Maulud Ahmad vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 97 of 1961

Decision Date: 13 November 1962

Coram: Subba Rao

In this matter, the Supreme Court considered an appeal filed by special leave against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, which had affirmed the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kheri. The lower court had convicted the appellant, a head constable, under section 218 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to two years of rigorous imprisonment. The appeal, identified as Criminal Appeal No 97 of 1961, arose from proceedings recorded on 13 November 1962. The petitioner's name was Maulud Ahmad and the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh. The bench that heard the case was constituted by Justice Subba Rao, who delivered the judgment.

The factual background involved a person referred to as “C” and several others who went on a shooting expedition armed with guns, during which two individuals were killed. To fabricate evidence favorable to C, the appellant, who was a head constable, entered a false record in the General Diary of the police station. The entry, dated the previous day, claimed that C had deposited his gun at the police station. Subsequent trials addressed a range of offences, including charges under sections 304‑A, 201/109, 120‑B, and 218/109 of the Indian Penal Code. All the accused, except the head constable, were acquitted of the charges, while the head constable was convicted under section 218 for making the false entry. The appellant raised two principal contentions: first, that his conviction under section 218 should not stand because C had been acquitted; and second, that the prosecution was barred by limitation because it was instituted more than three months after the false entry, invoking section 42 of the Police Act, 1861.

The Court examined the appellant’s arguments and held that the conviction was sustainable. It clarified that, irrespective of C’s eventual acquittal, at the time the false entry was made there existed a real likelihood that C would face prosecution for causing the deaths. The false entry was therefore made with the intention of, or with knowledge that it was likely to, shield C from legal punishment. The acquittal of C on the substantive charges did not erase the fact that the head constable had deliberately fabricated the entry to protect C, and consequently the conviction under section 218 could not be set aside. Regarding the limitation issue, the Court read sections 36 and 42 of the Police Act together and concluded that section 42 applied only to prosecutions for offences under the Police Act itself, not to prosecutions under the Indian Penal Code or other statutes. Hence, the prosecution was not barred by the limitation provision.

Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the head constable under section 218 of the Indian Penal Code and upheld the two‑year rigorous imprisonment sentence. The judgment confirmed that the false entry in the police diary was made with the purpose of obstructing justice and that the procedural limitation invoked by the appellant was inapplicable to the case at hand.

According to the evidence, a number of railway officials together with a railway guard named Chauhan travelled in two trollies toward Bhitra for a shooting excursion. Chauhan was carrying a double‑barrelled twelve‑bore gun identified as number 23727. The railway line was flanked on both sides by state reserve forests. While the party was near the line, several members alighted from the trollies, illuminated the area with a search‑light and discharged their firearms, resulting in the death of two persons. In an attempt to create favourable evidence for himself, Chauhan caused a report to be entered by the appellant, who was a Police Head‑Constable, in the General Diary of the police station. The entry, allegedly made on 13 December 1956 at 6.45 p.m., claimed that Chauhan had deposited the aforementioned gun at the police station. The appellant subsequently performed a number of further alterations in the police records so that they would correspond with this fabricated entry. Several individuals, including Chauhan and the appellant, were charged under sections 304‑A, 201 / 109, 120‑B and 218 / 109 of the Indian Penal Code as well as section 26 of the Indian Forest Act, and they were tried before the Additional Sessions Judge at Kheri. The appellant also faced a charge under section 218 of the Indian Penal Code. All of the accused were acquitted of every charge except the appellant, who was found guilty of the offence under section 218 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant appealed the conviction to the High Court, where his appeal was dismissed, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

The learned counsel for the appellant raised two principal questions. The first question contended that because Chauhan had been acquitted of all the offences with which he was charged, the charge against the appellant under section 218 of the Indian Penal Code should likewise fail. The second question asserted that the prosecution against the appellant, which was initiated three months after the alleged entry in the police diary, was barred by the limitation period prescribed in section 42 of the Police Act. Section 218 of the Indian Penal Code provides: “Whoever, being a public servant, and being as such public servant, charged with the preparation of any record or other writing frames that record or writing in a manner which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, … with intent thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save any person from legal punishment, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save … shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine or with both.” The essential element of the section, as applied to the present case, is that the public servant must have acted with an intention to save, or with knowledge that it was likely to save, another person from legal punishment.

