Laxman Balwant Bhopatkar vs The Charity Commissioner, Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 313 of 1958

Decision Date: 1 May 1962

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.R. Mudholkar, Venkatarama Aiyar

In this matter the Supreme Court of India recorded that the petition was filed by the estate of Laxman Balwant Bhopatkar, who was deceased, against the Charity Commissioner of Bombay. The judgment was delivered on 1 May 1962 and the report was authored by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, who sat with Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The bench is identified in the report as the Ayyangar bench, with the same three judges listed again in a slightly different format, and the citation of the decision appears as 1962 AIR 1589 and 1963 SCR (2) 625. The case is also noted in later citators as R 1965 SC1281 (290). The statutory context concerned the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Bombay Act 29 of 1950), particularly sections 2(13) and 9(4), and the question of whether a trust having a political purpose could be treated as a public charitable trust for the purpose of registration under section 18 of that Act.

The headnote of the report set out the factual background involving Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who died on 1 August 1920 leaving a will. On 16 August 1920 his two sons together with the executor named in the will executed a trust deed dealing with two newspapers, “The Kesari” and “The Maharatta”, and the associated property and machinery. Clause 1 of that trust deed was reproduced in the report and read in part: “This Trust deed has been made as a means to the fulfillment perpetually and uninterruptedly after the death of the late Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak of that very object of his with which he took all activities after he took charge of the newspapers‑the Kesari and Maratha such as of spreading political education through the newspapers and thereby making people alive to their political rights and carrying on other multifarious public activities conducive to the national ideal etc.” A review of Tilak’s public life indicated that his purpose in taking over and operating the two newspapers was political. The report explained that his aim was to awaken the consciousness of the people to their condition, to generate political awareness, and thereby to bring about adjustments of a political character demanded and enforced by those who absorbed the truths expressed in the writings.

The legal issue presented to the Court was whether the trust created by Tilak, as described in the deed of 16 August 1920, qualified as a public charitable trust under the definition in section 2(13) read with section 9(4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, so that an order of the Charity Commissioner could require the trustees to register the trust. Justice Subba Rao, speaking dissentingly, held that a political purpose did not fall within the meaning of a charitable purpose. He affirmed that a political purpose was not included in the expression “for the advancement of any other object of general public utility” found in section 9(4) of the Act. Consequently, he concluded that the life‑mission of Lokmanya Tilak, as pursued through the two newspapers and set out in the trust deed, was a political purpose and therefore the trust was not required to be registered under section 18 of the Act. Justice Subba Rao emphasized that the object of Tilak, after he assumed control of the newspapers, was to work for the regeneration of the country by using national education through the press to make people aware of their political rights, and he asserted that such a purpose, being political, fell outside the charitable category contemplated by the statute.

The Court observed that the purpose behind the newspapers was to work for the regeneration of the country, and that the founder believed national education conveyed through newspapers and writings, which would make people aware of their political rights, constituted the most important element in the uplift of the nation. The trust that was executed to perpetuate that purpose was therefore a trust for general public utility within the meaning of section 9(4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The expression “object of general public utility” was described as very comprehensive and capable of including every purpose, whether political or otherwise, provided it serves a general public utility. The Court referred to several authorities that had considered this question, namely Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1938) 17 Tax Cas. 508; Trustees of the Tribune Press, Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1939) LR 66 IA 241; All India Spinners’ Association v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1944) LR 71 A 159; Re Hopkinson: Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Baker [1949] 1 All ER 346; Subhas Ohandra Bose v. Gordhandas Patel ILR [1940] Bom 254; and In re Lokmanya Tilak Jubilee National Trust Fund Bombay (1941) 43 Bom LR 1027.

The judgment was recorded in the civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 313 of 1958, an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 2 February 1956 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 775 of 1955 from the original decree. Counsel for the appellants included Veda Vyasa, S. G. Patwardhan and Ganpat Rai, while counsel for the respondent and the State of Maharashtra (intervener) comprised the Additional Solicitor‑General of India, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar. The decision was delivered on 1 May 1962. The judgment of Chief Justice Sinha, C. J., together with Justices Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudholkar and Venkatarama Aiyar, was read by Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar. The appeal arose from a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Bombay under Article 133(1)(b) & (c) of the Constitution. The central issue was whether the “Kesari & Mahratta Trust”, of which the appellants were trustees, qualified as a “public trust” under the Bombay Public Trust Act (Act XXIX of 1950), hereafter referred to as the Act. The Act, by its long title, was enacted “to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts in the State of Bombay” and came into force on 14 August 1950. Section 18 of the Act provides that it is the duty of the trustee of a public trust to which the Act has been applied to make an application for registration of the public trust. Section 66 of the Act prescribes penalties, according to a table appended to it, for contravention of the various sections, including section 18(1). In that context, the trustees of the appellant‑trust addressed a communication dated 16 April 1952 to the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Poona region, Poona, who was the authority empowered to consider the registration of the trust.

The trustees contended that the Kesari and Mahratta Trust was not a “public Trust” within the meaning of the Bombay Public Trust Act and therefore should not be required to register under the Act. Section 19 of the Act authorises an Assistant Charity Commissioner to conduct an inquiry to determine, among other matters, whether a trust exists and whether it qualifies as a public trust. Acting under this power, the Assistant Charity Commissioner instituted such an inquiry, and he gave the trustees an opportunity to present their representations and arguments concerning the status of the trust. After reviewing the submissions, the Commissioner recorded a finding under Section 20 that the Kesari and Mahratta Trust was a public trust to which the Act applied, and he ordered its registration. Section 70 of the Act permits aggrieved parties to appeal findings and orders made under Section 20 to the Charity Commissioner, and the trustees exercised this right by renewing their contentions before the Commissioner. The appellate authority, however, affirmed the Assistant Commissioner’s conclusion, held that the trust was a public trust, and consequently dismissed the trustees’ appeal. Under Section 72 of the Act, any party dissatisfied with the Charity Commissioner’s decision on the existence or public character of a trust may apply to the Court for setting aside that decision. The trustees filed such an application, but the learned District Judge of Poona rejected it, maintaining the Commissioner’s order. The trustees then appealed the district judge’s judgment to the High Court of Bombay; the High Court also dismissed the appeal but granted a certificate that enabled the present appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether the Kesari and Mahratta Trust qualifies as a “public trust” under the Act, a determination that would justify the registration order issued by the Assistant Charity Commissioner. Section 2 of the Act defines a public trust in clause (13) as an express or constructive trust created for public, religious or charitable purposes, or any combination thereof. Section 9 of the Act defines “charitable purpose” to include relief of poverty or distress, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. The definition expressly excludes any purpose that relates solely to sports or solely to religious teaching or worship. The parties cited other provisions, but the Court noted that interpreting and deciding the validity of those provisions would be be only if the trust were found to be a public charitable trust under Section 2(13).

Invoking section 9, the Court moved straight to examine the arguments advanced by counsel on the pivotal issue. The trust that was the subject of the appeal had been created by a deed dated 16 August 1920 and was executed by three individuals. The first two creators of the trust were the sons of Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who had died on 1 August 1920 leaving a will dated 5 April 1918; the third creator was the executor that the deceased had appointed under that will. The preamble of the trust deed referred to the execution of the will and, after stating that the will had been accepted in all respects by the three executants, declared that the deed concerning the Kesari Printing Press, newspapers and related enterprises was being executed so that the purposes articulated in the will could be fulfilled. The trust deed comprised thirteen clauses, but for the purposes of the present appeal only clauses 1 and 8 were material. Clause 1 set out the objects of the trust. Clause 8 dealt with contingencies that might arise if a trustee became unable to perform his duties or if the institution ceased to exist. Clause 8 provided that if any of the trustees became incapable of discharging the duties of the trust for any reason, the remaining trustees could appoint a person, in their joint opinion, who was deemed fit to act in accordance with the wishes of Lokamanya Tilak. The clause further stipulated that if only one trustee remained, that trustee could make the appointment following the same policy, and that all rights of the trustee under the deed would vest in the newly appointed trustee. It continued that if, for any reason, new trustees were not appointed or none of the original trustees survived, the “panchas” mentioned in clause 8, under the heading of ‘the Printing Press’ in Lokamanya Tilak’s will, or the panchas appointed in their place, would select new trustees. Should such appointment fail to occur in the manner prescribed, the trust estate would revert to the first two trustees or to their heirs, primarily in the capacity of trustees. The clause further stated that if the institution temporarily ceased functioning but could be revived, any trustees who were then present and capable could resume the trust’s operations; however, if the institution ceased to exist permanently and revival was impossible, the trust and its assets would revert as described.

The Court observed that the clause stating “or their heirs. The trustees of the institution individually, or their heirs shall have no private (personal) right whatever to this property” meant that neither the trustees nor their successors could claim any personal interest in the trust property. The Court further recorded that counsel for the appellant‑trustees affirmed that the appellants had no intention whatsoever to abandon the purposes of the Trust or to disregard the terms of the Trust deed, even if the Court were to hold that the Trust was not a public charitable trust. Counsel explained that, out of respect for the memory of Lokmanya Tilak, the trustees would continue to pursue forever the mission entrusted to them by the great leader. Because the entire dispute in the present appeal, as well as the earlier decision adverse to the appellants, hinged on the interpretation and legal effect of the provisions contained in clause 1, the Court deemed it necessary to set out that clause in full. The Trust deed, originally drafted in Marathi, had been translated into English and this translation had been accepted by both parties. The translation read: “This Trust deed has been made as a means to the fulfilment perpetually and uninterruptedly after the death of the late Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak of that very object of his with which he took all activities after he took charge of the newspapers—the Kesari and Maratha—such as of spreading political education through the newspapers and thereby making people alive to their political rights and carrying on other multifarious public activities conducive to the national ideal etc.” The Court noted that the printed version of the translation in the Paper Book rendered the phrase as “such as spreading national education through those newspapers etc.” However, the parties agreed that the adjective “national” was not a correct rendering of the Marathi term “Rajakia,” which more accurately corresponded to the English word “political.” Consequently, the Court proceeded with the translation accepted by both parties that used the term “political.” The Court then pointed out that, from the preamble and clause 1, it was clear that the Trust was created for the purpose of fulfilling Lokmanya’s last wishes as expressed in his will dated 5 April 1918. Accordingly, the terms of that will were relevant to understanding the object that the Trust sought to achieve. The will had been executed in Colorado on 5 April 1918. While most of its provisions dealt with legacies to his sons, the Court focused on the provisions contained in clauses 3 and 4, which were pertinent to the present dispute. Clause 3(1), titled “The Printing Press,” stated: “I have made a public trust of the newspapers, the office, the printing press, the machine and the foundry, the newspaper library and security‑money in respect of newspapers.” The Court observed, however, that this statement was not accurate because, although Lokmanya clearly intended to create a trust, no formal deed had been executed. That deficiency, the Court noted, had been remedied by his sons and the executor appointed under the will.

