M. R. Balaji And Others vs State Of Mysore

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 28 September, 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

In this case the Supreme Court recorded that the petition titled M. R. Balaji and Others versus State of Mysore was decided on 28 September 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and was delivered by a bench comprising Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Chief Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice K. C. Das Gupta, Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice J. C. Shah. The parties were identified as petitioner M. R. Balaji and others and respondent State of Mysore. The official citation of the judgment is reported as 1963 AIR 649, 1962 SCR Suppl. (1) 439 and it appears in numerous later reports, including D 1964 SC 179, R 1964 SC 1823, R 1967 SC 1283, F 1968 SC 507, R 1968 SC 1012, F 1968 SC 1379, MV 1971 SC 530, R 1971 SC 1762, RF 1971 SC 2206, R 1971 SC 2303, E 1972 SC 1375, F 1973 SC 930, R 1974 SC 532, RF 1975 SC 563, D 1976 SC 490, R 1981 SC 298, R 1981 SC 588, O 1985 SC 1495, RF 1988 SC 959, F 1989 SC 903, RF 1992 SC 1 and the case also concerns the Act concerning admission into colleges and reservation of seats for socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, together with the relevant constitutional provisions Art. 15 (4), Art. 16 (4), Art. 29 (2), Art. 46 and Art. 340 of the Constitution of India.

The factual background set out by the Court described that on 26 July 1958 the State of Mysore issued an order reserving seats for all communities except the Brahmin community, defining them as educationally and socially backward classes as well as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and allocating seventy‑five percent of seats in educational institutions to those groups. Subsequent orders of similar character were issued on 14 May 1959, 22 July 1959, 9 June 1960 and 10 July 1961, each varying the percentage of seats reserved but each being challenged in court. On 31 July 1962 the State promulgated another order that superseded all earlier orders issued under Art. 15 (4). That order divided the backward classes into two categories—“backward classes” and “more backward classes”—and provided that sixty‑eight percent of seats in engineering, medical and other technical colleges would be reserved for the educationally and socially backward classes together with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, leaving the remaining thirty‑two percent of seats to a merit pool. Twenty‑three petitioners filed a writ petition under Art. 32 challenging the order. The petitioners claimed that, but for the reservations effected by the impugned order, they would have been entitled to admission in the institutions to which they had applied. They further argued that the classification made by the order was irrational and that the reservation of sixty‑eight percent of seats constituted a fraud on Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution. After considering these submissions, the Court held that the order was indeed a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15 (4). Accordingly, the Court directed that the impugned order be set aside and declared void. The judgment concluded with the words “The impugned order”.

The Court observed that the impugned order categorises the backward classes on the sole basis of caste, a classification that the Court held is not permitted by Article 15 (4). It further noted that the reservation of sixty‑eight per cent for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is inconsistent with the concept of the special provision authorised by Article 15 (4). Nonetheless, the Court stated that it would not prescribe a fixed or inflexible percentage for reservation. The Court emphasized that reservation should be adopted to advance the prospects of weaker sections of society, but that such measures must be taken with care so as not to exclude admission to higher educational institutions for deserving and qualified candidates belonging to other communities. Reservations made under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) must be kept within reasonable limits. The interests of the weaker sections, which constitute a primary charge on the State and the Centre, must be balanced with the interests of the community as a whole. Speaking in general terms, the Court expressed the view that a special provision should be less than fifty per cent, while the actual percentage must depend on the prevailing circumstances of each case. The object of Article 15 (4) is to advance the interests of society as a whole by looking after the weaker elements; if a provision under Article 15 (4) ignores the interests of society, it lies outside the scope of Article 15 (4), as the Court observed. It would be extremely unreasonable to assume that Parliament, in enacting Article 15 (4), intended that the advancement of backward classes or Scheduled Castes and Tribes should completely and absolutely ignore the fundamental rights of the remaining citizens of society. Considerations of national interest and the interests of the community as a whole must be kept in mind. The Court recalled that Article 15 was amended and Article 15 (4) was added in response to the judgments in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan and State of Madras v. C. R. Srinivasan [1951] S.C.R. 525. Article 15 (4) is a proviso or exception to Articles 15 (1) and 29 (2). Consequently, if an order is justified by Article 15 (4), its validity cannot be questioned on the ground that it violates Article 15 (4) or Article 29 (2). The Constitution indeed envisages the appointment of a commission whose report and recommendations may assist authorities in taking adequate steps for the advancement of backward classes, but the Court clarified that the appointment of such a commission and the subsequent steps are not conditions precedent to any action taken under Article 15 (4). Special provisions contemplated under Article 15 (4) may be made by the Union or the States through an executive order; it cannot be said that only the President may make special provision for the advancement of backward classes. Article 15 (4) therefore authorises the State to make such special provisions.

In this case, the Court observed that Article 15 (4) permits the State to make a special provision for the advancement of those citizens who are both socially and educationally backward, and that this class of persons is to be distinguished from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Court noted that, on occasion, a presidential order may bring certain backward classes within the ambit of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and in that limited sense the backward classes for which Article 15 (4) provides improvement are comparable to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. However, the Court emphasized that the backwardness required by Article 15 (4) must be both social and educational; it cannot be limited to only one of those dimensions.

The Court explained that while caste can be a relevant consideration in evaluating the social backwardness of Hindu groups, it cannot be the sole or dominant test. The Court pointed out that sections of Indian society such as Christians, Jains, Muslims and others do not adhere to the caste system, and therefore the caste test is not applicable to them. The Court further held that, in the ultimate analysis, social backwardness is largely the result of poverty. Those citizens who are extremely poor are automatically socially backward. In addition, the occupation of a person and the place of his or her habitation also contribute to social backwardness. The Court acknowledged that determining which classes are socially backward is a very complex problem, but it was clear that classification based solely on caste would be impermissible under Article 15 (4).

Turning to educational backwardness, the Court observed that the literacy figures supplied by the Census reports are not adequate for this purpose. It expressed doubt that using the average enrollment in the last three high‑school classes is a suitable measure of educational backwardness. The Court further held that the State is not justified in including in its list of backward classes those castes or communities whose average student‑population per thousand is only slightly above, very near, or just below the State average. The appropriate approach, the Court said, is to treat as educationally backward those classes whose average is well or substantially below the State average.

