Jyotish Thakur And Others vs Tarakantjha And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 443 of 1959

Decision Date: 11 September, 1962

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.R. Mudholkar

The case styled Jyotish Thakur and Others versus Tarakantjha and Others was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 11 September 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice K. C. Das Gupta, and the bench also comprised Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar and J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner was identified as Jyotish Thakur and others, while the respondents were Tarakantjha and others. The citation for this decision appears as 1963 AIR 605 and 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 13, with additional citator information recorded as R 1969 SC 204 (9). The matter concerned the law relating to raiyati land, specifically the acquisition of a superior landlord’s interest by a raiyat, the question of whether a raiyati interest merges into a proprietor’s interest, and the applicable rule of merger in the context of land tenure in the Santhal Parganas, including the meaning of the term “Bakasht Malik” and the relevance of section 27 of Regulation III of 1872.

The factual backdrop involved a person identified as S, who owned the raiyati interest in the lands that were the subject of the dispute. S subsequently acquired the entire interest of the Lakhirajdar, the superior landlord, under whom he had previously held the raiyati interest. The lands in question were later purchased by the appellants under a deed dated 15 May 1935 from the successors in interest of S. The plaintiffs argued that the sale deed did not convey any interest to the purchasers because, at the date of transfer, the land retained its raiyati character, which, according to them, was inalienable under the provisions of section 27 of Regulation III of 1872. The trial court, however, held that once S acquired the landlord’s interest, the land ceased to possess its raiyati character, and consequently section 27 of Regulation III was not applicable. On appeal, the High Court opined that the raiyati interest recorded in the earlier settlement continued notwithstanding the entry of “Bakasht Malik” in a subsequent settlement, and therefore the raiyati interest could not be alienated by the deed of sale dated 15 May 1935.

The Supreme Court held that S’s raiyati interest was not merged into his proprietary interest but continued to exist side by side, and that his successors in interest did not, in law, transfer the raiyati interest in the land to the purchasers in 1935. The Court explained the legal position on merger, stating that the mere union of superior and subordinate interests does not automatically result in merger; merger is recognized only when the intention to merge is clear. In the absence of any express indication of such intention, the courts presume that the party had no intention to merge where it would be contrary to his interest or where a duty existed to keep the interests separate. While determining intention, the Court also considers the party’s conduct. In the present case, there was no evidence that S intended to merge the interests, and the Court concluded that S must be held to have intended to keep the two interests distinct and separate. The entry in the record of “Bakasht Malik” was interpreted to mean that the land, which had previously been recorded as being in the cultivating possession of a raiyat under a landlord, was by that entry recorded as being in the cultivating possession of the landlord himself. Held.

The Court observed that section 27(3) of Regulation III did not prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining relief in the civil court. In the community village areas of the Santhal Parganas, which comprised the greater part of that district, a raiyat did not acquire the right to terminate his raiyati interest even when he acquired the superior landlord’s interest. Accordingly, the doctrine of merger was held not to apply to raiyati holders in the Santhal Parganas.

The appeal was listed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 443 of 1959. It challenged the judgment and decree dated 27 April 1956 of the Patna High Court in L.P.A. No. 13 of 1954. Counsel for the appellants were identified as L.K. Jha and B.P. Jha, while the respondents numbered one to seven were represented by counsel identified as A.I.C. Chatterjee, A.N. Sinha and P.K. Mukherjee. The judgment was pronounced on 2 September 1962 and was delivered by Justice Das Gupta.

The central issue framed by the Court concerned whether a raiyat in the District of Santhal Parganas, upon acquiring the entire superior landlord’s interest, ceased to retain his raiyati interest or continued to be a raiyat in addition to becoming a superior landlord. This question arose from a suit seeking a declaration and delivery of possession of land measuring twelve bighas, sixteen kathas and four dhurs situated in Mauza Chhatahara, District of Santhal Parganas. The plaintiffs, together with four defendants described in the plaint as the second‑party defendants, were the successors in interest of Santokhi Jha, who many years earlier had become the owner of the entire raiyati interest in the subject lands. Subsequent to acquiring the raiyati interest, Santokhi, by a registered deed, purchased the whole interest of the Lakhira Jdar under whom he had formerly been a raiyat.