The Court observed that clause 4 of the will was material and read as follows: “The policy of the papers (editorial policy) shall be kept as it is; under no circumstances shall it be changed.” The remaining provisions of the will were held to be irrelevant to the matters raised in the appeal. The issue for determination, the Court explained, was whether clause 1 of the deed of trust created a public charitable trust. In analysing that clause, the Court found that the principal object of the trust was to fulfil the basic purpose that animated the activities of the late Lokmanya and that he had sought to achieve through the two newspapers, Kesari and Mahratha, after assuming control of them. This purpose had to be read together with the provision of the will that required the two newspapers to continue operating with their editorial policy entirely unchanged. The Court further noted that, as an illustration of the prime purpose, the will indicated that the Lokmanya intended the newspapers to spread political education, to make the public aware of their political rights, and to undertake various other public activities that would advance the national ideal. The Court then pointed out that, although the trust’s object was closely linked to the policy and purpose of Kesari and Mahratha after the Lokmanya took charge, no party had introduced evidence at any stage identifying precisely what the editorial policy or the specific object of the two newspapers was meant to be. Nor had any evidence been adduced showing the exact aims and objectives that the Lokmanya had intended to inculcate through the teachings published in those newspapers. It appeared to be assumed, the Court observed, that the life and ideals for which the Lokmanya stood, and especially the matters he regarded as the prime purpose and policy of the two newspapers with which he had been associated for more than two decades, were matters of historical knowledge so well‑known to the courts and authorities in Maharashtra that formal proof was deemed unnecessary. The Court added, however, that the presence of such evidence on the record would have eased its task, and that the absence of that evidence constituted a handicap that the Court had to confront in deciding the controversy. At this juncture, the Court considered it appropriate to refer to a previous occasion on which the interpretation of the trust deed, particularly the question of whether it was a public charitable trust, had been examined by the courts. The Court cited Section 4(3) of the Indian Income‑Tax Act, 1922, which exempts from income tax “any income derived from property held under a trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes in so far as such income is applied or is accumulated for application to such religious or charitable purpose.” The provision also contained a definition of “charitable purpose,” which the Court indicated would be relevant to the present determination.

It was observed that the definition of a charitable purpose under the Act included “relief of the poor, education, medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility.” The Court noted that this definition was essentially identical to the language used in the provision that the parties relied upon. The Kesari and Mahratha Trust had claimed exemption from tax under that provision, and the claim was referred to the High Court of Bombay under section 66(2) of the Indian Income‑tax Act. The reference was heard by the Chief Justice, Mr Beaumont, and Justice Rangnekar. In delivering the judgment, the learned Chief Justice stated that, in his view, the trust described in clause I of the deed was overly vague and broad to be classified as a charitable trust within the meaning of the Income‑tax Act. He explained that although some of the purposes set out in the deed were unquestionably charitable, other purposes were not, and the totality of the trust’s funds could be applied to non‑charitable ends. He further observed that the purposes included the organization of public movements and, even if those movements were limited by the phrase “calculated to promote the national ideal,” it was impossible to say that such promotion, as conceived by the trustees, could be deemed necessarily of public utility. Consequently, the learned Judges held that the trust was not eligible for exemption under section 4(3) of the Income‑tax Act.

The counsel for the appellant did not argue before this Court that the earlier judgment was binding jurisprudence for the present proceedings; instead, the counsel pointed out that the earlier decision merely expressed the views of the learned Judges on the construction of the document whose interpretation was now in dispute. The Court therefore set aside that earlier decision and proceeded to interpret clause (1) of the deed to determine whether the objects sought to be achieved fell within the statutory definition of “charitable purpose.” To do so, the Court first outlined the construction that had been favored by the High Court Judges in the appealed judgment and then examined the submissions made by counsel on both sides. Referring to clause 1, the Judges identified two principal activities required to fulfil the trust’s objects: (1) the awakening in the minds of the people of a consciousness of their political rights by disseminating political knowledge through the newspapers “Kesari” and “Mahratha,” and (2) the organization of various public movements calculated to promote the national ideal. The Judges further stated that the second activity could not be regarded as a charitable purpose under the Bombay Public Trust Act, observing that the nature and character of the public movements intended to further the national ideal were not even indicated, let alone specified, making it impossible to deem such movements as an object of general public utility.

The Court observed that the activity of organising public movements, which the trustees believed might advance the national ideal, could not be treated as an object of general public utility within the meaning of clause (4) of section 9 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. The Court noted that such public movements would not fall under any of the other clauses of section 9 either. Consequently, the Court concluded that the second purpose mentioned in clause 1 of the trust deed – namely the promotion of public movements for the national ideal – could not be regarded as a charitable purpose. In contrast, the Court held that the first purpose, described as “awakening a consciousness of political rights among the people by spreading the knowledge of politics through the newspapers,” was a charitable purpose. While referring to English decisions that political purposes are not charitable because advancing an object of general public utility could not be imported into Indian law, the Court reasoned that the awakening of political consciousness is not identical with the advancement of political objects. Moreover, the Court stated that such awakening need not be directed toward a political aim and therefore could be characterised as the advancement of an object of public utility.

Learned counsel for the appellant advanced several points to support the contention that the trust deed did not create a charitable trust. First, counsel argued that the High Court erred in holding that the trust contained two separate objects; instead, counsel submitted that there was only a single object, and that object was political in nature, which would place it outside the ambit of charitable purposes under the law. Second, counsel contended that even if the High Court’s view of two objects were accepted, the two were not truly independent because both were dominated by the same political purpose. Underlying these arguments was the assertion that the trust was founded with the sole aim of permanently and uninterruptedly achieving the objective that the late Lokmanya pursued after assuming control of the newspapers “Kesari” and “Mabratha.” Counsel acknowledged that the newspapers might have been employed for activities appearing to go beyond a single purpose, but maintained that the common thread linking all such activities was their political character, as the newspapers served as the vehicle for fulfilling his political agenda.

The Court observed that determining the purpose of the trust required an examination of the various activities undertaken by the Lokmanya and the objectives that motivated those activities. It noted, however, that the High Court had not based its finding of a dual purpose on that examination. The High Court had concluded that the trust deed contained a duality of purpose, recognizing one limb as non‑charitable while holding the other limb to be charitable. The Court explained that the words in the second limb of the first clause – “the spreading of political education through the newspapers and thereby making people alive to their political rights” and “the carrying on other multifarious public activities conducive to the national ideal” – were intended merely as illustrations of activities carried out by the Lokmanya during his lifetime, as indicated by the introductory words “such as”. The Court reasoned that if the Lokmanya’s post‑newspaper activities were dominated by a political purpose and the newspapers served that purpose, then the illustrations of his activities in the clause should be interpreted in the same manner, a point that would be returned to later.

The Court further noted an alternative approach to the issue. It recalled that the High Court had held the phrase “carrying on other multifarious public activities conducive to the national ideal” to be overly vague to constitute an enforceable trust purpose. The Court highlighted two sources of vagueness: the indeterminate nature of “conducive to the national ideal” and the additional indeterminacy introduced by “other multifarious public activities”. To test the validity of this object, the Court proposed examining whether the deed would remain a valid charitable purpose if it were limited solely to the provision that the trust fund be used for “carrying on multifarious public activities conducive to the national ideal”. The Court concluded that such an inquiry could be answered only in one way – that the trust would be too vague to be valid.

Consequently, the Court stated that if the latter portion of clause (1) were excluded as vague, two questions would arise. First, whether, on a proper construction of clause (1) read with the remainder of the deed, the object sought to be achieved was a single object or multiple objects. Second, whether the object expressed in the words “spreading of political education through the newspapers and thereby making people alive to their political rights” would qualify as a charitable purpose within the meaning of section 9 of the Act. The Court emphasized that, with the vague portion removed, the object of the trust would read, quoting the relevant words, “the fulfilment perpetually and uninterruptedly of the very object with which he (the Lokmanya) took up all”.

In this case the Court first examined the language of the clause that spoke of “activities after he took charge of the newspapers such as spreading political education through these newspapers and thereby making people alive to their political rights.” The Court said it would now consider the meaning of the expression “the very object with which he took up all activities after he took charge of the newspapers.” Before doing so, the Court observed that it had no hesitation in holding that the words extracted from the clause indicate only a single purpose, namely the fulfilment of the objects with which Tilak took up all activities after he assumed control of the two newspapers. The Court also noted that no evidence had been placed before the authorities under the Act or before the Courts to show what objective the Lokmanya intended to achieve through the two newspapers.

Learned counsel for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to a reported decision of the Bombay High Court in which certain writings and articles of the late Lokmanya were considered, especially those articles that formed the subject‑matter of the charges against him in prosecutions for sedition. The Court cautioned that if the inquiry were confined only to those writings, the material would give a merely partial and truncated picture of Tilak’s activities and would likely present a distorted view of the objects with which the two newspapers were conducted. Consequently, the Court examined the broader literature on the life and work of this great leader, focusing in particular on two recent books: Bala Gangadhar Tilak by Parvate (1958), which had been brought to the Court’s notice by counsel appearing for the respondent, and Lokmanya Tilak by Dhananjay Keer (September 1959). In reviewing these works, the Court confined itself to the factual statements contained therein and deliberately refrained from considering the authors’ evaluations of Tilak’s activities or any commentary on the public or social views expressed by the subject of the biographies.

From that examination the Court gathered several facts that are relevant to the question before it. The Court found that Tilak was associated with the two newspapers from their inception, around 1881, that he assumed the editorship of the Kesari in 1887, and that by 1893 he had become the sole proprietor of both papers, remaining in charge of their conduct until his death in 1920. The Court further observed that Tilak was a public figure who dominated the political arena of the country for nearly three decades. He was a rebel against political wrongs and a champion of all who were oppressed. He regarded it as his sacred mission to rouse the people to an awareness of their grievances and to inspire them with a sense of their own strength in attaining salvation. The Court noted that Tilak firmly believed that the petty tyranny of the foreign bureaucracy was possible because of the people’s ignorance and their apathy toward their condition. His ideas, the Court said, can be gleaned from his observation that people must fight for the vindication of their rights.

