sarju was found covered with blood that had flowed from Bhagwan’s body, yet she herself was unharmed and remained soundly asleep on the cot, unaware of the violence. Naiku reported the incident to the police station, which was situated roughly eight miles from Bandi. His report did not name any accused because he had not seen the perpetrator. Following Naiku’s information, the local police commenced an investigation.

After the post‑mortem examination the dead body of Bhagwan was returned to the village for cremation, and, according to the record, the appellant visited Brij Lal, the second witness from the village of Bandi, on the third day following the murder. During that visit the appellant asked Brij Lal several questions that aroused Brij Lal’s suspicion. At that time the Sub‑Inspector of Police was present in the village and, after being notified of the appellant’s arrival, he proceeded to interrogate the appellant. The prosecution’s case stated that, during the interrogation, the appellant made certain statements and produced from his residence a kulhari (axe), a shirt and a dhoti. All three items were alleged to be stained with blood, and subsequent analysis by a chemical analyst and a serologist confirmed that the stains were of human blood. The recovery of the blood‑stained kulhari, shirt and dhoti was reported to have taken place on 22 March 1961, in the presence of two witnesses named Lal Bahadur Singh and Wali Mohammad. The prosecution’s case appeared to rely principally on two strands of evidence: first, the motive suggested by an incident that occurred approximately one and a half months before the murder, when the appellant and his father allegedly requested some land from the deceased; and second, the seizure of the blood‑stained axe and clothing from the appellant’s house. The appellant denied both that he and his father had made any such request for land and that he had produced any blood‑stained axe, shirt or dhoti, or handed such items to the Sub‑Inspector. He further asserted that the clothing and the axe did not belong to him. In his defence, the appellant explained that he had been residing with his father in Burdwan and had returned to the village only on 21 March 1961, and he contended that the case against him was motivated by personal enmity. Counsel for the appellant reviewed the evidence and argued that, apart from raising a suspicion against the appellant and his father, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The counsel also maintained that certain statements attributed to the appellant by the Sub‑Inspector, made in connection with the recovery of the blood‑stained items, were inadmissible, and that the lower courts erred in relying upon them. He submitted that, if those statements were excluded, the remaining evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The Court agreed with these contentions and held that they must be upheld. It was beyond dispute that Bhagwan had been murdered on the night in question; the post‑mortem report recorded thirteen injuries, eleven of which were incised wounds.

In this case the post‑mortem examination disclosed that Bhagwan had suffered a total of thirteen injuries, of which eleven were incised wounds located on various parts of his body. The injuries to his head and face penetrated the skull bones, and the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy expressed the opinion that Bhagwan died as a result of the skull fractures combined with hemorrhage and the resultant shock. Consequently, there can be no doubt that Bhagwan was murdered. The evidence further established that no person actually saw the individual who inflicted the fatal injuries. The testimony of Naiku, identified as the first prosecution witness, made it clear that neither he nor any other persons he named observed the appellant at the scene. The grand‑child who had been sleeping beside Bhagwan remained asleep throughout the incident and did not awaken when the injuries were administered. Whether Bhagwan raised a cry at the time of the assault could not be determined; Naiku’s evidence indicated that the only audible sounds he perceived were the steps of a person wearing shoes. The Court was satisfied that the motive for the crime had been adequately proved. Both Naiku and Brij Lal, the second prosecution witness, testified regarding the motive. They recounted that approximately four years earlier the appellant and his mother had stayed with Bhagwan in order to assist him with agricultural work. However, the appellant performed no labor and was consequently asked to leave, a fact established by the testimonies of Naiku and Brij Lal. Those same witnesses also established that the appellant and his father had approached Bhagwan about one and a half months before the murder, seeking a parcel of land. Bhagwan refused to transfer any land to the appellant, thereby creating a grievance that affected both the appellant and his father and establishing a clear motive. A further difficulty in the case concerned the evidence relating to the recovery of a blood‑stained axe and a blood‑stained shirt and dhoti. The Court found that the evidence concerning the recovery was not satisfactorily proved and that the lower tribunals erred in admitting certain statements alleged to have been made by the appellant in connection with that recovery. According to the recovery memorandum, two witnesses were present when the appellant produced the items from his house. The first, Lal Bahadur Singh, was examined as prosecution witness No. 4 and testified that the appellant retrieved the blood‑stained articles from a tub situated on the eastern side of the house; however, Lal Bahadur Singh did not report that the appellant made any statements concerning the recovery. The second witness, Wali Mohammad, was noted in the memo but was not examined at all. A third witness, Dodi Baksh Singh, examined as prosecution witness No. 3, testified that shortly before the recovery the Sub‑Inspector of Police had taken the appellant into custody and interrogated him, after which the appellant disclosed that the axe used in the murder as well as his blood‑stained shirt and dhoti were in the house and that he was prepared to produce them. These statements, as alleged, formed the subject of further consideration.

