Jia Lal vs The Delhi Administration

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 1961

Decision Date: 3 May 1962

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar

In the matter of Jia Lal versus the Delhi Administration decided on 3 May 1962, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment. The bench comprised Chief Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Justice T. L. Venkatramana. The case is reported in 1962 AIR 1781 and 1963 SCR (2) 864. The dispute centered on the constitutionality of section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, which required a sanction before prosecuting an offence under section 19(1)(f) when the offence occurred outside the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga, but did not require such sanction for offences committed within those northern territories. The petitioner, Jia Lal, was found in possession of an unlicensed firearm in Delhi, an area where section 29 required a sanction, yet he was tried and convicted without obtaining the sanction. The respondent, identified as B, was found in possession of an unlicensed firearm in Saharanpur, an area where the provision did not require a sanction, and likewise was tried and convicted without any sanction. The respondents argued that section 29 violated Article 14 of the Constitution and was therefore void. The petitioner contended that even if the portion of section 29 applicable to the northern territories were invalid, the remainder of the section could continue to operate for the other territories because the two parts were separable. The respondent B maintained that if the discriminatory portion were struck down, the remaining provision would still require sanction in all cases, but if the entire section were void, then section 19 itself would collapse and become unenforceable. The Court held that section 29 indeed offended Article 14 and was unconstitutional, making a sanction unnecessary for the prosecution of either Jia Lal or B. The Court observed that the historical distinction between the northern territories and the rest, based on the 1857 uprising and subsequent disarmament, no longer served any relevant legislative purpose after more than a century; consequently, the differentiation could not be sustained. The Court relied on the precedent set in Mehar Chand v. State, AIR 1959 All 660. It further ruled that it was not permissible to excise only the offending words of section 29 and read the remainder as requiring sanction for offences in the northern territories, nor could the portion requiring sanction for offences in other territories be severed and upheld, as that would perpetuate discrimination. Accordingly, the entire section 29 must be struck down. The Court also noted that while section 29 was severable from the substantive provisions of the Act, its invalidity did not affect the validity of section 19, which is a substantive provision providing punishment for violations of sections 14 and 15, and a procedural defect does not ordinarily nullify a substantive provision.

In this case, the Court held that it was not permissible to delete only the words in section 29 that were found to be offensive and to read the remaining portion of the section as imposing a requirement of sanction for prosecutions only in the areas north of the Jamna and Ganga. The Court explained that the provision could not be interpreted as limiting its own express language, nor could the part of the section that imposed a sanction requirement for offences committed in other territories be separated from the rest of the provision and sustained, because such a separation would inevitably re‑introduce the very discrimination that the earlier judgment had condemned. Consequently, the whole of section 29 had to be struck down. The Court affirmed the authority of Bhai Singh v. State, A.I.R. (1960) All. 369, and referred to Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, (1957) S.C.R. 930, for support.

Further, the Court observed that section 29 was severable from the other provisions of the Arms Act and that its invalidity did not affect the validity of section 19. Section 19 was identified as a substantive provision that prescribed punishment for violations of sections 14 and 15, whereas section 29 was characterised as a procedural provision. The Court reiterated the general rule that the invalidity of a procedural provision does not ordinarily render a substantive provision invalid, and noted that nothing in the Arms Act departed from this rule. The purpose of section 29, the Court said, was to protect individuals from frivolous and vexatious prosecutions, but the requirement of sanction was not an element of the offence defined in section 19(f). Accordingly, the Court could not conclude that the legislature would not have enacted the law without the protection afforded by section 29. The Court cited Davis v. Wallace, (1921) 257 U.S. 477; 66 L. Ed. 325 and Lemka v. Parmers' Grain Company, (1921) 258 U.S. 50; 66 L. Ed. 458, in support of this reasoning.

