Kalipada Chowdhury vs Union Of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: C. 783 of 1961

Decision Date: 3 May, 1962

Coram: B.P. Sinha, J.C. Shah, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In the matter titled Kalipada Chowdhury versus Union of India, the Supreme Court of India rendered its decision on 3 May 1962. The bench that heard the case consisted of Justices B. P. Sinha, J. C. Shah, K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo and P. B. Gajendragadkar, with Justice Gajendragadkar delivering the judgment. The petitioners were four individuals who were responsible for the operation of the mine belonging to the Salanpur “A” Seam Colliery, which is situated in the District of Burdwan. These four persons faced criminal prosecution on the allegation that they had violated Regulation 127(3) of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957, regulations that had been framed under the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 (Act 35 of 1952). The petitioners filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of prohibition that would set aside the criminal proceedings on the ground that the proceedings infringed the protection guaranteed by Article 20(1) of the Constitution and were therefore void. The Union of India was impleaded as opponent 1, the Chief Inspector of Mines, Dhanbad (West Bengal) as opponent 2, the Regional Inspector of Mines, Sitarampur as opponent 3, and the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Asansol as opponent 4. The prosecution of the petitioners originated at the instance of opponents 2 and 3, while opponent 4 was the authority before whom the trial was being conducted. The petitioners contended that Regulation 127(3), the alleged ground of the prosecution, was ultra‑violet, invalid and inoperative, and that its application amounted to a breach of Article 20(1). Accordingly, they asked the Court to quash the criminal proceedings, to prohibit opponents 2 and 3 from pursuing the case further, and to restrain opponent 4 from trying the petitioners. The specific criminal case against them was identified as C. 783 of 1961, which was pending before opponent 4 at the time of the petition.

Regulation 127(3) formed part of the Coal Mines Regulations that had been framed by opponent 1, the Union of India, exercising the authority conferred by section 57 of the Mines Act. The regulation had been published in accordance with the requirements of sub‑section (1) of section 59 of the same Act. The substance of Regulation 127(3) stipulated that no mining work could be extended to within sixty metres of any disused or abandoned workings—except where those abandoned workings had been examined and found to be free from water or other liquid accumulations—whether such abandoned workings were situated in the same mine or in an adjoining mine. The regulation further required that any such extension could proceed only after obtaining prior written permission from the Chief Inspector, and only subject to any conditions that the Chief Inspector might prescribe. Although a proviso and an explanatory note accompanied the regulation, the judgment noted that reference to those ancillary provisions was unnecessary for the purpose of the present discussion. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners had extended the mine’s working beyond the permitted distance without first securing the required written permission from opponent 2, the Chief Inspector of Mines, Dhanbad. In response, the petitioners argued that Regulation 127(3) itself was invalid and inoperative, and therefore could not form a lawful basis for their prosecution, especially in view of the constitutional safeguard contained in Article 20(1).

In this matter, the petitioners argued that the alleged breach of Regulation 127(3) could not form a lawful basis for their prosecution because it would violate the protection guaranteed under Article 20(1) of the Constitution. They acknowledged that the authority designated as opponent No 1 possessed the power to make regulations under section 57 of the Act, but contended that at the relevant time section 59(3) imposed a mandatory duty on opponent No 1 to ensure that a draft of any regulation was not published unless the Mining Boards specified in that provision were given a reasonable opportunity to report on the desirability of the regulation and on the adequacy of its terms. The petitioners maintained that when the 1957 regulations were framed, no Mining Boards had been constituted under section 12 of the Act. Although three Boards had been created under section 10 of the Indian Mines Act of 1923, subsequent amendments to section 10 rendered the composition of two of those Boards invalid, namely the Madhya Pradesh Mining Board and the West Bengal Mining Board. Consequently, only the Bihar Mining Board, which had been duly constituted on 22 February 1946 under the earlier version of section 10, remained valid. The petitioners asserted that opponent No 1 was required to consult all three Boards, and because two of them were not validly constituted, referencing the individual members of those Boards did not satisfy the requirement of section 59(3). While a reference to the Bihar Mining Board was made, the Board’s opinions were communicated through its individual members rather than as a collective Board decision. In the petitioners’ view, this failure to comply with section 59(3) rendered the entire body of regulations issued in 1957 invalid and inoperative, and that defect formed the foundation of their request to have the criminal proceedings against them set aside.

The respondents, on the other hand, disputed the petitioners’ principal contention that section 59(3) had been breached. They argued that the provisions of section 59(3) had been properly observed and that the regulations made were therefore valid. Although they accepted that two of the three Boards mentioned were invalid, the respondents maintained that the statutory requirement was limited to consulting the Board that was validly existing at the relevant time. Accordingly, they claimed that the Bihar Mining Board, being the only properly constituted Board, had been duly consulted. The respondents further contended that the manner in which the Bihar Mining Board’s opinions were conveyed—through its individual members—did not create any defect in the regulations. They emphasized that the regulations had subsequently been published in the Gazette, and that, pursuant to section 59(5), such publication conferred upon them the legal effect as if they had been enacted by the Act.