In the view expressed, the right to justice demanded that any individual who remained indifferent to the sight of injustice and to the high‑handed policies of the Government should not be regarded as a human being. Tilak intended his two newspapers, the Kesari and the Mahratha, to serve as the mechanism by which the wrongs inflicted upon the people could be brought home to them, thereby rousing the public conscience to a clear awareness of the injustices and oppressions to which they were subjected. By undertaking the responsibility of running the Kesari and the Mahratha, Tilak gave a clear indication of his resolve to throw himself completely into public life and to devote himself to the task of politically educating the masses. He wrote in the Kesari about every public grievance and every public cause, and this activity made him the champion of popular causes and a mass leader. The Kesari and the Mahratha were in no sense mere newspapers; they were primarily view‑papers, vehicles of public opinion, and the news they contained was carefully selected to be helpful to the views propagated in them. Tilak looked upon the Kesari as the chief vehicle for propagating his own views, desiring that those views be disseminated as widely as possible. The objective of the papers determined their style, which was direct, simple and forthright. Both papers championed the cause of the under‑dog, fought everywhere against injustice, presented studies of public complaints and grievances, exposed oppressive officers, criticised authority fearlessly, and made constructive suggestions for the reform of the administration, thereby championing the people's cause in every sense. During Tilak’s era, the name Tilak became synonymous with the Kesari, and the Kesari itself became the citadel of the national fight, remaining impregnable even through repressive campaigns and becoming a national asset. Tilak held the firm view that the ills of the nation demanded political reforms rather than immediate social reforms. He challenged the right of the foreign bureaucracy to sit in legislative judgment on Indian society. Tilak further maintained that respect must be paid to the prejudices of the people and that one must try to make even the humblest individual feel that he belonged to the community. He was convinced of the futility of appeals made to the people in the form of speeches and resolutions that kept their eyes fixed on the Government, and he realised that the Indian National Congress, with which he had been closely associated since 1889, could ameliorate the condition of the people if the masses were attracted to it and their power harnessed to the chariot of the Congress. The main role of his life, according to him, was to stir up the people against their poverty, degradation and slavery. To foster opposition to British rule, to bring the people into conflict with the Government and to make the Government unpopular was the great aim of Tilak’s speeches, writings and leadership. The enthusiasm and vigour of the people were to be utilized for keeping alive their pride in the achievements of their ancestors and as a means of educating the common people. He therefore sought to rouse the populace to these ends.

The Court observed that Tilak sought to inspire pride in the people by recalling the deeds of earlier heroes, hoping that such reverence would unite the populace into a single body capable of attaining political freedom. He argued that citizens needed to be educated about their rights and the methods for obtaining redress of grievances, because this knowledge would enlarge the influence of the Indian National Congress. Tilak encouraged the people to act fearlessly yet peacefully and lawfully, maintaining that the foreign yoke could be cast off only when the masses were awakened, dissatisfied, and unable to remain under foreign domination. He asserted that without drawing public attention to existing injustices, no political progress or administrative reform could be achieved.

From about 1903 Tilak gradually moved away from the approach of the Moderates toward what the Moderates termed “Extremism,” driven by his displeasure at their apathy towards active politics. He found that the Congress had become a forum for polished speeches that concluded with prayers and petitions, and that it had grown sterile. Tilak concluded that politics could no longer be a pastime for the old orators and title‑holders; instead, the true triumph of the Congress lay in awakening the nation’s soul. While the Moderates regarded British rule as a divine dispensation, the militant nationalists led by Tilak rejected that doctrine.

After the 1905 partition of Bengal and the ensuing agitation, Tilak authored articles advocating a boycott of foreign goods, especially foreign cloth, and he held that a nationwide boycott was the appropriate remedy, although its success depended on decisive action rather than mere words. As the leading figure of the Swadeshi movement, Tilak linked the boycott to a political objective, stating that if the Government of India continued to intertwine politics with commerce, it would be impossible to separate the Swadeshi movement from politics. In his newspaper, the Kesari, he advised that when the use of a foreign article was unavoidable, preference should first be given to products from Asian nations, then to those from other European countries, and finally to goods from America.

Tilak made it his life’s mission to rouse the people against political slavery and foreign domination. He resolved to organise the masses under the banner of the Congress and to transform the Congress into the genuine spokesperson of the people. He used his two newspapers as the principal vehicles to achieve these objectives. The Court noted that nothing illustrates more forcefully the purpose and aim that animated Tilak’s conduct of the newspapers than this determination.

Beyond the self‑appraisal that appears in the biography by Parvate, a dispute emerged in 1919 concerning Tilak’s apparent neglect of social reform and his exclusive focus on political advancement. Dr. Paranjpye criticized Tilak on this point in an article published in the Bombay Chronicle, characterising the matter as a “sin of omission and commission.” In response, Tilak issued a rejoinder in which he reviewed his entire career. In that letter he declared that his political and social views were already well known to the public and that the accusation against him was that his activity and propaganda were one‑sided. He explained that he did not believe social reconstruction had to precede political emancipation, and that he attached greater importance to the latter. Referring to his newspaper, the Kesari, Tilak acknowledged that he had made it an organ exclusively for political propaganda, but he argued that the political awakening in Maharashtra since that time was more the result of the paper and his party than of Dr. Paranjpye and his associates.

Before concluding this part of the case, it was necessary to consider an aspect arising from the summary of Tilak’s activities conducted through the two newspapers. It was evident that Tilak was wholly concerned with achieving a close association between the people and their representatives in the administration and governance of the country, and, if possible, with the complete elimination of foreign rule. The two newspapers were employed as instruments for educating and rousing the public to attain these objectives. While it is an interesting question what Tilak’s policy or the newspapers’ programme would have been after full independence, the Court held that such speculation was not relevant to the issue before it. The focus was on the object that Tilak sought to accomplish by running these newspapers, which was the very purpose for which the trust had been established.

The survey, although limited, of the Lokmanya’s public life and his relationship with the two newspapers undeniably showed that his purpose in taking over and managing the papers was clearly political. By stirring the consciousness of the people about their condition, he aimed to create political awareness that would lead to a political character being demanded and enforced by those influenced by his writings. The next question considered was whether a political purpose—defined not as teaching political or social theory in an academic sense, but as moving people to practical action to bring about governmental change—constituted a charitable purpose. A debate arose regarding the meaning of “charitable,” and arguments were presented concerning the precise point of difference between the concept of charity under English law and that under Indian law.

The Court observed that the issue required a comparison between the concept of charity under English law and that under Indian law. It noted, citing Lord Wright in Chichester Diocesan Fund & Board‑of‑Finance (Incorporated) v. Simpons (1), that the term “charity” has not always possessed a precise meaning in England. Historically, the identification of a charitable purpose had been derived from the preamble of the Act of 43 Elizabeth I, chapter IV (1601), which was taken to signify those purposes that would be recognised as charitable. The Court held that it was unnecessary to reproduce the specific objects listed in that preamble, but it was accepted that the list was not exhaustive. To determine whether a purpose was legally charitable, English courts have traditionally referred to that preamble. In earlier decisions, the courts considered not only the enumerated objects but also, by analogy, those purposes that were deemed to fall “within the spirit and intention of that statute,” and consequently held them to be charitable in the legal sense.

The Court further explained that, following the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel (1), the expression “charitable purpose” has been understood to comprise four main heads: (1) relief of poverty; (2) advancement of education and learning; (3) advancement of religion; and (4) other purposes beneficial to the community or the advancement of objects of general public utility. Regarding the fourth head, Lord Macnaghten had expressed the view that, under English law, some purposes of general utility might be charitable while others might not, the true test being whether the particular purpose fell within the spirit and intention of the Elizabethan statute.

The Court noted that it was not necessary to decide whether the Indian concept of charity was broader than the scope outlined by Lord Macnaghten for English law, because the present case was governed by section 9 of the Indian Act, which defines the various categories into which a charity may fall. The respondent did not argue that the trust deed created a charity under any head other than the fourth clause of section 9, namely “the advancement of any other object of general public utility.” The Court clarified that the respondent also did not contend that the reference to “political education” in clause 1 of the trust deed brought the trust within the “advancement of education” head of section 9(2).

Finally, the Court identified the pivotal question to be resolved: whether the achievement of a political purpose—understood as the arousal in people of a desire and an imperative need to demand changes in the structure of administration and the mechanisms by which they are governed—could be characterised as the “advancement of an object of general public utility.”

In this case, the Court observed that the matter raised was very narrow, and therefore it was unnecessary to examine in detail the exact differences between the English position articulated by Lord Macnaghten and the position embodied in the Indian statutes that deal with the same issue. The Court explained that this approach was justified because there were already several decisions of the Privy Council interpreting section 4 of the Indian Income‑Tax Act of 1922. In those decisions, the term “charitable” was defined in precisely the same way as the term appears in section 9 of the present Act, and the judges in those cases had to decide whether the pursuit of a political purpose could be treated as a charitable purpose. Before turning to the Privy Council judgments, the Court thought it useful to recall certain English cases that had taken the view that a purpose which is political does not qualify as charitable because it does not further an object of general public utility.

The earliest English decision referred to was the judgment of Justice Rowlatt in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The Temperance Council (1926) 10 Tax Cas. 748. In that case the Temperance Council claimed exemption from income‑tax on the basis that it was established solely for charitable purposes. The Council’s objective was described as “by united action to secure legislative and other temperance reform.” Justice Rowlatt rejected the claim, holding that the Council’s work was to be of strictly non‑party character, a point the Court considered irrelevant. He further stated that the proposition that a political purpose is not charitable is not decisive, because political purposes may be intertwined with party politics and the word “political” does not, in that context, convey a charitable meaning. Consequently, the judge concluded that because the trust’s object was to secure a particular line of legislation, it could not be regarded as a charitable trust.

The Court then turned to the later case of Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1933) 17 Tax Cas. 508. In that matter the trust had been created by a donor who, at the time of the gift, was the Chairman of the central office of the Conservative Party. After the donor’s death, an oral trust was formalised by a deed to achieve the donor’s objectives. The trust’s objects included, among other things, honoring the memory of Bonar Law, a former leader of the Conservative Party; preserving a historic building from destruction; and using that building as a college for the education of persons in economics, political and social science, and related subjects, with special reference to the development of the British Constitution. The Court noted that, although the college’s governing body intended to provide political education without party propaganda and admitted students without regard to their political views, the trustees and education committee were entirely composed of members of the Conservative Party and the lectures focused on Conservative organisation rather than on Liberal or Socialist organisations. This fact formed the basis for the court’s analysis of whether the trust’s purpose could be classified as charitable.

The governing body of the college stated that its purpose was to teach students political principles while deliberately avoiding any propaganda supporting a specific party. Admissions to the college were made without reference to the applicants’ political beliefs or inclinations. Nevertheless, it was conceded that all members of the college’s governing body and the education committee were members of the Conservative Party. Consequently, the lectures delivered at the college focused on the Conservative Party, as recorded in the 1933 report of the Tax Cases, and did not address Liberal or Socialist organisations.

