Mohan Singh vs State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 186 of 1960

Decision Date: 15 March, 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled Mohan Singh versus State of Punjab, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 15 March 1962. The opinion was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and the bench comprised Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K. N. Wanchoo and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner in the appeal was Mohan Singh, while the respondent was the State of Punjab. The decision is reported in the 1963 All India Reporter at page 174, as well as in the 1962 Supreme Court Reporter Supplement (3) at page 848. The case is also cited in several subsequent authorities, including D 1963 SC 1413, R 1972 SC 254, D 1974 SC 323, RF 1975 SC 1917, RF 1976 SC 1084, R 1976 SC 2207, and relates to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifically sections 302, 149 and 34, concerning criminal liability of members of an unlawful assembly, the maintainability of a conviction, the distinction between common object and common intention, and the alteration of a conviction.

The factual backdrop involved five accused persons, including the two appellants, who were tried together for offences under section 302 read with section 149 and also under section 147 of the Indian Penal Code. At trial, three of the accused were found guilty, while two were acquitted. The charge-sheet specifically identified these five individuals as constituting the unlawful assembly, and the evidence presented at trial was confined solely to their participation. The trial court concluded that the two appellants and the other convicted individual who delivered the fatal blow acted with a shared intention to permanently assault the deceased. On appeal, it was contended that the convictions of the two appellants under section 302 in conjunction with section 149 could not be sustained because the acquittal of two of the five alleged members meant that the statutory requirement of an unlawful assembly—defined in section 141 as a gathering of five or more persons—was no longer satisfied, rendering section 149 inoperative. The Supreme Court held that the contention was correct and consequently altered the convictions to section 302 read with section 34, which also imposes constructive liability but is predicated on a common intention rather than a common object. The Court explained that section 149 prescribes vicarious liability for members of an unlawful assembly, which ceases once the assembly fails to meet the minimum number of persons. In assessing the applicability of section 149, the Court referred to earlier decisions, namely Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, Bharwad Mepa Dana v. State of Bombay and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, to illustrate the various categories of cases that arise under this provision. While acknowledging that sections 149 and 34 both address constructive liability, the Court emphasized that the essential element of section 34 is the existence of a common intention, which differs fundamentally from the common object required under section 149. This distinction underpins the Court’s decision to substitute the conviction under section 149 with that under section 34.

The law defines action in concert as conduct that necessarily requires a pre‑arranged plan, a prior meeting of minds, and an element of participation by each person involved. Although the individual acts may differ in character and may vary, they must all be driven by the same common intention. The term common intention is distinct from merely having the same or a similar intention; it implies a coordinated purpose that is shared by the participants. This principle was discussed in Mahabub Shah v. King Emperor, (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 148.

The present appeal is a criminal appeal numbered 186 of 1960, taken on special leave from a judgment and order dated 18 March 1960 of the Punjab High Court in criminal appeal 1040 of 1959. The appeal was filed by the two accused, Mohan Singh and Jagir Singh, who were represented by counsel, while the State was represented by its counsel. The judgment was delivered on 15 March 1962 by Justice Gajendragadkar. The appeal arises from a trial in which Mohan Singh, Jagir Singh and three other persons—Dalip Singh and two individuals named Piara Singh, who were respectively the sons of Ujagar Singh and Bahadur Singh—were charged with offences under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149, as well as Section 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. In addition, Dalip Singh faced a separate charge under Section 302.

The trial was conducted before the Second Additional Sessions Judge at Ferozepore. The trial judge held that the evidence against the two Piara Singhs did not satisfy the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; consequently, they were acquitted on the basis of the benefit of doubt. Dalip Singh was convicted under Sections 302 and 147, and the two appellants, Mohan Singh and Jagir Singh, were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 and also under Section 147. For the principal charge of murder, each of the five accused was sentenced to life imprisonment, and for the lesser offence under Section 147 each received a six‑month term of rigorous imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The three convicted persons—Dalip Singh and the two Piara Singhs—challenged the conviction and sentence before the Punjab High Court. The High Court affirmed the trial judge’s findings and upheld the convictions and sentences. Subsequently, the three convicted persons sought special leave to appeal to this Court. The application for special leave by Dalip Singh was dismissed, whereas the applications by Mohan Singh and Jagir Singh were granted, bringing the two appellants before this Court. On their behalf, counsel argued that the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 in conjunction with Section 149 could not stand because the acquittal of the two Piara Singhs rendered Section 149 inapplicable. Before addressing the merits of that contention, the Court found it necessary to recapitulate the material facts that led to the prosecution of the appellants, beginning with the incident that gave rise to the charges.

