Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs Sampati Subba Rao

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 233 of 1960

Decision Date: 17 April, 1962

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, S.K. Das, J.C. Shah

In this matter, the petitioner Nedunuri Kameswaramma filed a suit for ejectment against the respondent Sampati Subba Rao, seeking to remove him from approximately 480 acres of land described as “jeroyti” and to recover mesne profits. The suit was based on a lease, referred to as a kadapa, that the respondent had executed in 1951, which stipulated the payment of an annual rent and the obligation to vacate the land peacefully at the termination of the tenancy. The petitioner’s records showed that similar kadapas had been executed in earlier years. The respondent denied that the land was jeroyti land and contended that it formed part of a dharmila inam grant made to his ancestors more than a century earlier, with regular rent payments (muhilakas) being made each year. He claimed the right of kudiwaram for himself and asserted that the petitioner possessed only melwaram rights, which he said had been transferred to the Government following the enactment of the Estate Abolition Act. The petitioner did not seek the court’s permission to file a rejoinder to the respondent’s pleadings, and the trial proceeded without any formal issue being raised concerning the dharmila inam status of the land.

The trial court determined that the land had originally been a karnikam service inam, which the zamindar had resumed in 1925 and subsequently re‑granted as jeroyti land. On appeal, the respondent argued that he had been prejudiced because the lower courts had rendered their decision without any pleadings or issues addressing whether the land was a karnikam service inam. The first appellate court ruled against the respondent, whereas the High Court dismissed the suit on the concise ground that the lower courts had decided on a matter that had not been pleaded or raised as an issue, and it further held that the land was indeed a karnikam service inam. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The principal questions before the Supreme Court were: (a) whether the suit should be dismissed because the appellant had failed to raise a proper plea in answer to the written statement, and (b) whether the conclusion that the land was not a karnikam service inam was appropriate given the facts of the case. The Court observed that both parties proceeded to trial fully aware of each other’s cases and presented all evidence not only to support their own contentions but also to refute those of the opposite side; consequently, the absence of a formally raised issue could not be deemed fatal to the proceedings or amount to a mistrial that would invalidate the judgment.

The Court observed that when each party presented its evidence principally to support its own case and simultaneously to counter the arguments of the opposite side, the mere failure to raise a particular issue could not be said to render the trial void or to constitute a mistrial that would invalidate the proceedings. Consequently, the case could not be dismissed on the narrow ground that an issue was not expressly pleaded. The Court then turned to the statutory framework governing Karnam service lands. After the enactment of Madras Act II of 1894, the remuneration of Karnamas was required to be made in cash, and section 17 of that Act authorised the conversion of lands that had been granted on favourable terms to Karnamas into fully enfranchised holdings. Under that provision, such lands might have been allotted either by the State or by a private proprietor in consideration for village service. The essential purpose of section 17 was that lands given as remuneration to Karnamas would revert to the State if the original grant had come from the State, and would revert to the proprietor if the grant had originated from a private proprietor. Moreover, the second proviso to section 17 was not confined solely to artisans or private village servants; it expressly embraced other categories of village servants, including Karnamas and similar personnel.

The Court held that between the years 1903 and 1925 the land in dispute was treated as a Karnam‑service inam that was liable to be resumed by the Zamindar. All subsequent documents referred to the land as “jeroyti” land, and on the date of its resumption the land was nevertheless regarded as being held under a Karnam‑service inam. After that resumption, the land was subsequently granted as jeroyti land. The Court further clarified that the interpretation of documents produced by the parties for the purpose of establishing a factual question does not raise a question of law, unless it can be demonstrated that the material evidence contained in those documents was misapprehended by the trial court. Finally, the Court stated that any concession made by counsel, whether due to a mistake or ignorance of the law, does not bind the client on the point of law concerned.

The appeal, bearing Civil Appeal No. 233 of 1960, was taken by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 4 September 1958 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 633 of 1955. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondent were instructed, and the judgment was delivered on 17 April 1962 by Justice Hidayatullah. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned an appeal against the High Court’s order dismissing a suit brought by the appellant. The suit sought the ejectment of the respondent from 4.80 acres of jeroyti land described as R.S. No. 186/1‑2 situated in Nedunuru Village, together with an award of mesne profits. The plaintiff’s claim was founded on a kadapa executed by the respondent, wherein the respondent promised to pay an annual rent of fifty‑eight bags of paddy and a sum of Rs. 38 as thirwa and cesses, while the plaintiff agreed to pay the applicable jeroyti tax.

