Patna Improvement Trust vs Smt. Lakshmi Devi and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 683 to 686 of 1962

Decision Date: 7 December 1962

Coram: J.L. Kapur, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.R. Mudholkar, Subba Rao

In the matter titled Patna Improvement Trust versus Smt. Lakshmi Devi and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 7 December 1962. The case was heard by a bench consisting of Justice J. L. Kapur, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner was the Patna Improvement Trust and the respondents were Smt. Lakshmi Devi together with other persons. The judgment is reported in the 1963 volume of the All India Reporter at page 1077 and also in the 1963 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reporter at page 812. The decision is cited in several later reports, including R 1965 SC 1017, R 1974 SC 2077, RF 1980 SC 326, and relates to provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, specifically sections 4, 6, 50 and 71, as well as sections 33, 46 and 71 of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951 (Act 35 of 1951).

The principal issue that arose for determination was whether the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951, wholly displaced the earlier Land Acquisition Act of 1894 in respect of the acquisition of land for the Trust, and consequently whether notifications issued by the Government of Bihar under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act remained valid after the 1951 Act had been enacted. The High Court had held those notifications to be ultra vires and therefore illegal. The Supreme Court applied the legal maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, which means that general provisions do not diminish special ones, and further observed that when a statute prescribes a particular method for performing an act, that method must be observed even if the statute contains no explicit prohibitory language. The Court, speaking through Justices Imam, Kapur and Mudholkar, held that section 71 of the Bihar Act, which itself modifies the Land Acquisition Act, contemplates the continued operation of the acquisition machinery as amended for the purpose of acquiring land for the Trust. Rather than excluding the Land Acquisition Act, the Bihar Act incorporated it, subject to the modifications and exceptions it introduced. The first significant modification is found in sub‑clause (1) of clause (2) of the schedule, where the first notice required under section 46 of the Bihar Act replaces, and is deemed to have the same effect as, a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, but this replacement is subject to an important exception. That exception is a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act or a declaration under section 6 of the same Act that “has been previously made and is in force.” The Court interpreted the phrase “has been previously made” to refer not only to notifications issued before the passage of the Bihar Act, but to all notifications made prior to or before the first publication of a notice of an improvement scheme under section 46 of the Bihar Act. The Court cited the earlier decision in Mercer Henderson’s Trustees v. Dunferuline District Committee, 37 S.C.L.R. 119, in support of this construction. Further, the Court held that the authority of the State Government to acquire land for the Trust was not withdrawn by the Bihar Act, a view reinforced by section 33 of that Act, which requires the Trust to prepare a Master Plan that designates land subject to compulsory acquisition by the various authorities, including the State Government.

In this case the Court observed that the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act of 1951 did not remove the State Government’s authority to acquire land, a point that was demonstrated by section 33 of that Act. Section 33 requires the Trust to prepare a Master Plan that must identify the land to be taken over compulsorily by the various authorities listed in the Act, including the State Government itself. The Court further held that section 50(1) of the Land Acquisition Act remained fully applicable for the purpose of a Trust, indicating that the legislature did not intend to exclude the normal provisions of the Land Acquisition Act—such as sections 4, 6 and 50—from operations concerning land acquisition for a trust. Subba Rao J. explained that under the Bihar Act the Trust was empowered to implement improvement schemes in a specific manner, and that acquiring land had to be carried out in the prescribed way. Consequently, the Trust was bound to follow the method set out in the Act and could not resort to any alternative procedure. The Court pointed out that the overall scheme of the Bihar Act supported the conclusion that the Trust could only execute its scheme by acquiring land according to the land‑acquisition provisions incorporated by reference in the Act; therefore, the two principles identified by the High Court were appropriate. The Court relied upon authorities such as Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co‑operative Insurance Society Ltd., A.I.R. 1931 PC 149, and Ex‑Parte Stephens, (1876) 3 Ch. D. 659. Regarding the saving clause, the Court noted that the provision saving a notification issued under section 4 or section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, which appears in paragraph 2(1) of the schedule of the Bihar Act, applied to notifications made either before or after the passage of the Bihar Act, provided they were issued before the first publication or notice of implementation of the scheme under section 46 of the Bihar Act. The judgment was delivered in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction for Civil Appeals Nos. 683 to 686 of 1962, on appeal by special leave from the Patna High Court’s order dated 5 January 1962 in Miscellaneous Judicial Cases Nos. 335, 433, 434 and 450 of 1961. The appellant, the Patna Improvement Trust, was represented by counsel for the State, while the respondents were represented by counsel for the individual appellants. The judgment was handed down on 7 December 1962 by Justices Imam, Kapur and Mudholkar, with a separate opinion by Subba Rao J. The central issue before the Court was the interpretation of the acquisition provisions in the Bihar Act and the validity of the notifications issued by the State Government under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