The matter before the Court concerned the trust’s claim for exemption under the Income Tax Act. Justice Finlay, while rejecting the trust’s claim for exemption, emphasized the need to precisely determine the issue to be decided. He noted that counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Needham, had suggested that a trust established for the promotion of Conservative principles could qualify as a charitable trust. Justice Finlay replied that he was not prepared to accept that view, observing that no legal authority had affirmed such a position. He acknowledged that Justice Stirling, in the case of Scoweroft, had left the question open, but contended that, in light of the existing authorities and the underlying principle, a trust whose sole purpose was the propagation of the political principles of a particular party could not be regarded as a charitable trust. He then quoted a passage from Justice Russell’s judgment in In re Tetly, which held that subsidising a newspaper to promote specific political or fiscal opinions might be considered a patriotic purpose by those who believed such opinions benefited the community, but nevertheless would not constitute the application of funds for a charitable purpose. The case cited by Justice Finlay, known as Scowcrofes and reported in the 1898 Chancery reports, involved a will that devised property “to be maintained for the furtherance of Conservative principles and for religious and mental improvement and to be kept free from intoxicants and dancing.” The present dispute arose from an originating summons filed by the trustees of that will seeking a determination of the validity of the devise. Counsel opposing the validity argued that a gift intended to further Conservative principles could not be a charitable gift, and that because it was impossible to ascertain the proportion of the gift devoted to the political cause versus religious and mental improvement, the purpose was vitiated and the entire devise should be declared void. In contrast, counsel for the Attorney‑General contended that the bequest…

In the case before the Court, the Attorney‑General argued that a bequest made for a religious purpose was inherently valid and was not invalidated merely because it was associated with, or intended to promote, any particular political views, except where those views were illegal or immoral. The Attorney‑General further submitted that the gift under consideration was not solely for the advancement of Conservative principles; rather, it was intended for both Conservative principles and for religious and mental improvement, that is, for the moral and intellectual betterment of the villagers, with the Conservative element merely providing a contextual backdrop. According to this submission, the substance of the gift was principally aimed at the mental and moral improvement of the community, and the presence of Conservative principles did not render the trust charitable. Judge Stirling accepted the Attorney‑General’s argument in support of the trust’s validity. He observed that it was unnecessary to pronounce on the broader question of whether a gift for the furtherance of Conservative principles alone would constitute a charitable donation, because the reading advanced by the petitioners did not reflect the true nature of the trust. Instead, the trust was characterized as a gift that combined the advancement of Conservative principles with religious and mental improvement. Stirling explained that the trust either sought to further Conservative principles in a manner that simultaneously advanced religious and mental improvement, or it pursued religious and mental improvement in conformity with Conservative principles; in either formulation, the improvement of religious and mental condition formed an essential component of the gift. Consequently, he concluded that the trust was, in effect, a charitable gift directed toward religious and mental improvement, even though it was coupled with the promotion of Conservative principles. This limitation, he held, did not prevent the trust from being a perfectly good charitable gift, just as it would have been if the purpose were solely the advancement of religious and mental improvement. The judgment then referred to the earlier decision in In re Tetley, cited by Justice Finlay, and to the Bonar Law Memorial Trust case, wherein trustees were directed to apply property “for such patriotic purposes or objects and such charitable object or objects in the British Empire as they in their absolute discretion should select.” The Court of Appeal, affirming Russell J’s judgment, had held that a patriotic purpose might not necessarily be charitable and therefore the bequest was void. Addressing the head of “Charity” concerning “trusts for purposes beneficial to the community,” Lord Justice Barrington observed that while there exists a miscellaneous class of charitable trusts, it is not logically correct to assume that every purpose of general benefit to the community automatically qualifies as a charity. He warned against the erroneous inference that any trust described as being for the general use of, or for a purpose beneficial to, the community must be a charitable trust.

The Court observed that a statement appearing in the report of an insurance society, which read “persons insured with us may be divided into men, women and children,” should not be taken to mean that every man, every woman and every child is in fact insured by that society. Accordingly, the Court held that it is permissible to say that the mere description of a trust as being for the general use of the community or for some purpose beneficial to the community does not automatically place the trust within the legal meaning of “charitable purposes.” The Court further noted that an expression such as “patriotic purposes,” even when limited to purposes beneficial to the State, is not necessarily confined to charitable purposes, and consequently a gift made for “patriotic purposes” is so uncertain that it must be treated as void. The position was summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England (1), which states: “A trust for the attainment of political objects is invalid, not because it is illegal—everyone is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law—but because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will be for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift.” The Court quoted the judgment of Lord Parker in Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd. (2) (1) 3rd Edn., Vol. 4, para 523, the title of which was contributed by Danckwerts, reported at [1917] A.C. 406 442. Turning to authority from the Privy Council on appeals from India, the Court examined whether a trust created for a political purpose or with a view to attaining political objects could be held to be a charitable trust within the meaning of “the advancement of an object of general public utility.” In Trustees of the Tribune Press, Lahore v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax (1) the Court considered a claim for exemption under section 4(3) of the Indian Income‑Tax Act, which, as previously noted, corresponds to section 9 of the Act for the purposes relevant here. The trustees claimed exemption on the basis of a trust that directed them “to maintain the said press and newspaper in an efficient condition, keeping up the liberal policy of the said newspaper and devoting the surplus income of the said press and newspaper … in improving the said newspaper and placing it on a footing of permanency.” Evidence before the Privy Council included selected issues of the newspaper that illuminated the character and policy of the paper during the founder’s lifetime, thereby explaining the direction to “keep up the liberal policy of the said newspaper.” The reference under section 66(2) of the Income‑Tax Act was initially placed before a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, where the learned judges were divided, leading to the question being referred to a full bench of three judges.

The matter was referred to a full bench of three judges, and by a majority the judges held that the income of the trust was not exempt under the relevant tax provision. Following that decision, the trustees filed an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Sir George Rankin, delivering the judgment of the Committee, first rejected an argument that sought to sustain the charitable character of the trust by contending, with reference to the case reported at [1939] L. A. 66 I. A. 241, that the trust might be regarded as having an educational character. The contention relied on the submission that the establishment and maintenance of an efficient newspaper serving the needs of a densely populated district, where there was a genuine demand for such a paper, fell within the purpose of education. The next argument advanced by the trustees was that the property was held under a trust for the advancement of an object of general public utility.

The learned judge observed that Indian statutory law, for many years and in numerous instances, had defined “charity” in the manner embodied in the Indian Income‑Tax Act, which was the statute under consideration. Two of the High Court judges had expressed the view that, in deciding whether a particular object or purpose qualified as of general public utility, the true test was not what the court deemed beneficial to the public, but rather what the testator or settlor of the trust considered beneficial. That view was rejected, on the ground that accepting it would permit trusts to be created in perpetuity for the promotion of any fanciful, though not unlawful, objects. Consequently, the court recognised its responsibility to determine the true object of the trust and to ascertain whether that object satisfied the statutory test of “advancing general public utility.” The Judicial Committee affirmed the principle that an eleemosynary element is not essential for a purpose to be charitable, and therefore the fact that the newspaper was sold to subscribers for a price, rather than being distributed free of charge, did not detract from the trust’s charitable nature.

Sir George Rankin then addressed the principal objection raised against the trust’s charitable status, namely that the Tribune newspaper was founded with the intention of carrying political propaganda and of advocating particular legislative measures that the founder regarded as reforms. The respondents argued that this political character prevented the trust from being considered an object of general public utility. After referring to a range of English decisions, the judge noted that those decisions are relevant only to the extent that they illustrate how political objects, broadly understood to include projects for legislation in the interest of specific causes, influence the question of whether a trust can be regarded as serving the general public utility.

In the judgment the Court examined whether a trust could be characterised as one serving a general public utility. The Court observed that the Commissioner of Income‑tax had not alleged that the newspaper was merely a conduit for political propaganda; rather, it was intended to function as a vehicle for disseminating news and for airing opinions on all matters of public concern. The Court recorded that, although the newspaper did contain discussion of political and legislative issues, these topics were presented alongside many other subjects, and no evidence showed that a political purpose dominated the trust’s objectives. Accordingly, the Court summarised that the newspaper’s purpose could fairly be described as “the object of supplying the Province with an organ of educated public opinion,” and that, on its face, this purpose should be regarded as one of general public utility. The Court further noted that the evidence presented regarding the newspaper’s contents demonstrated that it was not intended to promote any particular political or fiscal viewpoint. The judgment then turned to another precedent, namely All India Spinner’s Association v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1944) L.R. 71 A.I. 159, to illustrate a related point concerning tax exemption. The dispute in that case concerned whether the Association was entitled to exemption of its income under section 4(3)(1) of the Income‑tax Act. The Commissioner of Income‑tax, having referred the matter to the High Court under section 66(2), expressed the view that the Association’s dominant purpose was political because of its close association with the Indian National Congress, and that the manner in which the Association conducted its business was indistinguishable from that of a trading concern. The High Court of Bombay ruled in favour of the Revenue. The Court explained that, although the Association’s stated object was “the relief of the poor,” the income assessed for tax did not arise from “property held under a trust for a religious or charitable purpose.” No such property existed; the profits stemmed from the totality of the Association’s activities, that is, from its business operations, and the presence of a charitable object concerning poor relief did not render the income exempt. For the purposes of the present case, a more salient ground for the revenue’s position was that the Association’s aim of providing relief to the poor was coupled with another objective: the prevention of importation of foreign cloth into India, and the Association had been created with a view to assisting the All India Congress, thereby indicating a political object.

It was argued that the Association was formed with the aim of assisting the All India Congress and therefore possessed a political purpose. The matter was appealed to the Judicial Committee, where Lord Wright delivered the judgment of the Board. In his judgment he noted that the respondents claimed the income in question was derived from property held under a trust or another legal obligation that was wholly devoted to religious or charitable purposes. Lord Wright then observed that the Indian Act must be interpreted according to its plain language and must not be governed by English case law on the same subject. He explained that the English decisions on charitable law are not founded upon definite statutory provisions; rather, they have evolved over more than three centuries through the work of the Chancery Courts. He referred to the Act of 43 Elizabeth (1601), which contained in its preamble a list of charitable objects, and said that English courts used that list as a scheme for developing charitable law, employing liberal analogies and a large body of individual decisions that are often difficult to reconcile. Lord Wright further pointed out that the wording of section 4(3) of the Indian Act differs from the classification given by Macnaghten, particularly because the Indian statute uses the term “Public” instead of “community.” He emphasized that the Indian Act provides a clear and concise definition that must be construed according to its actual language and meaning, and that English decisions have no binding authority on that construction. Although English authorities may sometimes offer guidance, they cannot relieve Indian courts of the duty to apply the language of the Act to the facts that arise in Indian circumstances. The stated object of the Association excluded any intention of profit making and also excluded any element of party politics; any involvement in political propaganda would be ultra vires. Lord Wright identified the real underlying objective of the Association as the benefit of poor agricultural labourers in villages, especially during periods when they were not actively engaged in farming. Consequently, the primary purpose of the Association was the relief of the poor. He found that there was sufficient ground to hold that the Association’s purposes also embraced the advancement of other matters of general public utility, although the exact scope of those purposes might, on other occasions, require careful consideration. While the Association’s connection with the Congress was presented as contrary to general public utility because it might primarily advance a particular party, Lord Wright concluded that the Association’s purposes were independent of, and unaffected by, the aims or propaganda of the Congress. On that reasoning the appeal of the Association was allowed. The Court further observed that the two Privy Council decisions under consideration hold that a political purpose, understood as propaganda aimed at achieving a political objective, does not constitute a charitable purpose.

The Court observed that a purpose which is not for the advancement of an object of general public utility must be correctly interpreted in line with the Indian statute and the law applicable in India. The Court further held that, notwithstanding any apparent distinction between the definition of “charity” and the definition of “charitable purpose” under English law and under Indian law, no difference exists with respect to political purposes in the sense previously explained. In this regard the Court found it significant to refer to the decision in Chichester Diocesan Fund etc. v. Simposns (1) (1944) A.I. 341, 353, where Lord Wright, speaking in the House of Lords, discussed the uncertainties of English law on the meaning of “charity”. The Court noted that the appeal of the All India Spinners Association (1) before the Judicial Committee was heard at about the same time, and that Lord Wright’s view in that decision—that a political purpose does not constitute an object of general public utility even when the broader language of the Indian statute is applied—reinforces the Court’s conclusion on this point.

