K. Chinnaswamy Reddy vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1960

Decision Date: 25 July, 1962

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.C. Shah

In the matter of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy versus State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 25 July 1962. The decision was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo and was pronounced by a Bench consisting of Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, and Justice J.C. Shah. The petitioner in the case was K. Chinnaswamy Reddy and the respondent was the State of Andhra Pradesh. The case is reported in several law reports, including 1962 AIR 1788, 1963 SCR (3) 412, and appears in subsequent citator references such as R 1968 SC 707, R 1970 SC 272, RF 1970 SC 1934, F 1973 SC 84, R 1973 SC 1274, RF 1973 SC 2145, R 1975 SC 580, R 1978 SC 1, E 1981 SC 1415, and R 1986 SC 1721. The matters before the Court involved the power of a High Court to set aside an acquittal in revision under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the propriety of ordering a retrial, and the admissibility of statements made by an accused during police investigation under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The factual background, as summarized in the headnote, indicated that the appellant was tried together with another accused. The appellant was convicted under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, while the co‑accused was convicted under sections 457 and 380 of the same Code by an Assistant Sessions Judge. During police interrogation, the appellant told the investigating officer that he would show the place where the ornaments had been hidden; subsequently he proceeded to the garden and uncovered two bundles containing the ornaments. The co‑accused similarly declared that he had handed the 413 ornaments to a person named Bada Sab, then guided the police to Bada Sab and requested that the ornaments be returned, which Bada Sab complied with.

The Sessions Judge, on appeal, held that the portion of the appellant’s statement in which he admitted to having hidden the ornaments was inadmissible as evidence. In the absence of any other proof establishing possession of the ornaments, the judge concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant possessed the stolen property and therefore applied the benefit of doubt, resulting in the appellant’s acquittal. The judge arrived at a similar conclusion regarding the co‑accused and acquitted him as well. The High Court, exercising its revisionary jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, set aside the order of acquittal and directed that a retrial be conducted. The present appeal was filed against the High Court’s order of retrial. The Supreme Court held that while a High Court may, in revision and even at the instance of a private party, set aside an order of acquittal although the State had not appealed, such jurisdiction must be exercised only in exceptional circumstances—specifically where there is a glaring procedural defect or a manifest error of law resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The Court noted that section 439(4) of the Code prohibits the High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction, and therefore it is improper for the High Court to achieve the same effect indirectly by ordering a retrial. The Court further observed that it was open

The Court explained that while there is no precise formula for determining the rare situations in which a revisionary High Court may intervene, it is evident that the High Court may rightly interfere when (i) the trial court incorrectly excluded evidence that the prosecution sought to present, (ii) an appellate court mistakenly ruled that evidence admitted by the trial court was inadmissible, (iii) material evidence was overlooked either by the trial court or by the appellate court, or (iv) the acquittal rested on a compounding of the offence that the law does not permit, together with any analogous circumstances. The Court cited the authorities D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, [1951] S.C.R. 284 and Logendra‑nath Jha v. Shri Polailal Biswas, [1951] S.C.R. 676 in support of this proposition. In the present case, the Court found no doubt that the complete statements of both the appellant and the other accused were admissible under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act; consequently, the Sessions Judge erred in excluding portions of those statements, and the High Court was therefore justified in setting aside the acquittal on revision. The judgment also referred to Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, (1946) L.R. 74 I.A. 65.

The matter before this Court was a criminal appeal numbered 6 of 1960, filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 1 July 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 403 of 1958 and Criminal Revision Petition No. 337 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant was P. Ram Reddy, while the respondents were represented by K.R. Choudhuri and P.D. M for respondent 1, and K.R. Chaudhuri for respondent 2. The judgment was delivered on 25 July 1962 by Justice Wanchoo. The appeal concerned a conviction of the appellant under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code by the Assistant Sessions Judge of Kurnool. In addition, another individual, Hussain Saheb, had been convicted under ss. 457 and 380 of the same Code. According to the prosecution, the residence of Rahayya in Dudyia had been burglarised on the night of 20 April 1957. Ramayya and his wife, who were sleeping outdoors, discovered the theft the following morning when they found valuable property missing. The police were notified, and during the investigation they recovered seventeen ornaments based on information supplied by the appellant. Further information from the other accused led to the recovery of an additional stolen ornament. After evaluating the evidence, the Assistant Sessions Judge concluded that the other accused had actually broken into the house, removed ornaments, and handed seventeen of those ornaments to the appellant. The Judge also concluded that the seventeen ornaments recovered at the appellant’s request were in his possession, and therefore found the appellant guilty under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Sessions Judge examined the evidence concerning the appellant and the other accused and concluded that the prosecution had not established that the appellant possessed the seventeen ornaments that had been recovered from a garden at his request. The appellant had told the court that he would point out the place where he had hidden the ornaments. He then proceeded to the garden and unearthed two bundles that contained the seventeen ornaments. While the judge accepted that the ornaments were indeed recovered from the garden because of the appellant’s indication, he ruled that the portion of the appellant’s statement in which he claimed to have hidden the ornaments could not be admitted as evidence. Accordingly, the judge observed that the garden was a location open to anyone and that, in the absence of any further evidence linking the appellant to the hidden ornaments, it could not be said that the ornaments were in his possession. Relying on this view, the judge gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant and ordered his acquittal. The same judge also acquitted the other accused, from whose information a single stolen ornament had been recovered. That accused had testified that he had delivered the ornaments to a person identified as Bada Sab (PW 5), had taken the police to Bada Sab and had asked him to return the ornaments, which Bada Sab subsequently did. Although the judge found the evidence against the other accused doubtful and therefore acquitted him, he directed that the ornaments be returned to Ramayya.