In all four of the appeals the plaintiff is the Patna Improvement Trust, but each appeal involves a different respondent. On 19 January 1961 the Government of Bihar issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 proposing to acquire 407.85 acres of land in the city of Patna. The acquisition was to be made at the expense of the Patna Improvement Trust and was justified on the basis of a public purpose: the development of a residential neighbourhood, the provision of housing facilities for various income groups, and the facilitation of the planned growth of Patna. On the same date a second, similar notification was issued by the State of Bihar proposing to acquire an additional 54.08 acres. The respondents in each case filed applications or writs under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of those notifications made under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court of Patna, by a writ of certiorari, set aside both notifications. The Patna Improvement Trust subsequently filed these appeals by way of special leave, seeking a reversal of the High Court’s judgment and order.

To decide whether the notifications were valid, the Court examined the relevant provisions of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951 (the “Bihar Act”). Chapter II of the Bihar Act deals with the constitution of improvement trusts and related matters; section 3 of that chapter expressly vests in an improvement trust the duty of implementing the provisions of the Bihar Act within any local area under its jurisdiction. Chapter III governs improvement schemes. Section 46, situated in Chapter III, prescribes the preparation, publication, and transmission of notices concerning improvement schemes. Accordingly, when an improvement scheme is framed, the trust must prepare a notice that sets out the fact of framing, delineates the boundaries of the area covered by the scheme, and specifies other particulars regarding the land it proposes to acquire. Such a notice must then be published in the manner prescribed by the Act.

Following the publication under section 46, section 48 requires the trust, within thirty days, to serve a notice on all persons specified in the notice, including those whose land is proposed to be acquired. The notice served under section 48 must invite any person who objects to the acquisition to state his reasons within sixty days of receipt. Section 71 of the Bihar Act modifies certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the purpose of acquiring land on behalf of the trust. Section 71 states: “Modification of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. For the purpose of acquiring land for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) – (a) the said Act shall be subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule.” The Schedule referred to in subsection (a) enumerates the specific modifications made to the Land Acquisition Act; the Court limited its reference to those modifications that are pertinent to the present case. Clause 2(1) of the Schedule provides the first relevant alteration, describing how the first publication of a notice of an improvement scheme under section 46 of the Bihar Act shall be deemed to have the same effect as publication in the official Gazette and shall substitute for a notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, except where a prior notification or declaration under the Bihar Act remains in force.