The Court expressly stated that it would not lay down any rigid rule on how the State should determine backwardness. The responsibility, the Court said, lies with the State to decide the matter in a manner consistent with the requirements of Article 15 (4). The Court also rejected the notion of dividing backward classes into “backward” and “more backward” categories, observing that Article 15 (4) authorises special provision only for the truly backward classes. Introducing two categories would, in the Court’s view, attempt to devise measures for all classes that are less advanced than the most advanced groups in the State, which exceeds the scope of Article 15 (4). Finally, the Court linked the purpose of making special provision for the advancement of castes or communities to the Directive Principle embodied in Article 46, emphasizing that unless the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections are promoted rapidly and effectively, the constitutional goal of social and economic equality cannot be achieved.

It was observed that, unless social and economic equality is pursued liberally, the goal of establishing such equality could not be achieved. Article 15 (4) was said to empower the State to take adequate steps to attain this purpose. While the State was permitted to make appropriate reservations under Article 16 (4), the Court warned that reservations should not be unreasonable, excessive, or extravagant, because such measures could eliminate general competition in a broad field, generate widespread dissatisfaction among employees, and thereby materially reduce their efficiency. The Court likened reservations that exceed the permissible and legitimate limits under Article 16 (4) to the improper special provision made under Article 15 (4), describing such excesses as a fraud on the Constitution. The Court referred to the authorities of Ramakrishna Singh Rain Singh v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 338; S.A. Partha v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1961 Mysore 220; State of Madras v. Shrimathi Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525; and General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586.

In the judgment delivered on 28 September 1962, Justice Gajendragadkar noted that since 1958 the State of Mysore had been endeavouring to create a special provision for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in the State under Article 15 (4) of the Constitution. Each time such an order was passed, its validity had been challenged by writ proceedings. Four earlier orders had been contested through writ petitions under Article 226 in the High Court of Mysore. The present writ petitions, filed under Article 32, challenged the validity of the most recent order issued by the State of Mysore on 31 July 1962 under Article 15 (4). The petitions were filed by twenty‑three individuals; six of them had applied for admission to the pre‑professional class in medicine at medical colleges affiliated with Mysore University or Karnataka University, and the remaining seventeen had applied for admission to the first year of the five‑year integrated Bachelor of Engineering programme at the University of Mysore. The petitioners claimed that, but for the reservation made by the impugned order, they would have been entitled to admission in the respective colleges. Because of the reservation, students who had obtained lower percentages of marks were admitted, while the petitioners were not. Consequently, the petitioners asserted that the order denying them admission was void under Article 15 (1) of the Constitution.

In their petition the applicants requested that a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction be issued against the State of Mysore, identified as respondent No 1, and against the two selection committees that had been impleaded as respondents 2 and 3. The petitioners argued that the order challenged, which had been issued under Article 15 (4), was invalid because the method it used to specify and enumerate the socially and educationally backward classes in the state was unintelligible and irrational. They maintained that the classification derived from that method was inconsistent with, and exceeded, the limits of Article 15 (4). Further, they contended that the quantum of reservation prescribed by the order was so unreasonable and extravagant that it could not be justified by Article 15 (4) and that, in substance, the order amounted to a fraud upon the power conferred by that article. The State denied these allegations, asserting that the classification was both rational and intelligible and that the reservation percentages were fully justified under Article 15 (4). The State also rejected the claim that the order represented a colourable exercise of power or a fraud on the Constitution.

To understand the dispute, the Court noted that the impugned order was preceded by four earlier orders, and it was necessary to consider those orders in sequence. On 26 July 1958 the State issued an order declaring that all communities except the Brahmin community fell within the definition of educationally and socially backward classes as well as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and it provided for a reservation of seventy‑five percent of seats in educational institutions for those groups. For Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes the reservation percentages were fixed at fifteen percent and three percent respectively, and these percentages were retained in all subsequent orders. The 26 July 1958 order was challenged before the Mysore High Court, and the State conceded that the government order contained a drafting error, choosing not to press the validity of the order. Consequently, the writ petitions contesting that order succeeded and the order was set aside.

In 1959 the State issued two separate orders, one on 14 May and another on 22 July. The first of those orders classified all communities except Brahmins, Baniyas and Kayasths among Hindus, as well as Muslims, Christians and Jains, as socially and educationally backward. It appeared that sixty‑five percent of seats were to be reserved for these socially and educationally backward classes together with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Both of these 1959 orders were subsequently challenged before the Mysore High Court in the case of Ramakrishna Singh Ram Singh v State of Mysore, where the High Court upheld the petitioners’ pleas and quashed the orders. The High Court directed that the applicants’ admissions be considered without reference to those orders, while retaining the reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Following that decision, the State constituted the Mysore Backward Classes Committee, chaired by Dr R Nagan Gowda, to examine the problem and recommend criteria for identifying socially and educationally backward classes and for formulating special provisions for their advancement. The Committee issued an interim report, and based on that report the State issued an order on 9 June 1960 regulating admissions for that year into professional and technical colleges. The effect of the 1960 order was to set aside sixty percent of seats for the identified backward classes.

In the earlier case of Ramakrishna Singh Ram Singh v. State of Mysore, the High Court agreed with the petitioners’ arguments and set aside the orders that had been challenged. The court instructed that the applications filed by the petitioners for admission to the relevant colleges should be assessed without taking those orders into account, while still observing the reservation requirements for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes contained in the orders. Following this decision, the State created a body known as the Mysore Backward Classes Committee, appointing Dr R Nagan Gowda as its chairman, to examine the problem and to recommend criteria for identifying educationally and socially backward classes as well as special measures for their advancement. After an interim report was submitted by the committee, the State issued an order on 9 June 1960 governing admissions to professional and technical colleges for that academic year. The order stipulated that sixty percent of the available seats would be open to candidates based on merit, while the remaining forty percent would constitute a reservation pool. Within this reservation pool, twenty‑two percent of the seats were earmarked for Backward Classes, fifteen percent for Scheduled Castes and three percent for Scheduled Tribes. This order was subsequently challenged before the High Court in the matter of S A Partha v. State of Mysore. Although the court did not conclude that the entire scheme of special provisions in the order was invalid, it expressed the view that allocating seats to other Backward Classes beyond the twenty‑two percent reserved for them, apart from open competition, amounted to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of other citizens and therefore could not stand. Consequently, the court outlined a method for calculating reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes so as to avoid a successful challenge under Articles 15(1) and 29(2) of the Constitution. The Nagan Gowda Committee later issued its final report in 1961, and based on the findings and recommendations contained therein, the State issued a new order on 10 July 1961 under Article 15(4). That order began by noting that the committee had determined that, given the circumstances at the time, the only practical way to classify Backward Classes in the State was on the basis of castes and communities, and it set out the criteria that should be applied to ascertain educational and social backwardness. The order then affirmed the State’s agreement with the committee’s proposal concerning those criteria.