Ramayya filed a revision against both the appellant and the other accused. The High Court allowed the revision and directed that the matter be sent back to the Sessions Judge for a fresh trial on the charges originally framed. The present special leave appeal challenged that High Court order directing a retrial. It was noted that only the appellant, Chinnaswamy Reddy, had appealed the High Court’s decision; the other accused had not. The appellant contended that the revision was initiated by a private party and that there were no exceptional circumstances that would justify the High Court’s interference with an acquittal granted to a private complainant. He further argued that section 439(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly prohibits the High Court from turning an acquittal into a conviction, and that the High Court, by ordering a retrial, had indirectly compelled the Sessions Court to convict the appellant, thereby converting the acquittal into a conviction in contravention of the statute.

In this case, the Court observed that the High Court could not change an acquittal into a conviction directly, nor could it achieve that result indirectly. The Court explained that the scope of the High Court’s power to interfere with an order of acquittal on a revision petition had been examined by this Court on several occasions. In the decision of D. Stephens v. Nosibolla (1) the Court had held that the revisional power granted to the High Court by section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not to be exercised lightly when it was invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, a situation in which the Government alone possessed a right of appeal under section 417. The Court further observed that such power could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice required interference to correct a manifest illegality or to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice, and not merely because the lower court had taken an erroneous view of the law or had misappreciated the evidence on record. The Court then referred to the judgment in Logendranath Jha v. Shri Polailal Biswas (1), noting that although sub‑section (1) of section 439 authorises the High Court to exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by section 423, sub‑section (4) expressly excludes the power to “convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction”. The Court clarified that this restriction meant the High Court could not, in a revision petition filed by a private party against an acquittal, re‑appraise evidence and overturn factual findings unless it stopped short of declaring the accused guilty and imposing a sentence, even if it ordered a retrial. These two authorities therefore defined the limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction to meddle with an acquittal in revision, with the Logendranath Jha case stressing that the High Court could not indirectly achieve a conviction by ordering a retrial. The Court described how, in that case, the High Court had reversed the trial court’s factual findings while formally complying with sub‑section (4) by ordering only a retrial and cautioning the court conducting the retrial not to be influenced by any opinion expressed in the High Court’s judgment. The Court further noted that, despite such caution, it would be difficult for any subordinate judicial officer to disregard the strong opinions expressed by the High Court regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the overall circumstances of the case.

It was observed that a High Court exercising revision jurisdiction may set aside an order of acquittal even when the application is made by private parties, although the State itself may have elected not to appeal. However, the Court stressed that such power should be invoked only in exceptional situations where there is a glaring procedural defect or a manifest error of law that has produced a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Section 439(4) expressly prohibits a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction, and this prohibition makes it all the more necessary for the High Court to ensure that it does not achieve the same result indirectly by ordering a retrial, since it cannot directly transform an acquittal into a conviction. Consequently, the authority of the High Court to set aside an acquittal in revision is limited, and it should be exercised only in rare cases. Although it is not possible to formulate a rigid test that would encompass every possible contingency, the Court indicated several categories of cases that, in its view, would justify interference with an acquittal. Such categories include situations where the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the matter yet proceeded to acquit the accused; where the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that the prosecution sought to introduce; where an appellate court admitted evidence that the trial court had correctly held to be inadmissible; where material evidence was overlooked either by the trial court or by the appellate court; and where the acquittal was based on a compounding of the offence that is invalid under law. These and similar circumstances may be treated as exceptional, thereby permitting the High Court to intervene without violating the prohibition of section 439(4). In the present case, the Court examined the High Court’s order that set aside the acquittal and ordered a retrial. The High Court had undertaken a detailed analysis of the evidence against the appellant before directing the retrial. The Court held that such an extensive consideration of the evidence, when the purpose was merely to order a new trial, amounted to “loading the dice” against the appellant, a principle articulated in Logendranath’s case. If the matter had rested solely on this point, the Court would have readily set aside the High Court’s direction for a retrial. Nevertheless, the High Court had also identified an additional important circumstance, which the Court deemed sufficient to justify setting aside the acquittal, and therefore the detailed evidentiary scrutiny should not have been undertaken.