The Court noted that the first argument presented by counsel relied on the alleged inconsistency and conflict between the acquittal of Chauhan and the conviction of the appellant. Chauhan had been tried together with the appellant for offences punishable under sections 304‑A, 120‑B, 201/109 and 218/109 of the Indian Penal Code as well as section 26 of the Indian Forest Act, and he was ultimately acquitted. Setting aside for the moment the provisions of sections 218 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court examined the reasons for Chauhan’s acquittal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge identified several factual findings: firstly, that three firearms were in the possession of the party, one of which belonged to Chauhan; secondly, that after the trolley‑cars were halted and left beside the track between mile markers eight and nine, the trolley‑man Ramdeo and a person named Lala departed, and shortly thereafter four gunshots were heard, after which Lala returned alone and all members of the party except Ramdeo proceeded to Mailani by the Cane Special train; thirdly, that at the moment the four shots were heard, Chauhan and an individual named Gupta were standing near the track holding their guns, while Dilawar, Amin and Hira also remained standing beside the track; and fourthly, that the medical evidence did not specify the exact duration of the gunshot injuries suffered by Ramdeo and Chhotey, but the evidence suggested that the injuries were likely inflicted between 7.20 p.m. and 7.40 p.m. on the night of 14‑15 December 1956. Based on these findings, the learned judge concluded that there was no direct or substantial evidence linking any of the five accused, including Chauhan, to the deaths of Ramdeo and Chhotey. The judgment reflected that the judge accepted the evidence that Chauhan had been present in the shooting party, that he possessed a firearm, and that two persons had been killed by gunfire, yet for reasons not examined here he acquitted Chauhan. The Court observed that irrespective of Chauhan’s guilt, at the time false entries were made in the case diary there was a strong likelihood that Chauhan would have been prosecuted along with the others for causing the deaths of Ramdeo and Chhotey. Consequently, although Chauhan and the others were indeed prosecuted, Chauhan’s eventual acquittal could not negate the finding that the appellant had manipulated the record with the intention, or with knowledge that it was likely, to save Chauhan from legal punishment. If the appellant entered false information in the diary and altered other records with a view to shielding Chauhan from the punishment that might have been imposed on him, the mere fact of Chauhan’s later acquittal does not extinguish the appellant’s liability under section 218 of the Indian Penal Code.

In this case, the Court held that the subsequent acquittal of Chauhan of the offence could not, in any way, eliminate the fact that the conduct complained of fell within section 218 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court also rejected the argument that Chauhan’s acquittal for abetting the offence under the same provision, an offence allegedly committed by the appellant, could affect the appellant’s conviction under section 218. The essential allegation against Chauhan was that he had assisted the appellant in entering a false entry in the police diary and in manipulating the official record so as to accommodate that false entry. The Additional Sessions Judge examined three specific questions in connection with this charge. First, the Judge asked whether Chauhan had indeed abetted Maulud Ahmad in making false entries in the General Diary of Police Station Mailani. Second, the Judge considered whether Chauhan had deposited his gun at Police Station Mailani during the night of 14‑15 December 1956 and then obtained an entry in the General Diary that was back‑dated to show that the gun had been deposited on 13 December 1956 at 18:45, and whether this act was done after consulting Dilawar. Third, the Judge inquired whether Maulud Ahmad, the accused, had made false entries in the General Diary with the intention of, or with knowledge that it was likely to, protect the offenders from legal punishment, thereby seeking to cause the evidence of offences under sections 304‑A of the Indian Penal Code and section 26 of the Indian Forest Act to disappear. On the third question, the learned Judge found that the appellant had deliberately falsified the official record with the purpose of shielding Chauhan, but the Judge nonetheless acquitted Chauhan on the basis of reasonable doubt, noting that Chauhan’s signature was absent from both the entry recording the deposit of the gun on 13 December 1956 and the entry recording the gun’s return on 18 December 1956. Although the Judge concluded that it had not been conclusively proved that Chauhan had abetted the appellant in tampering with the record, this shortfall did not absolve the appellant, because the evidence demonstrated that the appellant himself had made the false entries with the intention of saving Chauhan. Consequently, whether Chauhan’s acquittal was correct or not, the appellant’s conviction does not conflict with that acquittal. Moreover, the Court observed that the record indicated that Chauhan’s acquittal was not justified under the circumstances, even though the State had not appealed the acquittal to the High Court. The Court could not rely on the acquittal to exonerate the appellant, whose case had been proved comprehensively. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the appellant’s conviction was not inconsistent with Chauhan’s acquittal.