The Court acknowledged that the concept of charity under Indian law may be broader than the English concept, especially under the residuary head described as “advancement of an object of general utility”. Nevertheless, the Court considered that such a broader head would still exclude a “political purpose” as already defined. To illustrate this principle, the Court referred to the more recent decision of Justice Vaisey in Be Hopkinson: Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Baker (2), because that judgment cites all the earlier English cases already mentioned and also refers to the Privy Council decision in the Tribunal case. In that case the trust instrument created an “educational fund to be utilized at the absolute discretion of the trustees for the advancement of adult education with particular reference to the following purpose … that is to say, the education of men and women of all classes on the lines of the Labour Party’s memorandum headed ‘A Note on Education in the Party’”. Justice Vaisey held that the instruction to the trustees to give particular reference to the Labour Party memorandum dominated the entire trust, forming its overriding and essential purpose, and thereby rendering the trust a trust aimed at political objects and not a charitable trust. The judgment quoted the learned judge as stating, “Political propaganda masquerading, using the word not in any sinister sense, as education is not charitable,” and added that “The principle that legitimate and proper political aims and ambitions are not charitable is far too well settled for me at this stage to attempt to depart from or refine upon it.” The judge further clarified that the purpose indicated in the memorandum and the purpose referred to in the testator’s will are lawful and legitimate, but they do not fall within the definition of charity.

In its reasoning, the Court held that even if a purpose is regarded by its promoters as wholly desirable and proper, it does not automatically become charitable; the long‑standing law on charity requires a trust to fulfil a charitable purpose, and a trust that is not charitable cannot be upheld by the court. The Court explained that this principle is reflected in the observation of Russell J. in Re Hummeltenberg (1923 1 Ch. 237), which states that a trust which the court could not administer because the trustees might decline their duties would be a trust that the law cannot support. The Court further noted that the decision in Srowcroft did not alter or limit that general proposition. The learned judge in Srowcroft concluded that there was no doubt that the testator’s intention was not the provision of education in its ordinary sense, but rather the promotion of his political views and the better preparation of those who chose to advance those views. Accordingly, the Court was of the clear opinion that a “political purpose” does not qualify as a charitable purpose within the meaning of “advancement of any other object of general public utility” under section 9(4) of the Charitable‑Trusts Act. To summarise the position, the Court set out three key points. First, the object for which the Kesari & Mahratta Trust was created was a single purpose: to perpetuate the activity that Lokmanya Tilak pursued through his two newspapers. Second, clause 1 of the trust deed described these activities as “directed to the spreading of political education through the newspapers and thereby making people aware of their political rights,” a description intended to capture Tilak’s purpose in establishing the newspapers and accurately reflected his public life and conduct of the papers. Third, the two newspapers were, in Tilak’s design, the vehicle for educating the mass of the population about the grievances they suffered under foreign rule, with the aim of rousing them to political action and demanding a share in government. Tilak was a full‑time politician, and at a time when many educated Indians praised British rule while the masses remained inert, he used his propaganda and leadership to instil self‑respect and courage in the people. By his writings in the papers he showed that foreign rule lacked a moral foundation, and when the people became aware of this, the attainment of freedom became inevitable. For this reason Tilak has been suitably described as the father of India’s freedom struggle. The Court further observed that the life‑mission Tilak pursued and achieved through the two newspapers, as set out in the trust deed, was unmistakably a political purpose. Consequently, a political purpose is not charitable under section 9 of the Act, and the trust was not required to be registered under section 18 of the Act; the order directing registration was therefore erroneous and was set aside.

The Court observed that the object for which the trust had been founded was a political purpose. Under section 9 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act a political purpose did not qualify as a charitable purpose, and therefore the trust was not required to be registered under section 18 of the Act. Consequently, the order issued by the Assistant Charity Commissioner and confirmed by the Charity Commissioner, which directed the trust to be registered, was held to be erroneous. The Court held that the District Court of Poona, in Miscellaneous Application No 325 of 1954, should have set aside that order. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner directing registration of the trust, as confirmed by the Charity Commissioner on appeal, was set aside, and the appellants were awarded costs in all the courts.

Justice Subba Rao noted that he had the benefit of reviewing the judgment prepared by Justice Rajagopala Ayyanger but expressed his inability to agree with it. He stated that the facts were fully detailed in his colleague’s judgment and therefore need not be repeated, except insofar as they were necessary to understand the issue before the Court. The facts recounted were that Bal Gangadhar Tilak executed a will on 5 April 1918 and died on 1 August 1920. On 16 August 1920, his two sons together with the executor appointed under the will executed a trust deed concerning two newspapers, “The Kesari” and “The Mahratta”, along with the associated property and machinery. The principal question was whether the trust created by that deed qualified as a public trust within the meaning of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The Court set out the relevant statutory provisions: section 2(13) defined a “public trust” as an express or constructive trust for a public, religious or charitable purpose, including temples, maths, wakfs, dharmadas, other religious or charitable endowments, and societies formed for religious or charitable purposes and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Section 9 listed charitable purposes as relief of poverty or distress, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility, expressly excluding purposes relating exclusively to sports or exclusively to religious teaching or worship. The Bombay High Court had held that the trust’s purposes were (1) to awaken in the minds of the people a consciousness of their political rights by disseminating political knowledge through “The Kesari” and “The Mahratta”, and (2) to organise various public movements intended to promote the national ideal. The High Court classified the first purpose as charitable and the second as non‑charitable. Since the Charity Commissioner had not appealed that finding, Justice Subba Rao accepted its correctness and proceeded to consider whether the first purpose also fell outside the scope of a charitable purpose as argued on behalf of the appellants.

The Court observed that before deciding whether the first purpose alleged by the appellants fails to qualify as charitable, it was necessary first to examine the scope of section 9(4) of the Act, since the trust was not covered by the other clauses of that section. The Court explained that when the language of a statute is clear and explicit, it must be given effect because the statutory wording reflects the intention of the Legislature. Where the words are unambiguous, the Court can interpret them without resorting to judicial precedent. The wording of clause (4) of section 9 is described as having the widest possible amplitude and being free from ambiguity. The key terms are “general public utility”. The Court defined “general” as pertaining to an entire class, “public” as the body of people at large, including any class of the public, and “utility” as usefulness. Consequently, any object that advances usefulness or benefit to the public at large, or to a class of the public, as distinguished from a benefit to a single individual or a small group, constitutes a charitable purpose. The clause expressly excludes two categories: a purpose that relates exclusively to sports, and a purpose that relates exclusively to religious teaching or worship. By expressly carving out these two exclusions, the provision indicates that every object of general public utility, except those expressly excluded, falls within the charitable category articulated in clause (4). Whenever a question arises as to whether a particular purpose is charitable under that clause, the inquiry must focus on whether the object of the purpose is to benefit the public. The Court then turned away from English case law, noting that foreign jurisprudence developed under very different circumstances might hinder rather than help the construction of an Indian statute. Instead, the Court examined the terms of the trust deed itself to determine whether its purpose qualified as one of general public utility. The relevant portion of the trust deed states that the deed was created “as a means to the fulfilment perpetually and uninterruptedly after the death of the late Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak of that very object of his with which he took up all activities, after he took charge of the newspapers ‘The Kesari’ and ‘The Mahratta’, such as of spreading national education through those newspapers and thereby making people alive to their political rights and carrying on other multifarious public activities conducive to the national ideal etc.” The Court noted that it would omit the final clause concerning “other multifarious public activities” because the High Court had held that clause did not indicate a charitable purpose and no appeal had been filed against that finding; the Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the correctness of that earlier finding. The opening words of the deed, as quoted, demonstrate that the trust deed was executed for the perpetual and uninterrupted fulfilment of the object of the late Bal Gangadhar Tilak.

The Court observed that the phrase “perpetually and uninterruptedly” unequivocally demonstrates that the object of the trust was intended to be permanent and not merely temporary, requiring it to be pursued forever. Consequently, the Court rejected any interpretation that the trust’s purpose was simply to replace the British Government with an Indian Government, because such a purpose would cease to exist once independence was achieved. The Court therefore concluded that the object must be something higher than a mere transfer of political power from British to Indian hands.

The Court then turned to the next part of the trust deed for guidance on the scope of the object. The deed lists the activities that Bal Gangadhar Tilak pursued after assuming control of the newspapers “The Kesri” and “The Mahratta.” The Court noted that these activities consisted of spreading national education through the newspapers and thereby making the people aware of their political rights. The Court further explained that the words “such as” in the deed indicate that the cited activity is illustrative rather than exhaustive of Tilak’s broader object.

The legal issue, as framed by the Court, was whether activities such as the dissemination of national education through the newspapers and the effort to make people conscious of their political rights qualify as charitable activities under section 9(4) of the relevant Act. The Court recorded that counsel for the appellants contended that the term “national education” did not accurately reflect the original Marathi expression and should be read as “political education.” The High Court had accepted the translation as “national education,” and the Court expressed that it would not be appropriate at this stage to allow the counsel to dispute that official translation.

Recognising India’s multilingual character and the fact that appeals arise from many linguistic regions, the Court explained that its judges cannot be expected to understand every language. Accordingly, the Court indicated that it ordinarily accepts the official translation as correct. The Court further clarified that the expression “national education” does not confine the education to any particular group; a nation can be educated in many ways, one of which is the dissemination of ideas through well‑run newspapers. While “The Mahratta,” published in English, might reach primarily the intelligentsia, “The Kesri,” published in Marathi, could enlighten people who are not educated in English and who reside in the countless villages of the Marathi‑speaking region.

The Court described the nature of the education intended by the trust as one that makes people aware of their political rights. It emphasized that making citizens conscious of their political rights is distinct from indoctrinating them with the ideology of any specific political party, and that such political rights pertain to the general populace rather than to a particular partisan agenda.

