Krishan Lal Dhawan And Another vs Delhi Administration

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 196 and 197 of 60

Decision Date: 15 February, 1962

Coram: Kapur J.

In this matter the petitioners, Krishan Lal Dhawan and another individual, filed a special‑leave appeal before the Supreme Court of India against a judgment dated 15 February 1962 rendered by the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi, which had affirmed their conviction and sentence. The respondents were the Delhi Administration. The case involved criminal proceedings instituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898) and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952). The appellants were charged with offences under sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The trial initially commenced before a Special Judge, Mr Jawala Das, who heard all prosecution evidence from the institution of the proceedings on 21 May 1956 until 26 October 1956, at which point the prosecution case was closed. Subsequently, the trial was taken over by another Special Judge, Mr P. D. Sharma, who began hearing the defence witnesses from 20 December 1956 and ultimately convicted the appellants while acquitting a co‑accused, R. P. Dhawan. The appellants challenged the conviction before the High Court, which upheld both the conviction and the sentence of six months’ rigorous imprisonment for each appellant. The appellants then sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, raising the sole ground that the succession of one Special Judge by another rendered the trial incompetent. The respondents, relying on section 8, sub‑section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, contended that the trial was valid and that the conviction and sentence were legally sound. The Supreme Court examined whether section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied to a trial conducted by successive Special Judges and whether section 3(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1956, gave a retrospective effect to that provision. The Court held that section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply when one Special Judge is succeeded by another, and that section 3(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1956, does not make the application of section 350 retrospective. Accordingly, the Court followed the precedent set in Payare Lal v. State of Punjab (1962) 3 SCR 328. The judgment was delivered by Justice Kapur. The appeal numbers were Criminal Appeal Nos. 196 and 197 of 1960. Counsel for the appellants included A.S.R. Chari, M.K. Ramamurthi, R.K. Garg, D.P. Singh and S.C. Agarwal for the first appeal, and N.S. Bindra, I.I. Lal and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for the second appeal. Counsel for the respondents comprised H.R. Khanna, R.H. Dhebar and P.D. Menon. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the validity of the convictions and the sentences imposed.

In this case the respondents were officials of the Rehabilitation Centre located at Malviya Nagar and at Kalkaji, both operating under the Ministry of Rehabilitation. The petitioner, K. L. Dhawan, was a partner in the firm styled M/s Dhawan & Co. The firm supplied a surface plate to the Works Centre for a consideration of Rs 1,950, and the Principal of the Works Centre at that time was Albert Moses. The criminal trial against the petitioners and against R. P. Dhawan, who was later acquitted, began before Special Judge Jawala Das of the Delhi Special Court. Judge Das presided over the matter from the date the proceedings were instituted on 21 May 1956 until 26 October 1956, when he concluded the hearing of the prosecution evidence. Subsequently, on 20 December 1956, Special Judge P. D. Sharma took over the case, examined the defence witnesses, and finally rendered a judgment convicting the petitioners of the offences previously outlined while confirming the acquittal of R. P. Dhawan. The petitioners appealed the conviction and the six‑month rigorous imprisonment sentenced to them to the High Court, which affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. By way of special leave, the two convicted petitioners now bring separate appeals before this Court, challenging the validity of the trial on the ground that the change of Special Judges during the proceedings rendered the trial incompetent and therefore the conviction and sentence unsustainable.

The sole question framed by the Court concerns whether the substitution of Special Judge Jawala Das by Special Judge P. D. Sharma after 20 December 1956 deprives the trial of jurisdiction. Counsel for the petitioners relies upon the Court’s earlier decision in Payara Lal v. State of Punjab, [1962] 3 SCR 328, where it was held that Section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply when one Special Judge succeeds another, rendering the succeeding judge incompetent to continue the trial. Accordingly, the petitioners submit that Judge Sharma could not lawfully proceed from the point at which Judge Das had left the case. counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, invokes sub‑section (3) of Section 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (Act 46 of 1952), which stipulates that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as they are not inconsistent with that Act, are applicable to proceedings before a Special Judge and that a Special Judge is to be deemed a Court of Session when trying a case under the said Act. The respondent further points to the Court’s ruling in Pyaralal’s case, [1962] 3 SCR 328, where it was held that sub‑section (3) of Section 8 of Act 46 of 1952 does not intend to make Section 350 of the Code applicable to Special Judge proceedings. Moreover, the Court observed that the amendment introduced by Act 2 of 1956, which added Section 3(a) to the Criminal Law Amendment Act and thereby made Section 350 of the Code applicable to trials before Special Judges, was not retrospective. In the light of these authorities, the Court is invited to consider that the conviction of the petitioners may have to be set aside.

The Court held that the judgment against the appellants had to be set aside, and accordingly ordered that the entire case be concluded in conformity with the law that governs such proceedings. By making this determination, the Court indicated that the appeal filed by the appellants was successful and therefore granted relief to them. The direction to set aside the earlier finding meant that the conviction recorded against the appellants was nullified, and the matter was to be disposed of on the basis of the statutory provisions applicable to the case. In expressing its order, the Court explicitly stated that the appeal was allowed, which signified that the higher court found merit in the arguments raised by the appellants and reversed the decision of the lower forum. The judgment also referenced the earlier authority cited as Pyaralal’s case, which appears in the 1962 volume of the Supreme Court Reporter, specifically volume three at page 328, to support its reasoning regarding the applicability of procedural provisions to trials before a Special Judge. By invoking that precedent, the Court reinforced its conclusion that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, as they relate to Special Judges, should be applied prospectively and not to the present appellate review. Consequently, the order of the Court resulted in the reversal of the conviction, the dismissal of the proceedings in line with the governing law, and the formal allowance of the appeal, as recorded in the cited report.