Krishna Prasad and Others vs Gauri Kumari Devi

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 352 of 1959

Decision Date: 5 March 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In the case titled Krishna Prasad and Others versus Gauri Kumari Devi, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 5 March 1962. The appeal was heard by a three‑judge bench consisting of P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar and K.N. Wanchoo, with Justice Gajendragadkar delivering the opinion. The petitioners were Krishna Prasad together with several co‑applicants, and the respondent was Gauri Kumari Devi. The decision appears in the 1962 All India Reporter at page 1464 and in the 1962 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reporter, volume 3, page 564. Subsequent references to the ruling are found in the 1967 Supreme Court Reports at page 801, the 1969 Reports at page 971, and the 1971 Reports at page 1678. The principal statutory issue concerned the operation of section 4(d) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act 30 of 1950), which governs the execution of personal decrees against a mortgagor when the mortgaged estate has become vested in the State. The judgment also examined the relevance of section 24(5) of the same Act, which deals with compensation payable on acquisition of a mortgaged estate and its character as a substituted security for the mortgage claim.

The factual background revealed that the petitioners had obtained a preliminary decree following an anomalous mortgage of a share in the Zamindari village of Sonchari Mouza, situated in Patna District, together with the associated khudkasht land. This preliminary decree directed that a personal decree be issued for the balance of the debt, and a final mortgage decree was subsequently entered on 30 September 1947. The petitioners later applied for execution against the mortgaged properties, but the application was dismissed on 9 January 1954 because, in the interval, the mortgaged lands had come to constitute an estate within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, and had vested in the State. The executing court then sought personal execution against the mortgagor by attaching and selling other properties belonging to the mortgagor, and eventually ordered such an attachment. On revision, the Patna High Court held that, in view of section 4(d) of the Act, the execution petition could not proceed and dismissed it. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that section 4(d) barred execution only against the mortgaged property itself and not against the personal decree. They further informed the Court that a claim had been filed under the Act, and that the Claim Officer had determined a sum of Rs 58,100 with interest at four per cent payable to the petitioners from the compensation arising from the abolition of the estate. The Supreme Court held that section 24(5) of the Act made the compensation payable on acquisition of the mortgaged estate a form of substituted security, against which the mortgage claim could be enforced under the Act. According to the scheme of the legislation, the debts of the proprietors in respect of the estate were to be investigated and adjusted exclusively by the designated Tribunal. On a proper construction, the Court concluded that section 4(d) precluded the executing court from enforcing the direction for a personal decree to realise the mortgage debt at the present stage; such enforcement could occur only at a later date if the realisation from the mortgaged property proved insufficient to satisfy the decree, which was the situation here because the entire mortgaged property formed an estate subject to a pending claim. The judgment cited Lion Insurance Association Ltd. v. Tucker (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 176 and Raqhubir v. Basudevanand (1953) I.L.R. 32 as authorities relevant to the interpretation of the statutory provisions.

In this case, the Court referred to the authorities Pat. 581, Mahanth Sukhdeo Das v. Kashi Prasad Tiwari, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 630 and Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd., (1962) 2 S.C.R. 441. The matter came before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 352 of 1959, an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 8 January 1957 of the Patna High Court in Civil Revision No. 590 of 1955. Counsel for the appellants, identified as the legal representatives of the petitioners, pleaded the case for the respondents, represented by counsel for the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 5 March 1962 by Justice Gajendra Gadkar. The appeal was instituted by virtue of a certificate issued by the Patna High Court and raised the concise question concerning the scope and effect of the provisions of section 4(d) of the Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950 (30 of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