The incident under consideration occurred on 9 May 1959 in the village of Malsian. According to the prosecution, on that day five persons named in the charge were members of an unlawful assembly. The prosecution alleged that, in furtherance of the common object of that assembly, the accused engaged in rioting while being armed with deadly weapons. It was further alleged that, in pursuance of the same common object, Gurdip Singh was murdered and that Harnam Singh suffered injuries. These allegations formed the basis of the charge under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The second charge asserted that Dalip Singh, one of the accused, had inflicted a fatal head injury on Gurdip Singh while acting in furtherance of the unlawful assembly’s common object, and therefore every member of the assembly was liable under sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Gurdip Singh. In addition, Dalip Singh was separately charged under section 302 without reference to section 149. The prosecution’s case thereby rested on the claim that Gurdip Singh’s murder was committed in prosecution of the assembly’s common object. For the injuries caused to Harnam Singh, an additional charge under sections 323 and 149 was framed. The appeal before this Court concerned specifically the conviction of the appellants under sections 302 and 149.

The appellants, Mohan Singh and Jagir Singh, were related as uncle and nephew; Jagir Singh was the son of Dalip Singh, who was Mohan Singh’s brother and one of the accused in the present case. A third brother, Tara Singh, had been married to Tej Kaur, the daughter of Gurdip Singh, who was the victim of the assault. Tara Singh had been killed during communal disturbances that followed the Partition of the country in 1947. As a result of those disturbances, the family migrated from their homes in West Pakistan to East Punjab and were eventually allotted land in the village of Malsian. After Tara Singh’s death, Tej Kaur took residence with her father Gurdip Singh in the village of Ghandyala. Because Tej Kaur had left her husband’s village, Dalip Singh and Mohan Singh succeeded in obtaining possession of her share of the land. When the holdings in Malsian were consolidated, Tej Kaur secured a separate parcel of land representing her deceased husband’s interest. Subsequently, Mohan Singh and Dalip Singh entered into possession of that parcel after executing a pattanama in her favour. Having taken possession in this manner, they failed to regularly pay Tej Kaur her share of the produce, leading to arrears. Consequently, Tej Kaur was forced to appoint her father Gurdip Singh as her attorney to recover the arrears of rent and to initiate appropriate legal steps.

Gurdip Singh was appointed by his daughter Tej Kaur as her attorney for the purpose of evicting Mohan Singh and Dalip Singh from her share of land. When the eviction suit was filed, the two appellants paid the arrears that were due, yet Tej Kaur nevertheless obtained a decree of eviction. Mohan Singh and Dalip Singh challenged that decree by filing an appeal; the appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the eviction order. Consequently, Gurdip Singh applied for the execution of the confirmed order, and warrants of possession were issued on his behalf. While acting under those warrants, Gurdip Singh travelled to the village of Behak Grujran to seek the assistance of his cousin Harnam Singh, who consented to accompany him. On 9 May 1959 the two men proceeded to Zira and requested the Patwari and the Girdawar to come to the disputed field and hand over possession of Tej Kaur’s land to Gurdip Singh. The Patwari informed them that the Qanungo was not present in the office and would be available only in the evening. While waiting in the court compound, they were joined by Dara Singh, the brother of Gurdip Singh’s wife, who also agreed to accompany them. Following the Patwari’s suggestion, the three men waited until the evening and then set out together to meet the Qanungo and complete the delivery of possession. The fields in dispute lay roughly a mile beyond the village habitation, and as the party approached the fields they observed Mohan Singh grazing cattle nearby. The Chowkidar who was with the party alerted Mohan Singh that they had arrived to hand over possession to Gurdip Singh. Mohan Singh responded that he was hungry and could not wait, and he left the spot. The Qanungo and the Patwari then formally handed over possession of the land to Gurdip Singh, a delivery that was announced in the village. Because a formal report of the delivery had not yet been prepared, the party returned toward the village. When they were about two furlongs from the village, they saw the appellants and their associates emerging from a grove of khajoor trees, each carrying a lathi. On seeing Gurdip Singh and Harnam Singh, the appellants attempted to flee, but the assailants pursued and surrounded them. Dalip Singh struck Gurdip Singh on the head with a wooden club (dang), and Jagir Singh delivered another blow to Gurdip Singh’s right arm with his dang, causing Gurdip Singh to fall unconscious. The appellants then proceeded to beat Harnam Singh, delivering multiple blows to his body.