The Court began by quoting the definition of political rights given in Corpus Juris, volume 49, page 1076, which describes such rights as those that may be exercised in the formation or administration of government, the power to participate directly or indirectly in the establishment or management of government, and rights that belong to a nation, a citizen, or an individual member of a nation, distinct from civil rights such as local rights of a citizen. The Court then referred to the third edition of the Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, which explains that a political right is a right exercisable in the establishment or administration of government, whereas a civil right is a right accorded to every member of a distinct community or nation with respect to property, family, marriage and similar matters, and that political rights consist in the power to participate directly or indirectly in the establishment or management of government. From these authorities the Court observed that political rights are not rights belonging to any particular political party; rather, they are rights of every citizen regardless of his party affiliation, and each citizen is entitled to exercise them in the formation or administration of government. The Court further explained that, in a modern state, education in political rights may encompass various aspects such as political, economic, and social dimensions, and that it is a fundamental requirement of any good government that the people of that state should know their political rights. The Court stressed that the importance of such education does not depend on the form of government in force at any given time; it is essential both in a self‑governing state and in a colonial state, because without knowledge of their rights people cannot strive for freedom or elect suitable representatives after attaining freedom. The Court added that no education is more important than political science, since the quality of government and the maintenance of independence largely depend on the political consciousness of the people of a particular state. Consequently, the Court found it impossible to hold that the dissemination of national or political education intended to make people conscious of their political rights falls outside the meaning of “object of general public utility” in section 9(4) of the Act. The Court then addressed the contention that the activities of Lokamanya Tilak were subversive, aimed at replacing the foreign government with a national government, and that his objective was to break the law, making his actions non‑charitable. The Court observed that such a view does great injustice to Tilak, who was, on all accounts, a great patriot of his era. The Court noted that no material had been placed before it to characterize Tilak as a political opportunist or as a person whose sole aim was to wrest political control from the British Government by any means, foul or fair. Recognizing that Tilak had become a historic figure, and finding no material before it, the Court considered it appropriate to consult a reputable book on Tilak’s life for further insight.

In the work titled “Lokamanya Tilak” by Tahmankar, the author records the reasons for the establishment of two newspapers, “The Kesari” in Marathi and “The Mahratta” in English, on page 26. According to the author, Tilak and his associates launched the papers “in order to lay the cornerstone of a future revolution.” The prospectus issued in 1880 declared boldly that “The Kesari” would cover political and economic conditions throughout the country, provide objective literary reviews of new Marathi works, and give particular emphasis to world events and politics. The first edition of “The Kesari,” dated 4 January 1881, contained a leading article that referred to Britain and observed that in that country “through the powerful medium of the Press, a vigilant eye is kept on the public conduct of every functionary from the highest to the lowest—from the Prime Minister to the pettiest civil servant which has enabled the British to enjoy a reasonable guarantee that no case of injustice should long remain concealed and unexposed.” The editor of the newspaper further announced an intention to improve social conditions by plainly telling the people what was evil and harmful in their way of life. On page 27 the author briefly summarizes the purpose of the two papers. He states that “The Kesari” was meant to serve the “mass ignorant population, who have generally no idea of what passes around them and who therefore must be given the knowledge of such topics as concern their everyday life by writings on literary, social, political, moral and economic subjects.” By contrast, “The Mahratta” was designed for the more advanced segment of the community, to provide material that would enable them to think intelligently about the important topics of the day. The tone of “The Kesari” was described as democratic, aimed at popular education and public agitation, while “The Mahratta” was portrayed as the authoritative organ of educated public opinion in Maharashtra, offering comprehensive discussion of high politics and presenting a selection of views from foreign and Indian journals and publicists on contemporary questions.

Although Tilak was initially only closely associated with the newspapers, the author notes that he later assumed the editorship of both publications and became their sole proprietor. On page 39 the narrative explains how the papers came to be “in the hands of Tilak.” The description emphasizes that “The Kesari” was produced not for entertainment but for instruction and guidance. It is characterized as a newspaper “for the people” whose purpose was to make readers think and act. Tilak is described as an “editor‑philosopher” who delivered his messages with fire and imagination, and whose writing was never meek. Week after week, Tilak is said to have poured his soul into the paper, addressing day‑to‑day problems, economic questions, philosophical ideas, historical research, literature and art in a “downright, frank and robust style.” The passage highlights that Tilak’s editorial approach was forceful and imaginative, seeking to educate the populace and stimulate active engagement with a wide range of social, economic, and cultural issues.

The Court observed that the individual in question was an eminent scholar who lived and worked during a period when India was still subject to foreign domination. He possessed a sweeping vision of India as a united, strong, prosperous, civilized and democratic nation. The Court stressed that he was not engaged in party politics nor did he seek to advance a personal political career. Rather, he devoted his entire life to the national cause, living, working and ultimately dying for the advancement of the country. His activities and ideals found expression, for the most part, in two leading periodicals of the era—the newspaper called “The Kesari” and the journal “The Mahratta.” These publications disseminated his views not only throughout the Marathi‑speaking regions but also to other parts of the country. Through these papers he supplied information on a wide range of subjects, including literary, political, social, moral and economic matters. The Court noted that the newspapers created an atmosphere conducive to constructive work both in that region and elsewhere, and that they supported many movements designed to improve the conditions of the people. Issues as diverse as famine relief, the problem of prostitution, the Swadeshi movement, plague relief, the partition of Bengal, the Home‑rule movement, national integration and other political and social movements all received powerful expression in the two journals. In summary, the Court said, the papers pleaded for the social, political, cultural and economic regeneration of the country. Although the removal of foreign rule was an important step in that regeneration, the newspapers were not limited to the narrow aim of merely replacing the foreign government with a national one. The Court then asked whether the objects pursued by this great man, as reflected, propagated and pursued through the newspapers, could be characterised as not being in the general public interest. It held that to say the objects of a trust established for a village school, hospital or choultry are of public utility, while denying the same character to a trust created to pursue Tilak’s objectives of national regeneration, would be a mockery of the statutory provision. The Court asked what trust could be more clearly in the public interest than one established to educate citizens about their political rights so that they might know those rights, understand and appreciate the problems of their country, and contribute their share to its progress and prosperity. The Court acknowledged that some counsel alleged that Tilak was the leader of a single political party and that his activities were comparable to those of a party leader in England. While accepting that during Tilak’s era there were patriotic gentlemen who favoured a gradual path to independence and also self‑seeking individuals who built careers on the sacrifices of their compatriots, the Court pointed out that political parties in the English sense did not exist then in India. Consequently, Tilak was not an ordinary politician engaging in party politics to advance his own career. His whole lifetime was spent educating the people in order to realise his vision. To classify him merely as a party politician for the purpose of importing English law into the construction of the trust deed, the Court concluded, would be to ignore the factual realities of his life and work.

In reviewing the historical record, the Court emphasized that diminishing Tilak’s substantial contribution to the nation’s cause would be unjust. The Court observed that Tilak’s activities should be assessed not through the lens of party politics but on the basis of their national impact. Consequently, the Court found it evident that after assuming control of the newspapers, Tilak’s purpose was to promote the regeneration of the country. He believed, and rightly so, that the most effective means of uplifting the nation lay in providing national education through the press and thereby awakening the public to their political rights. The Court held that the trust created to perpetuate this purpose qualifies as a trust for general public utility as understood in section 9(4) of the Act. While some observers contended that the trust’s objectives were not of public utility because certain English judges, whom the Court respects, had held that political purposes are not charitable, the Court noted that it would normally have omitted reference to English decisions were it not for the extensive citations presented by counsel. The Court therefore examined the authorities cited at the Bar that define “charitable purposes” under English law, noting that those authorities were being used to attempt to limit the scope of clause (4) of section 9 of the Act. The Court stressed the necessity of recalling the caution expressed by the highest authorities when attempts are made to import English law into the interpretation of Indian statutes. In the case of All India Spinners’ Association of Mirzapur, Ahmedabad v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1), the Judicial Committee considered the ambit of section 4(3)(1) of the Indian Income‑Tax Act. Lord Wright, speaking for the Board, declared that the Indian Act must be construed according to its own words and must not be governed by English decisions on the subject. He observed that English decisions on charity law lack a precise statutory foundation and have evolved over more than three centuries through the Chancery Courts. The Court further observed that, whereas English law classifies purposes beneficial to the community as charitable, the Indian statute treats the advancement of any object of general public utility as a charitable purpose. The Court highlighted the significance of the word “public” inserted in the Indian Act, emphasizing that the Act provides a clear and concise definition that must be interpreted based on its actual language and meaning. English decisions, while sometimes offering guidance, do not bind Indian courts and cannot excuse them from applying the Act’s language to the particular circumstances of Indian life. The Judicial Committee reiterated this principle in Williams Trustees v. Revenue Commissioners (2), giving it even greater emphasis. With this background, the Court briefly surveyed the English law on charity to determine whether it might assist in construing the statutory provisions of the Act.

The Court referred to reports numbered 159, 166 and 167 and to the 1948 volume 16 of the Income Tax Reporter, Supplement, page 41, to determine whether those authorities might provide any assistance or guidance in interpreting the statutory provisions of the Act. It observed that English charitable law had developed around the Statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. c. 4) and quoted the preamble of that statute, which enumerated a wide range of objects such as relief for the aged, impotent and poor; maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners; support for schools of learning, free schools and university scholars; repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea‑banks and highways; education and promotion of orphans; relief, upkeep or maintenance of houses of correction; marriage of poor maidens; assistance to young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons in decline; redemption of prisoners or captives; aid to poor inhabitants for payment of taxes; and the settlement of soldiers. The Court then cited Sir Samuel Romilly’s argument in Morice v. Bishop of Durham, where Romilly attempted to classify those objects under four heads: relief of the indigent, advancement of learning, advancement of religion, and advancement of objects of general public utility. However, the Court noted that Lord Macnaghten, in Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, rejected Romilly’s classification and instead grouped the charitable purposes identified in the preamble into four categories: relief of poverty; advancement of education; advancement of religion; and other purposes beneficial to the community that did not fall within the preceding three categories. The Court pointed out that section 9(4) of the Indian Act adopted the fourth category proposed by Romilly rather than the fourth category articulated by Lord Macnaghten, and that this choice has subsequently formed the basis for the decisions that the Court intended to examine. The Court acknowledged that the case law on charitable purposes is vast and lacks a single unifying principle, yet it limited its discussion to decisions involving trusts created to promote what may be described broadly as political objectives. In summarising the English authorities, the Court warned of the conflicting decisions and the potential hazards of applying those foreign rulings to the interpretation of an Indian statute.

Turning to specific English decisions, the Court listed several purposes that have been held to be non‑charitable. First, the purpose of securing legislative and other temperance reforms through united action was held non‑charitable, as indicated in The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. The Temperance Council of the Christian Churches of England & Wales. Second, the purpose of subsidising a newspaper to promote particular political or fiscal opinions was held non‑charitable, as reflected in National Provincial and Union Bank of England Ltd. v. Tetley. Third, the purpose of honouring the memory of a great statesman, a former leader of the Conservative Party, by preserving a historic building from demolition and using it as a college for the education of persons in economics, politics, social science and related subjects, with reference to the development of the British Constitution and any other subjects deemed desirable by the governing body of the trust, was also held non‑charitable, as shown in Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. These examples illustrated the Court’s view that purposes aimed at advancing political objectives or commemorating individuals, even when linked to educational activities, do not fall within the charitable category under the Indian statute.