The Court explained that, under the Schedule to section 71 of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951, the first publication of a notice of an improvement scheme prescribed in section 46 was to be treated as equivalent to a publication in the official Gazette and to a local notification made under sub‑section (1) of section 4, unless a notification under that same sub‑section or a declaration under section 6 had already been issued and remained in force. The Schedule further provided that the proceedings contemplated in section 48 and in sub‑section (1) of section 50 of the Bihar Act were to be regarded as having the same effect as the proceedings laid down in section 5‑A of the Land Acquisition Act. Additionally, the Schedule stipulated that, subject to paragraphs 6 and 7, the issuance of a notice under clause (c) of sub‑section (3) of section 39 of the Bihar Act, when land was proposed to be acquired under that clause, and, in any other situation, the publication of a notification under section 52 of the Bihar Act, were to serve as substitutes for a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, except where such a declaration had already been made and was operative. In other words, the Schedule made a notice under the specified clause of section 39 a replacement for the declaration required by the Land Acquisition Act for lands proposed to be acquired under that clause, and it made the publication of a notice under section 52 a replacement for the declaration in all other cases. By virtue of other provisions in the Schedule, certain additional sections were deemed to be inserted into the Land Acquisition Act. The respondents argued before the High Court, and reiterated their position before this Court, that when land was to be acquired for the purposes of the Patna Improvement Trust it should be acquired pursuant to the Bihar Act, not under the Land Acquisition Act, because the Bihar Act entirely supplanted the Land Acquisition Act with respect to acquisitions for the Trust. They further contended that the Bihar Act was intended to constitute a complete code for land acquisition for the Trust and that it was inconsistent with the Land Acquisition Act, so that the two statutes could not operate concurrently. The High Court had resolved the petition by applying the maxim “generalia specialibus non derogant,” holding that because both the Bihar Act and the Land Acquisition Act dealt with land acquisition, the special Bihar Act prevailed over the general Land Acquisition Act for acquisitions by the Improvement Trust.

The Court noted that both the Bihar Act and the Land Acquisition Act concerned the acquisition of land, the Bihar Act being a special statute that dealt specifically with acquisitions for the purpose of Improvement Trusts while the Land Acquisition Act was a general statute dealing with acquisitions of land in all other cases. Accordingly, the Court held that once the Bihar Act had come into force and the Improvement Trust had been constituted, the State Government possessed no authority to acquire land for the Trust under the general provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Consequently, any notifications issued by the State Government for that purpose were ultra vires and illegal. The Court further observed that the Improvement Trust was bound to follow the procedure expressly laid down in the Bihar Act in order to carry out its duties, and it could not adopt any other mechanism for performing those duties. The underlying principle, the Court explained, is that when a statute directs a statutory authority to exercise its power in a particular manner, the authority must exercise that power only in the manner prescribed and in no other way. The Court also reiterated the High Court’s finding that, under the Bihar Act, the Improvement Trust is empowered to perform only those functions for which it was constituted and it may not undertake development or expansion without first preparing a matter‑plan in accordance with section 33 of the Act or without complying with the procedure laid down in section 42A of the Act, that section having been inserted by an amendment enacted in 1956. The Court stated that it was unnecessary to delve into the argument concerning inconsistency between the Bihar Act and the Land Acquisition Act or the contention that the special act excluded the general act, because the provisions of the Bihar Act themselves provided the key to resolving the present question of construction. Section 71 of the Bihar Act, which modifies the Land Acquisition Act, expressly provides that for the purpose of acquiring land for the Trust, the Land Acquisition Act shall be subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule. Thus, even for acquisitions on behalf of the Trust, the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended, is deemed to apply. The Court emphasized that the Bihar Act does not exclude the Land Acquisition Act; rather, it makes the latter applicable subject to the modifications and exceptions enumerated in the Schedule. The first relevant modification, the Court explained, is found in sub‑clause (1) of clause 2 of the Schedule, where a “first notice” under section 46 of the Bihar Act is substituted for, and has the same effect as, a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, subject to an important exception. That exception arises when a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act or a declaration under section 6 of that Act has already been made and is in force. When such an earlier notification or declaration exists, the first notice under section 46 of the Bihar Act does not acquire the effect of a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.