The judgment proceeded to set out the procedural history of the appeal. The case arose under the criminal appellate jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 1961, which was filed by special leave from the order dated 23 December 1960 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 10‑D of 1960. The appeal was joined with Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1960, which itself was taken on special leave from the order dated 23 December 1959 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1694 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 1961 was identified, and counsel for the respondents in the two appeals were also listed.

The factual background presented to the Court concerned the appellant Jia Lal. On 15 April 1959, the Delhi Police searched Jia Lal and discovered that he possessed an English pistol for which he did not hold a licence. He was subsequently charged with an offence under section 20 of the Indian Arms Act of 1878 (XI of 1878), hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The trial was conducted before the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, who convicted the appellant under section 19(f) of the Act and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment. The Court noted that no sanction for the prosecution had been obtained, as required by section 29 of the Act. The appellant appealed the conviction and sentence to the Punjab High Court, which confirmed the conviction but reduced the term of rigorous imprisonment to four and a half months. The present appeal before the Supreme Court was filed by special leave against that judgment.

In the first case, the appellant was sentenced to nine months’ rigorous imprisonment after being found in possession of an English pistol without a licence on 15 April 1959. The conviction and sentence were imposed under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, but the required sanction for prosecution under section 29 of the same Act had not been obtained. The appellant appealed to the High Court of Punjab, which upheld the conviction while reducing the term of imprisonment to four and a half months. The present special leave appeal challenges that judgment. In the second case, the appellant identified as Bhagwana was searched by the Saharanpur Police on 6 August 1956 and discovered to be carrying a country‑made pistol and four cartridges without a licence. He was tried before the City Magistrate, Saharanpur, also under section 19(f) of the Act and was sentenced to six months’ rigorous imprisonment. No sanction had been secured for his prosecution; the court noted that, under section 29, such sanction is unnecessary when the alleged offence occurs in certain designated areas, and Saharanpur falls within one of those areas. Bhagwana appealed his conviction and sentence to the Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, but the appeal was dismissed and the original judgment affirmed. He subsequently filed a revision before the High Court of Allahabad, which likewise rejected his revision but issued a certificate of fitness for appeal under article 134(1) of the Constitution. This appeal therefore reaches the Court on the basis of those certificates. Although the two prosecutions are unrelated, they are being heard together because identical legal questions arise in both. The principal question presented for determination is whether section 29 of the Arms Act is unconstitutional and void for violating article 14 of the Constitution, on the ground that it mandates a prior sanction for prosecution of offences under the Act in some regions while exempting other regions. Section 29 provides that when an offence punishable under section 19(f) is committed within three months of the Act’s commencement in any state, district or place to which section 32, clause 2 of Act XXXI of 1860 applies, or in any part of India not falling within such a district, state or place, no legal proceedings may be instituted against any person for that offence without first obtaining the sanction of the district magistrate or, in a presidency town, the commissioner of police. For an accurate interpretation of the scope of this provision, reference must be made to the legislative history. The earliest relevant legislation is the Arms and Ammunition and Military Stores Act 18 of 1841, effective from 30 August 1841, which prohibited the export of arms and ammunition from territories of the East India Company and imposed restrictions on the storage of ammunition. This Act was subsequently repealed by Act 13 of 1852. Following the 1857 uprising against British rule, the Government concluded that stricter legislation was required, leading to the enactment of a new law.