After the assault, the assailants fled because they feared the arrival of villagers who might intervene. Gurdip Singh was placed in a bug and taken to the hospital at Zira, where medical assistance was provided but proved ineffective, and he died from his injuries in the early hours of the following morning. Harnam Singh also received medical treatment and subsequently recovered from his wounds. The appellants and their companions were then tried before the learned Additional Sessions Judge at Ferozepore on the charges that had been filed against them. All of the accused denied the accusations presented by the prosecution. The trial judge examined the testimony of the principal eyewitnesses, namely Harnam Singh Phula, the Chowkidar, and Sandhura Singh, the Qanungo, and he also evaluated the medical evidence relating to the victims. After considering the evidence in its entirety, the judge concluded that the testimony proved the charge against the appellants under section 302 read with sections 149 and 147 beyond reasonable doubt. He further held that the charge against Dalip Singh under sections 302 and 147 was also satisfactorily established. Regarding the two individuals named Piara Singh, the judge found that the prosecution had not demonstrated a motive for their participation, that the names recorded in the First Information Report did not conclusively identify them, and that, based on probability, it was highly unlikely that they had joined the assault owing to their alleged remote relationship or friendship with the other accused. Consequently, the judge entertained reasonable doubt regarding their involvement and granted them the benefit of doubt, resulting in their acquittal.

The learned judge also observed that the extensive injuries inflicted on Harnam Singh and Gurdip Singh, contrasted with the complete absence of injuries on the assailants, indicated a highly uneven confrontation, suggesting that more than three or four persons had taken part in the attack. Direct testimony from impartial witnesses further indicated that five assailants were involved, leading the judge to conclude that the offenses of unlawful assembly and rioting were proven, even though two of the accused were acquitted. In his reasoning, the judge explained that, despite the acquittal of the two Piara Singhs, the existence of five or more individuals participating in the assault satisfied the requirement for section 147 to be established. On the basis of this finding, the judge convicted the appellants under section 302 in conjunction with section 149. When the appeal was later presented before the High Court on behalf of the appellants, the findings of the trial judge on the merits of the case were contested and subsequently examined by the High Court.

In this appeal, the High Court examined the challenge raised by the appellants to the findings of the learned Judge on the merits and then evaluated the evidence independently. After this examination, the High Court concluded that the trial Court’s view was correct. Regarding the charge under section 149, the sole contention presented before the High Court was that the provision should not apply because the incident that led to the death of Gurdip Singh was, according to the appellant, only a chance encounter. The Court considered this argument and held that the assailants had been lying in wait for Gurdip Singh; consequently, the assault on him was the act of members of the unlawful assembly as alleged by the prosecution. No submission was made before the High Court that the acquittal of the two persons named Piara Singh would, by law, render section 149 inapplicable to the case. Counsel for the appellant, Mr Raghubir Singh, however, argued that the trial Court’s finding of five assailants, even after ignoring the alleged presence of the two Piara Singhs, was not justified. He maintained that, just as the charge specifies five named persons as the assailants, the entirety of the evidence refers exclusively to those five individuals and to no one else. This position was not contested by counsel for the State, Mr Bindra, who therefore allowed the Court to proceed on the assumption that both the charge and the evidence identified five persons as members of an unlawful assembly, two of whom have been acquitted. This raised the question of whether the acquittal of the two Piara Singhs permitted the prosecution to rely on section 149 against the remaining appellants. The legal position concerning the essential ingredients of an offence under section 149 was clear. Section 149 imposes vicarious or constructive criminal liability on all members of an unlawful assembly when any member commits an offence in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or an offence that the members knew was likely to be committed in furtherance of that object. One essential ingredient, therefore, is that the offence must have been committed by a member of an unlawful assembly. Section 141 further clarifies that an unlawful assembly comes into existence only when five or more persons constitute the assembly, provided that the other requirements of a common object are satisfied. In other words, a membership of at least five persons is a necessary condition for an unlawful assembly. The argument, consequently, is that once the two Piara Singhs were acquitted, the membership of the alleged assembly fell to three persons, which would render section 141 inapplicable and, by extension, preclude the invocation of section 149 against the appellants.