The State issued an order declaring that the Backward Classes should be sub‑divided into two distinct categories, namely “Backward” and “More Backward,” and it adopted the test laid down by the Committee’s report to determine the classification; the order characterised this approach as realistic and practicable for the purposes of reservation. Concerning the identification of the communities to be treated as backward, the State made certain variations to the Committee’s original recommendations, holding that the Lingayats and the Bhunts, who were part of the Vokkaliga community, ought to be classed as backward. In explaining this modification, the State observed that the Committee’s recommendation regarding these two communities had not been unanimous, and it noted that a large proportion of the Lingayat population resided in rural areas, were chiefly engaged in agriculture and manual labour, and consequently suffered from widespread illiteracy and poverty. Regarding the Bhunts, the State expressed the view that they could not be distinguished from the remaining Vokkaliga population and therefore should be placed in the same backward category. The order further added that the Satanis, the Nayars and the Zoroastrians, whose average educational attainment, as measured by the Committee’s test, was substantially higher per thousand of population—contrasting with the Lingayats’ figure of 7.1—should not be treated as backward. Turning to the question of the reservation percentage, the order rejected the Committee’s recommendation of an overall reservation of sixty‑eight percent on the ground that such a large share would not be in the larger interests of the State; consequently, the order fixed a total reservation of forty‑eight percent for the combined categories of Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, of which thirty percent was allotted to the Backward Classes. Annexure I to that order listed eighty‑one classes and one hundred‑thirty‑five “More Backward” classes. On 31 July 1962 the State promulgated the impugned order, which superseded all earlier orders made under Article 15(4) concerning reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes; under this new order the Backward Classes were again divided into the two categories of “Backward” and “More Backward.” The effect of the 1962 order was to fix a fifty‑percent quota for reservation of seats for Other Backward Classes, allocating twenty‑eight percent of that quota to the Backward Classes and twenty‑two percent to the More Backward Classes, while the reservation of fifteen percent for Scheduled Castes and three percent for Scheduled Tribes remained unchanged. As a result, sixty‑eight percent of the seats available for admission to engineering and medical colleges and other technical institutions specified in the earlier July 10 1961 order were now reserved, leaving only thirty‑two percent for the general merit pool; thus, the percentage of reservation amounting to sixty‑eight percent, which the July 10 1961 order had deemed contrary to the larger interests of the State, was by the impugned order accepted. The petitioners thereafter contended

The petitioners argued that the classification set out in the impugned order was irrational and that the reservation of sixty‑eight percent of seats effected by that order amounted to a fraud on the protection granted by Article 15 (4) of the Constitution. The questions presented for determination in these petitions required the Court to examine sociological, social and economic considerations. Consequently, before addressing the specific contentions advanced by the parties, the Court found it necessary to summarise briefly the material that had been placed before it.

On the twenty‑ninth day of January, 1953, the President, exercising the authority conferred by Article 340 (1) of the Constitution, appointed the Backward Classes Commission. The Commission submitted its report on the thirtieth day of March, 1955. The terms of reference for the Commission required it “to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour, and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to remove such difficulties and to improve their condition,” as provided by Article 340 (1). In the course of its inquiry the Commission identified a number of factors that it considered relevant for classifying a community as backward. These factors included the traditional occupation or profession of the community, the percentage of literacy or the overall educational advancement achieved by its members, the estimated population of the community, and the pattern of distribution of the community across the State or its concentration in particular areas. The Commission further held that the social position occupied by a community in the caste hierarchy must be taken into account, as well as the extent of the community’s representation in Government service and in the industrial sector (see page 47 of the report).

The Commission also enumerated the principal causes of educational backwardness among the socially and educationally disadvantaged communities. It listed: (1) a traditional lack of interest in education arising from social and environmental conditions or occupational handicaps; (2) poverty coupled with an insufficiency of educational institutions in rural areas; (3) residence in inaccessible locations; (4) a shortage of adequate educational aids such as free studentships, scholarships and monetary grants; (5) the absence of residential hostel facilities; (6) unemployment among educated persons, which discourages families from educating their children; and (7) a defective educational system that fails to train students for suitable occupations and professions (see page 107). The Committee observed that, in substance, the problem of the Backward Classes was essentially the problem of Rural India (page 55). After weighing several criteria that might be relevant in identifying backward classes, the Committee ultimately decided to treat caste status as an important factor and, on that basis, compiled a list of Backward Communities, which is set out in Volume 11 of its Report.

Turning to the issue of university education, the Committee noted that the growing influx of students into Universities posed a challenge to the broader interests of the nation. It argued that this rush could be curbed only by providing vocational and professional training at the secondary level itself. Nevertheless, the Committee observed that as long as a University degree remained a prerequisite for entry into Government service, it would be difficult to prevent students from seeking admission to Universities. This observation formed the foundation for the Committee’s subsequent recommendation that, in all scientific, engineering, medical, agricultural, veterinary and other technical institutions, a reservation of seventy percent of seats should be made available to qualified students belonging to Backward Classes until adequate accommodation could be provided for all eligible candidates (see pages 119 and 125 of the Report).

Because a university degree was required for entry into Government service, the Committee observed that it was difficult to stop the large number of applicants seeking admission to Universities. Consequently, the Committee recommended that in all institutions offering Science, Engineering, Medicine, Agriculture, Veterinary and other technical courses, a reservation of seventy percent of the seats should be allocated to qualified students belonging to Backward Classes. This reservation was to remain in force until such time as adequate accommodation could be provided for every student who was eligible for admission. The Committee’s report consequently presented this recommendation as the principal measure for addressing the problem of university‑level education for Backward Classes.