In the case of the Bonar Law Memorial Trust, the Court noted that the trust was created for the purpose of educating persons in economics, politics and social science, with a particular emphasis on the development of the British Constitution, and for any other subjects that the governing body of the trust might deem desirable, as recorded in Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. The Court then surveyed the range of purposes that have been held to be charitable in English case law. First, a trust that finances a Bill before Parliament was regarded as charitable, a principle found in the decision reported at (1926) 10 Tax Cas 748 and also referenced in [1923] 1 Ch. 258 and (1033) 17 Tax Cas 508. Second, the establishment of a see at Birmingham was considered charitable, as noted in In re Villiers‑Wilkes. Third, a trust aimed at combating vivisection, at least in part by seeking the repeal of a statute, was held charitable, as reflected in In re Foveaux. Fourth, the maintenance of a village club and reading room – to be used for the furtherance of Conservative principles together with religious and mental improvement, and to be kept free from intoxicants and dancing – was classified as charitable, according to In re Scowcroft. Fifth, a trust for the benefit of a particular locality, whether a parish, town, borough, county or country, was likewise held charitable, as illustrated in Public Trustees v. Smith. The Court referred to the summary in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 4, page 231, which expressed that the promotion of particular doctrines or principles that are not subversive of morality, not pernicious, and not merely in furtherance of a political party’s agenda may be charitable; examples cited included Conservative principles combined with mental and moral improvement, socialism, kindness to animals, temperance, and the dissemination of knowledge of such doctrines through literature in order to ascertain truth and teach it to willing listeners. A brief review of these illustrations indicated that no single consistent principle underlay the decisions; the authorities spoke in different voices, and where some decisions attempted to set out a principle, later cases often abandoned it in search of another. From the cited authorities, the Court extracted several propositions: (1) a trust is charitable only if it falls within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth; (2) not every object of public general utility is necessarily charitable, as shown in Williams Trustees v. Inland Revenue Commissioners; (3) a trust whose purpose is to change the law of the country is not charitable; (4) because the execution of a trust must be under the control of a court, the trust must be of a nature that permits such judicial control and review, a principle established in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham; and (5) a gift with a purpose so vague as “dbaram” would not be charitable, since it could be applied to non‑charitable ends.

The Court noted that the first principle could not be readily applied to a proceeding under the Act because the Act neither expressly nor by necessary implication invokes the pre‑amble to the Statute of Elizabeth. Regarding the second principle, the Court held that it conflicted with the explicit provision of clause (4) of section 9 of the Act; while English law sometimes treats certain public‑utility purposes as non‑charitable on other grounds, the Act does not permit such a division, since clause (4) of section 9 expressly classifies every such purpose as charitable. Turning to the third principle, the Court observed that this principle has not been consistently applied even in England and that no reasonable justification could be found for it. The Court explained that, if the principle were accepted, then no purpose—however clearly for the public good—could be charitable if its achievement required creating a climate for changing existing law. The Court gave examples of trusts set up to educate the public about alcoholism, prostitution and other social evils with the aim of pressuring the legislature to enact reforms; under the third principle such trusts would cease to be charitable because political purposes are often, though not always, intended to bring about legal change. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the view that the mere involvement of a change of law automatically converts a charitable purpose into a non‑charitable one. The Court also rejected the fourth principle as an inadequate test for charitable purpose. While acknowledging that the donor’s declaration that a gift is charitable is not determinative, the Court emphasized that ultimately the court must decide whether the purpose or object is charitable. The Court saw no insurmountable difficulty for a court to determine whether a political object is charitable, just as it would decide the charitable nature of a gift for propagating the tenets of a particular religious sect. The Court rejected the suggestion that a court, by characterising a trust created for political purposes, would be indulging in politics; the same argument could be made about a court deciding a religious trust, which would appear to favor one sect over another. The Court clarified that it does not take sides in political or religious controversies but objectively examines the purpose to ascertain its charitable character and, if required, administers it through the appropriate mechanisms.

The Court further examined the fifth principle, which attempted to apply a rule of vagueness to political purposes. It was argued that the phrase “political purpose” is so vague that the trust might be applied to non‑charitable ends. The Court rejected this reasoning, stating that it does not see how a political purpose, by its very nature, must be vague. The Court affirmed that the determination of vagueness depends on the facts of each case, and that the court must construe the trust deed with a view to establishing whether the purpose—political or otherwise—is sufficiently definite. Citing earlier “locality cases,” the Court observed that a gift for the benefit of a specific place, such as a parish, town, borough, county or country, has been held charitable, and therefore a gift aimed at the political uplift of a country should not be automatically excluded as non‑charitable on the ground of vagueness. Moreover, the Court declined to accept the proposition that the propagation of the principles of a particular political party would necessarily be detrimental to the community. The Court reasoned that if a country is backward or under‑developed, a philanthropist may endow property to propagate a doctrine expected to promote public welfare; such ideology may be labelled according to prevailing doctrines in that country, yet still serve a charitable purpose. The Court concluded that the alleged vagueness of a political purpose must be assessed on the basis of the specific facts and purpose, rather than dismissed outright.

The judgment observed that the characterization of every political purpose as inherently vague cannot be treated as an absolute rule; rather, the determination depends on the specific facts of each case. It stated that it is the responsibility of the court to interpret the trust deed in every individual instance in order to decide whether the purpose, whether political or otherwise, is sufficiently clear or remains vague. The court recalled the authority of the “locality cases,” in which a gift made for the benefit of a particular parish, town, borough, county or country was held to be charitable. On the basis of that principle, the court expressed the view that a gift intended for the political uplift of the nation should not automatically be excluded from being charitable merely because it might be described as vague. Moreover, the court rejected the notion that, as a matter of law, the propagation of the principles of a specific political party could never be beneficial to the community. It illustrated this point by imagining a scenario in which a backward or under‑developed country receives an endowment of property from a philanthropist who wishes to disseminate a doctrine that is expected to improve public welfare; the ideology advanced might be identified with the prevailing doctrines of that country. Consequently, the court held that it is not tenable to proclaim an inflexible rule that a political purpose can never be advantageous to the community, and emphasized again that the assessment must be made on the facts of each particular case.

In support of its analysis, the court cited Tudor’s discussion in the fifth edition of his book on charities (page 41), where he observes that “the proposition that political purposes cannot be charitable is difficult to reconcile with certain decided cases.” The judgment noted that several English decisions, recognizing the illogicality of a blanket exclusion of political aims, have sought to qualify the rule by requiring that a charity’s purpose not be achieved principally through political means, thereby indicating that the dominant purpose must not be political. The court further referred to the concise description offered by Chitty, J., in the 1895 case Re Foveaux, which explained that the court’s method is to consider the enumeration of charities in the Statute of Elizabeth while remembering that the enumeration is not exhaustive; institutions whose objects are analogous to those listed in the statute, as well as those analogous to institutions previously recognized by reported decisions, may be admitted as charities, but this analogy must be applied with caution and circumspection, examining each case on its own special circumstances. Although the statement originated in 1895, the court observed that later judgments continued to adopt the same approach. Finally, the court again referenced Tudor (fifth edition, page 38), who described the judicial trend as extending the class outlined in the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth to such an extent that it becomes ineffective as a basis for classifying charitable objects, and he acknowledged that many of the charities enumerated have no clear analogous counterpart.

The Court observed that English judicial decisions on charitable trusts are contradictory and lack a unifying principle, despite originating from the preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth and often invoking Lord Macnaghten’s four‑fold classification. It noted that English courts have, from time to time, decided cases on analogies that could not be sustained either by the illustrations in the preamble, the analogies drawn therefrom, or by Lord Macnaghten’s classification, resulting in conflicting authority. Consequently, the Court held that it is neither possible nor advisable to rely on those English decisions to interpret the clear provisions of Indian statutes or documents executed under Indian law, given that the Indian context differs entirely from the English environment in which those decisions were rendered. The judgment further remarked that India’s democratic superstructure is being built upon an illiterate foundation, and that political education is essential for the nation’s political maturity. In the case of Trustees of the Tribune Press, Lahore v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Punjab, the Judicial Committee examined a trust created by a testator’s will, which directed that his property “in the stock and goodwill of the Tribune Press and News‑paper in Anarkali, Lahore” should vest permanently in a committee of trustees. The trustees were tasked with maintaining the press and newspaper efficiently, preserving its liberal policy, and applying any surplus income, after meeting current expenses, to improve the newspaper and secure its permanence. The Committee held that the newspaper’s purpose was to supply the Province with an organ of educated public opinion, an objective regarded as of general public utility; consequently, the trust income was exempt from taxation under sub‑section (3) of section 4 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922. The Judicial Committee expressly removed the matter from the ambit of English precedent, observing that material before it demonstrated the newspaper’s character as it existed during the testator’s lifetime and concluded that political and legislative matters were discussed only as among many other topics, not that a political purpose dominated the trust. On the facts, the Committee further concluded that the paper’s object could fairly be described as supplying the Province with an organ of educated public opinion and that, prima facie, this constituted a general public utility. Subsequent remarks by the Committee distinguished between the promotion of party politics and the broader goal of political education.

In discussing the question of general political education, the Court observed that, taking into account the special circumstances of the period, the testator’s directions and the evidence concerning the newspaper’s content before 1898, the facts of the present case were more closely aligned with the decision in In re Scowcroft (1) than with the case of the Bonar Law Memorial Trust (2) or with the view expressed by Russell, J., in In re Tetley (3) concerning a newspaper that was subsidised for the advancement of specific political or fiscal opinions. The judgment therefore sought to uphold the validity of a trust that, while aimed at educating public opinion, also involved the dissemination of political ideas, relying on the broad definition of charitable purpose found in the Indian Act. The Court then referred to the case of All India Spinners’ Association of Mirzapur, Ahmedabad v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bombay (4), where the All India Congress Committee, by resolution, created an association for the purpose of promoting band‑spinning through cooperative handling. The association operated on a cooperative basis, meaning that any surplus was distributed solely among its members. The Privy Council held that although the association had been instituted by a political party, its object was charitable within the meaning of the Income‑tax Act, as demonstrated by the citations (1) (1898) 2 Ch. 638, (2) (1923) 1 Ch. 258, (3) (1938) 17 Tax Cas. 508, and (4) (1944) L.P. 71 I.A. 159. Lord Wright remarked that the stated object, in his opinion, excluded any profit‑making intention and any element of party politics. Turning to subsection (3)(1) of section 4 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, which refers to “other purposes of a general public utility,” the Judicial Committee noted that these words were extremely wide and that their precise scope might, on other occasions, require very careful consideration. The Committee further observed that, although a connection with the Congress might suggest a lack of consistency with the notion of general public utility because of a possible primary advancement of a particular party, in this instance the Association’s purposes were clearly independent of and not influenced by Congress’s propaganda. Referring to English decisions, the Committee pointed out that the English cases, including the Tribune Press Case (1), did not hinge on the phrase “general public utility,” but rather illustrated how first‑instance courts in England had dealt with the specific questions presented. From this analysis the decision articulated two principles: first, that the phrase “other purposes of general public utility” is very broad and that the English authorities do not depend on those words; and second, that even assuming the English decisions were applicable, a trust would not lose its character as a trust for general public utility merely because it might be primarily advancing a particular party, provided that its purposes remain independent.