The respondent, Smt. Gauri Kumari Devi, together with her husband, Babu Shyamakant Lal, executed on 10 July 1937 a registered anomalous mortgage in favour of the appellants, Babu Krishna Prasad and his three sons, for the sum of Rs. 35,000. The instrument combined elements of a ‘Sudharna’ arrangement with a simple mortgage and specified a term of five years. Smt. Devi was the principal mortgagor and, by the mortgage deed, she mortgaged ten annas and eight pies of Hakiat Milkiat in the village of Sonchari, Mouza No. 11 912 in the Patna district, which constituted a Zamindari estate, together with 16.41 acres of khudkasht land pertaining to khata No. 3 of the same mouza. The appellants instituted a suit on the basis of this mortgage seeking recovery of Rs. 69,816 ½ 17 in the Sub‑Judge’s Court at Patna. The suit concluded on 26 August 1946 with a decree in favour of the appellants. The trial judge ordered that, for satisfaction of the decretal amount, the mortgaged properties should be charged preliminarily and that, if the amount was not fully satisfied from those properties, the respondent alone would be personally liable for any balance remaining. Consequently, a composite decree was issued. By the final decree dated 30 September 1947, the respondent’s liability was fixed at Rs. 52,950 ⅓. The appellants thereafter instituted Execution Case No. 6 of 1952, seeking realisation of the decretal amount by sale of the mortgaged Zamindari properties. The respondent objected, contending that the mortgaged properties had meanwhile vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Act and therefore could not be sold in execution proceedings because she no longer possessed any interest in them. The execution case was ultimately dismissed on 9 January 1954. After the respondent challenged the dismissal on the ground of vesting, the appellants applied to have their decree transferred for execution to the Gaya Court, indicating that they intended to execute the decree against the respondent by proceeding against properties other than those forming the subject‑matter of the mortgage, relying on the personal decree that had been passed against her. The Court granted the transfer and the decree was transferred on 22 January 1954 with a certificate of non‑satisfaction. Subsequently, the appellants filed Execution Case No. 19 of 1954 in the Subordinate Judge’s Court at Gaya, seeking to recover the decretal amount by attachment and sale of other properties belonging to the respondent.

In the subsequent proceedings, the appellants addressed the court and stated that they sought to enforce the decree against the respondent by proceeding against property that was not the subject of the original mortgage. They claimed that the personal decree that had been passed against the respondent conferred upon them the right to attach and sell those other properties. The court granted the appellants’ request for transfer of the decree, and on 22 January 1954 the decree was transferred together with a certificate of non‑satisfaction. Following the transfer, the appellants instituted Execution Case No. 19 of 1954 before the Subordinate Judge at Gaya, asking that the decretal sum be recovered by attachment and sale of additional properties owned by the respondent. The respondent opposed this move by filing an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was recorded as Miscellaneous Case No. 96 of 1954. In that objection she asserted that no personal decree had been obtained against her and consequently the claim in the execution proceedings was not maintainable. She further argued that the appellants could not lay claim to her other properties because the appropriate remedy lay in the compensation payable by the State of Bihar in place of the properties that had vested in the State. On 23 December 1954 the Sub‑Judge at Gaya allowed the respondent’s Miscellaneous Case ex‑parte, and as a result the Execution Case No. 19 of 1954 filed by the appellants was dismissed.

The appellants subsequently moved the executing court for a review of that dismissal, praying that the execution case be restored and dealt with according to law. On 20 April 1915 the executing court entertained the review application and held that the appellants had, in fact, obtained a personal decree against the respondent, which gave them a right to sell her other properties in execution of that personal decree. Accordingly, the executing court directed that the execution proceed as prayed for by the appellants. Unsatisfied, the respondent challenged this direction by filing a Civil Revision Application before the Patna High Court, recorded as 590 of 1955. The High Court examined the matter and concluded that a personal decree in favour of the appellants had indeed been passed, although that portion of the direction had not been formally incorporated into the decree itself. The High Court therefore rejected the respondent’s contention that no personal decree existed because the appellants had not made an application under Order 34, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It also dismissed the respondent’s argument that a review application could not be entertained against the initial order of the executing court, while noting that there was some merit in the respondent’s claim that, on the merits, the review might not have been justified. Nevertheless, the High Court chose not to base its decision on that contention and proceeded to set aside the executing court’s order in favour of the appellants and to dismiss the execution application.

In the revision proceedings, the High Court chose not to base its decision on the respondent’s contention that a review ought not to have been granted. Instead, the Court examined the merits of the application and concluded that the appellants possessed no authority to enforce the personal decree by selling the respondent’s other properties, because section 4(d) of the Act expressly prohibited such action. Consequently, the High Court set aside the order of the Executing Court that had favored the appellants and directed that the execution application filed by the appellants be dismissed. After the High Court’s order, the appellants obtained a certificate from that Court, and they approached the Supreme Court armed with that certificate. The primary issue now before this Court concerned the scope and effect of section 4(d) of the Act. It is noted that the respondent did not raise any objection before this Court regarding the competence of the appellants’ application for review. Before addressing the legal question, the Court found it necessary to recount certain material facts relevant to the dispute.