In the aftermath of the uprising of 1857, the Government concluded that a more stringent law was necessary to prevent further insurrections and to maintain public order. Consequently, it enacted Act 28 of 1857, a comprehensive statute that addressed numerous matters not covered by earlier legislation and introduced detailed provisions concerning the manufacture, import, sale, possession, and use of arms and ammunition. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is paragraph 24 of this Act, which empowered the Governor‑General to order a general search for arms and ammunition in any district. Exercising this authority, the Governor‑General issued a notification on 21 December 1858 ordering a general search and seizure of arms in the territories situated north of the Jumna and Ganga rivers, then known as the North Western Provinces, because that region had been the principal centre of the disturbances of 1857. Act 28 of 1857 was initially a temporary measure intended to remain in force for two years; after a series of extensions, it finally lapsed on 1 October 1860. On that date, a new statute, the Arms and Ammunition Act 31 of 1860, came into operation. This later Act incorporated the provisions of the 1857 Act and added several new sections, the most material of which for the present analysis is section 32. Section 32 read as follows: “Clause 1. It shall be lawful for the Governor‑General of India in Council or for the Executive Government of any Presidency or for any Lieutenant Governor, or with the sanction of the Governor‑General in Council for the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner of any Province, District or place subject to their administration respectively, whenever it shall appear necessary for the public safety, to order that any Province, District, or place shall be disarmed. Clause 2. In every such Province, District, or place as well as in any Province, District, or place in which an order for a general search for arms has been issued and is still in operation under Act XXVIII of 1857, it shall not be lawful for any person to have in his possession any arms of the description mentioned in s. 6 of this Act, or any percussion caps, sulphur, gunpowder or other ammunition without a licence.” This Act was repealed in 1878 and succeeded by the Indian Arms Act XI of 1878.

When section 29 is examined in the light of the legislative history recounted above, it becomes evident that it creates a distinction between the areas to which section 32 of the 1860 Act applied and other areas. The former category comprised territories that had been disarmed under orders of the Governor‑General issued in accordance with clause (1) and those in which a general search had been ordered under clause (2). Under the December 1858 notification, these areas specifically included the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga rivers. Section 29 provides that for the prosecution of offences committed within the region to which section 32 applied, no prior sanction is required, whereas a different procedural requirement applies to offences committed in other areas. This historical distinction forms the basis for the Court’s subsequent analysis of whether the differential treatment accords with constitutional principles.

In the present matter, the requirement of a sanction was imposed for a prosecution of the same offence when it was committed in territories other than the area north of the Jumna and Ganga. The question for determination is whether this differential treatment amounts to discrimination prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution. The principles governing the application of Article 14 are well settled and need not be restated. Article 14 forbids legislation that is hostile to particular individuals or groups, but it does not preclude reasonable classification. For a classification to be valid, it must rest on an intelligible distinction that separates the class in question from others, and that distinction must have a rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation. A classification based on geography is permissible only when the geographical difference is relevant to the legislative objective. Consequently, the short issue before the Court is whether the distinction drawn between territories north of the Jumna and Ganga and the remaining territories bears any relation to the object of the statute. As previously noted, this differentiation originated from the political circumstances of 1857, reflecting the fact that the strongest opposition to the British administration came from the Taluqdars situated north of those rivers. However, more than a century has elapsed, and the conditions have altered so fundamentally that it is now impossible to justify any separation between the northern territories and the others on grounds pertinent to the statute’s purpose. Such differentiation, therefore, constitutes discrimination contrary to Article 14. This view was adopted by the Allahabad High Court in Mehar Chand v. State, and the present Court concurs. The correctness of that decision has been challenged before us. On that basis, two questions arise for decision: first, whether Section 29, if the portion contravening Article 14 is omitted, remains valid and whether the prosecutions in the present cases are defective for lack of sanction; and second, if Section 29 is void in its entirety, whether Section 19 also becomes void and unenforceable. Regarding the first question, attention is drawn to two decisions of the Allahabad High Court addressing the same point. In Mehar Chand’s case, after holding that the distinction made in Section 29 between offences committed in the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga and those committed elsewhere was repugnant to Article 14, the learned judges consequently held that a sanction for prosecution under the Act was required in every case. That judgment, however, was overruled by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bhai Singh v. State, where it was held that the effect of the finding that the section was …

The Court observed that a finding that a statutory provision is partly unconstitutional was held by the Allahabad High Court Full Bench to render the entire provision void, and consequently no prior sanction was required for instituting prosecutions under the Act. The respondent relied upon that judgment and argued that the present proceedings were not illegal for lack of sanction. The Court noted that the positions of the appellants in the two criminal appeals differed with respect to the geographical scope of section 29. In Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961 the appellant resided in an area that lay outside the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga, and therefore, under section 29, a sanction would be required for his prosecution. By contrast, in Criminal Appeal 62 of 1960 the appellant lived in an area situated north of the Jumna and Ganga, and according to the wording of section 29, no sanction would be required for his prosecution. Because of this factual distinction, the arguments presented by counsel on this point followed different lines.