The Court noted that the preceding discussion ended with the phrase “if enacted in the Act.” On behalf of the petitioners, counsel argued that section 59(3) placed a duty on the Central Government to obtain the views of the specific Boards named in that provision. He further maintained that when section 12 of the Act was read together with section 59(3), the result was that the Central Government was required to create Mining Boards for each area or mine for which the Regulations were to be issued. Because, according to the petitioners, two of those Boards had not been validly created, counsel said that the requirements of section 12 had not been satisfied and therefore the Central Government had violated section 59(3). He added that a recent decision of this Court supported his view that the provisions in sections 12 and 59(3) were mandatory. The learned Solicitor‑General for the respondents, however, replied that the cited decision did not have any material or direct relevance to the construction of section 12. He admitted that the decision affirmed the mandatory nature of the requirement in section 59(3), and therefore he suggested that the first step was to examine the effect of that decision. The Court then turned to the earlier case of Banwari Lal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, where it had examined whether a prosecution could stand on the ground that a Regulation made in 1957 had been contravened. In that case, the respondents had told the Court that the Mining Boards created under section 10 of the 1923 Act were still functioning when the relevant Regulations were framed, and that full consultation with those Boards had taken place before the Regulations were drafted. The respondents argued that section 59(3) was merely directory and not compulsory, contending that no legal duty was imposed on the Central Government to consult Mining Boards even if such Boards existed. They also suggested that the Boards established under the earlier Act continued to exist under the present Act by virtue of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, and that those Boards had been duly consulted. The appellant, on the other hand, maintained that the Boards referred to by the respondents were not validly constituted under the current Act and therefore had not been properly consulted. He further urged that both sections 12 and 59(3) were mandatory. The Court emphasized that these facts required a careful appreciation of the effect of its earlier decision in the Banwari Lal case. Finally, the Court observed that Justice Das Gupta, speaking for the Court, outlined the appellant’s argument that both sections 12 and 59 were mandatory, but that the judgment only examined whether section 59(3) was mandatory and concluded that it was. The judgment did not address the mandatory nature of section 12, and no discussion on that point appeared in the opinion.

The judgment did not address the construction of section 12 or its legal effect. After determining that section 59(3) was mandatory, the Court sent the matter back to the Magistrate who was already handling the case, directing him to decide whether the Mining Boards that had been created under the earlier Act were validly operating under the present Act and whether those Boards had been properly consulted. It is clear that, had the Court examined whether section 12 imposed a mandatory duty, it would have had to interpret that provision and then consider whether the Central Government’s failure to establish valid Boards, as argued by the appellant, rendered the challenged Regulation invalid. The Court did not follow that path because the respondents asserted that the required Boards existed and had been consulted, thereby limiting the dispute to the question of whether section 59(3) obliges the Central Government to consult existing Boards. The respondents further argued that, even if Boards were constituted under section 12, the Central Government was not required to consult them under section 59(3), characterising the consultation requirement as directory rather than mandatory. The Court rejected that contention, holding that section 59(3) imposes a mandatory duty to consult any existing Board before drafting a Regulation, and consequently remitted the factual issue to the trial Magistrate for determination. Accordingly, the effect of the earlier decision in Banwari Lal Agarwalla’s case is that when a Board exists at the relevant time, the Central Government must consult it before publishing a draft Regulation, confirming the mandatory nature of section 59(3). It would be incorrect to assume that the appellant’s claim that section 12, like section 59(3), is mandatory was resolved without any discussion of its construction or effect. The facts presented by the respondents made it unnecessary for the Court to decide the appellant’s argument concerning the mandatory character of section 12. Therefore, the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant that the present appeal’s issue regarding the effect of section 12 was already decided in Banwari Lal Agarwalla’s case is not justified. Having reached that conclusion, the Court proceeded to examine the appellant’s arguments on their merits. At this point, it was necessary to read both sections 12 and 59 together. Section 12 governs the constitution of Mining Boards. Section 12(1) provides that the Central Government may constitute, for any part of the territories to which the Act extends or for any group or class of mines, a Mining Board consisting of …

The Board is to be composed of seven persons as prescribed in clauses (a) to (e). The question that requires determination is whether the opening clause of section 12(1) creates a duty upon the Central Government to constitute a Mining Board whenever regulations are proposed that fall within the ambit of section 59(3). Section 59, as it existed before its amendment in 1959, read as follows: “59(1) The power to make regulations and rules conferred by section 57 and 58 is subject to the condition of the regulations and rules being made after previous publication. (2) The date to be specified in accordance with clause (3) of section 23 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), as that after which a draft of regulations or rules proposed to be made will be taken under consideration, shall not be less than three months from the date on which the draft of the proposed regulations or rules is published for general information. (3) Before the draft of any regulation is published under this section, it shall be referred to every Mining Board which is, in the opinion of the Central Government, concerned with the subject dealt with the regulation and the regulation shall not be so published until each such Board has had a reasonable opportunity of reporting as to the expediency of making the same and as to the suitability of its provisions. (4) No rule shall be made unless the draft thereof has been referred to every Mining Board constituted in that part of the territories to which this Act extends which is affected by the rule, and unless each such Board has had a reasonable opportunity of reporting as to the expediency of making the same and as to the suitability of its provisions. (5) Regulations and rules shall be published in the Official Gazette and, on such publication, shall have effect as if enacted in this Act. (6) The provisions of sub‑sections (1), (2) and (4) shall not apply to the first occasion on which rules referred to in clause (d) or clause (e) of section 58 are made. (7) The regulations and rules made under sections 57 and 58 shall be laid down before Parliament, as soon as may be, after they are made.” The petitioner argues that, in interpreting section 12, the court must take into account the provisions of section 59(3). By a 1959 amendment enacted through Act 62 of 1959, subsection (3) of section 59 was repealed and its effect merged into subsection (4), which was suitably altered to encompass both regulations and rules. The amended subsection (4) now reads: “59(4). No regulation or rule shall be made unless the draft thereof has been referred to every Mining Board constituted in that part of the territories to which this Act extends which is affected by the regulation or rule and unless”

