Narain Singh vs State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1959

Decision Date: 21 August, 1962

Coram: Shah

In this matter, the petitioner Narain Singh challenged a conviction imposed by the Punjab High Court. The case was decided by a Bench of the Supreme Court on 21 August 1962. The appellant and three other persons were charged with the murder of a man identified as B. According to the prosecution, a dispute arose between B and the accused concerning the diversion of water flow in agricultural fields. The prosecution alleged that the appellant was armed with a stick while the others were armed with a spear, a kaholi and a salang, and that they assaulted B, causing injuries from which B died. In his statement made under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), the appellant claimed that B had thrown him to the ground and had attempted to strangle him. The appellant asserted that he drew his kirpan and struck B in self‑defence. The Sessions Judge found the prosecution evidence unconvincing and acquitted the three other accused persons. However, the Judge convicted the appellant under section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, relying only on the portion of the appellant’s statement in which he admitted striking blows, while disregarding the part in which he alleged that B attempted to strangle him. The Judge concluded that the appellant’s only apprehension could have been of simple hurt, which did not justify causing B’s death. On appeal, the Punjab High Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the conviction under section 304 Part II could stand.

The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not be sustained because the lower courts had based their decision on a selective reading of the appellant’s statement. The Court observed that it is not permissible for a court to dissect a statement and consider only the incriminating portion while ignoring the exculpatory part that is not supported by other evidence. When an accused confesses to the commission of the offence, the confession may form the basis of conviction; however, where the accused offers his own version and claims innocence, the entire statement must be taken into account. Considering the appellant’s statement in its entirety, the Court found that he had a genuine apprehension that B was attempting to strangle him, which gave him a right of self‑defence extending even to causing the death of the assailant. Consequently, the Supreme Court ordered that the conviction under section 304 Part II be set aside and that the sentence imposed on the appellant be vacated. The appeal was instituted by special leave under Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1959, and the parties were represented by counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondent.

Justice Shah delivered the judgment of the Court. After the arguments in this appeal were completed, the Court ordered that the appellant Narain Singh be acquitted of the offence under section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, an offence for which he had been convicted, and that the sentence imposed on him be set aside. The Court then set out the reasons supporting that order. The factual background was that Narain Singh and his three nephews, Mehar Singh, Mewa Singh and Pakhar Singh, had been tried before the Court of Session at Ludhiana for offences punishable under section 302 in conjunction with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge alleged that on 31 October 1958, acting with a common intention, they caused the death of a man named Bachan Singh by inflicting a murderous assault upon him. According to the prosecution, on the evening of that date the four men were irrigating their field when Bachan Singh diverted the water flow into his own field. The diversion allegedly enraged Narain Singh and his nephews, leading to a quarrel between the parties. The prosecution asserted that the four men then attacked Bachan Singh with a kaholi, inflicting serious injuries. Specific allegations regarding the weapons used were that Mehar Singh was armed with a spear, Pakhar Singh with a kaholi, Mewa Singh with a salang and Narain Singh with a stick. A complaint regarding the assault was lodged, and Bachan Singh was taken to the Civil Hospital in Ludhiana. The investigating Sub‑Inspector recorded a statement of Bachan Singh, and a First Class Magistrate recorded his declaration on the evening of 2 November 1958. Bachan Singh died on 3 November 1958, after which Narain Singh and his nephews were prosecuted before the Ludhiana Court of Session for the offence of murder. At trial Narain Singh pleaded that he had acted in exercise of the right of self‑defence, contending that he had caused injuries to Bachan Singh because the latter had thrown him down and attempted to strangle him. The statement recorded in the Court of Session, on which his conviction was based, read in part as follows: “The correct facts are that when I objected to the deceased cutting the nakka he caught hold of me and threw me on the ground. I was alone at the time. The other three co‑accused were not with me. After I had fallen on the ground the deceased attempted to strangulate me. I was then wearing small kirpan. I unsheathed it and used it in self defence causing a couple of injuries to the deceased. On the alarm raised by me, Mehar Singh, my co‑accused, who was coming from the khal nearby, came to the spot and rescued me. He was armless and did not cause any injury to the deceased. I did not carry any stick but was wearing a small kirpan as usual.” The other two nephews, Pakhar Singh and Mewa Singh, denied being present at the scene of the offence.