Mr Sarju Prasad, appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961, contended that the decision in Bhai Singh’s case (1) was erroneous. He argued that the invalidity of the section as it operated in the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga did not affect its validity in the remaining territories, since the two parts of the section were distinct and could be severed. He further relied on the principles laid down by this Court in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. the Union of India (2), asserting that the portion of section 29 that required a sanction should therefore be held valid. Mr Garg, appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal 62 of 1960, also maintained that a sanction was required for prosecution under the Act. He proposed that if the portion of section 29 offending Article 14 were struck out, the remainder would read: “Where an offence under section 19 clause (f) has been committed in any part of India, no proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without the previous sanction of the Magistrate of the District.” He argued that the expurgated section would be complete in itself and harmonise with the rest of the Act. Citing Chamarbaugwalla’s test, he said that if, after striking out the invalid part, what remains is a complete and independent code, it should be upheld even though the deleted part is unenforceable. Applying that test, he claimed the sanction‑requiring part of section 29 was severable from the part that dispensed with sanction and thus valid. The Court rejected this contention, holding that acceptance of the argument would defeat the clear and unequivocal intention of the section, namely that no sanction was required for prosecutions of offences committed north of the Jumna and Ganga. The Court further stated that such a reading would run counter to established canons of construction, which prohibit interpreting a statute to forbid what it expressly authorises.

The Court held that a provision of a statute cannot be read so as to forbid conduct that the statute itself expressly authorises. Accordingly, the section could not be interpreted to require a sanction for the prosecution of offences committed in the areas north of the Jumna and the Ganga. Having reached this conclusion, the Court found it untenable to accept the argument advanced by counsel that the part of the section imposing a sanction for offences committed in territories other than those north of the Jumna and Ganga could be severed from the remainder and that, on that basis, the law would remain valid. If that argument were accepted, it would create a discriminatory scheme in which persons who committed offences north of the Jumna and Ganga could be prosecuted without a sanction, while persons who committed the same offences elsewhere could not be prosecuted without a sanction. Such a distinction would permit those charged with offences north of the rivers to challenge the law on the ground that it discriminates against them, and there would be no satisfactory response, because the Court had already determined that the classification created by the section is invalid. The grievance of a violation of Article 14 rests on the observation that the provision makes an irrational distinction among similarly situated persons; when such a charge is well founded, the entire provision must be struck down. Consequently, the Court concluded that, because the section is repugnant to Article 14 by discriminating between offenders in the northern area and elsewhere, the whole section should be declared void.

The next contention argued that, if section 29 were held void in its entirety, section 19(f) of the Act should also be declared void, on the basis that both provisions form an integral part of a single legislative scheme and therefore must stand or fall together. It was submitted that the policy behind section 29 was manifestly intended to protect innocent subjects from frivolous and vexatious prosecution, and that the requirement of a sanction under that section was an essential element that gave the offence its character. Support for this position was sought in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that accompanied the legislation, which indicated that ample safeguards were provided “to prevent this prohibition pressing unfairly against respectable persons.” The argument pressed before the Court was that, in view of that statement, the Legislature would not have enacted section 19 if it had known that section 29 was void, and therefore the two sections are inseverable.