The provision required that every such Board be given a reasonable opportunity to report on whether it was advisable to make the regulation or rule and on the suitability of its provisions. Before interpreting section 12, the Court found it helpful to examine the other sections of the Act that either gave powers to the Boards or assigned them duties. Section 14(1) stated that a Board formed under section 12 could use any of the powers of an Inspector under the Act whenever it deemed such use necessary or expedient for deciding or reporting on any matter referred to it. Section 14(2) further granted the Board the powers of a civil court for the purposes specified in that section. Consequently, Boards created under section 12 could either prepare a report on regulations or rules that were referred to them under section 59, or they could adjudicate matters sent to them under section 81. The reference of rules and regulations to the Boards had already been covered by section 59. Section 81(1) provided that if a court trying a case, which had been instituted by the Chief Inspector or other specified officers, considered that the matter should be referred to a Mining Board instead of proceeding with prosecution, the court could stay the criminal proceedings and forward the matter to the Central Government for possible referral. Section 81(2) empowered the Central Government either to refer the case to the Mining Board or to direct the court to continue with the trial. Thus, when the Central Government chose to refer a pending criminal case to a Board, the Board was required to decide the case, illustrating the two‑fold function that the Act could assign to the Boards. Mr. Sen argued that if section 59(3) were mandatory, then consultation with the relevant Board was essential, and because the legislature had finalized the regulations before the Central Government, the mandatory nature of section 59(3) implied that the Central Government must first constitute the Boards under section 12. In other words, he contended that section 59(3) assumed the existence of the Boards and made it obligatory for the Central Government to consult them, a requirement that could be satisfied only if the Central Government were compelled to create the Boards under section 12. The Court noted that this contention possessed some initial force. However, the Court also observed that if section 59(3) were read as imposing an obligation to consult a Board only when such a Board already existed, then the mandatory character of the provision would not necessarily compel the Central Government to constitute Boards, contrary to Mr. Sen’s suggestion. Section 59(3), as it stood before the 1959 amendment, provided that every Mining Board which, in the opinion of the Central Government, was concerned…

In this case the Court observed that the language of section 59(3) required that a Mining Board be consulted when the Board existed and, in the opinion of the Central Government, was concerned with the subject of the regulation, and that the provision therefore presupposed the prior existence of such a Board. The Court stressed that the requirement of consultation did not itself impose a duty on the Central Government to create a Board, because the power to constitute Boards was dealt with separately in section 12. Consequently, if section 12 was not mandatory, the proper construction of section 59(3) was that the Central Government could either establish a Board or refrain from doing so, and the effect of 59(3) was limited to the obligation to consult a Board only when it actually existed and was relevant to the regulation. The Court then turned to section 59(4), which, after the 1959 amendment, mandated that a draft rule or regulation be referred to every Mining Board that had been constituted in the part of the territory to which the Act applied and that was affected by the regulation. The Court explained that this provision likewise meant simply that any Board already constituted in the relevant area must be consulted, and it did not add any new words to sections 59(3) or 59(4). This interpretation rested on the premise that section 12(1) was not a compulsory duty. Accordingly, the Court held that it would be illogical to read sections 59(3) and 59(4) as imposing an obligation on the Central Government to constitute a Board, because the creation of Boards fell squarely within the domain of section 12, and any determination of whether the Central Government was required to constitute a Board had to be based on the meaning of section 12. The Court further examined the wording of section 12 itself and concluded that the terms used did not support the construction advanced by counsel for the petitioner. While it was not contested that the context might allow the word “may” to be interpreted as “shall,” the Court noted that substituting “shall” for “may” in section 12(1) would eliminate the argument that the provision was mandatory. To read the provision as obligating the Central Government to establish a Mining Board for every part of the territory or for every class of mines would create a direct conflict with the explicit discretion that the provision left to the Central Government. The Court emphasized that the statute clearly retained that discretion, allowing the Central Government to decide whether or not to constitute a Board for particular territories or groups of mines based on the requirements and circumstances applicable to those areas.

The Court observed that the provision dealing with the constitution of Mining Boards is expressed in clear language in its operative part, and that language shows that the word “may” cannot be interpreted as “shall”. Section 12(1) therefore assigns to the Central Government a discretionary power to constitute a Board for any part of the territory to which the Act applies. This discretion implies that the Government may choose not to constitute a Board for certain parts of the territory. In the same way, the section leaves to the Central Government the discretion to constitute a Board for a particular group or class of mines, meaning that for some groups or classes of mines a Board need not be set up at all. The decision as to whether Boards should be constituted for specific territorial parts or for particular groups or classes of mines is left entirely to the Central Government, based on the requirements of the territory concerned or the exigencies of the groups or classes of mines involved.