The Chairman of the Commission, who signed the Report, subsequently expressed a profound dissatisfaction with the method used by the Commission to identify which communities could be regarded as backward under Article 15(4). In a covering letter addressed to the President, the Chairman wrote, “My eyes were however opened, to the dangers of suggesting remedies on caste basis when I discovered that it is going to have a most unhealthy effect on the Muslim and Christian sections of the nation.” He further stated that this realization gave him a rude shock and led him to conclude that the remedies suggested by the Commission were worse than the evil they were intended to combat. The Chairman added, “if we eschew the principle of caste, it would be possible to help the extremely poor and deserving from all communities. Care, however, being taken to give preference to those who come from the traditionally neglected social classes.” Despite this strong expression of distress, the Chairman ultimately agreed to the Commission’s proposal that seventy percent of seats be reserved for Backward Classes. The Report and the Chairman’s covering letter were later examined by the Central Government. The Government, however, was not satisfied with the approach taken by the Commission in determining who should be treated as Backward Classes under Article 15(4). In its memorandum on the Report, the Government noted that “it cannot be denied that the caste system is the greatest hindrance in the way of our progress towards an egalitarian society,” and warned that recognizing the specified castes as backward might perpetuate existing caste distinctions. The memorandum further observed that some of the tests applied by the Commission were essentially individual in character and, if accepted, would cover a very large proportion of the nation’s population. It warned that if almost an entire community, with only a few exceptions, were classed as backward, the truly needy would be overwhelmed by the multitude, would receive little special attention or adequate assistance, and such a dispensation would not satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 340 of the Constitution.

The memorandum stressed that any systematic and elaborate action could commence only after the government had formulated clear positive tests and criteria to identify the classes or sections genuinely entitled to special relief and assistance. It therefore indicated that further investigation was evidently required before proceeding. Nevertheless, the Central Government issued instructions to the State Governments, requesting that they provide every possible assistance and reasonable facilities to persons who fell within the category of Backward Classes as listed in their existing registers, and also to those whom the States, in their judgment, should be considered socially and educationally backward under the prevailing circumstances. On 24 April 1962 the Central Government addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Education Department of the Government of Mysore concerning the reservation of seats under Article 15(4). In that letter the Central Government stated that it had examined the matter and was of the opinion that a uniform policy should be applied throughout the country, at least in non‑governmental educational institutions. The letter further noted that the All‑India Council for Technical Education had recommended that reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward communities could be set at up to 25 percent, with marginal adjustments not exceeding 10 percent in exceptional cases. Accordingly, the Central Government suggested that in all non‑government institutions in the State, the total reservation under Article 15(4) should not, under any circumstances, exceed 35 percent.

The Court then referred to the report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes prepared in 1959. That report cited a pilot survey conducted by the Deputy Registrar General of India at the request of the Government of India, using material gathered during the 1951 Census, to determine whether occupation could serve as a suitable basis for ascertaining social and educational backwardness. A preliminary analysis of the collected data indicated that a list of socially and educationally backward occupations could be drawn on two grounds: (a) any non‑agricultural occupation in any State where fifty percent or more of the persons engaged belong to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes; or (b) any non‑agricultural occupation where the literacy rate of the persons engaged is less than fifty percent of the general literacy rate of the State. In his report the Commissioner expressed adverse comments on the classification made by the State in the order that was being challenged. The Court noted that the next matter for consideration was the report of the Nagan Gowda Committee, appointed by the State. That Committee’s report proceeded on the premise that higher social status had historically been accorded on the basis of caste, and therefore it concluded that the low social position of any community was primarily due to the caste system.

There were ample reasons to conclude that social backwardness was primarily based on racial, tribal, caste and denominational differences, although economic backwardness might also have contributed to social backwardness. The Committee therefore approached the task of enumerating and classifying the socially and educationally backward communities on the premise that social backwardness depended substantially on the caste to which a community belonged, while recognising that economic condition could be a contributory factor. In the classification prepared by the Committee, the classes were virtually equated with the castes. According to the Committee, the entire Lingayat community was socially forward, whereas all sections of the Vokkaliga community, excluding the Bhunts, were socially backward. With regard to the Muslims, the majority of the Committee agreed that the Muslim community as a whole should be classified as socially backward. The Committee further decided to divide the backward communities into two categories, namely “Backward” and “More Backward”. To make this distinction, the Committee applied a single test: it asked whether the standard of education in the community in question was less than five hundred percent of the State average. If the answer was affirmative, the community was to be regarded as “More Backward”; if not, it was to be regarded as simply “Backward”. Concerning the extent of reservation in educational institutions, the Committee recommended that twenty‑eight percent be reserved for the Backward category and twenty‑two percent for the More Backward category, amounting to a total of fifty percent for the whole group of backward communities in addition to the existing one‑fifty percent for Scheduled Castes and three percent for Scheduled Tribes. Thus, according to the Committee’s calculation, sixty‑eight percent of seats would be set aside by reservation for the advancement of the Backward Classes as well as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Government based its impugned order on these recommendations. Article 15(4) provides that nothing in that Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. This provision was added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, with the purpose of bringing Articles 15 and 29 in line with Article 16(4). The Court recalled the case of State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, in which the validity of a Madras Government order fixing certain proportions for admissions to engineering and medical colleges was challenged. That order, which fixed admissions on the basis of the communities to which candidates belonged, was struck down by the Madras High Court and the decision was affirmed by this Court on the ground that the order violated the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 15(1) and 29(2) because no corresponding exception existed in Article 15 at that time.

In that earlier decision the Court observed that the fundamental rights enumerated in Articles 15(1) and 29(2) were not subject to any exception, and that, because there was no provision in Article 15 that corresponded to the special provision made in Article 16(4), the impugned order could not be upheld. The judgment consequently prompted the amendment of Article 15 and the insertion of clause 15(4). Accordingly, the Court regarded clause 15(4) as a proviso or exception to the general guarantees contained in Articles 15(1) and 29(2). The Court explained that if an order is justified on the basis of Article 15(4), its validity cannot be attacked on the ground that it violates Articles 15(1) or 29(2). In other words, the fundamental rights protected by those two provisions do not affect the legality of a special measure that may be made under the authority granted by Article 15(4). The Court stated that this position is settled and beyond dispute.