In the suit the appellant had agreed to pay the tax; the respondent had also agreed to vacate the land peacefully at the end of the tenancy year, as evidenced by the kadapa recorded in Exhibit A‑1 dated 4 April 1951. In addition, yearly kadavas executed in earlier years, including one from 1948, were produced as part of the record. Nevertheless, the respondent raised numerous pleas. He denied that the subject land was a jeroyti (revenue) land and asserted that it formed part of a Dharmila inam identified by revenue survey number 186/1‑2. He claimed that the inam had been granted to the appellant’s predecessors more than a hundred years earlier and that the respondent’s ancestors had been the original ryots of that land from the beginning, although they had been required to hand over yearly muchalikas under pressure and ignorance, and those transfers had been effected by the respondent and his predecessors. The respondent further claimed personal kudiwaram rights and maintained that the appellant possessed only melwaram rights, which she had lost because those rights had vested in the Government after the enactment of the Estates Abolition Act. Accordingly, the respondent contended that the appellant was now entitled only to compensation, that she possessed no kudiwaram right, and that she lacked any basis to bring the present ejectment suit. The respondent also alleged that the appellant’s husband, who had held the position of karnam, had entered the suit land in the Adangal accounts as a Dharmila inam. The appellant did not obtain permission from the Court to file a rejoinder to these pleas, and the trial record therefore treated her silence as a denial of the respondent’s contentions. It appears that during the trial the appellant’s position was that the land was not a Sarvadumbala inam but a karnikam service inam, that is, an inam granted in lieu of wages for village service, which had been resumed by the Zamindar of Pithapuram. The Zamindar subsequently issued a jeroyti patta, recorded as Exhibit A‑5, on 1 September 1925 in favour of Vakkalanka Venkata Subbarayudu, the appellant’s predecessor. The District Munsif of Amalapuram therefore had to determine whether the suit land had been a Dumbala Dharmila inam prior to 1925 and had remained so until the Estates Abolition Act took effect, or whether it was a Karnikam service inam granted by the Zamindar, resumed in 1925 and re‑granted to Venkata Subbarayudu. If the land were a Dharmila Dumbala inam, the appellant would have possessed only melwaram rights, which would have been lost under the Estates Abolition Act, making the respondent a ryot. Conversely, if the land were a Karnikam service inam, the 1925 resumption by the Zamindar would be valid, the re‑grant would render Venkata Subbarayudu a tenant and the respondent a sub‑tenant subject to ejectment under the terms of the kadapa he had executed. Unfortunately, because the pleas regarding the Dharmila inam were raised only in the written statement and were not contested by the appellant, the issue that was formally framed before the court was limited to the question of whether the land was a Dharmila inam and, if not, whether the ejectment suit was maintainable, leaving the question of a Karnikam service inam unframed.

The Court observed that the only question formally framed before the trial was whether the suit land constituted a Dharmila inam and, if it was not, whether the ejectment suit could be maintained; the matters concerning whether the land was a Karnikam service inam, whether there had been a valid resumption, and whether a valid re‑grant had occurred were not included in the framed issues. Nevertheless, before the District Munsif at Amalapuram, both parties presented evidence relating to those unframed questions as though they formed part of the dispute, and the trial was reopened on two occasions to permit the respondent to adduce additional evidence. Even after these reopenings, no step was taken to seek a modification of the issues or to make the proper pleadings on the unframed points.

After the District Munsif rendered a decree in the suit, the respondent appealed to the Subordinate Judge, also at Amalapuram, contending that he had been prejudiced because the decree was based on a point – namely the existence of a Karnikam service inam – that had never been pleaded or raised as an issue. The Subordinate Judge held that the absence of a specific issue on the Karnikam service inam did not prejudice the respondent, because the respondent himself had advanced a case asserting that the land was a Dharmila inam and had also addressed the possibility of a Karnikam service inam by filing relevant documents and leading evidence to refute the opposing claim. Accordingly, the Subordinate Judge affirmed the District Munsif’s finding that the land was a Karnikam service inam and confirmed the decree.