Consequently, the Court held that it could not accept the contention that Section 12(1) imposes a mandatory duty on the Central Government to constitute Boards so that, when regulations are made, appropriate Boards will be available for consultation under Section 59(3). The Court noted that the directory nature of the provisions of Section 121(1) actually reinforces the interpretation given to Section 59(3) in the earlier decision of this Court in Banwari Lal Agarwalla, namely that if Boards exist, they must be consulted before draft regulations are published under Section 59. The Court stressed that this requirement is quite distinct from a requirement that Boards must be constituted in every area or for every group or class of mines that the proposed regulations might cover.

Turning to the argument raised by counsel for the petitioner, the Court examined Section 5, which was relied upon to argue that the word “may” in that provision should be read as “shall”. Section 5 authorises the Central Government to appoint a person possessing the prescribed qualifications as Chief Inspector of Mines for all territories to which the Act extends. The Court acknowledged that the effective implementation of the Act depends on the appointment of the Chief Inspector, and that, in the context of that appointment, the word “may” can be understood to carry the force of “shall”. However, the Court pointed out that Section 5 itself demonstrates that “may” does not always equate to “shall”, especially regarding the appointment of other inspectors contemplated in the latter portion of the same section.

The Court therefore concluded that the meaning of the word “may” must be determined by the context in which it appears, and that the context of Section 12(1) does not support the interpretation advanced by the petitioner. It further held that, unlike the appointment of the Chief Inspector of Mines, the constitution of Mining Boards is not essential to the operation of the Act; the Act can continue to function smoothly even in the absence of such Boards. Accordingly, the Court was unable to find that Section 12(1) creates an obligatory duty to constitute Boards across all territories or for all classes of mines.

The Court observed that the legislation permits only two functions for the Mining Boards. First, under section 81(2) the Central Government may, at its discretion, refer a pending criminal case to a Board, but it is not compelled to do so. Second, section 59(3) requires consultation with a Board only when a Board actually exists. Because the operation of the Act does not hinge on the existence of Boards, the situation created by section 12 differs from that created by section 5, which contemplates a more indispensable role for a body that must exist for the Act to function effectively.

The Court then turned to another relevant provision, namely section 61, which governs the preparation of mining by‑laws. Section 61(1) mandates that the owner, agent or manager of a mine must, if requested by the Chief Inspector or an Inspector, prepare and forward a draft of the proposed by‑laws to that official in the manner prescribed. Section 61(2) further empowers the Chief Inspector or Inspector to suggest amendments to the draft. Section 61(3) provides that if, within a period of two moths from the date the draft by‑laws or draft amendments are sent by the Chief Inspector or Inspector to the owner, agent or manager, the two parties cannot reach agreement on the terms, the Chief Inspector or Inspector must refer the draft to the Mining Board for settlement; if no Mining Board exists, the matter must be referred to such officer or authority that the Central Government may appoint by general or special order. The Court noted that this sub‑section expressly assumes that a Mining Board may not exist in the locality of the mine or for the class of mines to which it belongs.

Consequently, the Court held that accepting the petitioners’ interpretation of section 12 together with section 59(3) would require a Mining Board to be present in every territory, group or class of mines across the nation so that regulations could be made binding on all mines. Such a requirement would clash with the assumption in section 61(3) that a Mining Board may be absent in certain areas or for certain classes of mines. In this indirect manner, section 61(3) supports the construction that the Court is inclined to adopt for section 12(1). The respondents argued that upholding their construction of section 12 would render sections 59(3) or 59(4) ineffective, defeating the purpose of consulting the Boards. The Court was not persuaded by this argument and, in assessing its validity, indicated that it must be examined in the context of the overall scheme of the relevant provisions.

Section 57 gave the Central Government the authority to make regulations, while Section 58 gave the same Government the authority to make rules in the manner specified therein. Section 59(1) stipulated that the power to make regulations could be exercised only after the regulations had been previously published. Section 59(2) then prescribed a minimum period that must elapse before a draft regulation could be taken up for consideration. Section 59(3) required that the Central Government must first consult the Mining Boards before proceeding with any regulation. In a logical sequence, the consultation with the Boards represented the initial step in the regulatory process; the second step involved publishing the draft regulations; the third step required allowing the prescribed period to run its course before the draft could be examined; and the final step consisted of publishing the regulations after they had been considered. Once the regulations were published, Section 59(5) declared that they would have the same effect as if they had been enacted by the Act itself. The initial publication referred to the publication of the draft under Section 23(3) of the General Clauses Act, whose purpose was expressly to invite objections or suggestions from persons or bodies that might be affected by the draft. Section 23(4) of the General Clauses Act further required the authority empowered to make rules or regulations to consider any objection or suggestion received with respect to the draft before the date specified therein. This provision ensured that publishing the draft served to give notice to the interested parties and that the requirement that the draft not be considered until the prescribed period had expired gave those parties sufficient time to file their objections. Consequently, the scheme of Section 59 made it clear that, apart from the mandatory consultation with the Boards mentioned in clause (3), every affected party would have an opportunity to submit suggestions or objections, and that such inputs would be taken into account before the draft was finalised and the regulations were formally made. Accordingly, the Court held that it would be incorrect to interpret Section 59(3) in the manner advanced by the respondents, that is, to suggest that the Central Government could issue regulations without consulting the views of the persons affected. The Court concluded that Section 12(1) was directory rather than mandatory, and that Section 59(3), or, after the 1959 amendment, Section 59(4), was obligatory in the sense that the Central Government had to consult the Board constituted under Section 12 before publishing any draft regulation. If no Board had been constituted, the requirement of consultation could not arise. In light of this interpretation, the Court proceeded to examine the petitioners’ grievance concerning the validity of their prosecution. It had already been established that both the Madhya Pradesh Mining Board and the West Bengal Mining Board had been constituted under Section 10 of