The first material fact was that all the properties mortgaged by the respondent in favour of the appellants formed an estate under section 2(1) of the Act; therefore, the entire mortgaged property of the mortgagor had vested in the State of Bihar. This case did not involve a situation where only a portion of the mortgaged properties vested in the State while the remainder remained with the mortgagor. The second fact to bear in mind was that the appellants sought to execute the personal decree against the respondent personally. Under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a personal decree may be granted on an application by the mortgagee‑decree holder only when the net proceeds from any sale conducted under Order 34 Rule 5 are insufficient to satisfy the amount due to the decree holder. In other words, the mortgagee‑decree holder must first exhaust his remedy against the mortgaged property before he may seek recovery of the remaining balance from the mortgagor personally, outside the mortgaged assets. While a composite decree might dispense with a separate application under Rule 6, the normal procedure remains that the mortgagee‑decree holder must demonstrate that the net proceeds from the sale of mortgaged property are inadequate to cover the decree amount before the Court may order personal liability. The trial court’s judgment, which has been treated in substance as a personal decree in these proceedings, aligns with this procedural requirement.

In this case the Court observed that the learned Judge had made the position quite clear. The Judge had directed that, for the purpose of satisfying the amount specified in the decree, the mortgaged properties should first be charged. He further stated that if the amount specified in the decree could not be fully satisfied from the sale proceeds of those properties, the appellants would then be entitled to proceed against the respondent personally. In other words, the decree plainly and unequivocally provided that the appellants could enforce the personal decree against the respondent only after they had exhausted their remedy against the mortgaged properties and had failed to recover the entire decretal amount by that process. The Court identified this as the second material fact that must be kept in mind.

The third material fact, according to the Court, concerned the events that followed the issuance of the prescribed notification and the vesting of the respondent’s mortgaged properties in the State of Bihar. After that vesting, the appellants filed an application under section 14 of the Act, notifying their claim under the mortgage decree to the Claims Officer. On 24 November 1956, the Claims Officer determined that a sum of Rs 58,100, together with future interest calculated at four per cent per annum on the principal amount only—subject to the condition that the total interest would not exceed the principal—would be payable to the appellants out of the compensation amount that was payable to the respondent in respect of the mortgaged properties. This determination was not known to the respondent at the time her revision application was argued before the High Court, because it appeared that the respondent had not appeared before the Claims Officer. The respondent later disclosed this fact in an affidavit before the Court, and the appellants did not dispute its correctness. In light of these facts, the Court needed to decide whether the High Court had been correct in holding that the appellants’ application for execution at the present stage was incompetent under the provisions of section 4(d) of the Act.

The Court then turned to a brief discussion of the relevant provisions of the Act to interpret section 4(d) and determine its scope and effect. The Act, as the Court noted, was enacted to provide for the transfer of the interests of proprietors and tenure‑holders in land, including the interests of mortgagees and lessees, to the State. It also provided for the constitution of a Land Commission for the State of Bihar, empowering the Commission to advise the State Government on the agrarian policy to be pursued following such transfer and to deal with other matters connected therewith. The overarching object of the Act, as reflected in its provisions, was to eliminate intermediaries and establish a direct relationship between the State and the cultivators. This policy had subsequently been adopted by many other States in order to bring about necessary agrarian reform. The Court cited Section 2(1), which defines “estate” as any land included under a single entry in any of the general registers of revenue‑paying lands and revenue‑free lands prepared and maintained under law, including revenue‑free land not entered in any register and a share in or of an estate.