On a further appeal, a single Judge of the High Court dismissed the suit on the concise ground that the lower courts had decided a matter that was neither pleaded nor framed as an issue. Although he proceeded to examine whether the land was a Sarvadumbala Dharmila inam or a Karnikam service inam, he concluded that the two lower courts were incorrect in holding it to be a Karnikam service inam. Consequently, he allowed the appeal and ordered the dismissal of the suit.

The present special leave appeal raised only two questions: first, whether the suit should be dismissed for the lack of proper pleadings by the appellant in answer to the written statement; and second, whether the finding that the land was not a Karnikam service inam is proper in the circumstances of the case. Concerning the first question, the Court found no basis for dismissal because the facts of the case clearly indicated a remand. The appellant had pleaded that the land was “jeroyti” land, supported by a patta in favour of her ancestors, and had based the suit on a kadapa that demonstrated a sub‑tenancy. The respondent, on the other hand, pleaded that the land was a Dharmila inam and not “jeroyti” land, asserted that he possessed the kudiwaram rights inherited from his predecessors for over a hundred years, and claimed the status of an occupancy tenant. Although the appellant had not expressly mentioned a Karnikam service inam, the parties had nonetheless contested each other’s alternative claims throughout the trial.

The parties were fully aware that the dispute centered on two contrasting types of land grants: a Dharmila Sarvadumbala inam on the one side and a Karnikam service inam on the other. The evidence presented during the trial clearly demonstrated that the respondent endeavoured to establish that the land in question was a Dharmila inam and, at the same time, to disprove the claim that it constituted a Karnikam service inam. Although the trial court did not formally frame an issue, and the sole issue that was framed could have been articulated in a more detailed manner, the Court observed that both parties proceeded to trial with a complete understanding of the opposing case. They each produced all the evidence necessary to support their own positions and to counter the arguments of the opposite side. Consequently, the lack of a formally framed issue cannot be said to have rendered the trial invalid or to have fatally compromised the proceedings. In this regard, the Court was of the opinion that the suit should not be dismissed on the narrow ground of an alleged procedural defect, and that there was no requirement to remit the matter for a fresh trial, because the record already contained sufficient evidence to enable a proper determination. Neither the appellant nor the respondent claimed before the Court that any additional evidence remained to be offered, and the matter therefore moved to the consideration of the principal question that had already been extensively referenced.

The appellant called four witnesses, while the respondent examined seven witnesses in support of their respective claims. The High Court as well as the two subordinate courts had placed no reliance on the oral testimony, rendering it unnecessary for the present Court to revisit the substance of those witness statements, except where the testimony served merely to authenticate documentary evidence. Accordingly, the decision in this case rested entirely upon the documents produced by the parties to substantiate their respective contentions. These documents fell into two distinct categories: those that described the land as a Dharmila inam, and those that characterized it as a Karnikam service inam. Some of the submitted documents appeared to have been inadequately proved, and a considerable number of other documents filed in the proceedings were difficult to connect with the specific parcel of land that was the subject of the dispute; such documents were to be excluded from consideration. The most significant document was the jeroyti patta (Exhibit A‑5), issued by the Zamindar of Pithapuram on 1 September 1925. This document was crucial because, if the land had been held under a Karnikam service grant from the Zamindar, it was acknowledged that the Zamindar possessed the authority to resume the land and to re‑grant it under a new jeroyti patta. The respondent’s strategy, which had succeeded before the High Court but had been rejected by the two lower courts, was to demonstrate that the land was a Sarvadumbala inam, a category of grant that the Zamindar could neither resume nor re‑grant. The learned single Judge of the High Court treated the finding that, prior to 1925, the land existed as a Karnikam service inam as a legal finding open to review on second appeal. After a meticulous examination of the documents filed by the parties, the Court proceeded to assess the merits of the arguments based on those documents.