In this case, the Court explained that the expression “has been previously made” did not merely indicate that a notification had been issued before the Bihar Act came into force; rather, it encompassed any notification that had been issued prior to the first publication of a notice of an improvement scheme under section 46 of the Bihar Act. Consequently, if, before a notice under section 46 was published, a notification under section 4(l) or a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act had been made and was still in force, the first publication of a notice under section 46 would not be treated as a substitute for, nor would it have the same effect as, a notification under section 4(l). The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with the construction adopted by the Scottish courts in Mercer Henderson’s Trustees v. Dunferuline District Committee, where the phrase “previously in use” was held not to mean “prior to the passing of a statute.” The Court further observed that the power of the State Government to acquire land for the Trust was not taken away by the Bihar Act, a point illustrated by section 33 of that Act, which concerns the preparation of a master plan by the Trust. Section 33(3) required that a master plan, subject to prescribed rules, include maps and descriptive matters necessary to illustrate any scheme proposal with appropriate detail for different parts of the area, and permitted the plan to designate, among other things, land subject to compulsory acquisition by the State Government, the Trust, the planning authority appointed under section 138, or any public utility agency. Accordingly, the master plan was required to identify the land that would be subject to compulsory acquisition by the various authorities, including the State Government. The Court also referred to clause I of the Schedule to the Bihar Act, under which sub‑section (ee) was deemed to be inserted into section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, thereby expanding the definition of “local authority” to include the Board of Trustees constituted under section 8 of the Bihar Act, which meant the Trust itself. Moreover, section 50(l) of the Land Acquisition Act dealt with the use of its provisions for acquiring land at the cost of any fund managed or controlled by a local authority or any company. Therefore, section 50(1) would be equally applicable to a trust. These provisions, the Court concluded, demonstrated that the legislature had not intended to exclude the operation of the Land Acquisition Act, including sections 4, 6, and 50, in matters concerning the acquisition of land for the purpose of a Trust.

In this case, the Court noted that the notification issued by the State Government was not invalid and that the High Court had erred in holding the opposite. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside both the judgment and the order of the High Court, and remitted the matter to the High Court for determination of whether the State Government’s order was violative of Article 14‑a, a point that had been raised before the High Court but not finally decided. The Court directed that costs would follow the event and that one hearing fee would be payable in this Court. Justice Subba Rao stated that he had read the judgment prepared by his learned brother, Justice Kapur, and expressed regret that he could not agree with it. He observed that the factual matrix was fully recorded in Justice Kapur’s judgment and therefore needed no restatement. The issue that required consideration was whether the Government of Bihar could issue a notification under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act to acquire land at the expense of the Patna Improvement Trust for the development of a residential neighbourhood, to provide housing facilities for various income groups, and to facilitate the planned growth of the City of Patna after the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951 (Act 35 of 1951) had come into force. In other words, the question was whether the 1951 Act superseded the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 in matters of land acquisition for the Trust.

The Court then examined the material provisions of the 1951 Act that were relevant to this enquiry. The long title of the Act was “to provide for the improvement, development and expansion of towns in the State of Bihar.” The preamble declared that it was expedient to make provision for the improvement, development and expansion of towns in Bihar so as to secure sanitary conditions, amenity and convenience for present and future inhabitants. Section 2(16) defined “Trust” as the Board of Trustees constituted under section 3. Section 3 provided that the duty of implementing the provisions of the Act in any local area was vested, subject to the conditions and limitations specified therein, in a board called “the (name of the town) Improvement Trust,” hereinafter referred to as “the Trust.” The section further stated that every such Trust would be a body corporate with perpetual succession, a common seal, and the capacity to sue and be sued. Section 69 empowered the Trust, with prior sanction of the State Government, to acquire land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the purposes of the Act. Section 71 clarified that for the purpose of acquiring land for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act, the Act would be subject to the modifications set out in the Schedule, and the Schedule specified the alterations made to various sections of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. These provisions together demonstrated that the 1951 Act incorporated the Land Acquisition Act, as modified, to enable the Trust to acquire land necessary for its improvement schemes.