The petitioners argued that the order in question was invalid because it was not supported by Article 15(4). The first point raised on their behalf was that the State does not have the competence to issue an order under Article 15(4) unless a commission has been appointed pursuant to Article 340(1) and a copy of that commission’s report has been laid before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with Article 340(3). Their contention was that Article 340 provides for the creation of a commission to investigate the condition of Backward Classes, that the commission is required to prepare a report recommending measures for the improvement of those classes, and that, once the President receives the report, the President must cause a copy of the report together with a memorandum explaining the action taken to be placed before each House of Parliament. The petitioners therefore argued that only the President can take action on the report, and consequently only the President can make a special provision for the advancement of Backward Classes. They read Articles 340 and 15(4) together to reach this conclusion.

The Court rejected this contention as a misunderstanding. It acknowledged that the Constitution indeed contemplated the appointment of a commission whose report and recommendations would assist the authorities concerned in taking appropriate steps for the advancement of Backward Classes. However, the Court cautioned that it would be erroneous to treat the establishment of the commission and the subsequent procedural steps as a condition precedent to any action taken under Article 15(4). Moreover, Article 340(1) expressly states that the commission is to make recommendations regarding the steps that should be taken by the Union or by any State to improve the condition of Backward Classes. This language implies that the Union or the State, acting in their discretion, are the bodies responsible for implementing the recommendations, not the President alone. Consequently, the argument that only the President may act in this field could not be accepted.

The Court observed that the power to act on the recommendations of the Commission under Article 340(1) rests with the Union or with a State government, and not with the President. Accordingly, the contention that the President alone must act in this matter was rejected. The Court then considered the submission that any special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) must be made by legislation rather than by an executive order. It held that this submission was also erroneous. Article 12 defines the term “State” to include both the Government and the Legislature of each State, so it would be unreasonable to interpret “State” as meaning only the Legislature. Moreover, when the Constitution intends that a measure be taken by legislation and not by executive action, it uses specific phraseology to that effect. The Court pointed to Article 16(3) and (5) as illustrations, where those sub‑clauses expressly refer to law‑making by Parliament. In the same way, Articles 341(2) and 342(2) speak of a law to be enacted by Parliament. By contrast, Article 15(4) merely states that the State may make a special provision, and the Court concluded that this language permits the provision to be effected through an executive order. Hence, a special provision under Article 15(4) does not have to await parliamentary legislation and may be issued by the appropriate executive authority.

The Court explained that Article 15(4) authorises the State to make a special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, a category that is distinguished from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. While special provision can be made for both categories, the Constitution treats them as separate. Sub‑clauses (24) and (25) of Article 366 define Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively, but there is no definition in the Constitution of “socially and educationally backward classes of citizens.” Consequently, when assessing whether a particular provision under Article 15(4) is valid, the first issue to resolve is whether the State has correctly identified the persons who belong to those backward classes. The Court observed that, by the terms of Article 15(4), the backward classes for whom special provision is authorised are to be regarded as being similar to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Constitution‑makers had already recognised the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as backward and intended special measures for their advancement. They also recognised that other sections of society might be equally or somewhat less backward, and therefore the Constitution contemplated that special provision could also be made for those groups. Article 341 provides for a public notification specifying the castes, races or tribes that shall, for the purposes of this Constitution, be deemed Scheduled Castes, and similarly Article 342 deals with Scheduled Tribes.

Article 341 provides that, for the purposes of the Constitution, a public notification may declare certain castes, races or tribes to be deemed Scheduled Castes either in a State or in a Union Territory, as the situation requires. In a similar manner Article 342 authorises the issue of a public notification concerning Scheduled Tribes. Article 338(3) further states that any reference to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes shall be interpreted as also including any other Backward Classes that the President, after receiving a report from a Commission appointed under Article 340(1), may specify by order, and it also includes the Anglo‑Indian community. This provision therefore contemplates that the President may, by order, bring some Backward Classes within the ambit of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. The consequence of this scheme is to emphasize that the Backward Classes for whose advancement special provision is made under Article 15(4) are regarded, with respect to their backwardness, as comparable to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

When the scope and meaning of the expression “backward classes” in Article 15(4) are considered, it is essential to recognise that the notion of backwardness is not meant to be a relative concept that would admit every class that is backward in relation to the most advanced sections of society. If a relative test based on comparison with the most advanced classes were adopted, the result would be a proliferation of strata or layers of backward classes, each of which could claim inclusion under Article 15(4). This argument is not contested by the learned Advocate‑General for the State. The Constitution requires that the backwardness relevant to Article 15(4) be both social and educational; it is not sufficient for a class to be merely socially backward or merely educationally backward, but it must satisfy both criteria. Consequently, the Court must address the method by which social and educational backwardness are to be ascertained.

Turning first to social backwardness, the question arises as to the test that should be applied to determine whether a particular class is socially backward. Article 15(4) applies to “classes of citizens” rather than to “castes of citizens.” By dictionary definition, a class denotes a division of society on the basis of status, rank or caste. In the Hindu social structure, caste unfortunately continues to play a significant role in determining an individual’s status. Although scholars of sociology and Vedic studies contend that the caste system originally emerged from occupational or functional distinctions, over time it has become rigid and inflexible. Historical development shows that the original functional basis of caste was later burdened with notions of ritual purity, which produced a system characterised by inflexibility, a sense of superiority and inferiority, and narrow caste loyalty. Therefore, in examining whether any class of citizens is socially backward, it cannot be ignored that the caste of the group may be relevant to the assessment.