On 15 May 1935, the lands were conveyed by the second‑party defendants and other parties, including plaintiffs numbered one to six, to the present appellants. The plaintiffs contended that no interest could pass to the vendee by that sale deed because, on the date of transfer, the lands retained their raiyati character, which was inalienable under the provisions of Regulation III of 1872. They further alleged that the 1935 transfer was fraudulent and collusive and that there was no legal necessity for such a transfer. The first‑party defendants denied any allegation of fraud or collusion and asserted that the transfer was made out of legal necessity to discharge antecedent family debts, thereby rendering the sale binding on the plaintiffs. Additionally, they claimed that, at the time of sale, the lands were not raiyati but Bakasht lands belonging to the Malik, and consequently, no prohibition under Regulation III of 1872 applied. The Subordinate Judge of Dumka, who tried the suit, held that the sale was justified by legal necessity, was not fraudulent or collusive, and further determined that while the plaintiffs were …

The Subordinate Judge of Dumka held that the sale deed was justified by legal necessity, that it was neither fraudulent nor collusive, and that, although the plaintiffs were not estopped from challenging the deed, the deed remained binding on them. The judge further opined that the land ceased to retain its raiyati character after Santokhi, the raiyat, acquired the landlord’s interest; consequently, the judge rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the lands were inalienable under section 27 of Regulation III of 1872 and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge of Santhal Parganas affirmed the findings of the trial court and agreed that the suit had been rightly dismissed. The plaintiffs then appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Patna. Before the High Court, the plaintiffs did not contest the earlier findings that the sale deed was for legal necessity and that there was no fraud or collusion; their entire argument focused on the contention that the raiyati interest continued to exist despite Santokhi’s acquisition of the superior landlord’s interest and that the later entry in the settlement records, which described the lands as “Bakasht Malik,” did not extinguish that interest. Justice Banerjee, hearing the appeal, observed that there was no inconsistency between the earlier record showing the lands held by Santokhi as raiyat and the later settlement entry showing them as Bakasht Malik, and he held that, in law, the raiyati interest persisted even after the raiyat acquired the landlord’s interest. He further concluded that the equitable doctrine of merger could not be applied because the facts and circumstances did not demonstrate a true unity between the raiyat’s and the landlord’s interests. Justice Banerjee also rejected the respondents’ contention that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the sale deed. Accordingly, he allowed the appeal, declaring the sale void with respect to the raiyati interest. The defendants filed a Letters Patent Appeal against this decision, but the appeal was dismissed; the judges hearing the appeal concurred with Justice Banerjee that the earlier settlement entry “Bakasht Malik” did not extinguish the pre‑existing raiyati interest and that the raiyati interest could not be alienated by the deed dated 15 May 1935. The High Court, however, issued a certificate under section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Article 135 of the Constitution of India, stating that the matter satisfied the requisites for appeal to this Court. On the basis of that certificate, the defendants filed the present appeal. The first contention advanced by counsel for the defendants, Mr Jha, asserted that after Santokhi acquired the Lakhirajdar’s interest, he ceased to be a raiyat. This argument was presented in two parts: first, that the law provided for an automatic merger of the raiyati interest into the larger Lakhirajdar interest; and second, that Santokhi had the option to merge the raiyati interest into the Lakhirajdar interest and that he had exercised that option.