In this case, the Court explained that an “estate” is defined in section 2(i) as any land appearing in the general registers of revenue‑paying lands and revenue‑free lands that are prepared and maintained under law, including land that is forever held by the Collector of a district, revenue‑free land not entered in any register, and any share in an estate. The Court noted that it was undisputed that the mortgaged properties involved in the present appeal constituted an estate within the meaning of section 2(i). It was also undisputed that the respondent qualified as a proprietor as defined in section 2(o). Section 3 empowers the State Government to issue, by notification, a declaration that the estates or tenures of a specified proprietor or tenure‑holder have passed to and become vested in the State. A notification contemplated by section 3(1) had been issued with respect to the estate that was the subject of the dispute. Section 4 then sets out the consequences of such vesting. In broad terms, section 4(a) provides that once a notification is issued, the estate vests absolutely in the State from the date of vesting, becomes free from all encumbrances, and the former proprietor ceases to have any interest in the estate except for any interest expressly saved by the provisions of the Act. Section 4(d) further states that no suit may be brought in any civil court for the recovery of any money due from such a proprietor or tenure‑holder when the payment is secured by a mortgage of, or is a charge on, the vested estate or tenure, and that any suit or proceeding for recovery of such money pending on the date of vesting must be dismissed. The Court accepted that section 4(d) includes situations where decrees have already been passed and that the term “proceedings” in its latter part also covers execution proceedings. Nonetheless, the appellant’s counsel argued that the bar created by section 4(d) should be limited only to execution proceedings initiated by mortgagees who are decree‑holders seeking to enforce their decretal amounts against estates that have vested in the State. According to that argument, execution proceedings in which decree‑holders attempted to recover their dues from properties other than those that had vested in the State fell outside the mischief that section 4(d) sought to address. In other words, the counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court erred by adopting a broad and literal construction of section 4(d). Before addressing this contention, the Court found it appropriate to refer to other relevant provisions of the Act. Section 14(1) prescribes the time limit within which a secured creditor must file his claim. Every creditor whose debt is secured by a mortgage of an estate is required, within the prescribed period, to notify his claim in writing to the Claims Officer appointed for that purpose, following the prescribed manner. The function of the Claims Officer is to determine, for each creditor, the amount of debt that is legally and justly payable. This framework makes clear that a mortgagee decree‑holder must apply within the specified time before the Claims Officer, who will then ascertain the legal and just amount due to the creditor.

In this part of the judgment, the Court explained that the statutory provisions require a mortgagee decree‑holder to file his claim within the time limit prescribed in Section 14(1) before the appointed Claims Officer. The Claims Officer is then responsible for determining the amount that is legally and justly payable to each creditor with respect to his claim. The Court pointed out that Section 14(3) makes it explicit that if the mortgagee decree‑holder fails to give notice of his claim in the manner and within the period set out in Section 14(1), the claim becomes barred, the proviso to that effect being deemed unnecessary for consideration. Consequently, any claim of the kind described in subsection (1) that is not duly notified to the Claims Officer in the prescribed form and within the prescribed time is barred. The Court noted that the penalty for not complying with Section 14(1) is therefore clear. The Court then turned to Section 15, which obliges the creditor to provide full particulars and supporting documents for his claim. Under Section 16(1), the Claims Officer must determine both the principal amount that is justly due to each creditor and the interest that accrues up to the date of determination, with the determination to be made in accordance with the rules made under the Act. Section 16(2) sets out a scheme for scaling down the debts owed by the judgment‑debtor. The Court observed that clauses (b) and (d) of Section 16(2) indicate that the policy of the Act, among other things, is to give relief to debtors whose estates have, by operation of law, vested in the State. Section 17 provides for an appeal against the decision of the Claims Officer to a Board whose constitution is prescribed in Section 18(1). Section 18(3) declares that the decision of the Board, and, where no appeal is preferred to the Board, the decision of the Claims Officer, shall be final. Accordingly, the Court summarized that the scheme of Chapter IV, comprising Sections 14 to 18, requires that all claims based on mortgages of estates be submitted to the Claims Officer, and that the amounts due to creditors be determined according to the principles laid down in the Act. When the entire mortgaged property is an estate, the Court held that there can be no doubt that the procedure prescribed in Chapter IV must be followed so that the amount due to the creditor is determined by the Claims Officer, whose or the Board’s decision is made final by the Act. The Court then described Chapter V, which deals with the assessment of compensation. Section 24 provides the rates of compensation, and Section 24(5) states, among other things, that where a proprietor’s interest is subject to a mortgage or charge, the compensation shall first be payable to the creditor holding that mortgage or charge, and any balance shall be payable to the proprietor. The provision further provides that the amount of compensation payable to a creditor shall be