The Court noted that the acquittal of the two individuals named Piara Singh reduced the alleged assembly from five members to only three, and that reduction rendered section 141 inapplicable; consequently, section 149 could not be pressed against the remaining appellants. On the facts before the Court, the argument advanced by the appellants therefore required acceptance. The Court had previously pointed out that the issue raised by the appellants should be examined on the premise that only five persons had been specifically named in the charge as constituting the unlawful assembly, and that the evidence presented during trial concerned solely those five individuals. Assuming that premise to be correct, the Court reasoned that once two of the five named persons were acquitted, the assembly could be said to consist of merely three persons, a number insufficient to satisfy the definition of an unlawful assembly under section 141.

In addressing the broader question of when section 149 may be applied, the Court emphasized that various factual situations arise before criminal courts. Where the charge identifies five or more persons as members of an unlawful assembly and the prosecution successfully proves the charge against each of those individuals, section 149 may be invoked without difficulty. However, the Court clarified that it is not a strict requirement that five or more persons be convicted before a conviction under section 149 can be sustained. For example, it is possible for fewer than five persons to be charged and convicted under section 302 together with section 149 if the prosecution’s case alleges that the accused, together with other persons who are not present before the Court, formed an unlawful assembly. In such circumstances, the absence of some participants—perhaps because they have fled or could not be located—does not defeat the applicability of section 149, provided that the charge and the evidence demonstrate that the accused and the unidentified individuals together exceeded five in number and thus constituted an unlawful assembly.

The Court further explained that even when the charge names fewer than five persons, a conviction under section 149 remains viable if the prosecution establishes that those before the Court, along with other persons who remain unnamed and unidentified, together formed an unlawful assembly. Evidence showing that the accused acted in concert with such unidentified assailants permits a conviction under section 149 despite the fact that the unnamed participants have not been traced or formally charged. The Court also observed that cases may arise where the prosecution explicitly names five or more persons as members of an unlawful assembly. In those instances, if both the charge and the evidence are confined to the named individuals and two or more of them are acquitted, leaving fewer than five persons to stand trial, section 149 cannot be invoked. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that even in such scenarios, the evidence might reveal the presence of additional, unidentified persons who participated in the unlawful assembly. In such situations, either the trial court or an appellate court may conclude that the acquittal of some named defendants does not necessarily defeat the charge under section 149, because the unlawful assembly also comprised other participants who have not been identified or charged.

In situations where both the charge and the evidence relate only to the persons specifically named in the charge, and two or more of those persons are acquitted, leaving fewer than five individuals to stand trial, section 149 cannot be invoked. Nevertheless, it is possible that although the charge identifies five or more persons as constituting an unlawful assembly, the evidence may also disclose the participation of additional persons who remain unidentified and unnamed. In such circumstances, either the trial court or, on appeal, the High Court may hold that the acquittal of some of the named accused does not defeat the charge under section 149 because other, un‑named participants were also part of the unlawful assembly. Accordingly, the acquittal of one or more persons named in the charge does not affect the validity of the charge if, on the basis of the evidence, the fact‑finder concludes that the assembly still comprised five or more persons. The court must exercise great care in arriving at that conclusion, but there is no statutory prohibition that prevents it from doing so. The omission in the charge of reference to unnamed or unidentified members may raise a concern of possible prejudice to the accused, and such prejudice must be examined carefully. Apart from the question of prejudice, however, no legal rule bars the fact‑finding court from holding that, although only five or more names appear, the assembly included additional unnamed persons. This understanding represents the correct legal position for the various categories of cases that arise when a charge under section 149 is framed. To illustrate this position, the Court may refer to three representative decisions, the first being Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (1), where it held that before applying section 149 the Court must be satisfied that at least five persons shared the common object. The Court further clarified that this requirement does not imply that five persons must necessarily be convicted before section 149 can be applied; if the judge is convinced that five persons were undeniably present and shared the common object, even if the identity of some remains doubtful, the provision may still apply. The judgment in that case was reported in 1954 at page 145 of the Supreme Court Reports, reinforcing the principle that conviction of all five individuals is not a prerequisite. The other two decisions, while not cited in detail here, similarly support the view that the presence of five or more participants, whether named or unnamed, suffices for the operation of section 149.