In support of the contention that section 19 must be held inseverable from section 29, reliance was placed on observations made in two United States cases, namely Daris v. Wallace and Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Company. In Daris v. Wallace the Court was called upon to decide whether, when a provision that functions as an exception is found to be unconstitutional, the principal provision that the exception was intended to qualify may nevertheless be enforced according to its own terms. The Court answered this question in the negative and explained that “the excepting provision was in the statute when it was enacted, and there can be no doubt that the legislature intended that the meaning of the other provisions should be taken as restricted accordingly. Only with that restricted meaning did they receive the legislative sanction which was essential to make them part of the statute law of the State; and no other authority is competent to give them a larger application.”

In Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Company a North Dakota law was challenged on the ground that it regulated interstate commerce, a power beyond the competence of the State legislature. One argument advanced was that certain portions of the Act could be sustained because they fell within the State’s authority. The Court rejected this line of reasoning and observed that “it is insisted that the price‑fixing feature of the statute may be ignored, and its other regulatory features of inspection and grading sustained if not contrary to valid Federal regulations of the same subject. But the features of this act, clearly regulatory of interstate commerce, are essential and vital parts of the general plan of the statute to control the purchase of grain and to determine the profit at which it may be sold. It is apparent that, without these sections, the State legislature would not have passed the act. Without their enforcement the plan and scope of the act fails of accomplishing its manifest purpose. We have no authority to eliminate an essential feature of the law for the purpose of saving the constitutionality of parts of it.”

Applying the rule of construction articulated in those decisions, the petitioners argued that section 19 must be read as inseverable from section 29 and therefore should be struck down. The Court was unable to agree with that submission. The suggestion that the sanction provided under section 29 constitutes an essential ingredient of the offence created by section 19 rests on a misunderstanding of the true scope of section 19. The Act’s scheme imposes certain substantive obligations; a breach of those obligations gives rise to offences for which penalties are prescribed. Sections 14 and 15, for example, prohibit any person from possessing specified arms and ammunition without a licence, and section 19(f) makes a contravention of those provisions an offence. These provisions belong to the substantive domain of the law, establishing the elements of the offence, whereas section 29 is purely procedural, becoming operative only after an offence has already been completed. Consequently, section 29 cannot be treated as an element that forms part of the offence described in section 19(f).

The Court explained that the offence under sections 14 and 15 becomes complete when the conditions listed in those two sections are satisfied. Consequently, the sanction prescribed in section 29 does not form part of the essential elements that constitute the offence. Section 29 is described as a purely procedural provision that is triggered only after an offence has already been completed. Because it operates merely after the offence, it cannot be regarded as an ingredient of the offence that is punishable under clause 19(f). This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that offences under the Act are punishable under clause 19 even when the sanction in section 29 is not applied, specifically when the offences are committed in the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga. The Court further noted that it is untenable to argue that the substantive provisions of sections 14 and 15, which attract punishment under clause 19(f), would vary depending on whether they are applied to areas north of the Jumna and Ganga or to other regions. The Court accepted the appellants’ submission that the purpose of section 29 was to provide protection to subjects against harassment, a purpose that is evident from the language of the section itself.

The Court then turned to the question of whether the statement of objects and reasons relied upon by the appellants could be admitted as evidence. It reiterated the well‑settled principle that legislative proceedings cannot be used to aid in the construction of a statutory provision, citing the cases Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick and Krishna Ayyangar v. Nellapuru Mal. The Court also quoted Lord Wright’s observation in Assam Railway & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioner that the language of a Minister of the Crown during the parliamentary proposal of a measure that eventually becomes law is inadmissible. The admissibility of the statement of objects and reasons for statutory interpretation was directly considered in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, where it was held that such statements are not admissible. While some counsel argued that the legislative history might be relevant for ascertaining intent in a severability issue, the Court referred to its own decision in B.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla’s case to confirm that the statement of objects and reasons does not form part of the legislation’s history. It is merely an expression of the mover’s view of the bill’s scope and purpose, and, like a speech on the floor of the House, it is not admissible for construing the statute. The Court also noted that some judgments have suggested that the statement of objects and reasons may be admissible for purposes other than statutory construction, but the present case required a construction of the provision, and therefore such statements could not be admitted.