The Court stated that, absent any other factor, it would have had no hesitation in setting aside the High Court’s order that mandated a retrial. However, the Court identified one important circumstance that the High Court had noticed in passing, and deemed that circumstance sufficient to justify the High Court’s decision to set aside the acquittal. Because of that circumstance, the Court held that it would have been unnecessary for the High Court to examine the evidence in the exhaustive detail with which it actually proceeded. Such a detailed appraisal, the Court observed, would have loaded the dice against the appellant when the matter returned for retrial, a point that the Court noted as having been recognised in the earlier authority reported at (1) [1951] S.C.R.676.

The Court explained that the crucial circumstance concerned the admission by the Assistant Sessions Judge of a part of the appellant’s statement. In that statement, the appellant said that he would show the place where he had hidden the ornaments, and on that basis the Sessions Judge concluded that the appellant was in possession of seventeen ornaments that had been recovered from a garden that the appellant owned jointly with others. Nevertheless, the Sessions Judge ruled that the portion of the appellant’s statement in which he admitted to having hidden the ornaments was inadmissible. A similar situation arose with respect to the other accused, who had said that he had given one ornament to a person named Bada Sab and would seek its recovery. Although the Sessions Judge did not expressly reject the segment of the other accused’s statement concerning the gift to Bada Sab, the Judge did not, consistent with the treatment of the appellant’s statement, attach any importance to that portion. The Court therefore concluded that if the parts of the statements of both the appellant and the other accused that led to the discovery of the ornaments were admissible, then the appellate court had wrongly excluded evidence that was, in fact, admissible. In such circumstances, the case fell squarely within the principles previously set out by the Court, because relevant evidence had been wrongly ruled inadmissible. Accordingly, the High Court was justified in interfering with the order of acquittal so that the evidence could be re‑appraised in light of the material that had been improperly excluded. The Court observed that the High Court appeared aware of this issue, as it stated in its judgment that the only possible inference was that the appellant possessed stolen goods before they were concealed in the secret spot, an inference drawn from the appellant’s statement, a part of which is admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Had the High Court confined its review solely to the admissibility of that portion of the statement, its interference with the acquittal would have been justified. Instead, the High Court went beyond that limitation and also evaluated the evidence, a course of action that the Court held to be impermissible in accordance with the ruling in Logendranath’s case. Nonetheless, if admissible evidence had been excluded and not considered, that omission would itself constitute a ground for the Court to intervene in the order of acquittal.

The Court observed that when evidence which is admissible under law is excluded from consideration, such exclusion provides a sufficient reason for a higher court to intervene in an order of acquittal on revision. Consequently, the Court turned its attention to the precise issue of whether the appellant’s declaration that he had hidden the ornaments and would indicate their location was entirely admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, or whether only the portion in which he offered to point out the place of concealment could be admitted while the admission of having hidden the ornaments itself had to be excluded. In deciding this question, the Sessions Judge had relied upon the authority in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King‑Emperor (2), wherein a segment of a statement that led to the recovery of a knife in a murder trial was held inadmissible by the Judicial Committee. The Judicial Committee examined section 27, which reads: “Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” This provision operates as an exception to sections 25 and 26, which forbid the proof of a confession made to a police officer or while a person is in police custody unless it is made in the immediate presence of a magistrate. Section 27 therefore permits that any part of an accused’s statement to the police, irrespective of whether it is confessional, may be proved if it relates specifically to the fact that was discovered as a result of that information. The Judicial Committee stressed the importance of the phrase “so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” and held that the scope of admissibility must be determined by the precise nature of the fact that was discovered and to which the information must connect. The Committee further explained that the “fact discovered” includes the place from which the object was produced and the accused’s knowledge of that place, and that information concerning the prior use or history of the object does not relate to its discovery.

