Madan Gopal Rungta vs Secretary To The Government Oforissa

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 407/61

Decision Date: 16 March 1962

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter entitled Madan Gopal Rungta versus Secretary to the Government of Orissa, the judgment was delivered on 16 March 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice K. N. Wanchoo and the bench comprised Justices K. N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner was Madan Gopal Rungta and the respondent was the Secretary to the Government of Orissa. The decision is reported in 1962 AIR 1513, 1962 S. C. R. Supl. (3) 906 and is cited in several later cases, including D 1963 SC 1124 (6, 7), R 1964 SC 1473 (12), R 1965 SC 458 (29), R 1970 SC 1 (4), RF 1974 SC 1380 (22, 30), RF 1987 SC 2111 (13), F 1990 SC 10 (11). The operative statutory provisions concerned the power of a High Court to issue writs beyond its territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the Mineral Concession Rules 1949, particularly rules 6, 57, 59 and 60. The headnote explains that the State Government of Orissa rejected the petitioner’s application for a mining lease in December 1957 on the ground that the State intended to develop the area through public‑sector exploitation. The petitioner subsequently sought a review of that decision before the Central Government under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, but the Central Government dismissed the review application in June 1959. Following that refusal, the petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 in the Orissa High Court, alleging that the High Court should be able to grant a writ because the final order, in the petitioner’s view, was the State Government’s rejection. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that it lacked jurisdiction since the ultimate order in the matter was issued by the Central Government, which lay outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court. The petitioner then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The principal issue before the Supreme Court was the extent of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226. The petitioner argued that the Central Government had merely dismissed the review petition and that the effective order rejecting the mining lease remained the State Government’s order, thereby conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to grant the writ. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was correct in finding that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 because the final and effective order in the case was that of the Central Government, which was not situated within the territory over which the Orissa High Court exercised jurisdiction. The Court explained that the Central Government’s order, which effectively rejected the petitioner’s application for the mining lease and confirmed the State Government’s earlier rejection, could not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court under Article 226, given that the Central Government was not located within the territorial limits of that High Court. Consequently, it would have been futile for the Orissa High Court to issue a writ against the State Government for the Central Government’s order rejecting the petitioner’s application.

In this appeal, the Court observed that the Orissa High Court could not issue a writ against the Orissa Government for the order of the Central Government that rejected the appellant’s application for a mining lease. The Court further explained that, setting aside the theoretical issue of whether the State Government’s order merged with the Central Government’s order, Rule 60 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1949 expressly stated that when a matter was referred to the Central Government under Rule 59, the order issued by the Central Government became the effective and final order. Consequently, whenever a review petition was filed and the Central Government decided the petition—whether to confirm or to set aside the earlier decision—its order prevailed, and the State Government’s order in those circumstances merged into the Central Government’s order. The Court relied upon the authorities in Election Commission India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1953) S.C.R. 1144, Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India (1961) 2 S.C.R. 828, and A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1196. It also referred to Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India (1960) 2 S.C.R. 775, while noting that The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh (1958) S.C.R. 595 was not applicable. The judgment was entered under the civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 407/61, arising by special leave from the judgment and order dated 23 August 1960 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 103 of 1959. Counsel for the appellant were N. O. Chatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee; for the respondents were C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor‑General of India, and B. R. L. Iyengar with P. D. Menon; and for the intervener were B. M. Patnaik, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra. The judgment was delivered on 16 March 1962 by Justice Wanchoo. This appeal, taken by special leave, challenged the earlier decision of the Orissa High Court. For the purposes of the appeal, the Court summarized the essential facts: the appellant had applied in 1949 to the State Government of Orissa for a mining lease covering 5,400 acres of manganese‑rich land in the Keonjhar district. The appellant was the first applicant, but subsequently other parties, including Messrs. Tata Steel Company Limited (the intervener), also sought the lease. The Orissa Government chose to grant the lease to the Tatas and, in January 1956, referred the matter to the Central Government for approval under Rule 32 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1949. Rule 32 provides that where more than one application concerns the same land, preference is given to the first‑received application unless the State Government, for a special reason and with prior Central approval, decides otherwise. The appellant made a representation to the Central Government contesting the State Government’s recommendation. Eventually, on 9 April 1957, the Central Government …