In this case the Court examined the effect of the amendment made by the Amending Act 5 of 1935 on the provisions of the Mining Act of 1923. The amendment altered section 10, which originally required that a Mining Board be constituted by the Provincial Government and limited its composition to five members. After the amendment the law required that a Mining Board be constituted by the Central Government and that it consist of seven members. Because of this change the respondents admitted that the Mining Boards that had been created in Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal could not be considered validly constituted for the purposes of section 12, even if the General Clauses Act, section 24, were applied. Consequently the Court found that at the time the regulations were prepared in 1947 there was only one Board that satisfied the statutory requirements – the Bihar Mining Board. The Bihar Board had been constituted in 1946 and, by virtue of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, qualified as a valid Board under section 12. The Court noted that the Central Government had indeed consulted this Board before formulating the regulations. It was not contested that the draft regulations were transmitted by the Central Government to the Bihar Mining Board through the State Government. After receiving the draft, the Chairman of the Board circulated it to each member, and each member then communicated his or her individual opinion. An argument was raised that because the Board members expressed their views individually rather than as a collective Board, this did not satisfy the consultation requirement of section 59(3), and therefore the Central Government had failed to comply with that provision. The Court rejected this contention, holding that section 59(3) merely obliges the Central Government to give the Board a reasonable opportunity to report on the expediency or suitability of the proposed regulations. How the Board chooses to formulate its report is beyond the control of the Central Government. The Central Government fulfilled its duty once it sent a copy of the draft regulations to the Board; the fact that the Board thereafter submitted individual opinions instead of a single collective report does not constitute a breach of section 59(3). Moreover, section 59(3) does not compel the Board to make any report at all. Although section 14 empowers the Board to prepare a report and it is unlikely that a properly consulted Board would refuse to do so, the Court emphasized that even a refusal would not invalidate the regulations that the Central Government may eventually frame and publish under section 59(5). Accordingly, the Court held that the regulations framed in 1957 were duly made and published under section 59(5) and therefore possessed the same effect as if they had been enacted by legislation.

In this case, the Court held that the petition was unsuccessful and therefore dismissed. The judgment was delivered by Subba Rao, J. The judge expressed regret at being unable to agree with the petitioners. The factual matrix relevant to the dispute was narrow. The petitioners were responsible for operating a mine known as Salanpur “A” Seam Colliery, located in the Burdwan district of West Bengal. A criminal complaint was lodged against them on the allegation that they had violated Regulation 127(3) of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957, hereafter referred to as the Regulations. The complaint was filed in the Court of the Sub‑divisional Magistrate at Asansol, and that magistrate took cognizance of the complaint under section 190(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read with section 73 of the Mines Act, 1952, hereafter called the Act. The petitioners challenged the validity of the Regulations on the ground that they had been made in breach of section 59(3) of the Act. Section 59(3) imposes a duty on the Central Government to give a reasonable opportunity to a Mining Board before issuing regulations exercising the power conferred by the Act. Under section 10 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923, the Central Government had, in 1946, constituted the Bihar Mining Board with jurisdiction over the area covered by the Province of Bihar. The Government transmitted the draft Regulations to that Board; the Chairman then circulated the draft to all Board members, and each member conveyed his or her opinion individually to the Central Government. After receiving those opinions, the Central Government proceeded to make the Regulations applicable to the whole of India, except Jammu and Kashmir, and to every coal mine within that territory, in compliance with the remaining provisions of section 59 of the Act.

The principal issue before the Court was whether the Regulations, having been prepared after consulting only the Bihar Board, were valid and enforceable in the West Bengal region, such that a criminal prosecution for alleged contravention of those Regulations could be sustained with respect to a mine situated there. This question could be broken down into two components. First, the Court considered whether, in the absence of a constituted Mining Board, the Central Government could disregard the condition laid down in section 59(3) of the Act. Second, the Court examined whether, assuming that providing a reasonable opportunity under section 59(3) was a necessary condition for the validity of the Regulations, the Central Government could validly enact regulations for West Bengal after having afforded such an opportunity only to a Mining Board constituted for Bihar. In Subba Rao, J.’s view, the initial component was directly addressed by the Court’s earlier decision in Banwari Lal v. State of Bihar, wherein Justice Das Gupta delivered the judgment of the Court. The decision in that case was argued to apply only where a Mining Board had been validly constituted under the Act, and the Court needed to ascertain precisely the scope of that precedent before extending its reasoning to the present factual situation.