Mehar Singh asserted that he was actually present at the location where the incident occurred and that he made an effort to intervene in the altercation by trying to separate Bachan Singh from Narain Singh. Both Narain Singh and Mehar Singh relied upon the fact that each of them sustained injuries to their bodies, injuries that were observed and documented during subsequent medical examinations. The medical report showed that Narain Singh had suffered six contused injuries, while Mehar Singh (also referred to as Mehr Singh) had one incised wound together with four abraded contusions. During the proceedings before the Court of Session, the prosecution’s witness Jagir Singh altered significant portions of the narrative he had originally given in his complaint filed at the police station. The individual identified as Kaka, whom the prosecution alleged to be an eyewitness, failed to provide testimony that supported the prosecution’s version of events. Another person named Hakku, who was listed as a witness, was not directly examined by the prosecutor; instead, his testimony was offered only for the purpose of cross‑examination. A witness referred to as Johri, whose name had not appeared in the original police complaint, was nonetheless examined by the prosecutor. Two statements made by the deceased Bachan Singh were presented as evidence, both being treated as dying declarations because they were recorded shortly before his death; one of these statements was taken by the investigating officer, and the other was recorded by the First Class Magistrate in Ludhiana. The Sessions Judge concluded that the testimony offered by Jagir Singh could not be trusted, and further held that Johri was incapable of having witnessed the alleged assault. In the judge’s assessment, the two dying declarations were also unreliable because, before making those statements, Bachan Singh had sufficient opportunity to become aware of the progress of the investigation, had consulted with Jagir Singh, and had the chance to discuss the prospective case against the accused. Moreover, the narratives contained in the dying declarations failed to provide any explanation for the injuries that Narain Singh and Mehar Singh claimed to have received. The medical evidence presented in the trial also did not assist the prosecution’s case. According to the medical report, Bachan Singh sustained four incised injuries: three of them were situated on his cheek and the remaining one was located on the left side of his ring finger. The judge observed that none of these wounds could have been inflicted by a salang or a kaholi; rather, the nature of the incised injuries suggested that they could have been caused by a spear or by a kirpan. Consequently, the Sessions Judge held that the oral testimony and all other evidence were insufficient to support a conviction for murder against the three individuals identified as the nephews of Narain Singh. However, relying on the statement given by Narain Singh, the judge found that the injuries inflicted on Bachan Singh were caused by Narain Singh himself. He noted that the injury marks on Narain Singh’s body seemed to support the suggestion that Bachan Singh had taken a strong grip on him with an intention to strangle him. Nevertheless, the judge concluded that there was not even the slightest evidence on the record to prove that Bachan Singh had actually attempted to strangle Narain Singh. In the view of the Sessions Judge, because there were no injuries, however minor, on Narain Singh’s throat, and because he had not lodged any complaint with the medical officer who examined him shortly after the incident, it was apparent that Narain Singh could not have been apprehending death or griev

In the trial before the Sessions Judge, it was observed that the injury inflicted on Narain Singh amounted only to simple hurt and therefore did not give him any justification for taking the life of Bachan Singh. Consequently, the Judge held that Narain Singh was lawfully entitled to resist Bachan Singh in the exercise of his personal right of defence, but that he was not lawfully entitled to employ the kirpan in such a manner and with such force as to cause Bachan Singh’s death by piercing one of his lungs. On that basis, the Sessions Judge acquitted Mewa Singh, Mehar Singh and Pakhar Singh of the charges framed against them and convicted Narain Singh of an offence punishable under section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The Judge sentenced Narain Singh to rigorous imprisonment for five years.