In this case the Central Government rejected the State Government’s recommendation to grant the mining lease to the Tatas and instructed that the earlier applications received before the Tata application should be examined in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules, while also indicating that, should the Government of Orissa wish to undertake the exploitation of the area on a departmental basis, the Central Government would not object to considering a proposal for that purpose. Subsequently, in December 1957 the State Government turned down the appellant’s application on the ground that it intended to arrange for the exploitation of the area in the public sector. The appellant then filed a review application before the Central Government under rule 57 of the Rules, and that review was dismissed by the Central Government in June 1969. Thereafter, in July 1959 the appellant instituted a petition under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter under article 226 because the final order in the dispute had been issued by the Central Government, an authority situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Following that dismissal the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate authorising an appeal to the Supreme Court, but the certificate was refused. The appellant then applied for special leave to file the present appeal before the Supreme Court, and that special leave was granted, bringing the matter before this Court. The principal issue framed for determination is the extent of the High Court’s jurisdiction under article 226 in circumstances similar to those presented here. The appellant contended that, since the Central Government had merely dismissed the review petition and the substantive order refusing the mining lease originated from the State Government, the High Court possessed jurisdiction to grant a writ under article 226, and that the principle articulated in Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1) should not be applied. The appellant relied on the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh (2) to support that view. It is well settled, however, by a series of judgments beginning with the Saka Venkata Subba Rao case (1), that the power of a High Court to issue writs under article 226 is subject to a two‑fold limitation: first, the writs may be issued only within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, and second, the person or authority against whom the writ is directed must be situated within those territories, thereby being amenable to the High Court’s jurisdiction either by residence or location. This principle has been recently reaffirmed by this Court in later authority.

In the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India (3) the Court observed that, on its face, the final order was issued by the Central Government, which lies outside the geographical area over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court lacked the authority to issue a writ in that matter.

The appellant’s counsel, however, urged reliance on the decision in Mohd. Nooh’s case (2). In that precedent it had been held that it was incorrect to describe the dismissal order dated 20 April 1948 as having merged into the appellate order of May 1949, and thereafter into the revision order of 22 April 1950. The court in Mohd. Nooh’s case further held that the original dismissal order remained operative on its own strength and therefore could not be attacked under Article 226, because Article 226 did not operate retrospectively. The citations for that case are: 1. [1953] S.C.R. 1144; 2. [1958] S.C.R. 595; 3. [1961] 2 S.C.R. 828.

The counsel argued that if, in Mohd. Nooh’s case, the dismissal order did not merge into the final revision order issued after the Constitution came into force in April 1950, there was no justification for treating the order of the State Government in the present matter as having merged into the Central Government’s order. Such an approach, the counsel contended, would unduly deprive the appellant of his remedy under Article 226 before the High Court.

The Court expressed the view that the principle articulated in Mohd. Nooh’s case (1) could not be transferred to the facts of the present dispute. The issue in Mohd. Nooh’s case was whether the High Court could entertain a writ under Article 226 concerning a dismissal that took effect in 1948, merely because the revision of that dismissal was rejected by the State Government in April 1950, after the Constitution had become operative. The Supreme Court had held that allowing a writ in that circumstance would amount to giving retrospective effect to Article 226, which was impermissible.

The Court also explained that the argument that the dismissal order merged into the appeal order and subsequently into the final revision order was rejected on two grounds. First, the doctrine of merger that applies to court decrees does not extend to orders issued by departmental tribunals. Second, the original dismissal order retained its own operative force and was not strengthened by the later dismissal of the appeal or the revision. Accordingly, an order dated before the commencement of the Constitution could not be subject to attack under Article 226.

Finally, the Court reiterated that the facts underlying Mohd. Nooh’s case (1) were of a distinctive nature, as indicated by the citation [1958] S.C.R. 595, and therefore the reasoning in that case was not applicable to the circumstances presented in the present appeal.