In the earlier decision that the Court referred to, the factual backdrop involved a fatal accident at the Central Bhowra Colliery in Dhanbad, Bihar, which resulted in the loss of twenty‑three lives. Following the incident, the Regional Inspector of Mines at Dhanbad lodged a criminal complaint against the appellant, alleging a violation of section seventy‑four of the Mines Act, 1952. The alleged breach related specifically to contraventions of regulations numbered one hundred seven and one hundred twenty‑seven contained in the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957. After the Sub‑Divisional Officer took cognizance of the complaint, the appellant subsequently filed an application before the Patna High Court invoking Article two hundred twenty‑six of the Constitution. In that application, the appellant sought to set aside the proceedings on several grounds, one of which was the assertion that no Mining Board had been constituted under section twelve of the Act, and consequently the Central Government had framed the Regulations without the mandatory consultation of a Mining Board as required by section fifty‑nine, subsection three of the same Act. The second ground, which forms the focus of the present discussion, was expressed in the High Court’s judgment as follows: “the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957, are invalid having been framed in contravention of section fifty‑nine, subsection three of the Mines Act, 1952.” Counsel for the appellant elaborated this ground by contending that the provisions of sections twelve and fifty‑nine of the Mines Act, 1952, are mandatory in nature. The learned judge then quoted in full the language of section fifty‑nine, subsection three, set out the material facts of the case and posed the issue for determination in the following terms: it was not contested that at the time the Regulations were framed, no Board required by section twelve existed, and therefore no reference could have been made to any Board as mandated by section fifty‑nine. The question therefore was whether the failure to make such a reference rendered the Regulations invalid.

The question, as framed, made clear that the Court’s task was to decide whether a Regulation drafted without reference to a Mining Board – because such a Board had not been constituted – could be deemed invalid. The judge then turned to an analysis of the wording of section fifty‑nine, subsection three, and observed at page eight hundred fifty‑one that the legislative language was emphatic and appeared to convey a strong legislative anxiety. Specifically, the provision seemed to require that the publication of a regulation, which itself is a condition precedent to the making of the regulation, be subject to two preliminary conditions: first, an explicit reference to the concerned Mining Board, and second, the granting of a sufficient opportunity to that Board to prepare a report on the expediency and suitability of the proposed regulation. The learned judge subsequently examined the rationale behind imposing such a condition, seeking to understand why the legislature had insisted upon the involvement of a Mining Board before a regulation could be validly issued.

In his observations, the Judge noted that a brief review of the twenty‑seven clauses contained in section 57 demonstrated that most of those clauses directly affected the day‑to‑day operation of mines. He explained that even by citing only a few of those clauses, it became clear that the overall purpose of the Mining Act could be frustrated unless the government framed suitable and practical regulations that would enable the purpose of the Act to be achieved.

The Judge then turned to section 12 of the Act, pointing out that this provision empowered the Government to appoint Boards that would represent a variety of interests. He emphasized that such Boards would be positioned to assist the Central Government in formulating regulations that were both suitable and practicable. Quoting his own words, the Judge stated that the constitution of these Boards was intended to ensure that every aspect—on one side the necessity of safeguarding the safety and welfare of labour, and on the other the practicality of the proposed provisions considering likely expense and other factors—could be examined thoroughly. He added that it was clearly of public benefit that Boards so constituted should be given the opportunity to review regulations initially proposed by an administrative department of the Government and to express their opinions.

According to the Judge, the method of constituting the Board prescribed by the Act served a genuine purpose; consequently, the Act made consultation with such a Board a condition precedent to the issuance of regulations. When the argument was raised that insisting on such consultation might jeopardise public welfare in emergency situations, the Judge referred to section 60 of the Act. He explained that this section allowed the Central Government, under special circumstances, to make regulations without first referring to the Mining Boards. Therefore, the existence of an emergency clause did not prevent the Court from holding that providing the Board an opportunity to comment was nonetheless a prerequisite for the exercise of the power to make regulations.

Summarising his reasoning, the Judge declared that an examination of all relevant factors—including the precise language used, the overall scheme of the legislation, the public benefit derived from strict compliance, and the potential risks to public interest from insisting on such compliance—led to the conclusion that the legislative intention was to make consultation with the Mining Board a prerequisite for the validity of any regulation. He reinforced this view by referring to section 60, which, while permitting the framing of regulations without following the procedure laid down in section 59 under certain conditions, also inserted a proviso that any regulation made in that manner would not remain in force for more than two years from the date of its making. An amendment in 1959 reduced this period to one year. The Judge observed that it was reasonable to interpret this proviso as an implied indication of the legislature’s intention that, where the special circumstances contemplated in section 60 did not arise and there was no scope for applying that section, the requirement of Board consultation remained essential.

The Court observed that, according to the earlier discussion, a regulation enacted in violation of section 59 would be valid for only a single day. The learned judge then concluded his argument, stating, “For all the reasons giving above, we are of opinion that the provisions of s. 59(3) of the Mining Act, 1952, are mandatory.” The author found it difficult to accept a reading that the Court held, either expressly or by necessary implication, that the mandatory nature of s. 59(3) applied only when the relevant Board existed. The author notes that the argument presented, the question framed, the reasons supplied, and the ultimate conclusion all opposed the notion of limiting the judgment to such a narrow circumstance. It was also contended by counsel that both section 12 and section 59 of the Act imposed mandatory obligations upon the authorities. In framing the issue, learned judge referred to “the omission to make such a reference,” where “such” indicated failure to make a reference because no Board had been constituted under s. 12 of the Act. Consequently, the author holds that there was no ambiguity in the question presented and that the learned judge clearly understood the matter before the Court. The reasons offered by the learned judge for holding that the Central Government was obligated to consult the Board before issuing a regulation were stated to apply regardless of whether the Board actually existed. The learned judge’s conclusion that consultation with a Board was a condition precedent to the exercise of regulatory power was intended to cover both scenarios. If a condition precedent is required, its existence does not depend on the Board’s existence but on the act of consultation; thus, non‑consultation breaches the condition whether the Board is present or absent. The author observes that the last three paragraphs of the earlier judgment appear to consider only the situation where a Board had not been constituted. These paragraphs focus on whether Boards created under s. 10 of the Mines Act, 1923, were still operating when the regulations were framed and whether full consultation had occurred. Because the record lacked sufficient material, the learned judge could not resolve that issue and therefore the Court directed the Magistrate to determine the question. The author disputes the view that these paragraphs limit the Court’s decision to cases with an existing Board, noting that the observations in the first of the three paragraphs suggest the opposite. Accordingly, the author concludes that the overall observations indicate that the Court’s ruling was not confined to situations where a Board had been constituted.