In discussing the group of citizens highlighted by the Court, it was emphasized that the special provision under Article 15(4) was intended to apply to classes of citizens rather than to individual persons. Consequently, while the caste of a particular class might have some relevance, the Court cautioned that its significance should not be overstated. The Court observed that a classification of backward classes based solely on caste would not always be logical and could risk perpetuating the caste system itself. Moreover, the Court noted that relying exclusively on caste as the test for social backwardness would fail in many parts of Indian society where caste, as understood in the Hindu context, does not exist. The Court asked how one could determine whether members of communities such as Muslims, Christians, Jains or even Lingayats were socially backward if the test were confined to caste, since the caste criterion would be inapplicable to those groups. Yet the Court stressed that this limitation did not warrant a blanket exclusion of such communities from the operation of Article 15(4), because it was conceivable that in some states certain Muslim, Christian or Jain groups might indeed be socially backward. Accordingly, the Court concluded that although caste may be a relevant factor when assessing the social backwardness of Hindu classes, it could not be made the sole or dominant test. The Court further explained that, at its core, social backwardness was largely the result of poverty; classes of citizens who were extremely poor automatically assumed a socially backward status because they lacked any recognized standing in society. While poverty‑induced backwardness might be intensified by the caste to which the poor belonged, this only demonstrated that both caste and poverty were pertinent considerations. The Court also identified occupation as another element that could contribute to social backwardness, noting that certain occupations were traditionally regarded as inferior and that individuals engaged in such work were likely to be classified as socially backward. Additionally, the Court recognized that the place of habitation played a non‑trivial role in determining the backwardness of a community, observing that the problem of social backwardness was fundamentally a problem of rural India, and that classes of citizens occupying a backward position in rural areas fell within the ambit of Article 15(4). Finally, the Court acknowledged that identifying socially backward classes was an inherently complex task, requiring the integration of sociological, social and economic factors, and that developing appropriate criteria would demand a thorough investigation, systematic data collection and a rational, scientific analysis of the gathered information.

In this case the Court explained that the role of the State, when it acts under article 15 (4) of the Constitution, is to apply a test that is consistent with the requirements of that provision. The matter before the Court was limited to determining whether the test employed by the impugned order satisfied the constitutional standard. The Court stated that if it were to be found that the test used by the order was inappropriate or invalid, then any classification of socially backward classes that relied on that test would have to be declared inconsistent with article 15 (4). Accordingly, the first step was to identify the test that the State had applied when it issued the order that was being challenged.

The Court observed that the Nagan Gowda Committee, which had been appointed by the State to examine the question of social backwardness, was inclined to treat caste as the dominant, if not the sole, criterion for determining whether a community could be classified as socially backward. Although the Committee did mention the general economic condition of a community as a contributing factor, the Court noted that the way the Committee listed the classes it deemed backward left no doubt that caste was the predominant consideration in its reasoning. Turning to the impugned order itself, the Court found that it adopted the earlier order dated 10 July 1961, making only minor modifications with respect to the quantum of reservation. Consequently, the Court examined the 1961 order to discern the test that had been applied by the State in classifying backward classes.

In the preamble of the 10 July 1961 order, the Court read a clear and unambiguous statement that the Committee had concluded that, under the present circumstances, the only practicable method of classifying the backward classes in the State was on the basis of castes and communities, and that the State Government accepted this method as the test to be applied. From this language, the Court concluded that there could be no doubt that the classification of “backward” and “more backward” classes had been made solely on the basis of caste, which the State regarded as a practicable basis. While the order did refer to additional factors in support of including the Lingayats among the backward classes, neither the Nagan Gowda Report nor the orders dated 10 July 1961 and 31 July 1962 provided any indication that any test other than the caste test had been employed in reaching the classification decision.

The learned Advocate‑General argued that the preamble of the 1961 order should not be read literally, contending that the wording was “inartistic” and that the order was not based solely on caste. The Court, however, was not persuaded by this submission. After carefully considering both orders in the context of the Nagan Gowda Report and its recommendations, the Court was satisfied that the State’s classification of socially backward classes was made on the sole consideration of caste, without taking into account the other factors that are undeniably relevant to the determination of social backwardness.

The Court observed that the State’s classification of socially backward classes was based solely on caste, without taking into account any of the other relevant factors that should influence such a determination. Because the classification ignored these additional considerations, the Court held that the identification of social backwardness for the communities covered by the impugned order was not in conformity with the requirements of Article 15(4) of the Constitution. This failure, the Court said, introduced a fundamental defect that invalidated the entire classification. Turning to the issue of educational backwardness, the Court noted that both the Nagan Gowda Report and the order under challenge attempted to assess educational disadvantage by measuring the average number of students from each community who were enrolled in the last three classes of every high school in the State, expressed per thousand members of that community. The figures supplied to the Committee were acknowledged to be approximate and not completely accurate, yet the Committee concluded that the State’s overall average enrollment for the last three high‑school classes was 69 per thousand. On that basis, the Committee determined that any caste whose average fell below the State average of 6.9 per thousand should be classified as a backward community, and it further held that any community whose average was less than half of the State average should be treated as a more backward class.

The Court conceded that using census‑provided literacy figures might not be sufficient for measuring educational backwardness, but it doubted whether the average enrolment in the last three high‑school classes was an appropriate yardstick either. Since the purpose of the test was to identify educationally backward classes, the Court reasoned that the benchmark set by the Committee was unduly high. Even if the test were considered rational and permissible under Article 15(4), the Court questioned whether it was proper to label as educationally backward those castes or communities whose enrolment figures were merely slightly below the State average. With the State average at 6.9 per thousand, a community that merely met or was just under that figure could not be regarded as backward; only communities whose enrolment was substantially lower than the State average could properly be described as educationally backward. Communities whose average enrolment was below fifty percent of the State average were, without doubt, educationally backward. Consequently, the Court concluded that the State was not justified in placing in the list of backward classes those castes or communities whose enrolment per thousand was only marginally above, very near to, or just below the State average. The judgment also recalled that the Nagan Gowda Committee had specifically recommended that the Lingayats...

The Court observed that the Committee had recommended that the Lingayat community should not be classified as a Backward Class. Nevertheless, the State decided otherwise. In doing so, the State adopted the view that the figures produced by the Committee ought to be rounded to the nearest whole number because, as stated in the order of 10 July 1960, absolute mathematical precision in such assessments is unattainable. Accordingly, the State increased the State average from 6.9 to 7 per thousand. Even after this adjustment, the Committee’s calculation placed the Lingayat community’s student‑population average at 7.1 per thousand, while the State, using its rounded figure, treated the average as 7 per thousand. Yet the State still held the Lingayats to be an educationally backward class. The Court explained that this conclusion was reached by effectively adding 0.1 to the State average and subtracting 0.1 from the Lingayat average. In the same manner, the Ganiga community, whose average also stood at 7 per thousand, was included in the list of Backward Classes. The Court held that, whether the State average is 6.9 or 7, it would be manifestly erroneous to deem communities whose student‑population ratios are at the same level as the State average to be educationally backward.