In this case the appellant argued that once Santokhi had acquired the Lakhirajdar interest, the raiyati interest merged into the larger Lakhirajdar interest and therefore he ceased to be a raiyat. The appellant presented two sub‑arguments. First, he contended that, as a rule of law, the smaller estate automatically merged in the larger estate when both interests were held by the same person without any intermediate estate. Second, he claimed that even if the merger was not automatic, Santokhi possessed a legal option to merge the raiyati interest into the Lakhirajdar interest and that he had exercised that option. The court observed that the first argument reflected the traditional English common‑law rule of merger. It cited Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, volume II, fourth edition, page 151, which stated that “whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the same person without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated; or in the law phrase, is said to be merged, that is, sunk or drowned in the greater.” However, the court noted that English equity had promptly modified this strict doctrine by requiring an examination of the parties’ intention to determine whether a merger had occurred. The court further explained that the statutes enacted in the Judicature Act of 1873 and later in the Law of Property Act of 1925 had resulted in a rule that merger would be recognised only when it was found to exist both at common law and in equity. The court referenced Foa’s Law of Landlord and Tenant, eighth edition, page 643, which explained that if the circumstances were such that an equity court would formerly have refused to find a merger, then no merger existed at law. The court also explained that, in the absence of an expressed intention, English courts looked to the benefit accruing to the person in whose hands the interests coalesced. On the question of intention, the court observed that a presumption against merger arose when it could be shown that the duty or interest of the person acquiring the superior estate required the two estates to be kept separate, citing Re Fletcher, [1917] 1 Ch. 339. Although the doctrine of merger originated in England, the court referred to it because English law had influenced judicial thinking in this jurisdiction. The court recalled an 1868 decision of the Calcutta High Court, Noomesh v. Rai Narain, in which the question of whether merger applied to a Patni taluk that came into a Zamindar’s possession was answered in the negative. Sir Barnes Peacock, delivering the judgment, expressed the view that “the doctrine of merger does not apply to lands in the mofussil in this country” and explained that Zamindars traditionally purchased Patni taluks in the name of a trustee to avoid merger, a practice imported from England. The court noted that similar reasoning had been adopted in Ruston v. Atkinson and Savi v. Panchanan, and that in Prosona v. Jagat (1878) the court held that although the mere union of superior and subordinate interests did not automatically create a merger, the conduct of the party could demonstrate an intention not to keep the interests distinct, thereby establishing a merger. The court also mentioned a Privy Council decision, Raja Kissen Dutt Ram v. Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan, which recognized the possibility of merger of a resumable birta tenancy in a superior interest where the holder failed to take steps to preserve the two interests as separate. These authorities collectively illustrated that merger was not an automatic consequence of co‑possession but depended on statutory, equitable, and intention‑based considerations.

The Court observed that the view expressed in the earlier decision that a Zamindar could not hold a patni tenure in khas possession was also affirmed in the cases of Ruston v. Atkinson and Savi v. Panchanan. In the 1878 case of Prosonna v. Jagat, however, the Court held that although the mere union of a superior interest and a subordinate interest does not automatically produce a merger of the subordinate interest into the superior one, the party’s conduct may reveal an intention not to preserve the two interests as distinct rights. When such an intention is demonstrated, the Court said that a merger must be deemed to have occurred. The Privy Council, in the decision of Raja Kissen Dutt Ram v. Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan (1868) 10 W. R. 15, (1869) 11 W. R. 485, (1869) 11 W. R. 485, (1876) 25 W. R. 503, (1878) 3 C. L. R. 159, (1879) I. L. R. 5 Cal. 198, expressed that a merger of resumable birth‑tenures into a superior interest is possible where the holder fails to take steps to keep the two interests separate. After that, the Calcutta High Court, in a larger number of subsequent cases, consistently adopted the principle articulated in Prosonna v. Jagat, holding that where the party’s conduct shows a lack of intention to keep the superior and subordinate interests alive as mutually distinct, the union of those interests inevitably results in the merger of the subordinate interest into the superior. The Court cited Surja Narain Mandal v. Nand Lall Sinha, Ulfat Hossain v. Gayani Dass, Promotha Nath Roy v. Kishore Lal Sinha and Dakshavani Dasi v. Amrita Lal Ghosh as further authorities supporting this view. A comparable position was also indicated by the Patna High Court, through the judgments of Chamier, C.J., and Sharfuddin J., in Lachanbati v. Bodhnath. The Court noted that statutory provisions dealing with merger were introduced by the Transfer of Property Act of 1882 and by the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, which was later extended to Bihar; however, those statutes were not applicable to the matter before the Court. Apart from those statutes, the Court summarized the prevailing legal position on merger in India: the mere union of superior and subordinate interests does not, by itself, cause a merger, but a merger is deemed to have taken place when the intention to merge is clear. In the absence of any express indication of such intent, the courts presume that the party had no intention to merge when it was contrary to his interest or when a duty existed requiring him to keep the interests separate. While determining intent, the courts also consider the party’s conduct. The Court further added that the land tenure system in the Santhal Parganas possesses special features that render the application of the general merger principle difficult, as reflected in earlier authorities such as I. L. R. 36 Cal. 802 (1906), C. W. N. 826 (1919) and others.