It was clear from the language of the legislation that the Act of 1894 had been enacted specifically to promote the improvement, development and expansion of towns within the State of Bihar. The statute created a statutory corporate entity known as the Improvement Trust, and it vested in that body a series of powers that were intended to enable it to achieve the purposes of the Act. In addition, the Act expressly referred to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, as modified by the Schedule, so that the Trust could acquire any land that was required for the execution of its improvement schemes. The Act is therefore a special, self‑contained piece of legislation that governs the manner in which the Trust may obtain land. The Trust is authorised to acquire land only in the manner prescribed by the Act; it cannot disregard those provisions and seek a separate route by approaching the State Government for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act outside the framework of the Act. This central question – whether the Trust may bypass the statutory procedure and rely on an alternative method of acquisition – formed the crux of the dispute. The Court noted that the legal position on this issue was well settled, and it agreed with the High Court’s interpretation of the law as applied to the facts. The High Court had relied on two well‑established principles. The first principle, “generalia specialibus non derogant,” was illustrated by the Privy Council decision in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co‑operative Insurance Society Ltd. (1). The second principle, that a statute which prescribes a particular mode of performance bars any other mode even in the absence of negative language, was illustrated by the decision in Ex parte Stephens (2). These principles together mean that a general statute yields to a special statute dealing with a specific subject, and that a statute’s explicit direction of how a act must be performed effectively forbids any alternative method.

Applying those principles to the Improvement Trust Act, the Court observed that the Act authorises the Trust to implement its improvement schemes only in the way that the statute outlines, which includes acquiring land solely through the modified Land Acquisition Act incorporated by reference. Consequently, the Trust is bound to follow the prescribed procedure and may not resort to any other mechanism for land acquisition. A careful reading of the relevant sections of the Act shows an integrated scheme for planning and executing improvements, whether by acquisition or other means. The Act grants the Trust a variety of statutory powers and duties for devising and carrying out different schemes. For example, Section 33 empowers the Trust to prepare a master plan, while Sections 34, 35, 36, 39 and 40 authorize the Trust to create various schemes within the master plan’s framework. These provisions together underscore that the acquisition of land must be carried out in accordance with the specific procedural and substantive requirements set out in the Act, and that any deviation would be contrary to the legislative intent.

Sections 41 and 42 of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act authorised the Trust to formulate a variety of schemes that fell within the overall framework of the master plan prepared under the Act. Section 42A further empowered the Trust to devise an improvement scheme for an area that was not originally incorporated in the master plan. The statutory provisions ranging from sections 43 to 47 required the Trust to issue the necessary notices to persons who might be affected by any such scheme and to consider any representations or objections that those persons might submit. Section 48 regulated the manner in which a notice of the proposed acquisition of land had to be published. Section 50 imposed a duty on the Trust to examine any objections or representations that were received and, where a party so desired, to provide an opportunity for that party to be heard. After hearing the objections and representations, the Trust possessed the discretion either to abandon the proposed scheme or to seek the sanction of the State Government for the scheme, possibly with modifications that the Trust deemed necessary. The State Government then either granted its sanction or declined to do so. Consequently, the Court observed that, under the Act, the Trust could not acquire land for its purposes without first undergoing a quasi‑judicial process that culminated in the finalisation of the scheme. The affected parties were given a full opportunity to object to the scheme in general and, subsequently, to any specific acquisition of their own land. This elaborate procedure, which was designed to balance individual property rights with broader social objectives, could not be circumvented by the Trust simply ignoring the statutory framework and approaching the State Government directly for land acquisition, because the Act permitted implementation of acquisition only in the manner expressly prescribed. The overall scheme of the Act therefore supported the conclusion that the Trust’s power to acquire land was confined to the processes laid down in the Act. Nevertheless, the respondents relied heavily on the provisions of the Schedule, especially paragraph 2, to argue that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act remained available to the Trust for acquiring land. Paragraph 2 of the Schedule states: (1) “The first publication of a notice of an improvement scheme under section 46 of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act 1951 (Bihar Act XXXVI of 1951) shall be substituted for and have the same effect as publication in the Official Gazette and in the locality of a notification under sub‑section (1) of section 4 of the said Act, except where a notification under sub‑section (1) of section 4 or a declaration under section 6 of the said Act has been previously made and is in force.” (2) “Proceedings under section 48 and subsection (1) of section 50 of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951 (Bihar Act XXXV of 1951) shall be substituted for and have the same effect as proceedings under section 5‑A of the said Act.” (3) “Subject to the provisions of paragraph 6 and 7 of the Schedule, the issue of a notice under clause (c) of sub‑section (3) of section 39 of the Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951 (Bihar Act XXXV of 1951) in the case of land proposed to be acquired in pursuance of that clause, and in any other case the publication of a notification under section 52 of that Act shall be substituted for and have the same effect as a declaration under section 6 of the said Act, except where a declaration under the last mentioned section has been previously made and is in force.” The Court noted that this reliance on the Schedule formed a central point of the respondents’ argument.