With respect to the Muslim community, the Court noted that the Committee’s majority view was that Muslims as a whole should be treated as socially backward, but that conclusion was presented merely as a conclusion without any supporting data or reasons. The Court pointed out that the Muslim community’s student‑population average is 5 per thousand, which is not sufficiently below the State average to justify classifying the community as educationally backward in Mysore. Consequently, the Court was not satisfied that the State was justified in treating communities or castes whose averages were the same as, or only slightly below, the State average as educationally backward classes of citizens. The Court further explained that, if the test is to be applied by reference to the State average, the proper approach is to regard only those classes whose averages are well or substantially below the State average as backward. The Court refrained from laying down a rigid rule, emphasizing that the State must consider the matter and decide in a manner consistent with the requirements of Article 15(4).

Finally, the Court addressed the sub‑classification introduced by the impugned order, which distinguished between “Backward Classes” and “More Backward Classes.” The Court held that this subdivision is not justified under Article 15(4), which authorises special provisions for the really backward classes. By creating two categories, the order in substance sought to devise measures for the benefit of all citizens, an exercise that exceeds the scope of Article 15(4). The Court concluded that such a classification does not align with the constitutional mandate.

In the Court’s view, classifying citizens as “less advanced” in comparison with the most advanced classes of the State does not fall within the scope of Article 15(4). The method employed by the impugned order effectively labels nearly ninety percent of the State’s population as backward, thereby dividing the population into a small “most advanced” group and a large “rest” that is further split into two categories: Backward and More Backward. This bifurcation, the Court held, is not justified by Article 15(4). The discussion then turned to the question of how far a State may go in making special provisions under Article 15(4). Article 15(4) empowers the State to make any special provision for the advancement of the Backward Classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Advocate‑General argued that this provision must be read in light of Article 46, which directs the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, particularly the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and to protect them from social injustice and exploitation. The Advocate‑General contended that the purpose of special provisions for the advancement of these castes or communities is to give effect to the directive principle embodied in Article 46, and that without rapid and liberal promotion of the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, the ideal of social and economic equality cannot be achieved. Consequently, Article 15(4) authorises the State to take adequate steps to fulfil the objective it envisions.

The Advocate‑General further submitted that the lack of any explicit limitation on the State’s power to make special provisions implies that, where the magnitude of backwardness and inequality among Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, or Scheduled Tribes in a particular State is such that it would require reserving all seats in higher educational institutions, the State could adopt that measure. According to this argument, the sole test to be applied is whether, in view of the problem the State is tasked to address, the provision made is reasonably adequate. The Court observed that this line of reasoning is prima facie attractive and therefore warrants careful examination.

In interpreting Article 15(4), the Court observed that the clause permits a special provision for the advancement of certain classes, Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, but it does not create an exclusive provision that would allow the State to disregard the advancement of the rest of society. The Court explained that the purpose of authorising a special provision is to serve the larger interests of society by promoting the progress of weaker sections, and that a provision which, by its very nature, excludes all other members of society falls outside the scope of Article 15(4). It would be unreasonable to presume that Parliament, in enacting Article 15(4), intended to permit the complete and absolute neglect of the fundamental rights of citizens who are not members of the backward classes, Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. The Court then turned to the specific reservation order that was under challenge, noting that the order related to admissions in seats of higher education institutions within the State. It was recognised that, following the awakening brought about by political freedom, every segment of the population now expressed an increasing desire to secure higher university education for their children, thereby placing a growing demand on universities. While acknowledging that this rising demand must be met and properly channelled, the Court stressed that the standards of higher education must not be compromised. It suggested that the large demand could be accommodated by establishing a greater number of educational institutions, including vocational schools and polytechnics, but warned that it would be contrary to national interest to bar qualified and competent students from university entry merely because all university seats were reserved for weaker elements of society. The Court quoted the University Education Commission, observing that “he indeed must be blind who does not see that mighty as are the political changes, far deeper are the fundamental questions which will be decided by what happens in the universities” (p. 32). Accordingly, when assessing the propriety of the reservation made by the impugned order, the Court held that the reservation must be viewed in the context of higher university education. It noted that the nation’s need for technicians, scientists, doctors, economists, engineers and other experts is great, and that a wholesale reservation of seats in all technical, medical or engineering colleges, to the exclusion of merit‑based considerations, would cause serious prejudice to national interests. Consequently, the Court affirmed that considerations of national interest must be taken into account when evaluating the scope and extent of special provisions under Article 15(4).

In examining whether the special measure contemplated by Article 15 (4) may legitimately exclude the remainder of society, the Court emphasized that the interests of the community or society as a whole cannot be ignored. It noted that the University Education Commission, while addressing assistance to backward communities, observed that the percentage of reservation should not exceed one‑third of the total seats and that such a principle may be applied for a period often extending many years, as recorded on page 53 of its report. The Court further recalled that the Central Government, in its communication to the State, had suggested that reservation for backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes could be up to twenty‑five percent, allowing marginal adjustments not exceeding ten percent in exceptional cases. The Advocate‑General argued that reserving a large number of seats for weaker sections should not diminish either the depth or the efficiency of scholarship, relying on the Backward Classes Commission’s observations that no complaints had arisen in the States of Madras, Andhra, Travancore‑Cochin and Mysore where the system of recruiting candidates from other backward classes to the reserve quota had been in operation for several decades, and that representatives of the upper classes did not complain about any lack of efficiency in offices filled through reservation, as noted on page 135. The Court found this opinion plainly inconsistent with the inevitable consequence of reservation in higher university education, stating that if admission to professional and technical colleges were unduly liberalised, it would be idle to contend that the quality of graduates would not suffer. The Court clarified that this observation does not imply that reservation should be rejected; rather, reservation must be adopted to advance the prospects of weaker sections of society, but in doing so the State must take care not to exclude admission to higher educational institutions for deserving and qualified candidates belonging to other communities. The Court held that a special provision contemplated by Article 15 (4), like the reservation of posts and appointments under Article 16 (4), must operate within reasonable limits. The interests of weaker sections, which constitute a primary charge on the State and the Centre, must be balanced against the interests of the community as a whole. Although the adjustment of these competing claims is undeniably difficult, the Court warned that if, under the guise of a special provision, a State were to reserve practically all seats available in all colleges, such action would clearly subvert the object of Article 15 (4). While the Court expressed reluctance to prescribe a definitive quantum, it suggested, in general terms, that a special provision should be less than fifty percent, with the precise figure depending on the prevailing circumstances of each case.