The Court noted that applying the law of merger in the Santhal Parganas was especially difficult because the Santhal way of life encouraged the development of a strong village community that possessed special collective rights over all village lands. This community, composed of village raiyats, was granted preferential and reversionary rights over every piece of village land, whether it was cultivated or left uncultivated, as recorded in the final report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the District of Santhal Parganas. In most villages of the district, a headman also existed. In addition to performing certain village duties, the headman collected rents from the raiyats and transferred those rents to the proprietor. Although the headman did not hold any tenure himself, one of his responsibilities was to arrange the settlement of any village land that became vacant and available for allocation. All raiyats in the village were listed in the jamabandi prepared for the village, and it was the headman’s duty to settle any available land to one of the raiyats named in that jamabandi. The Court observed that it required little imagination to foresee that both the interests of the village community and those of the headman would be harmed if land classified as raiyati and included in the jamabandi were removed from the total stock of raiyati lands. Once such lands lost their character, the village could, within a few years, see the total amount of land available for settlement to resident raiyats shrink dramatically. In this context, the Government issued orders in 1887 prohibiting the alienation of raiyat holdings in any form. Those orders immediately curtailed the open transfer practices that had emerged during the early years of Wood’s Settlement, although concealed transfers continued and officials had to remain vigilant to prevent village lands from passing into the hands of persons whose intrusion into the village community was deemed harmful, as documented in Appendix XV of the Settlement Report of the Santhal Parganas. The Court further referenced a note by Mr. McPherson on the alienation policy in the Santhal Parganas, in which he strongly opposed any form of sale. He argued that permitting sales would, in his view, weaken the communal system of the Santhal Parganas and undermine the position of the Pradhan, emphasizing that the fundamental principle of the system was that all cultivated village lands, in effect, belonged to the whole community. The Government accepted his recommendation, leading to an amendment of the prohibition of transfer in Regulation III of 1872. Consequently, Section 27 was revised to state: “27. (1) No transfer by a raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof, by sale, gift, mortgage,”

The Court noted that section 27 of Regulation III of 1872 provides that a raiyat may not transfer his right in his holding, whether by sale, gift, mortgage, lease or any other contract or agreement, unless such a right to transfer has been entered in the record of rights and only to the extent recorded. The provision further states that any transfer made in violation of this first sub‑section shall not be registered and shall not be recognized as valid by any court, whether exercising civil, criminal or revenue jurisdiction. Moreover, the section empowers the Deputy Commissioner, upon becoming aware of a transfer that contravenes the first sub‑section, to, at his discretion, evict the transferee and either restore the land to the original raiyat or to the heirs of the raiyat who effected the transfer, or to re‑settle the land with another raiyat in accordance with the village custom for disposing of an abandoned holding. This power is subject to three safeguards: the transferee proposed for eviction must not have been in continuous cultivating possession for twelve years; the transferee must be given an opportunity to show cause against the eviction order; and all actions of the Deputy Commissioner under this section are subject to control and revision by the Commissioner. The Court emphasized that this background of raiyat rights and duties, and the incidents involving raiyati lands, must be kept in mind when considering the extent to which the doctrine of merger applies in the Santhal Parganas. Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Chatterjee, argued that a raiyat is legally obliged to keep his raiyati interest separate even when he acquires a superior interest, and the Court found considerable force in that submission. Even assuming it might be in the raiyat’s personal interest to terminate his raiyati interest to remove the transfer bar, the Court observed that the interests of the village community and the Pradhan obligate the raiyat to preserve the raiyati interest. Consequently, the Court preliminarily concluded that, in the communal village areas of the Santhal Parganas, which constitute the majority of the districts, the raiyat does not possess the right to end his raiyati interest even after acquiring a superior interest. The Court indicated an inclination to hold, as presently advised, that the doctrine of merger does not apply to raiyati holders in the Santhal Parganas, while refraining from expressing a final opinion on that point in the present case. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that a raiyat could treat the raiyati interest as merged into the proprietary interest, the Court was of the view that the evidence before it did not demonstrate that Santokhi had done so. The appellants, in attempting to show that Santokhi had elected to merge his raiyati interest into his Lakhirajdar interest, relied on Exhibit I‑a, a certified copy of the order‑sheet in Settlement Objection Case No. 41 of 1909. The objection