The Court held that the purposes of the trust were independent of and were not affected by the propaganda of the political party. Although the decision did not resolve the full scope of the Indian statute, it drew a line between a party’s propaganda, its party politics and any other objects it might pursue. The matter was illustrated by reference to Subash Chandra Bose v. Gordhandas Patel, where the testator, in his will, made four gifts and then bequeathed the balance of his assets to Mr Subhas Chandra Bose for “the political uplift of India and preferably for publicity work on behalf of India’s cause in other countries.” The Bombay High Court examined the phrase “political uplift of India” and concluded that the expression was so vague—whether it meant a general improvement in India’s political status, conditions or the advancement of a political purpose—that the Court could not enforce it. Consequently, the trust was declared void and the residue of the estate was treated as intestate. The decision therefore rested on the principle that a charitable purpose cannot be sustained when it is vague. The Court, however, found the observations of Chief Justice Beaumont instructive. He noted that if the case involved a gift to India or to the people of India, it would be necessary to consider whether the principles applied in earlier cases should be extended from a parish to a country and, perhaps, even to the sub‑continent. Further comments by the learned Chief Justice, recorded at pages 254, 278 and 279 of the I.L.R. 1940 Bom., explained the difficulty. He observed that the gift was for the “political uplift of India” and that the adjective “political” could not be disregarded. Assuming that “political uplift” meant an improvement in India’s political system, it would nevertheless be beneficial to India, but the expression remained too vague for the Court to determine its scope. The essential test, the Court said, was whether it could, if called upon to administer the trust, actually carry out the trust’s terms; in this instance, it seemed impossible to define what the term “political uplift of India” encompassed. Citing Lord Parker’s observations in Bowman v. Secular Society Limited, the learned Chief Justice again stated that a trust whose purpose is to advance a political aim is invalid, not because such a purpose is illegal, but because the Court lacks a method of judging whether any proposed political change would be for the public welfare or benefit. Accordingly, the learned Chief Justice was inclined to hold that the trust was invalid.

In this case the Court observed that the trust could be considered charitable only if it were concluded that the term “political uplift” was vague and that a court could not determine whether a specific political aim would serve the public welfare or benefit. The Court referred to a division‑bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Lokamanya Tilak Jubilee National Trust Fund, Bombay, which had examined a comparable issue under the Income‑tax Act of 1922. In that earlier case the trust deed set out four objects: first, the advancement of any purpose that the managing committee might in its unfettered opinion deem national or of national importance for the inhabitants of British India; second, the political advancement of India with the goal of attaining complete national autonomy or “swarajya”; third, the diffusion of political education and knowledge concerning the political affairs of India and propagandist work both within India and elsewhere; and fourth, any object that might further any of the preceding objects. The Court held that the first object exceeded the definition of charitable purposes contained in section 4 of the Income‑tax Act because the purpose depended on the uncontrolled opinion of the managing committee. The Court also held that the second object went too far, characterising it as a gift for political purposes. Chief Justice Beaumont, delivering the leading judgment, noted that the purpose of advancing any other object of general public utility extended beyond the charitable definition derived from English case law. He observed that if every purpose in the deed could be regarded as of general public utility for the benefit of the inhabitants of English India, then the trust would, in his view, be a charitable trust. However, he could not accept that view because, in his opinion, while national autonomy might be regarded as a nationally accepted purpose, there existed a sharp divergence of opinion on the methods to achieve that autonomy, and consequently the gift was for political purposes. Justice Kania, in a separate but concurring opinion, concluded that the second object was predominantly a political purpose and fell within the rule stated in the Tribune’s case. The Court further remarked, with respect, that the learned judges’ decisions appeared to be unconsciously influenced by English decisions rooted in party politics, and that such decisions had been improperly applied to a case concerning the national uplift of a country struggling for independence. The trust under present consideration subsequently came before the Bombay High Court for judicial scrutiny under the Income‑tax Act of 1922, where the trustees argued that the trust was charitable and therefore not subject to the provisions of the Act.

The trustees contended that the trust was created for a charitable purpose and therefore should not be subject to the provisions of the Income‑tax Act. The Bombay High Court, however, held that clause (1) of the trust deed could not be interpreted as establishing a charitable purpose because the purposes described in that clause were too vague and too broad to fall within the meaning of “charitable purpose” under the Income‑tax Act. Chief Justice Beaumont, delivering the judgment of the bench, observed that the purpose mentioned in the deed included the organization of public movements, and even if those words were limited by the phrase “calculated to promote the national ideal,” it was impossible to say that the promotion of such public movements, as envisaged by the trustees, could be regarded as necessarily of public utility. He further explained that under clause I of the trust deed the entire profits of the newspapers could be applied to any one of the various objects specified therein; consequently, if any of those objects did not fall within the definition of a charitable object, the clause as a whole could not be said to constitute a charitable trust. The Chief Justice expressed his view that some of the objects of the trust certainly went beyond the definition of a charitable trust. As a result, the Court reasoned that because some of the objects were charitable while others were not, and because the whole of the newspaper profits could be applied to non‑charitable purposes, the trust could not be held valid. The High Court did not decide whether the first purpose in the trust deed was charitable, leaving that question to be determined in the present appeal. It is clear, the judgment noted, that Indian decisions, though to some extent coloured by English authorities, appreciated the distinction between the wide language of sub‑section (3) of section 4 of the Indian Income‑tax Act and the fourth category of Lord Macnaghten’s classification under English charity law. Nevertheless, the Court found it difficult to accept the view expressed in those judgments that a trust created for the advancement of political objects must necessarily cease to be a public charitable purpose. The Court observed that there was no supporting authority for that proposition beyond doubtful and conflicting English cases, and that there was no justification for narrowing the broad words of the statute by importing foreign ideas developed in a different constitutional setting. In this context, a decision of a State Supreme Court in the United States, namely Taylor v. Hoag, was considered instructive. In that case, a trust created to promote improvements in the structure and methods of government was held to be a charitable trust, even though the purpose was to secure radical changes in the “present” system. Justice Frazer, the Court held, effectively answered all the objections raised by the English courts in holding that a trust for a

In discussing the earlier decision that deemed a trust with a political purpose void, the Court examined the judgment in the 1922 case reported at 21 A.L.R. 946, 949, 950. The judge in that case addressed whether a trust could be held invalid merely because the achievement of its objectives would require a change in the existing law. He asked, “Must it be held void because the successful attainment of these objects would involve a change in existing laws? We would hesitate to subscribe to such doctrine, unless reason or authority compelled us to do so.” He continued by explaining that to treat an effort to bring about legislative change, even by lawful means, as an attempt to violate the law would discourage legislative improvement and force society to remain permanently bound by statutes that may no longer suit contemporary conditions. The judge emphasized that such a view contradicts the fundamental principle that government is of the people, by the people, and for the people, and it ignores the legislature’s authority to amend laws when circumstances demand. He clarified that courts are not concerned with the wisdom of the proposed amendment; their role is only to determine whether the method used to effect the change breaches any existing law. In the case at bar, the judge found no intention to contravene any law and noted that the trust expressly required its objectives to be pursued by lawful means.

The Court then turned to several provisions of the Indian Income‑Tax Act that appear to conflict with the tests formulated by English authorities for determining charitable status. Section 9(4) of the Act defines a charitable purpose to include the advancement of any other object of general public utility, a phrase the Court described as having a very wide amplitude. Section 11 provides that a public trust whose purposes are partly charitable or religious and partly non‑charitable shall not be declared void solely on the ground that the non‑charitable purposes are invalid. This is a marked departure from English law, where a trust containing both charitable and non‑charitable purposes could be rendered entirely void because trustees might administer the trust for non‑charitable ends. Under Section 55, the Act introduces a “cypres doctrine” that expands the traditional doctrine by permitting the court, in appropriate circumstances, to apply the original intention of the trust creator to any other object when it is not in the public interest, or when it is not expedient, practicable, desirable, necessary, or proper to carry out the original purpose wholly or partially. By these provisions, the Act broadens the scope of what is considered a charitable purpose beyond the narrower interpretation applied by English courts, and it affirms the validity of trusts even when they contain a mixture of charitable and non‑charitable objectives.

The judgment observed that, although a trust may contain both charitable and non‑charitable purposes, the statute permits the court, in appropriate circumstances, to redirect the trust towards other charitable purposes that were not originally specified by the settlor. This statutory liberalism was held to preclude a narrow construction of “charitable purpose” as was sometimes applied by English courts under different factual settings. The Court then summarized its view in three distinct points. First, it noted that English authorities were grounded in a pragmatic response to the historical evolution of charity law in England and that no single doctrinal thread could be discerned across the extensive body of English case law. Second, unlike the English position, the Act expressly classifies the advancement of objects of common public utility as charitable and rejects any attempt to limit that classification by reference to English decisions. Third, the Court explained that the phrase “object of general public utility” is intended to be all‑encompassing, covering any purpose—political or otherwise—so long as it serves the general public. Consequently, English precedents were deemed unhelpful for interpreting section 9 of the Act to determine whether a purpose qualifies as charitable under Indian law. On the basis of these considerations, the Court held unequivocally that the purpose of the trust in the present case fell within the meaning of a charitable purpose under section 9 of the Act.

The Court then addressed the contention that a trust instrument granting a trustee authority to apply funds to both charitable and non‑charitable objects should be declared void, a view previously advanced by the High Court on the ground that the second object was non‑charitable, thereby rendering the whole trust invalid. The Court explained that this argument overlooked the essential distinction between a trust deed that merely empowers a trustee to spend on a charitable or a non‑charitable object, and a deed that simultaneously authorises expenditure on both charitable and non‑charitable objects. Citing Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd edition, vol. 4, p. 272), the Court quoted the principle that when a testator leaves funds to be applied partly to charitable objects and partly to non‑charitable or failing objects without specifying the respective proportions, the court will make an apportionment. Moreover, where a fund is dedicated to several objects—some charitable and some non‑charitable or illegal—and there is a clear intention to allocate a portion to the charitable objects, the court will determine the appropriate shares; if the proportions cannot be ascertained from the nature of the gift, the court may divide the fund equally among the various objects. The Court noted that this passage is supported by the decisions referenced by the author, but it was unnecessary to examine those decisions in detail because the appellant’s counsel had not challenged this proposition.

In the case, the Court observed that it was unnecessary to examine whether section 11 of the Act operated retrospectively. The appellant’s counsel had contended that section 55 of the Act infringed the appellant’s reversionary right in the property that formed the subject matter of the trust. The Court noted that the issue of the validity of that statutory provision did not arise for determination in the present proceedings. The sole question, according to the Court, was whether the trustees of the trust were obligated to file an application for registration of the trust. Having previously held that the trust qualified as a public trust within the meaning of section 9 of the Act, the Court affirmed that, pursuant to section 18, the trust must be registered in the manner prescribed by that section. The Court further indicated that matters such as the extent of the trust or the scope of the doctrine of cypres were irrelevant to the matter before it and no opinion would be offered on those points. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal was to fail and ordered its dismissal with costs. By the Court: In view of the majority opinion, the appeal was allowed and the order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner directing registration of the trust, which had been confirmed by the Charity Commissioner on appeal, was set aside. The appellants were awarded costs in all courts, and the appeal was allowed.