Narain Singh appealed the conviction and the sentence to the High Court of Punjab. The High Court concurred with the Sessions Judge that the prosecution had failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the case against him, and it also affirmed that the Sessions Judge was correctly justified in relying upon the statement made by Narain Singh under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court held that Narain Singh had exceeded the right of self‑defence by causing Bachan Singh’s death through stabbing with a kirpan, an act constituting an offence punishable under section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. However, the High Court reduced the term of rigorous imprisonment from five years to three years and, subject to that modification, dismissed the appeal against both the conviction and the sentence.

With special leave, Narain Singh further appealed to this Court. The prosecution contended that Narain Singh had taken part in an assault on Bachan Singh while armed with a stick. Nevertheless, both the Court of Session and the High Court had rejected the witness evidence relating to that alleged assault. Both courts concluded that the injuries sustained by Bachan Singh were caused by Narain Singh striking him with a kirpan, and that the three nephews of Narain Singh had not participated in the assault. In finding Narain Singh guilty of the offence under section 304 Part II for causing the injuries to Bachan Singh with a kirpan, the two lower courts had relied solely on the statement made by Narain Singh in his defence, rather than on the prosecution’s case. Under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the first subsection provides that, insofar as it is material, the Court may, at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the prosecution witnesses have been examined but before the accused is called upon for his defence, put questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to

The Court explained that the object of examining an accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was to obtain the accused’s own version or explanation, if any, of the incident that formed the subject‑matter of the charge and to hear his defence. Under sub‑section (3) the answers given by the accused may “be taken into consideration” at the enquiry or at trial. Accordingly, if the accused, in his examination under section 342, confessed to having committed the offence with which he was charged, the Court could rely upon that confession and proceed to convict him. However, where the accused did not confess and instead, in response to the circumstances appearing in the evidence, set out his own version and pleaded that he had committed no offence, the Court was required to consider the accused’s statement in its entirety. The Court was not authorised to dissect the statement, extract a portion that might be incriminating, and then test whether the remainder of the explanation was supported by the record. If the accused admitted to having performed an act that would, but for his explanation, constitute an offence, that admission could not be used against him apart from the explanatory context he provided.

The Courts below held that the prosecution evidence, as it stood, was insufficient to substantiate the charge against Narain Singh and his nephews. The prosecution’s case was that Narain Singh was armed with a stick and had joined the assault on Bachan Singh, and it sought to establish this claim by affirmative evidence. That case failed because the evidence offered in support was unreliable. Narain Singh admitted that he had caused injuries to Bachan Singh with a kirpan that he was carrying, but he explained that the injuries occurred when he was thrown down and Bachan Singh was attempting to strangle him. The Court noted that there can be no doubt that when a person reasonably apprehends that his assailant is trying to strangle him, the right of self‑defence may extend even to causing the death of the assailant.

Narain Singh therefore pleaded that he had fallen down and that Bachan Singh had attempted to strangle him, and that the injuries he inflicted on Bachan Singh were inflicted in the exercise of his right of self‑defence. The Court regarded this plea as a composite plea and held that it was not open to the Court to investigate whether Narain Singh could have reasonably apprehended such injury to himself that would justify causing the death of Bachan Singh. The Court further observed that when a person accused of an offence raises a plea that he is protected by one of the general or special exceptions in the Indian Penal Code or any other law defining the offence, the burden of proving that exception lies on the accused. However, that burden may be taken up by the accused only if the prosecution case establishes that, in the absence of such a plea, the accused would be guilty of the offence charged. In the present case, the prosecution case did not, by reliable evidence, establish the elements necessary to sustain a conviction.

The Court observed that the prosecution had failed to establish positively that Narain Singh had performed any act which would make him liable for the offence of murder. Consequently, any responsibility that might attach to him could arise only from the plea that he himself had raised. The Court explained that if the plea advanced by the accused amounted to a confession of guilt, the trial court could rely upon that confession to uphold a conviction. However, where the plea consisted merely of an admission of certain factual circumstances coupled with a claim of justification, the Court could not treat those admitted facts as established truth for the purpose of conviction, particularly when such facts were not part of the prosecution’s case and when the evidential material did not support a justification defence. In light of this principle, the Court concluded that the lower courts had erred in sustaining a conviction against Narain Singh under section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the conviction was set aside.