The objection that Santokhi filed concerned the entry in the record of rights for the land that was presently in dispute. After stating that Santokhi had purchased the Zamindari interest three years earlier, the order stated: “Santokhi is now the Zamindar and the sole raiyat in the village. It seems necessary to have him as Pradhan now. He wants the village to be made Khas and his jote interest as Bakasht Malik. I think this should be allowed. Submitted to Settlement Officer.” The Settlement Officer accepted the proposal and the record was amended by entering the term “Bakasht Malik” against the land. Mr Jha attempted to persuade the Court that by praying that his jote interest be recorded as Bakasht Malik, Santokhi was treating his raiyati interest as terminated. The Court was not convinced by that argument. It was acknowledged that the phrase “Bakasht Malik” as used by the settlement authorities meant “in the cultivation of the owner.” On page 83 of the Settlement Report on the Santhal Parganas, the report observed that in a few villages agricultural lands that formerly belonged to raiyats had come into the hands of proprietors, usually by purchase at auction when courts were selling raiyati jots for arrears of rent. Those lands were then entered as “Bakasht Malik” and occurred both in pradhani and khas villages. A foot‑note explained the term Bakasht Malik as “lands in the cultivating possession of landlords, but not privileged.” A subsequent note described “Khas Khamat” as “privileged lands in the private possession of landlords.” The Court could find no basis for Mr Jha’s contention that the assertion of Bakasht Malik status negated the raiyati status of the land. When Santokhi prayed for the record to show “Bakasht Malik,” all he sought was to record the fact that the land, which had previously been entered as being in the cultivating possession of a raiyat under a landlord, was now in the cultivating possession of the landlord himself. This correction was required because Santokhi, the raiyat, had acquired the landlord’s interest. It would be excessive to read into Santokhi’s prayer an intention to end the raiyati nature of the land or to merge his raiyati interest into the landlord’s interest. Moreover, the Court noted that it was not in Santokhi’s interest that the raiyati status cease, because as long as his raiyati interest survived he retained the rights of a raiyat in the village jamabandi lands; those rights would be lost if his raiyati interest terminated. Indeed, any advantage he might obtain by removing the bar against transfer would ultimately be more harmful to him and his family.

It was evident to the Court that retaining the raiyati interest as a separate and distinct right was advantageous to Santokhi, and that such separation also corresponded to his duty under the community village system operative in the Santhal Parganas. Even if the Court were to accept that the doctrine of merger applied in the Santhal Parganas to the extent that, when a person who possessed both a raiyati interest and a zamindari (proprietary) interest chose to treat the two as a single unit, the lesser interest would be deemed to have merged into the larger, the facts of the present case did not demonstrate any such choice by Santokhi. The evidence showed that Santokhi intended to keep the two interests distinct and separate, and therefore the raiyati interest did not merge into his proprietary interest. The next contention raised by the respondents’ counsel was that an entry made in a later record of rights should prevail over an earlier entry, a proposition that would have assisted their clients only if the later entry identifying the land as “Bakasht Malik” effectively negated the raiyati interest. The Court, however, found that the “Bakasht Malik” entry was neutral with respect to the continuance or termination of the raiyati right and did not constitute a denial of that right. Consequently, there was no actual conflict between the earlier settlement entry and the subsequent entries, and no issue arose as to which entry should dominate. For the same reason, the respondents’ argument that the decision of the Settlement Officer, which recorded the land as “Bakasht Malik,” operated as res judicata was rejected; the plaintiffs were not required to challenge the correctness of that entry. Another point advanced by the respondents concerned whether the raiyati interest survived Santokhi’s acquisition of the proprietary interest, asserting that this was a pure question of fact. They argued that, because the Trial Court and the Court of First Appeal had held that the raiyati interest had ceased to exist, the High Court in the second appeal could not go behind those findings. The Court disagreed, observing that in the present circumstances the question of the survival of the raiyati interest could not be characterized solely as a factual inquiry. The determination required a proper understanding of the doctrine of merger as it applied in the Santhal Parganas, rendering the issue a mixed question of law and fact. Accordingly, the argument that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the conclusions of the lower courts lacked merit. As a result of the finding that Santokhi’s raiyati interest had not merged with his proprietary interest but continued to exist alongside it, the Court concluded that the 1935 sale by the plaintiffs and other successors‑in‑interest of Santokhi did not, in law, transfer the raiyati interest in the land to the purchasers.