The Court observed that the earlier decision reported in (1) [1958] S.C.R. 595 involved circumstances of a special nature, and therefore the reasoning applied in that case could not be extended to the facts of the present dispute. The Court also referred to the decision in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti (1), where, although the precise question before this Court was not directly raised, the Court examined several High Court judgments that dealt with situations similar to the case at hand, as noted on page 1213 of the report. In those High Court judgments, orders were originally issued by inferior authorities that operated within the territorial limits of the respective High Courts, but the parties subsequently appealed those orders to superior authorities situated outside the High Courts’ jurisdictions. The High Courts concluded that the orders of the inferior authorities merged into the orders issued by the superior authorities upon appeal. This Court indicated that it accepted the High Courts’ view, reasoning that a writ directed against the inferior authority within the High Court’s territory would be ineffective, because the superior authority’s orders, issued outside the jurisdiction, would continue to remain operative and could not be altered by such a writ. Consequently, the Court held that no writ could be issued against the external authorities, and that the High Courts were correct in dismissing the petitions, since any writ against the inferior authority would be fruitless in view of the prevailing orders of the superior authority.

In the matter before the Court, the facts closely mirrored the situation described above. The Government of Orissa denied the appellant’s request for a mining lease. Dissatisfied with that decision, the appellant filed a review application before the Central Government pursuant to the applicable Rules, and the Central Government dismissed the review petition, thereby also refusing the appellant’s request for the lease. It is undisputed that, had the Central Government chosen to do so, it could have allowed the review and ordered the Orissa Government to grant the mining lease to the appellant. By rejecting the review, the Central Government effectively affirmed the Orissa Government’s refusal and confirmed the denial of the lease. The Court held that this order of the Central Government, which effectively denies the appellant’s application and upholds the State Government’s rejection, does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court under Article 226, because the Central Government is situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. Accordingly, it would have been pointless for the Orissa High Court to issue a writ against the Orissa Government for the Central Government’s order, since such a writ could not affect the decision of an authority located beyond the Court’s territorial reach.

In this case the order issued by the Government of Orissa would continue to operate only because the Central Government, by rejecting the review petition, effectively rejected the applicant’s request for a mining lease. Rule 60 of the applicable Rules makes this result clear. Rule 60 states that “the order of the Central Government under Rule 59 and subject only to such order, any order of a State Government under these rules, shall be final.” Consequently, when a review petition is filed against an initial order of a State Government, the order that the Central Government makes after considering the review becomes the prevailing and final order with respect to the mining‑lease application. The language of Rule 60 therefore dispenses with any theoretical discussion about whether the State order merges with the Central order; the rule expressly provides that once a matter is referred to the Central Government under Rule 59, the Central Government’s order alone is effective and final. Because the ultimate order in the present dispute was issued by the Central Government, which is situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court, the Court correctly held that it lacked authority to issue a writ under Article 226. The High Court’s view that it could not entertain the petition was based on the fact that the final, enforceable order lay beyond the geographical reach of that Court.

The Court also considered the precedent of Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India. In that earlier case a mining lease had been granted by a State Government, and a review petition was filed against that grant. The review led to the cancellation of the lease without giving notice to the leaseholder, raising the question of whether the affected person possessed sufficient interest to invoke Article 226. The Court then observed that, under the Rules, the State Government’s order was effective because the Rules did not require confirmation by the Central Government before the order became final. However, that observation does not aid the present appellant. Where a review petition results in an order from the Central Government, that order supersedes the State order, and the State order merges into the Central order. The remarks in Shivji Nathubhai were made in a different factual context and therefore cannot influence the present issue. Because the Central Government’s order, made under Rule 60, is the final and operative order, the appellant’s challenge fails and the appeal carries no force.

In the final judgment the Court directed that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed, bringing an end to the matter before the Court. The order required that the appellant bear the expenses incurred by the opposite party in connection with the appeal. By dismissing the appeal, the Court concluded that the appellant’s contentions could not be sustained and that no further relief would be granted. The decision was entered as a final decree, and the costs provision was attached to that decree. This order is recorded in the official law reports as appearing in the 1960 volume of the Supreme Court Reports, second series, at page 77S, with the reference number (1). The citation indicates where the full text of the judgment can be found for reference and future citation.