The Court explained that the amount fixed under Chapter IV, notwithstanding any other law in force, must not exceed the compensation payable in respect of the estate or the portion of the estate that is subject to the mortgage, and when two or more creditors are entitled, the compensation must be paid to them in the order prescribed by that Chapter. This provision is consequential because it directs that the sum already determined to be justly and legally due to a creditor under a claim made under section 14 shall be assessed under section 16 and the amount so determined shall be paid under section 24(5). Chapter VI deals with the payment of compensation, and section 32 specifies the manner of such payment. Accordingly, the scheme of Chapters IV, V and VI is clear. The provisions in those Chapters constitute an integrated and self‑sufficient code for ascertaining the amount due to the creditors in question and for effecting their payment. Section 35, which appears in Chapter VIII, bars the jurisdiction of civil courts over the matters included therein. Under that section no suit may be brought in any civil court concerning any entry in or omission from a Compensation Assessment Roll, nor in respect of any order passed under Chapters II to VI, or concerning any matter that has already been the subject of an application or proceeding under those Chapters. There can therefore be no doubt that the Act postulates that where its provisions apply, claims of creditors must be submitted before the Claims Officer, the claimants must follow the procedure prescribed by the Act, and they cannot obtain any remedy outside the Act by instituting a suit or any other proceeding in an ordinary civil court. In light of this scheme the Court turned to consider the true scope and effect of section 4(b). Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Jha, contended that in construing the words of section 4(d) it is necessary to bear in mind the object of the Act, namely to provide for the transference to the State of the interests of proprietors, tenure‑holders, mortgagees and lessees of such interests. He argued that it was not the object of the Act to extinguish debts due by proprietors or tenure‑holders and therefore it would be reasonable to confine the operation of section 4(d) only to claims made against estates that have vested in the State and to no others. In the Court’s opinion this argument proceeds on an imperfect view of the aim and object of the Act. It is true that one of the objects of the Act was to provide for the transference to

In this case, the Court observed that although the Act transfers to the State the estates that are specified, the provisions of section 16 concerning the reduction of debts owed by proprietors and tenure‑holders demonstrate that the legislation also intended to provide some relief to debtors whose estates were removed by the notifications issued under section 3. Accordingly, when interpreting section 4(d), the Court held that it would be incorrect to assume that the interests of those debtors covered by the Act lie outside its protective scope. Counsel for the petitioner acknowledged that if the words of section 4(d) are read literally and given their ordinary grammatical sense, it becomes difficult to confine the application of the section solely to execution proceedings that seek relief against property that has already vested in the State. The relevant provision in section 4(d) states that all suits and proceedings for the recovery of any such money pending on the date of vesting shall be dropped; the Court explained that this language is sufficiently broad to encompass execution proceedings even where the decree‑holder seeks recovery from properties other than the ones vested in the State. The sole limitation imposed by the clause is that the execution proceedings must concern the recovery of any such money, meaning any amount due from the proprietor on the basis of a mortgage executed by him in respect of an estate. The Court further noted that in the present matter the entire mortgaged property constitutes an estate; therefore, it was unnecessary to examine how section 4(d) would operate in a situation where only part of the mortgaged property is an estate and part is not. Likewise, it was unnecessary to consider whether section 4(d) would create a bar in cases where the compensation payable to the mortgagor is insufficient to satisfy the mortgagee‑decree‑holder’s claim, even after applying the reductions prescribed in section 16. However, counsel for the petitioner argued that grammatical rules should not dominate if a literal construction would produce unreasonable or anomalous results. To support this submission, counsel referred to the observations of Brett, M. R. in Lion Insurance Association Ltd. v. Tucker (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 176, wherein Brett stated that “when you construe a statute or document you do not construe it according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject‑matter with regard to which they are used, unless there is something which obliges you to read them in a sense which is not their ordinary sense.”

In this case, the Court observed that the doctrinal rule stating that statutes must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject‑matter does not assist the argument advanced by counsel for the petitioner. The Court explained that the structure of the relevant provisions of the Act, which had already been examined, makes it clear that when the entire mortgaged property constitutes an estate, a fixed sequence of consequences follows. First, the decree‑holder is required to lodge a claim. Second, that claim must be examined by the Claims Officer. Third, the Claims Officer must determine the amount that is due to the decree‑holder, a point supported by the authority cited as (1) (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 176, 186. Finally, the amount so determined is to be paid to the decree‑holder out of the compensation money that is payable to the judgment‑debtor. The Court emphasized that, in view of this systematic scheme, it would be improper to restrict the operation of section 4(d) solely to execution proceedings in which the decree‑holder seeks to enforce the decree against the estate of the debtor.