The Court noted that the raiyati interest in the land had not been conveyed to the buyers, since it was unanimously accepted that the entitlement to transfer a raiyati interest had never been entered in the record of rights for the lands in question. As a final argument, counsel for the respondent contended that the civil courts possessed no jurisdiction over the matter and that the sole remedy available for an illegal transfer of raiyati interest lay in section 27(3) of the Regulations. Section 27(3) authorises the Deputy Commissioner of the District to evict the transferee and either restore the land to the original raiyat or any of his heirs, or to re‑settle the land with another raiyat in accordance with village custom, whenever the Deputy Commissioner becomes aware that a transfer contrary to section 27(1) has occurred. The Court found no basis to conclude that this provision was intended to be the exclusive remedy or to preclude any other reliefs from the courts. Moreover, section 27(2) expressly provides that any transfer contravening section 27(1) shall not be recognised as valid by any court, thereby obligating a civil court, when a dispute over title arises, to disregard such unlawful transfers. To fulfil this duty, the Court must determine whether the transfer on which a party relies was indeed made in violation of section 27(1). If the Court is satisfied that such a violation occurred, it must accordingly dispose of the proceeding on the ground that no title passed to the transferee. Consequently, the argument that section 27(3) bars the plaintiffs from obtaining relief in a civil suit cannot prevail. The Court also observed that this objection had not been raised on behalf of the appellants in any of the lower courts. Turning to the authorities cited, the Court referenced Sarda Devi v. Ram Louchan Bhagat, where the Patna High Court held that section 27 of the Regulations does not forbid a landlord from transferring his interest in a raiyati holding if he acquires possession of that holding by any means. The present Court disagreed with the view that such a decision would imply that the landlord’s raiyati interest is automatically transferred, deeming that interpretation erroneous. However, the Court acknowledged that the Patna High Court carefully indicated that the transaction in that case concerned the sale of the judgment‑debtor’s Brahmottar interest in four annas and the sixty‑two bighas of land held in the capacity of a Brahmottardar.

Section 27 of the Regulations forbade the transfer of a raiyati interest but it did not prohibit the transfer of a landlord’s separate interest, even where that landlord’s interest existed together with a raiyati interest in the same person. The Court then examined the decision in Madan v. Kheelu(1), which the counsel for the petitioner had also cited in support of his arguments. In that case the Patna High Court was required to determine whether certain lands belonged to the plaintiffs’ father as Ghatwali lands. During the hearing a plea was raised before the High Court asserting that some of the disputed properties had been entered in the Khatian Jamabandi of 1904 in the name of the defendants as raiyat, and therefore those properties could not be described as Ghatwali lands of the defendants. The Court observed that, according to the Revision Survey and Settlement of 1932, the same lands were recorded as “Ire appertaining to Mahal Ghatwali” belonging to Maharaj Rai Ghatwal and identified as his Bakasht. After considering the provisions of section 25 of the Regulations, the High Court concluded that the 1932 entry prevailed over the earlier record. In the same reasoning the Court held that the term Bakasht was sufficiently broad to encompass khud‑kast, sir and Zerait, and that, on the facts before it, it was appropriate to find that the earlier entry showing the land as raiyat was erroneous and should have been recorded merely as Ghatwal. The learned judges emphasized that there was no evidence before them indicating to whom the alleged raiyati interest belonged or when it might have come into Maharaj Rai’s possession. They further noted that the land had never been the raiyati land of the appellant but was in fact the pradhani jote of Maharaj Rai Ghatwal, as established by the authority (1957) I.L.R. 36 Pat. 439. The present Court found it unnecessary to pass a definitive view on whether the High Court’s decision was correct in that particular case; it merely observed that the Madan decision did not intend to declare that every entry marked Bakasht automatically negated a raiyati right. The judges also mentioned that the learned judges who decided the earlier case had specifically referred to the High Court’s decision in the matter now under appeal and had distinguished it by stating that the earlier finding was limited to its own facts and circumstances. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in holding that the sale dated 15 May 1935 was void with respect to the raiyati interest, while the right to receive rent alone passed by that sale to the first plaintiff‑defendant. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs, and the appeal was dismissed.