In that case, the Court observed that the prosecution had failed to establish beyond doubt that the unlawful assembly comprised five or more persons, and consequently held that section 149 could not be applied. The Court therefore concluded that, for the purposes of applying section 149, the factual situation in that case was analogous to the facts before it in the present appeal. In Bharwad Mepa Dana v. State of Bombay, the Court considered a matter in which twelve persons were expressly named in the charge as having formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of murdering three individuals. At the trial before the Sessions Judge, seven of the named accused were acquitted, while five were convicted under sections 302 in conjunction with 149 and sections 302 in conjunction with 34. On appeal, the High Court acquitted one of the convicted persons but upheld the convictions and sentences of the remaining four. The validity of those convictions and sentences was challenged before this Court on several grounds, one of which asserted that section 149 became inapplicable once eight of the twelve named persons were acquitted. The Court rejected that argument by referring to the High Court’s finding that the unlawful assembly consisted of ten to thirteen persons, of whom only four had been positively identified, and held that the High Court was entitled to make such a finding. The opposing counsel advanced two alternative contentions: first, that the prosecution case must be confined to the charge framed against the accused persons, which named twelve individuals as members of the unlawful assembly, and therefore, once eight of those individuals were acquitted, section 149 should cease to apply; second, that by concluding that the unlawful assembly comprised ten to thirteen persons, the High Court was effectively creating a new unlawful assembly, an act the counsel argued was impermissible in a criminal trial. This Court dismissed both contentions, holding that no legal impediment prevented the High Court from concluding that, aside from the acquitted individuals, the evidence presented by the prosecution demonstrated the presence of more than five persons constituting the unlawful assembly. The Court clarified that the assembly about which the High Court made a finding was not a new assembly but the same assembly alleged by the prosecution; the distinction lay solely in the fact that, while the charge alleged all members were known, the evidence enabled the High Court to ascertain that the identities of some members remained unestablished, yet the number of participants was definitely five or more.

All of the individuals who formed the assembly had not been positively identified, but the evidence established that the assembly consisted of at least five persons. On this basis the Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants under sections 302 and 149. This finding demonstrates that section 149 may be applied even when two or more of the persons originally charged are acquitted, a principle that the Court previously articulated in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1). According to that decision, a conviction under section 149 cannot be sustained only when the number of alleged assailants is fixed, all are named, and the proven participants are fewer than five; in such a situation the alleged assembly cannot be said to have comprised five or more persons. The Court also observed that when the charge specifically names persons as members of an unlawful assembly, it generally excludes the possibility that other individuals were part of the same assembly, especially where there is no reason to suspect that the witnesses who identified the accused made a mistake in recognizing them. Counsel for the appellant relied on this observation. However, the Court considered it unreasonable to interpret that observation as an absolute rule that prevents the prosecution, during trial, from proving that additional persons beyond those named in the charge were also members of the unlawful assembly. In other words, the observation merely suggests that when the charge names certain persons as constituting an unlawful assembly, the fact‑finder will be cautious before concluding that persons not named were also members. Nevertheless, if the evidence demonstrates that unnamed persons were indeed part of the assembly, there is no legal prohibition on a court reaching that conclusion. Such a situation may arise when some participants are not identified by witnesses and therefore not named. The decision in Kartar Singh itself rejected the appellants’ argument that their convictions under sections 302 and 307, read with section 149, were invalid. Consequently, there is no inconsistency between the observations made in this case and the earlier precedents cited. As a result, in the facts of the present case the appellants may argue that section 149 should not be applied to them. This leads to the further issue of whether the appellants can be convicted under section 302 together with section 34, noting that, like section 149, section 34 also addresses constructive criminal liability.