In this case the Court first reviewed the findings of the learned single Judge and concluded that the alleged Dharmia Karnikam service inam did not exist. The Court further held that the Zamindar possessed no authority to resume the land under the second proviso of section 17 of the Madras Proprietary Estates’ Village Service Act, 1894 (Act 11 of 1894), and likewise had no power to re‑grant the land by means of a jeroyti patta. At the outset of the appeal the petitioner argued that the single Judge had in effect reversed a factual finding, an action that would be barred by section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court observed that a construction of documents, unless those documents constitute documents of title, is a question of fact and does not ordinarily raise a legal issue, except where the material evidence contained therein has been misapprehended by the trial court. The Court noted that the documents examined in the present dispute, which had been the subject of three separate judicial considerations, comprised the Land Registers, the Amarkam and Bhooband accounts, the Adangal Registers, and certain records derived from the Zamindari archives. None of these materials could properly be described as documents of title, irrespective of whatever evidentiary value they might possess. Nevertheless the Court expressed that it did not wish to base its decision solely on this narrow categorisation, even if it were correct, because the legal inference drawn from the established facts might still present a question of law. Before undertaking its own examination of the documentary record, the Court said it needed to ascertain precisely what point the evidence had been held to establish. The term “Dharmila” was explained as not being a technical term of law but rather a convenient expression used to distinguish inams created after the settlement from those created before it. Under section 11 of the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Act 26 of 1948), every ryot in an estate shall, from the date of notification, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of all ryoti lands. That Act abolishes all rights and interests in an estate belonging to any landholder, and the expression “estate” is interpreted to include an inam estate within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act. A further consequence of the notification is the extinguishment of the relationship between the former landholder and the ryot as of the notified date. In order to avoid the effects of the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, both parties invoked section 11: the appellant claimed an occupancy right based on the patta read together with the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended in 1936, while the respondent contended that the appellant and her predecessors possessed an inam estate limited to meluwaram rights, rights that were extinguished by the Act. Accordingly, the decisive issue was whether the appellant held a genuine inam estate or was merely a pattadar – that is, an occupancy tenant now eligible to become a ryot – and whether the respondent was consequently only a sub‑tenant.

From this perspective the Court indicated that any documentary evidence presented in the proceedings must be examined in light of the statutory framework governing the rights and obligations of landholders. Accordingly, before assessing the relevance of the documents, the Court turned to the provisions of three principal statutes, reasoning that those provisions would provide the necessary foundation for its findings. The first statute was the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1802, also cited as Madras Regulation 25 of 1802. This Regulation was enacted to establish a permanent, moderate assessment of public revenue that could not be increased under any circumstances, thereby safeguarding the proprietary right of the soil for the owners of the land. Under the Settlement, the authorities were required to deliver instruments specifying the revenue demand to the proprietors, and the proprietors, in turn, were required to execute a Kabuli as acknowledgment of the assessment. The Regulation further provided that when a portion of a Zamindari estate was transferred, either by invitation or through private negotiation, the revenue assessment on the detached portion would correspond proportionally to its actual market value, just as the total permanent jama on the entire Zamindari corresponded to the total value of the whole estate. Zamindars were consequently obligated to present accurate accounts to support this proportional assessment. Section II of the same Regulation imposed a duty on Zamindars or landholders to maintain the regular and duly appointed number of karnams in each of the villages within their respective estates; these karnams were to obey all legal orders and could be removed only by a decree of a Court of Judicature. In parallel, the Madras Karnams Regulation of 1802, identified as Madras Regulation 29 of 1802, was enacted to ensure an efficient establishment of the karnam office so that authentic information and accounts could be obtained. This Regulation stipulated that a karnam should be appointed for each village where the revenue exceeded four hundred pagodas, while in villages with lower revenue a single karnam could be appointed for two or more villages. The office of karnam was deemed hereditary, except where the successor was proven incapable. Lists of the appointed karnams and the villages assigned to each were required to be filed with the Collectorate. The Regulation also laid out detailed duties for the karnams, mandating the maintenance of precise accounts and registers, and required the karnams to swear to the accuracy of those records. The third statute addressed by the Court was the Madras Proprietary Estates’ Village Services Act of 1894, cited as Act 11 of 1894. This Act was introduced to improve the provisions governing the appointment and remuneration of karnams and related village officers. It extended its application to various categories of village officers, irrespective of the local titles by which they were known, specifically including Village Accountants, Head Villages, and village watchmen or police officers. The Act provided that upon its extension, or the extension of any part of it, to the office of a village accountant in any estate, Section 11 of Regulation 29 of 1802 and Madras Regulation 99 of 1892 would cease to be operative. Within the Act, the term “Estate” was defined broadly to encompass any permanently settled estate, any separately registered portion of such an estate, any inam village, or any portion consisting of one or more villages of the estates previously described, provided they were held on permanent undertenure. The term “Village‑office” was defined to refer to, with respect to any such estate, an office within that estate that fell under the extension of the Act or any of its parts.