The Court noted that the observations recorded earlier stated: “As has been pointed out above, it was not disputed before us that at the time when the regulations were framed no new Mining Board had been constituted under the Mines Act, 1952 and consequently no consultation with any Mining Board constituted under the 1952 Act took place.” This quotation, marked as paragraph 33, demonstrated that the entire earlier part of the judgment was based on the premise that there was no consultation with a Mining Board because such a Board had never been constituted. After establishing this premise, the judge turned his attention to the alternative argument put forward by the State, which claimed that a pre‑existing Board had been consulted and that such consultation satisfied the requirements of section 59(3) of the Act.

The judge then outlined, in a step‑by‑step manner, the reasoning that guided his decision. First, counsel for the appellant argued that because no Board had been created under section 12 of the Act, there could be no consultation with a Board, and consequently the regulations issued without such consultation were void. The judge accepted this contention. Next, counsel for the Government contended that, although there was no consultation with a Board formed under section 12, a consultation with an earlier, pre‑existing Board might nonetheless fulfil the statutory requirement. Because the record contained no material to decide this issue, the judge declined to rule on it and directed that the question be referred to the Magistrate for determination. The judge further observed that it was a common fact that no Board under section 12 had been constituted; therefore, if the Government’s contention were accepted, the State’s argument would become moot, since, according to the State, section 59(3) could not be invoked where no Board existed. The plea that a pre‑existing Board had been consulted was raised by the State, not by the appellant, and would be unnecessary if section 58(3) did not impose a consultation requirement when a Board did not exist. In paragraph 34, the judge declared that the earlier judgment of the Court was clear and unambiguous: because there was no consultation with any Mining Board under section 59(3), and because no Board existed, the regulations were invalid. The present submission was described as an attempt to overturn a clear pronouncement made by a Constitution Bench. Finally, in paragraph 35, the judge concluded that a proper construction of sections 12 and 59(3) required the Central Government to first exercise the power under section 12 before it could exercise the power under section 59 of the Act. Section 12 authorises the Central Government to constitute a Mining Board for any part of the territories to which the Act extends or for any group or class of mines, thereby establishing the prerequisite for the subsequent regulatory power.

The Act provides that for each mine a “Mining Board” may be constituted, the Board being composed of persons who possess the qualifications prescribed by the statute and who represent the various interests that exist in the mining sector. Section 59 makes the power to enact regulations, which is granted by section 57, dependent upon a procedural condition. That condition requires that before any draft regulation is published, the draft must be referred to every Mining Board that, in the opinion of the Central Government, has an interest in the subject matter of the proposed regulation. The draft may not be published until each such Board has been given a reasonable opportunity to report on whether the regulation is advisable and whether its provisions are appropriate. The Court has previously interpreted this requirement as a condition precedent, meaning that the regulation cannot be finalized unless the consultation with the Board has been completed.

If the argument advanced by the learned Solicitor‑General were accepted, the requirement to refer the draft to a Mining Board could be removed when the Central Government deliberately chooses not to exercise the related power under section 12. In that view, the Central Government could, by its own inaction, disregard the consultation condition even though the condition is intended to serve the public interest. Such an interpretation would produce an anomalous result, and the Court cannot adopt it unless the language of the provisions forces that conclusion. Established rules of statutory construction dictate that, where possible, the Court must interpret apparently conflicting provisions so that they give effect to each other and produce a harmonious reading. In other words, when two plausible constructions exist, the one that yields a consistent meaning across the different sections should be preferred.

Applying that principle to the present case, sections 12 and 57‑59 can be read in a manner that does not distort their language. Section 12 is an enabling clause that authorises the Central Government to constitute a Mining Board for any part of the territory covered by the Act or for any class of mines. Sections 57 and 59 together confer on the Central Government the power to make regulations, subject among other requirements to the condition that the draft regulation be referred to a Mining Board. These two powers are linked. When read together, it is reasonable to hold that the Central Government must first exercise the power under section 12 to appoint a Mining Board if it intends to make regulations under section 57. This interpretation gives effect to the legislative purpose behind section 59 as understood by this Court. Both powers can therefore operate without one negating the other.

The construction preferred by the respondents would allow the Central Government to sidestep the public‑policy purpose underlying the consultation requirement of section 59. In contrast, the construction advocated by the petitioners enables the Government to use both powers in a compatible way, preserving the intended public‑interest safeguard. On the basis of the principle of harmonious construction, the Court favours the latter interpretation, which maintains the integrity of both statutory provisions and upholds the legislative intent.

