M/s. L. H. Sugar Factories and Oil Mills (P) Ltd. vs Their Workmen
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 254 of 1962
Decision Date: 3 August 1962
Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta
The case titled M/s. L. H. Sugar Factories and Oil Mills (P) Ltd. versus Their Workmen was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 3 August 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice J. R. Mudholkar, with Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar and K. C. Das Gupta forming the bench. The petitioner is identified as M/s. L. H. Sugar Factories and Oil Mills (P) Ltd., and the respondent is identified as Their Workmen. The citation for this decision appears as 1967 AIR 161 and 1963 SCR (3) 571, and the dispute falls under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 (14 of 1947) concerning the meaning of the date on which the “crushing season” ended.
According to the headnote, the petitioner employed approximately 1,600 seasonal workers together with about 650 permanent workers. The cane‑crushing process was reported to have terminated on March 1‑2 1959, and on that day roughly 1,000 of the seasonal workers departed for their homes after receiving all dues. The remaining seasonal workers continued to work in the factory until March 16 1959. Under a previous award, these workers were entitled to three days of closure holidays. The petitioner contended that the crushing season should be regarded as having ended on March 16 1959, which was the last day on which any work was performed in the factory, and that only those seasonal workers who were borne on the muster roll on March 17 1959 would qualify for the three days of closure holidays. The central issue for determination was whether the “crushing season” of 1958‑59 should be deemed to have ended on March 12 1959, when actual crushing of sugarcane ceased, or on March 16 1959, when all ancillary operations and the entire plant machinery came to a standstill.
The Court held that the expression “crushing season” must be given its ordinary meaning unless the parties demonstrate that, within the specific industry, the term has acquired a distinct definition. The tribunal found no evidence indicating that “crushing season” meant the period during which the factory was actively working, as opposed to merely the period when crushing operations were carried out. Because the crushing operations ceased on March 12 1959, the Court concluded that the crushing season ended on that date. Consequently, the seasonal workers who were borne on the muster roll on March 13 1959 were entitled to the three days of closure holidays provided under the award.
The judgment was issued under the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 254 of 1962, filed by special leave against the award dated 1 May 1961 of the Industrial Tribunal (111), Uttar Pradesh, at Allahabad in Reference No. 69 of 1959. Counsel appearing for the petitioner included G. S. Pathak, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, while B. P. Maheshwari represented the respondents. Delivered on 3 August 1962, Justice Mudholkar explained that the sole point for consideration in this appeal was whether the “crushing season” of 1958‑59 should be deemed to have ended on March 12, when the actual crushing of sugarcane stopped.
The dispute centered on whether the “crushing season” for the 1958‑59 period should be legally deemed to have concluded on 12 March 1959, the date on which the actual crushing of sugarcane ceased, or on 16 March 1959, the day when all ancillary operations in the factory halted and the entire plant machinery was idle. The appellants maintained that the season terminated on the later date, whereas the respondents, who were the factory’s employees, argued that it ended on the earlier date. Determining the correct termination date was crucial because the award provided that only those seasonal workers who were listed on the factory’s muster roll on the day following the end of the crushing season would be eligible for three days of closure holidays. The respondents stated that the factory employed approximately 1,600 seasonal workers in addition to about 650 permanent workers. It was commonly agreed that the crushing process itself ended on 12 March 1959; on that evening roughly 1,000 of the 1,600 seasonal workers departed for their homes after receiving all dues owed to them. The remaining seasonal workers continued to work in the factory until 16 March 1959, and, according to the terms of Industrial Tribunal Award reference No. 33 of 53 dated 15 April 1953, these workers were therefore entitled to three days of closure holidays. In contrast, the appellants argued that the crushing season should be regarded as having ended on 16 March 1959, the last day on which any factory work was performed, and thus only those seasonal workers who were on the muster roll on 17 March 1959 would qualify for the holiday entitlement; under this view, the 600 seasonal workers who worked until the evening of 16 March would not be eligible. During the arguments, counsel for the appellants suggested that the fact that 600 seasonal workers continued to work between 12 and 16 March 1959 had not been established. To address this point, the Court noted that the evidence of witness W. W. 1 B. S. Chauhan, a member of the executive of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Union Congress, Kanpur, indicated that the seasonal workers who did not leave on the evening of 12 March were still borne on the appellants’ muster roll on 13 March 1959. This testimony was not contradicted in cross‑examination, and the appellants did not call any witness to challenge the number of seasonal workers recorded on the muster roll for 13 March. The only witness produced by the appellants, Shri K. K. Sinha, a manufacturing chemist, admitted in cross‑examination that he was not employed in the mills during the 1958‑59 crushing season and consequently possessed no knowledge of the muster‑roll details. Given the total seasonal workforce of 1,600 and the departure of nearly 1,000 workers on 12 March, it follows that approximately 600 seasonal workers remained employed through 16 March, and their names continued to appear on the muster roll on 13 March.
In this case, the Court observed that, since approximately one thousand seasonal workers had left on March 12, 1959, the number of those who remained working until March 16, 1959 was six hundred. Accordingly, the Court proceeded on the basis that the names of about six hundred seasonal workers continued to appear on the appellants’ muster roll on March 13, 1959. The next issue for consideration was the date on which the crushing season of 1958‑59 came to an end. The Court held that the crushing season should be deemed to have ended on the date when the crushing operations in the factory ceased, and not on the date when the manufacturing processes in the factory terminated. The Court emphasized that the expression “crushing season” must be given its ordinary meaning unless it could be shown that the industry had given it a different meaning. No evidence was placed before the Tribunal to demonstrate that “crushing season” meant the period during which the factory was actually operating, as opposed to the period during which crushing operations were being carried out. The Court then quoted Clause (3) of the 1953 Award, which provides: “All permanent workers and such seasonal employees as are on the factory’s roll on the day following the close of the crushing season will be entitled to the closure holidays.” The Award contained no indication that the Tribunal intended a meaning of “crushing season” other than the period in which crushing operations were conducted. Since, as previously noted, the crushing operations terminated on March 12, 1959, the Court concluded that the crushing season ended on that date. Consequently, the seasonal workers who were listed on the muster roll on March 13, 1959 were entitled to three days of closure holidays. Agreeing with the Tribunal’s findings, the Court upheld the Award, dismissed the appeal, and ordered costs against the appellant.