In the context of an estate, an offence committed in that estate to which the Act or any portion of it was extended was defined, and the term “Village‑officer” was explained as a person who held or performed the duties of such an office. Chapter III of the Act then set out the rules for imposing a village‑service cess, determining its amount by apportionment, and describing the method and incidents of its levy. The purpose of this cess was to generate funds for the payment of remuneration to village servants, who before the enactment of the Act were often paid by the grant of lands. Section 17 of the Act provided that if the remuneration of a village office consisted, wholly or partly, of lands or of assignments of revenue payable in respect of lands that were granted, continued, or annexed to such village office by the State, the State Government could enfranchise those lands from the condition of service by imposing a quit‑rent in accordance with the rules then in force for the enfranchisement of village‑service inams in villages not permanently settled, or by any rules that the State Government might prescribe for that purpose. The enactment of such enfranchisement would take effect from a date notified by the State Government. The provision further stipulated that the enfranchisement would apply to all such lands or assignments even if, at the time the Act came into force, they were not being used for the purpose for which they were originally granted. It also provided that any lands or emoluments derived from lands that had been granted by a proprietor for the remuneration of village service and that were still held or enjoyed could be resumed by the grantor or the grantor’s representative.

The section therefore dealt with the enfranchisement of two categories of lands: (a) lands granted by the State to be enfranchised by the State, and (b) lands granted by the proprietor to be enfranchised by the proprietor. Earlier, when fixing the peishkush of a Zamindar, due regard was given to the expenses of the office of a karnam, and such expenses were excluded from the assets of the Zamindari; an adjustment of the peishkush was allowed by the Act. Consequently, after the passage of Act II of 1894, karnams were to be paid in cash, and the Act enabled the enfranchisement of lands that had been granted on favourable terms to the karnams. Lands granted by the State were to be enfranchised by the State, while lands granted by the Zamindar were to be enfranchised by the Zamindar. The learned single Judge held that lands granted or held as remuneration for the performance of a village office such as that of a karnam could be enfranchised only by the State Government and not by the Zamindar, who had no authority over such lands. Accordingly, the Zamindar’s action in 1925 to resume the lands and to re‑grant them by a jeroyti patta was said to be entirely without jurisdiction, and it was held that

In this matter, the Court observed that if the lands in dispute were originally Dharmila inams, they could not be resumed by the Zamindar nor could they be re‑granted, and the learned Judge additionally held that a karnam service inam did not exist. The Court then turned to section 17 of Act II of 1894, noting that the language of that provision plainly states that lands may be granted for village service either by the State or by the proprietor. The title of the Act, “Proprietary Estates’ Village Service,” and the use of the expression “village service” in the second proviso to section 17, led the Court to conclude that a sharp distinction between village officers and village servants, as drawn in the Madras Hereditary Village‑Offices Act, 1895 (III of 1895), could not be applied here. The Court further expressed the view that the second proviso was not restricted solely to lands given by proprietors to village artisans or servants such as astrologers and purohits. Even the Hereditary Village Offices Act employs the word “office” in its title and in reference to artisans and village servants, reinforcing the broader scope. Consequently, the essence of section 17 was that lands granted as remuneration for karnams were to be resumed by the State when the grant originated from the State, and by the proprietor when the grant came from the proprietor. The Court noted that the specific land involved in the present dispute had never been shown to have been granted by the State; therefore, resumption by the State under section 17 was impossible. The remaining issue, the Court said, was whether the land was a Dharmila inam—meaning a personal service inam granted after the settlement—or a grant for Karnikam service. The Court accepted that the proceedings sufficiently proved that the land was held as a Karnikam service inam at the time of resumption. However, the Court emphasized that the question of whether it truly constituted a Karnikam service inam required consideration of evidence, and that oral evidence had not been examined; consequently the Court could rely only on the documentary material presented by the parties. Among the documents, the Court held that exhibits B‑37 to B‑43, which comprise the Dharmila inam accounts of Neduru village for fasli 1290 relating to Palivela Thana, could not be taken into account because they could not be connected with the suit land. Likewise, the series of exhibit A‑17, consisting of assessment receipts showing tax payments to the Pithapuram Estate after exhibit A‑5, added no weight to the matter as they pertained to different lands and did not resolve the issue. The Court further observed that exhibits A‑8 to A‑11, A‑14 and A‑15, which are earlier Kadapas executed in favour of the appellant and are similar to exhibit A‑1 on which the suit was based, were irrelevant to the controversy except to the extent that the respondent admitted to taking those lands on a yearly lease. Finally, the Court considered exhibits B‑4 to B‑12, which are assessment receipts from the jeroyti ryots; although these receipts did not mention the suit land, they did record the name of Vakkalanka Venkatasubbarayadu and demonstrated that he paid jeroyti tax to the Estate from 1888 to 1901, a period that coincides with the timeframe covered by the undisclosed receipts. The Court concluded that these documents did not assist the appellant because the identity of the lands remained unclear.