The Court observed that the testimony of Dobi Baksh Singh, who was identified as prosecution witness 3, could not be admitted as evidence. The Court explained that the statements attributed to the appellant were made to a police officer while the appellant was in custody, and therefore fell within the prohibitions of sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. Consequently, those statements were excluded from the record.

The Court further analysed two specific statements. First, the assertion that the axe recovered from the house was the very weapon with which the murder had been committed was not a statement that led to any discovery within the meaning of section 27 of the Evidence Act. Second, the claim that the blood‑stained shirt and dhoti found at the scene belonged to the appellant also failed to satisfy the requirements of section 27. Section 27, the Court noted, permits the admission of information received from an accused in custody only to the extent that the information directly relates to a fact that was discovered as a result of that information. The provision allows the admission of the portion of the information that "relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovery."

To illustrate the principle, the Court quoted the reasoning of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 65. The Privy Council held that it is erroneous to treat the “fact discovered” under section 27 as equivalent to the object produced. The “fact discovered” includes the place from which the object was produced and the accused’s knowledge of that place, and the information must relate directly to that fact. Information about the past use or history of the object does not satisfy the requirement. The Council explained that a statement such as “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the informant’s house, which may be relevant if the knife is proved to have been used in the offence. However, adding the words “with which I stabbed A” renders the statement inadmissible because those added words do not pertain to the discovery of the knife in the house.

Applying this interpretation, the Court concluded that the lower courts erred in admitting the appellant’s alleged statements that the axe had been used to commit the murder and that the blood‑stained shirt and dhoti were his. The Court held that those statements must be excluded from evidence. With those statements excluded, the only remaining evidence was that the appellant produced from his house a blood‑stained axe and some blood‑stained garments. The prosecution had not produced any evidence establishing whether the axe actually belonged to the appellant or whether the blood‑stained clothing was his. Accordingly, the Court framed the issue for consideration: whether, in light of the remaining evidence concerning motive, the mere production of the blood‑stained axe and clothing was sufficient to conclude that the appellant was the murderer.

In this case, the Court examined whether the appellant could be conclusively identified as the murderer on the basis of the evidence presented. It reiterated the well‑settled principle that circumstantial evidence must be of such a quality that, under any reasonable hypothesis, it can be said to be compatible only with the guilt of the accused and not with his innocence. The motive that the prosecution alleged would, according to the evidence, have been capable of operating not only on the appellant but also on his father. Consequently, the mere fact that the appellant produced articles that were stained with blood could not, by itself, lead to the conclusion that he had carried out the murder. The Court observed that even if another person had committed the homicide and the blood‑stained items had remained in the house, the appellant could have lawfully produced those items when questioned by the Sub‑Inspector of Police. Hence, the production of the stained weapon and clothing was not evidence that was exclusively consistent with the appellant’s guilt and inconsistent with any possibility of his innocence. The Court further held that the chain of circumstantial evidence in the present case was incomplete. It noted that the prosecution had failed to supply the missing links that would have tied the appellant directly to the crime, a failure that appeared to stem from the prosecution’s attempt to attach to the appellant certain statements that were plainly inadmissible. Counsel for the respondent urged the Court to rely on the precedent set in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 S.C.R. 14, where this Court had accepted the production of a blood‑stained weapon as sufficient proof. The Court declined to follow that view, observing that the earlier decision was based on a broader circumstantial matrix that included additional facts beyond the mere presence of the weapon. In that case, the Court had expressly stated that the circumstantial chain was complete and that the judgment was not founded solely on the weapon’s condition. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and the sentence that had been imposed on the appellant, and ordered that the appellant be released immediately. The appeal was thereby allowed.