Bihar Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1951 (Bihar Act XXXV of 1951) provides that, when land is proposed to be acquired under clause (c) of sub‑section (3) of section 39, a notice under that clause shall be substituted for a declaration under section 6, except where a declaration under section 6 has already been made and is in force. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the saving of notifications under sections 4 and 6 in paragraph 2(1) of the Schedule reveals a legislative intention to retain the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, without any modification, as an alternative mechanism for the Trust to acquire land for its scheme. If that contention were accepted, it would undermine the entire purpose of the 1951 Act. The reasoning is that, if the 1894 Act were to remain unaltered as an alternative, the need for amending that Act and for incorporating the modified provisions by reference in the 1951 Act would disappear. The legislature could simply have required the Trust, whenever it needed to acquire land for its scheme, to apply to the government for acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act. An inconsistency should not be imputed to the legislature unless it is unavoidable. In the present case, the exception in paragraph 2(1) of the Schedule can be given a meaning that does not contradict legislative intent. The appellant’s counsel suggests that the notification contemplated in sections 4 or 6 of the 1951 Act refers only to those issued by the government before the 1951 Act came into force. However, the words “previously made” are broad enough to include any notification under sections 4 or 6 made after the enactment of the 1951 Act but before the first publication of a notice under section 46 relating to the scheme. Consequently, the exception covers notifications issued both before and after the Act. Section 33(3) of the 1951 Act contemplates such a notification: a master plan prepared by the Trust may identify a specific parcel of land as subject to compulsory acquisition by the State Government. If a parcel is so designated, the State Government may compulsorily acquire it, and it may issue a notification under section 4 or 6 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 concerning that land. In that circumstance, the exception is triggered and the notice under section 46 cannot replace the earlier notification. It is not alleged that the notification in question was issued by the government with respect to a parcel designated under the master plan as land subject to compulsory acquisition by the State Government. Under this interpretation, the exception does not become redundant; rather, it aligns perfectly with the scheme of the 1951 Act.

In this case the Court observed that the exception in clause (3) which relates to deferred street schemes under section 39 of the Act could refer only to a notification issued by the Government under section 4 or section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly the Court held that whenever the Trust attempts to acquire land for the purpose of carrying out the scheme for which it was created, such acquisition must be made only in the manner prescribed by the Act, that is, in accordance with the land‑acquisition provisions that are incorporated in the Act by reference. The Court noted that in the present matter the notifications issued by the Government under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring the land in question for the trust’s purposes did not fall within the exemption. Consequently those notifications were declared void. The Court affirmed that the High Court was correct in setting aside those notifications under article 226 of the Constitution. The appeals were therefore dismissed with costs. By the Court: In line with the majority view, the appeals were allowed and the matter was remitted to the High Court. The costs were ordered to follow the event, and a single hearing fee was payable in this Court.