The Judicial Committee illustrated its point by observing that a statement by a person in custody such as “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” leads to the discovery of a knife concealed in the informant’s house, a fact that becomes highly relevant if the knife is later shown to have been used in the commission of the offence. However, when the same statement is followed by “which I used to stab A,” those additional words are inadmissible because they do not pertain to the discovery of the knife in the house. The Court noted that this authority clearly delineates the portion of a statement that may be admitted under section 27: only that segment which directly relates to the discovery is admissible, and if any part of the statement satisfies this requirement, the entire statement may be admitted as a whole, without the court excising the confessional portion. Section 27, therefore, renders the entire portion of the statement that is distinctly connected to the discovery admissible, regardless of whether it is confessional. The Court then applied this principle to the present case, where the appellant’s statement was alleged to be that he had hidden the ornaments and would point out their location.

The Court explained that when an informant tells the police that a knife is concealed in his house and, if that knife is later proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact of its discovery is highly relevant. However, the Court held that if the informant’s statement were to be supplemented with words such as “with which I stabbed A”, those added words would be inadmissible because they do not pertain to the discovery of the knife in the house. The Court therefore clarified that Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act permits only that portion of a statement which distinctly relates to the discovery to be admitted. Once a part of the statement is found to relate directly to the discovery, the entire portion must be admitted; the court cannot excise a segment merely because it is of a confessional character. Section 27 makes the whole of the portion that is distinctly connected with the discovery admissible, irrespective of whether it takes the form of a confession.

Applying this principle, the Court considered the appellant’s declaration that he would show the place where he had hidden the ornaments. The Sessions Judge had held that the clause “where he had hidden them” was not admissible. The Court observed that removing that clause would render the remaining statement – that the appellant would show the place – meaningless. Consequently, the entire statement, in the Court’s view, relates distinctly to the discovery of the ornaments and must be admitted under Section 27. The Court distinguished the phrase “where he had hidden them” from the example “with which I stabbed the deceased,” noting that the former does not refer to the past history of the crime but directly to the actual discovery that resulted from the statement. The Court further addressed the argument that, in a possession offence, the words “where he had hidden them” might be inadmissible because they would amount to an admission of possession. The Court offered two responses: first, Section 27 itself provides that any portion of a statement that distinctly relates to the discovery is admissible, even if it is confessional; second, even if the words suggest possession, they do not in themselves prove the offence, because the prosecution must still establish that the recovered ornaments are stolen property and are linked to the crime. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appellant’s entire statement, as well as the similar statement of the other accused, should be admitted as evidence, and that the Sessions Judge’s exclusion of part of the statement was erroneous.

In this case, the statement that the appellant had given the ornament to Bada Sab and would have it recovered from him was admissible evidence, and the Sessions Judge erred in excluding part of that statement. Because the Sessions Judge excluded relevant and admissible evidence, the High Court was justified in setting aside the acquittal on revision, although it was regrettable that the High Court did not confine its discussion to that point and also made strong remarks on other portions of the evidence. The Court then considered what order should be made in a case of this nature. Two possible situations can arise. First, the trial court may have acquitted the accused. If, on the basis of the principles earlier articulated, the High Court is justified in interfering with such an acquittal on revision, the only remedy available is to set aside the acquittal and remit the matter to the trial court for a new trial. The second situation is where the trial court convicted the accused but the appellate court later acquitted him. If the High Court decides that the appellate court’s order must be set aside, it must decide whether to direct the appellate court to rehear the appeal after admitting the statement it had previously excluded, or whether a fresh trial is required. The Court expressed the view that the High Court may pursue either option; it may order a retrial or may order the appellate court to rehear the appeal. The appropriate choice will depend on the facts of each case. Where, as here, the entire evidence has been presented and it was the appellate court that excluded evidence previously admitted by the trial court, the Court considers that the proper course is to remit the appeal to the appellate court for rehearing. In such a scenario, the trial‑court’s judgement will remain in force, subject to whatever decision the appellate court reaches on rehearing. In the present matter, there is no dispute that the whole body of evidence was produced and that the only defect was the appellate court’s erroneous exclusion of evidence that the trial court had admitted. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that the appellate court should be directed to rehear the appeal and either confirm the conviction after considering the previously excluded evidence, or acquit the accused if that is the just outcome. The Court also indicated that the appeal court

The Court directed that, when the appellate court rehears the appeal, it must not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court regarding the appreciation of the evidence. Instead, the appellate court must apply its own mind to the evidence, taking into account the portion of the evidence that it had previously regarded as inadmissible. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, subject to the modification just described. The Court then considered the pending matter of the other accused. It expressed the view that, because it was ordering the appellate court to rehear the appeal of the original appellant, it was proper also to set aside the order relating to the other accused and to require that his appeal be reheard in the same manner. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order directing a retrial of the other accused and directed that his appeal be reheard together with the appeal of the original appellant. The appeal was therefore allowed.