The Court examined the statutory provisions from a different perspective. It noted a well‑established doctrine that when a statutory power is coupled with a duty imposed on the person who holds that power, the exercise of the power becomes imperative. This principle is discussed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, eleventh edition, page 234. The Court also observed that when the object for which a power is conferred contemplates the grant of a right, a corresponding duty is imposed on the person to whom the power is given to exercise it for the benefit of the party who holds that right whenever the latter requires it. In relation to section 51 of the Income‑Tax Act, 1918, which provides that the Chief Revenue Authority “may” state a case to the High Court, Lord Phillimore’s observation in Alcock Ashdown & Co. v. The Chief Revenue Authority Bombay [AIR 1923 PC 138] was quoted. He explained that although the word “may” does not command the authority to state the case, the grant of a capacity or power to a public authority can, in appropriate circumstances, be coupled with a duty to exercise that power. Where a serious point of law is at issue, a duty therefore lies on the Revenue authority to state the case for the Court’s opinion; and if the authority fails to recognise such a point, the Court has the power to control it and to order the authority to state the case. The Court then turned to the Act under consideration, noting that it contains two connected powers: a power to appoint a Mining Board and a power to make regulations subject to a condition. The condition creates a right in the Mining Board to be consulted before any regulation is made. A combined reading of section 12 together with sections 57 and 59 demonstrates that the powers conferred on the Central Government are coupled with a duty to consult the Board whenever the Government seeks to exercise the power under section 57. The Court expressed no hesitation in holding that the power is indeed coupled with a duty and must be exercised whenever the duty demands it. Accordingly, the Central Government, in making regulations, has a duty to consult the Mining Board; the Mining Board possesses a right to be consulted; and to discharge that duty the Central Government is required to exercise the connected power by appointing the Board. The Court further noted that it is submitted that under section 59 of the Act the regulations and rules shall be referred to a Mining Board, and that under section 58 the Central Government has the authority to make a rule providing for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Mining Board.

In considering whether section 59 imposes a mandatory duty, the Court observed that if the provision were indeed mandatory, the Central Government could never invoke the power that arises under section 58(a). Such a difficulty did not exist in the Act before it was amended in 1959. At that time, subsection 3 of section 59 required consultation with a Mining Board only when the Government exercised its power to make a regulation, and section 57, which granted the Central Government the authority to make regulations, contained no clause that corresponded to clause (a) of section 58. Consequently, section 58(a) could be lawfully exercised by the Central Government only after a Mining Board had been constituted for future appointments. The Court noted that this line of argument had been raised before it in an earlier reference to the construction of section 59, but that issue was no longer open because the Court had finally settled the proper interpretation of that section. The Court further examined other provisions of the Act and reached the same conclusion. Numerous enabling clauses empower the Central Government to appoint specific authorities to perform the duties described in various sections. If it were held that the Government was never required to make such appointments, the Act would become ineffective. For example, section 5 leaves the appointment of the Chief Inspector and other Inspectors to the discretion of the Central Government; without those appointments, the duties assigned to those officers could not be performed. Thus, a reasonable construction requires that where the duties must be performed, the Government must appoint the officers. By the same logic, whenever the Central Government wishes to exercise the powers conferred by section 57 read with section 59, it must first appoint the Mining Board. Accordingly, the Court held that, on a proper construction of sections 12 and 59, the Central Government has a duty to appoint a Mining Board whenever it intends to use the power granted under section 57.

The Court then turned to the argument that the Bihar Board had been consulted in the manner prescribed by subsection 3 of section 59 and that, therefore, the regulations made after such consultation were valid. The Court rejected this contention. It observed that the Board in question had been appointed under section 10(1) of the Indian Mines Act, 1923, and that there was no dispute that the Board was duly constituted under the present Act. However, the Board’s jurisdiction was limited to the area that now forms the State of Bihar and did not extend to West Bengal. Under section 12 of the Act, the Central Government may constitute a Mining Board for any part of the territories to which the Act applies. Consequently, a Board constituted solely for Bihar could not be regarded as a Board concerned with matters relating to mines in West Bengal, and consultation with such a Board could not satisfy the requirement of section 59 for regulations affecting mines in a different region.

The judgment explained that, under the statutory scheme, the Central Government may create a Mining Board for any class or group of mines. Section 59 requires the Government, before issuing a mining regulation, to forward the draft regulation to every Mining Board that the Government reasonably believes is concerned with the matter addressed by the regulation. The Court then considered whether a Board that had been constituted for the area of Bihar could be regarded as a Board concerned with regulations affecting mines situated in West Bengal. The Court observed that the purpose of section 59 is to consult individuals who are closely linked to the mining activities of the specific area for which the regulation is intended, so that the resulting rules are appropriate to the conditions of those mines. The Court held that it could not be said that the Legislature intended to allow the Government to make regulations for mines in one part of the country by consulting a Board that had been set up for a different part of the country. Such an intention, the Court said, could not be ascribed to the Legislature. Moreover, when the Central Government constituted the various Boards, it expressly indicated that all Boards, including a Board that would operate in West Bengal, should be consulted. Because no Board had been legally constituted in West Bengal under the Act, the required consultation could not take place and became ineffective. Consequently, the Court concluded that any regulations purporting to govern mines located in West Bengal were not validly made, since the mandatory condition imposed by section 59—consultation with an appropriate Board—had not been satisfied. Accordingly, the Court ordered the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondents 1 to 4, restraining them from proceeding with the criminal proceedings that had been initiated against the petitioners, and awarded costs to the petitioners. Finally, the Court noted that, in accordance with the majority view of the Court, the writ petition was dismissed.