The Court further noted that an execution proceeding intended to recover the decretal sum from an estate that has already vested in the State would be incompetent, because that estate no longer belongs to the judgment‑debtor. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that, on the facts before it, the High Court was correct in holding that the petitioners’ application to execute the decree against the respondent by proceeding against her non‑mortgaged properties was premature. The amount due to the petitioners under the decree had already been quantified by the Claims Officer, and the petitioners were required to first recover that amount in accordance with the provisions of the Act before they could move to execute the personal decree. This conclusion was consistent with the language of the decree itself. The Court pointed out that the direction issued by the trial Court was explicit and clear, and that the direction, which aligns with the provisions of Order 34 B. 6, would permit the petitioners to proceed personally against the respondent only if it could be shown that the decretal amount had not been fully satisfied from the proceeds of the mortgaged property. In the present circumstances, the mortgaged property could not be sold because it had vested in the State free of encumbrance. In place of the mortgaged property, the respondent became entitled to a specific compensation amount, and the petitioners were granted a statutory right to receive the amount due to them from that compensation under section 24(5). The Court observed that this provision bears a resemblance to section 73(2) of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that when a mortgaged property is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act or any other law effecting compulsory acquisition of immovable property, the mortgagee is entitled to claim payment of the mortgage money, in whole or in part, out of the compensation due to the mortgagor. In a sense, the compensation amount payable

In this case, the Court observed that compensation amount owed to the respondent could be regarded as a security that replaces the mortgaged property, as contemplated by section 73(2) of the Transfer of Property Act. Nevertheless, the decree expressly required the appellants to first pursue their remedy from that compensation before they could initiate any action against the respondent’s property that was not mortgaged. The directions contained in the decree therefore did not support the appellants’ claim that, because the mortgaged estate had vested in the State, they were entitled to enforce the personal decree. The Court noted that the appellants must first use the remedy provided under section 24(5) of the Act. The Court then turned to several decisions of the Patna High Court that had been cited during the hearing. In Raghubir v. Budevanand (1), the High Court held that section 4(d) of the Act does not apply when a monetary claim is secured by a mortgage or charge. The Court explained that this holds for mortgages covering estates that are notified under section 3 of the Act and for those that are not. Accordingly, the High Court explained that section 4(d) blocks suit or execution proceedings only with respect to the estates that have vested in the State. The creditor, however, may continue suit or execution against those estates or portions that remain outside State ownership. Because the present dispute involves an entire mortgaged estate, the Court found it unnecessary to evaluate the correctness of the Patna High Court’s view in that case. The Court also considered Mahanth Sukhdeo Das v. Kashi Prasad Tiwari (1), where a full Bench examined whether a mortgagee‑decree holder, whose mortgaged estate had vested in the State, could proceed against the Bakasht lands. The Bench held that the mortgagee could not be compelled to seek relief under section 14 and satisfy the debt solely from the compensation payable under the Act. The Full Bench appeared to view that the judgment‑debtor’s interest in the Bakasht land was protected by section 6. Consequently, those lands remained with the former proprietor as raiyati lands instead of being treated as Bakasht lands. Because those lands formed part of the security created by the mortgage deed, the decree‑holder was entitled to enforce his right against them without resorting to the remedy under section 14 of the Act. This conclusion was derived from an interpretation of section 4(d) in conjunction with sections 3 and

In this case, the Court observed that section 6 of the Act was intended not to annihilate the mortgage altogether but only to affect that portion of the estate which had become vested absolutely in the State, leaving no interest in that portion for the mortgagor, proprietor or tenure‑holder. Counsel for the appellant conceded that the decision under discussion was also based on the assumption that the mortgage security was composed of two parts: one part being an estate that had already vested in the State, and the other part being bakasht lands which, in substance, had not vested in the State and therefore remained with the mortgagor in the character of raiyati lands. Accordingly, the Court held that it was unnecessary to re‑examine the merits of the conclusion reached by the Full Bench, as reported in A.I.R. 1958, Pat. 630, in the present matter. The Court added, however, that it was appropriate to note incidentally that counsel for the respondent, Sarjoo Prasad, had submitted that the Full Bench’s assumption regarding the nature of the bakasht lands under section 6 was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd. (1)[1962] 2. S.C.R. 44 1. The respondent’s argument was that section 6 of the Act corresponds to section 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, and that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 18 undermines the Full Bench’s conclusion about the effect of section 6. The Court expressed that it did not consider it necessary to address this point in the present appeal. Moreover, the Court observed that the authorities relied upon by counsel for the appellant did not assist in resolving the issue before it. Consequently, the Court affirmed the order passed by the High Court, dismissed the appeal with costs, and recorded the dismissal of the appeal.