The Court observed that the tax receipts could not be said to assist the appellant because the precise identity of the lands involved remained uncertain. It further noted that the remaining documents alternately described the land as a Dharmila inam and as land held for Karnikam service. The Court explained that the documents relied upon by the appellant fall into two categories: those produced after the issuance of the jeroyti patta, namely Exhibit A‑5 dated 1 September 1925 and documents connected with that grant, and those produced that pre‑date the grant of the patta. Exhibit B‑1, dated 1903, is a certified extract from the land register of Nedunuru village concerning the suit land and unmistakably records that the land was a Dharmila inam held for Karnikam service. Exhibits B‑14 and B‑15, both dated 15 June 1903, convey the same description. The first of these is a certified extract of a statement made by Vakkalanka Venkatasubbarayudu before the Deputy Inam Collector, in which the land is termed “Paikars Mirasi in Karnam Service”; the second likewise refers to the land as a service inam. The Court held that these documents do not support the respondents’ contentions, even though Venkatasubbarayudu appeared to have objected at that time. In Exhibit B‑18, another entry from the land registers, the land is again shown as a Dharmila inam for service as Karnikam. Exhibit A‑2 of 1920‑21, a statement of Dharmila inams and services issued by the Pithapuram Estate, records the inam as “for service” and contains a note stating, “There is no need to continue this Inam free of service. This should be resumed and assessed, if no agreement is given. Continue as long as the service is rendered properly. (Signed)… for Raja.” Beneath this note, an additional endorsement reads, “Immediate steps should be taken to resume his Inam and assess, as they are being paid money.” The Court interpreted these passages as indicating that by 1910‑21 a change in law required monetary payment for Karnikam service and that the Zamindar was therefore directed to resume the lands under section I of Act 11 of 1894. Further, Exhibits A‑3 and A‑4, dated 1923 and 1924 respectively, show that the Dewan again ordered the resumption of these lands; the latter exhibit records that a notice was to be sent through a vakil. This notice was apparently issued in October 1924, and a reply from Vakkalanka Venkatasubbarayudu was filed as Exhibit B‑34, wherein he asserted that the lands were not Dharmila Karnikam service inam. Although the respondent sought to use this statement as an admission against the appellant, the Court concluded that Venkatasubbarayudu made the declaration merely to avert the resumption of the lands, a position contrary to the facts already established. The Court further noted that the Pithapuram Estate disregarded that statement and obtained a further declaration from Venkatasubbarayudu on 1 September 1925 (Exhibit B‑35) in which he expressed willingness to accept a jeroyti patta, while reserving the right to pursue any future legal claim without prejudice.