In this matter the Court observed that the State had issued an order on 10 July 1961 in which it clearly stated that the reservation of sixty‑eight percent recommended by the Nagan Gowda Committee was not in the larger interests of the State. The record contained no information about any events that occurred between that date and 31 July 1962. Nevertheless, during that interval the State altered its position and proceeded to adopt the Committee’s recommendation, thereby disregarding its earlier view that the recommendation was contrary to the State’s larger interests. The Court held that when a State makes a special provision for the advancement of weaker sections of society under Article 15(4), it must do so in an objective and rational manner. While it must take reasonable and even generous steps to promote the advancement of weaker elements, it must also assess the extent of the problem, keep the needs of the community at large in mind, and devise a formula that achieves a reasonable balance among the various relevant considerations. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the order directing a sixty‑eight percent reservation was plainly inconsistent with Article 15(4). The petitioners argued that, because of the defects in the impugned order, the State’s action amounted to a fraud on the constitutional power conferred by Article 15(4), and the Court found this argument well‑founded and worthy of upholding. The Court explained that describing an executive action as a fraud on the Constitution does not necessarily imply bad faith; rather, an action that is openly beyond the constitutional limits is ultra vires and must be struck down. Even when the transgression is not overt but hidden, the action is treated as a fraud on the constitutional power and is likewise invalid. Courts therefore examine the substance rather than the form of the executive action, scrutinising any appearance, cloak or veil that may conceal a substantive breach of constitutional authority. Having already determined that the impugned order classified Backward Classes solely on the basis of caste—a classification not permitted by Article 15(4)—and that the sixty‑eight percent reservation conflicted with the concept of a special provision under Article 15(4), the Court concluded that the order was a fraud on the constitutional power granted to the State by Article 15(4).

The Court held that the impugned order amounted to a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State by Article 15(4). The learned Advocate‑General made an earnest plea that the Court should not strike down the entire order but should only strike down those portions that appear unconstitutional on the doctrine of severability. He emphasized that since 1938 the State had issued five separate orders to address the problem of advancing the lot of the Backward Classes and that the State was anxious that the implementation of the impugned order should not be completely prohibited or halted. The Court observed that it could not discern a practicable way of severing the invalid provisions of the order. If the categorisation of the Backward Classes is held invalid, the Court would not, and could not, attempt to enumerate those categories; likewise, if the percentage of reservation is found to be improper and outside the scope of Article 15(4), the Court would not prescribe a definite or inflexible percentage to be reserved. In this connection the Court referred to a fact relied upon by the petitioners. They urged that the method adopted by the Government of Maharashtra in exercising its powers under Article 15(4) was a proper method. The Maharashtra scheme provides financial assistance and monetary grants to students seeking higher education where the family’s annual income falls below a prescribed minimum. The Court noted that this scheme is not before it and it is not called upon to express an opinion on it. Nevertheless, the Court observed that if any State adopts such a measure, it may afford relief and assist the advancement of the Backward Classes, because social and educational backwardness is fundamentally linked to poverty. The Court suggested that a State could also start newer educational institutions, polytechnics, vocational institutions and even rural universities to create more opportunities for higher education. This dual approach to the problem of backward communities can be pursued on a rational, broad and scientific basis consistent with the noble ideal of a secular, welfare, democratic State established by the Constitution. Such an approach may be supplemented, if necessary, by special reservation provisions to aid the Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It may be that other ways and means can achieve the same result. In a country where social and economic conditions differ from State to State, it would be idle to expect absolute uniformity of approach; however, in taking executive action to implement the policy of Article 15(4), it is necessary for the States to remember that the policy intended to be implemented is the policy which has been declared by

In this discussion, the Court observed that Article 46 together with the preamble of the Constitution provides the underlying purpose for Article 15(4). The provision authorises the State to make special arrangements for the advancement of the communities that the Constitution intends to protect, even when those arrangements may be inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 15 or Article 29(2). Consequently, any executive action taken under Article 15(4) must be based on an objective approach that is free from external pressures. The Court emphasized that such action is meant to achieve social and economic justice and must therefore be undertaken in a manner that ensures justice is actually done. While addressing this issue, the Court noted that the provisions of Article 15(4) are analogous to those of Article 16(4), which were examined in the earlier case of The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangoon (1962) 2 S.C.R. 586. In that case, the majority of the Court held that the power of reservation conferred on the State by Article 16(4) may be exercised not only by reserving appointments but also by reserving posts for selection. The Court reached this conclusion to give effect to the intention of the Constitution‑makers to provide adequate safeguards for the progress of backward classes and to ensure their appropriate representation in public services.

The judgment in Rangoon identified that the sole issue before the Court was whether the reservation made fell outside the scope of Article 16(4), thereby raising a question of construction of that article. The Court did not examine the propriety, reasonableness, or wisdom of the order because the respondents did not argue that an order valid under Article 16(4) could nevertheless be a fraud upon the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court observed that administrative efficiency is of paramount importance, and it would be unwise and impermissible to compromise efficiency by imposing any reservation that undermines it, a principle reflected in Article 335. The Court therefore stated that what holds true for Article 16(4) also applies to Article 15(4). The Constitution‑makers assumed, rightly, that while adequate reservation under Article 16(4) is permitted, it must not be unreasonable, excessive, or extravagant, because such reservation would eliminate general competition, generate widespread dissatisfaction among employees, and materially affect efficiency. Accordingly, a special provision made improperly under Article 15(4) or an excessive reservation under Article 16(4) would be liable to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitution. In this context, the Court stressed that Article 15(4) is an enabling provision; it does not impose a mandatory duty on the State but merely leaves it to the discretion of the appropriate government to take suitable action when necessary.

The Court observed that the statutory provision places the decision‑making power in the hands of the appropriate government, allowing it to exercise its discretion to take such suitable action as may be required, if it considers such action necessary. Accordingly, the Court granted relief in favour of the petitioners by allowing the writ petitions that had been filed. It directed that an appropriate writ, order, or direction be issued by the competent authority, expressly restraining the three respondents from giving effect to the impugned order. This restraint was to be effected in accordance with the specific prayer set out in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph 38 of the petitions. In addition, the Court ordered that the petitioners be awarded their costs, which included a single set of hearing fees. The petitions were therefore allowed, and the relief sought by the petitioners was granted in full.