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code addresses constructive criminal liability. It stipulates that when a criminal act is carried out by several persons acting in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act had been performed by him alone. The essential element of the vicarious liability created by Section 34 is the existence of a common intention. If such common intention animates the accused persons and directs them to commit the offence charged, every person who shares that intention becomes constructively responsible for the criminal act performed by any one of them. In the same way that a group of persons sharing a common object characterises an unlawful assembly, a group of persons sharing a common intention characterises the situation contemplated by Section 34. Although the two provisions sometimes overlap, the common intention that underlies Section 34 is distinct from the common object that defines an unlawful assembly. Common intention signifies concerted action and necessarily implies the presence of a pre‑arranged plan, that is, a prior meeting of minds. Cases where Section 34 is applicable invariably show participation by all the accused in the criminal conduct. The individual acts may differ in nature or character, but they are all driven by the same common intention. It is now well‑settled that the common intention required by Section 34 is not the same as a merely similar or identical intention. As observed by the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor (1945) L.R. 72 I.A.-148, common intention within the meaning of Section 34 implies a pre‑arranged plan, and to convict an accused under this section it must be proved that the criminal act was executed in concert pursuant to that plan; the inference of common intention must arise only as a necessary deduction from the surrounding circumstances. In the present case, the evidence establishes that the appellants shared with Dalip Singh the motive that prompted Dalip Singh to deliver the fatal blow to Gurdip Singh. The close relationship among the appellants and Dalip Singh leaves no doubt that they possessed the same motive to an equal degree. Moreover, the facts demonstrate that Dalip Singh and the two appellants lay in wait for Gurdip Singh. It has also been shown that when the party accompanying Gurdip Singh informed the appellant Mohan Singh that the Patwari and the Qanungo had arrived to hand over possession of the land to Gurdip Singh, Mohan Singh pretended to be hungry and withdrew from the scene.

It was observed that the appellant had apparently communicated with Dalip Singh and Jagir Singh, after which the three of them positioned themselves in anticipation of Gurdip Singh’s arrival, fully aware that he would travel along that route. Consequently, the two appellants together with Dalip Singh deliberately concealed themselves behind a grove of Khajoor trees and each was equipped with a lathi. This pattern of behavior on the part of the three assailants demonstrated clearly that they shared a common intention to inflict a fatal assault on Gurdip Singh. Their possession of lathis and the decision to hide behind the Khajoor trees were explained by this shared intention. Moreover, when Gurdip Singh and Harnam Singh approached the spot where the appellants were concealed, all three assailants rushed at Gurdip Singh and pursued him as he and Harnam Singh began to flee. This subsequent conduct further affirmed the existence of a common intention among them. After chasing the two victims, the three men surrounded them, and at that moment Dalip Singh delivered the fatal blow to Gurdip Singh. In the act of surrounding Gurdip Singh, the two appellants unquestionably participated and thereby assisted Dalip Singh in the execution of the attack. Following the lethal assault on Gurdip Singh, the three assailants anticipated that villagers would soon arrive at the scene because an alarm had been raised, and consequently they fled together. On the basis of these facts, the conclusion was deemed inescapable that the two appellants and Dalip Singh were driven by a common intention to kill Gurdip Singh, and that the blow inflicted by Dalip Singh was carried out in furtherance of that shared intention. Accordingly, the Court found no difficulty in holding that the appellants were guilty under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court also expressed certainty that, had the appellants argued before the High Court that section 149 was inapplicable, the High Court would have without hesitation altered their conviction from section 302 together with section 149 to a conviction under section 302 read with section 34. Consequently, the conviction of the appellants was accordingly altered to one under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. This change in the conviction did not necessitate any alteration in the sentencing order. For the offence of murder under section 302 read with section 34, the appellants were sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction and sentence previously recorded for the offence under section 147 were set aside, and the appellants were ordered to be acquitted of that particular charge.