Venkatasubbarayudu never instituted any suit against the estate and he took the jeroyti patta that was issued to him in 1925, as shown in Exhibit A‑5. Apart from this patta, the appellant placed before the tribunal Exhibit A‑12, a document dated 1904 that is an extract from the Survey and Settlement Register. That extract records the land in question as being held for karnam service. The appellant also cited Exhibit B‑25, although that document does not pertain to the land that is the subject of the present dispute. From these papers it follows that, beginning in 1903 and continuing through 1925, the land was treated by the authorities as a karnam‑service inam, a status that made it liable to be resumed by the Zamindar. Subsequent records confirm that the Zamindar did indeed resume the land, that a jeroyti patta was issued thereafter, and that all later documents describe the property as jeroyti land. The respondent, on the other hand, relied on a series of accounts that had been summoned from the Estate. Exhibits B‑28 to B‑30 are Bhooband accounts for the years 1814, 1850 and 1851; they refer to parcels described as “dumbala inams” in the Chalapalli Nedunuru group. Those accounts cannot be linked to the land that is the subject of this suit, and no legal inference may be drawn from them.

Exhibit B‑36, dated 1906, is a Jhadta entry for fasli year 1316. The entry mentions the suit land and contains the note “Entered as kardam service inam but not correct. It is a Dharmila inam.” No evidence was offered to explain why this annotation was made, who authored it, or when it was recorded. Moreover, the entry is contradicted by the Zamindar’s actions between 1921 and 1925, when the land was resumed on the basis that it was a karnam‑service inam; such a resumption would not have taken place if the parcel had truly been a Dharmila inam. The District Munsif held that the endorsement in the Jhadta account had not been proved, and the petitioner was unable to testify to the truth of that notation. Consequently, the endorsement must be treated as inconclusive. Exhibit B‑42, a Dharmila Inam Statement of 1892 for Nedunuru Palivela Thana, records that Palivela inams were granted for ferry service. It contains an entry under the heading “Shrotri or service” bearing Vakkalanka Venkatasubbarayudu’s name, labelled “Dharmila Inam,” but it fails to specify the extent of the land or its survey numbers, and thus does not establish a connection with the suit land. A further note on the same document states that the date, grantor, and purpose of the inams are unknown and that no supporting documents are available, rendering the statement ineffective for resolving the dispute. Exhibit B‑2, an Adangal Register for fasli year 1333, lists the land as a Dharmila inam and is said to have been compiled by the appellant’s ancestor, who served as the karnam. The fact that the recorder himself held the karnam position lends considerable weight to the appellant’s case, although the entry was made in a register whose accuracy may be questionable. Overall, the evidentiary material presented by the respondent fails to establish that the land was a Dharmila inam, whereas the documents produced by the appellant demonstrate that the parcel was consistently treated as a karnam‑service inam and was lawfully resumed by the Zamindar under that classification.

In examining the register on which the entry was recorded, the Court observed that the register might not have been kept with exact accuracy; therefore, no inference could be drawn that the entry was made against the informant’s own interest. The Court further noted that the parties claiming the right at that time asserted that they possessed a Dharmila inam in order to prevent its resumption, and it was possible that the entry in the register was produced merely to bolster that claim. The Court regarded Ex‑B‑26 of 1920 as another documentary account that could have been prepared for the same purpose, namely to support the contention of a Dharmila inam. The Court then turned to the last document, Ex‑B‑28, which comprised a list of the Dumbala inams in the Zamindari; because the list did not contain any specific land numbers, the Court found that there was nothing in that document that could connect the list with the particular land that was the subject of the suit. From this analysis, the Court concluded that the documents relied upon by the appellant sufficiently demonstrated that the land in question was a Karnikam service inam, and that the Zamindar’s act of resuming the land as a Karnikam service inam carried a presumption of correctness which, in turn, firmly established the appellant’s case. The Court held that the concession made by counsel in the trial Court, which identified the land as a Dharmila inam, could not be given any weight because it was a concession on a point of law that was subsequently withdrawn. The Court considered that the concession appeared to stem from a mistake or perhaps ignorance, and therefore it was not binding on the client. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that the judgments of both lower Courts, which had jointly held the land to be Jeroyti land after the resumption of the Karnikam service inam, were correct in the circumstances, and that the High Court was not justified in overturning those decisions. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the order of the High Court was set aside, and the judgment of the lower Court was restored, with costs awarded throughout. The appeal was thus allowed.