In this case the Court examined the provisions of Section 42 of the Police Act. Section 42 stated that every prosecution that could be lawfully brought for any act done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Act, or under the general police powers granted by the Act, had to be started within three months after the act complained of was committed. The Court clarified that the three‑month limitation applied only to prosecutions for offences committed under the Police Act itself or under the general police powers given by that Act. The Court emphasized that Section 42 did not extend to prosecutions for conduct that fell under any other statute or for police powers that were conferred by any other legislation. Further, the Court referred to Section 36 of the Police Act, which declared that nothing in the Act should be interpreted as preventing a person from being prosecuted under any regulation or any other Act for an offence that is punishable under the Police Act, or for being liable for a higher penalty than that provided by the Police Act. By reading Sections 42 and 36 together, the Court concluded that the time limit in Section 42 was confined solely to prosecutions for offences that arose under the Police Act and could not be invoked for prosecutions under any different legislation.

The Court then turned to the duties imposed on police officers by the Act. Section 29 provided that a police officer who violated any of his duties would, upon conviction by a magistrate, be liable to the penalty prescribed in that section. Section 44 imposed a specific duty on the officer in charge of a police station to maintain a General Diary in the manner prescribed by the Act. The Court observed that if the appellant had failed to keep a regular diary, such a failure would constitute an offence punishable under Section 29. However, the prosecution in the present matter was not for that diary offence; it was for an offence under Section 218 of the Indian Penal Code, which is a separate statute that carries a substantially higher punishment. Because the offence was defined in the Penal Code, the Court held that the limitation period of Section 42 could not apply, as Section 36 expressly barred the use of Section 42 for prosecutions under any other Act. The appellant had also sought a reduction of his sentence on the basis that a “head countable” device was merely a tool used by a superior officer who might have been approached by Chauhan. The Court found that the record contained no evidence that Chauhan had approached any senior police officer, nor that the appellant had altered the records at the dictation of such an officer. The Court concluded that the alleged connection was a pure speculation without factual support.

In his judgment the learned judge of the High Court observed that it was not improbable that Chauhan or some other person who had a direct interest in him could have approached the appellant, and that the appellant could have responded in the manner that was alleged. The High Court further noted that the appellant’s conduct might have been motivated by the receipt of some consideration or by other undisclosed reasons, although the record did not establish a precise motive for his actions. The Court explained that when a police officer manipulates an official record such as a police diary, the very foundation of an honest criminal investigation in this country is undermined, because the reliability of evidence and the credibility of the investigative process depend on the integrity of such documents. Accordingly, the Court emphasized that offences involving the falsification or alteration of police records must attract a punishment that is sufficiently severe to serve as a deterrent to others who might consider similar misconduct. The Court also observed that the punishment awarded in the present case was more lenient than the seriousness of the offence required, and therefore did not fulfill the deterrent purpose that the law seeks to achieve. On the basis of these observations and the reasoning set out above, the Court held that the decision of the High Court was correct and that there was no material reason to disturb it. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the order of the High Court was left undisturbed.