The Court observed that the statement of objects and reasons could not be used to ascertain the conditions that prevailed at the time the legislation was enacted, as established in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, M. K. Ranganathan v. Government of Madras, A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti, and Commissioner of Income‑tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Sm. Sodra Devi. For the present case, it was sufficient to state that the appellants sought to rely on the statement of objects and reasons not to determine the historical conditions when the statute was passed but rather to demonstrate that the legislature would not have enacted the law without the protection provided by section 29. The Court found that such use was clearly inadmissible. Beyond the exclusion of the statement of objects, the Court noted that the plain language of the provision indicated that the legislation had been enacted with a view to giving protection to certain subjects. However, it questioned whether this alone established that the legislature would have refrained from enacting section 19 had it known that section 29 was void. The burden, the Court held, rested on the appellant to prove that the legislature would not have passed section 19 without the protection of section 29, and that the policy behind section 29 constituted merely one factor in the legislative decision‑making process. The Court then turned to the distinction between substantive and procedural provisions. It reiterated that section 19 was a substantive provision whereas section 29 was an adjectival, or procedural, one. Generally, the invalidity of a procedural enactment does not affect the validity of a substantive provision. While it is conceivable that in rare circumstances the invalidity of a procedural rule could render a substantive provision ineffective, such cases are exceptional, and the Court found no indication in the present statute that would place it outside the general rule. Finally, the Court emphasized that the principal purpose of the law was to punish certain offences. Although section 29 had been enacted to afford some protection to subjects, the Court reasoned that even if the legislature had been told that section 29 would be invalid, there was no doubt it would have proceeded with the enactment of the statute, perhaps without that protective provision. The removal of the protection would merely require the accused to face trial in a regular court, where justice would still be served. Consequently, the Court concluded that the legislature’s intention was to enact the law, incorporating section 29 if possible, but willing to proceed without it if necessary.

The Court noted that the inference drawn from the provision in section 29, which exempts certain areas from its operation, supports the argument that the section is intended to be applied only to the specified portions of the statute. The American authorities cited on behalf of the appellants were held not to require detailed examination because the principles articulated in those authorities have already been approved by this Court in Chamarbaugwalla’s case (1) at pages 950‑951. Consequently, the only issue remaining was the application of the rules of interpretation laid down in that case to the present legislation, as discussed in (1) (1957) S.C.R. 930. The Court observed that in Davis v. Wallace (1) and in Lemke v. Farmers Grain Company the decisive question was what effect would follow from holding that a substantive provision in a law was unconstitutional on another substantive provision contained in the same statute. The Court acknowledged that it has sometimes been suggested that a distinction should be drawn in matters of severability between criminal and civil laws, and that a penal statute must be construed strictly against the State. However, the Court pointed out that numerous decisions have applied the same rules of construction when deciding severability issues in criminal statutes as in civil statutes, and on principle it is difficult to find a convincing reason for maintaining such a distinction. As Sutherland observed, “Perhaps the most that can be said” for the distinction between criminal and civil statutes is that the penal nature of a statute may carry weight in favour of inseparability, as noted in Statutory Construction Vol. 2 p. 197 para 2418. In the present case, the Court held that the fact that section 29 is a procedural, not a substantive, enactment is sufficient to tip the balance heavily in favour of the State. After considering the overall scheme of the Act and its provisions, the Court expressed the opinion that section 29 is severable from the other portions of the Act and that its invalidity does not affect the validity of the remaining sections. The Court then examined the submissions in Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961, where it was contended that the pistol possessed by the appellant was not in a condition to be effectively used, lacked a chamber, and therefore did not fall within the definition of “Arms” in section 4(1) of the Act. The Court found no merit in this contention, citing (1) (1921) 257 U.S. 47; 66 L. Ed. 325‑329 and (2) (1921) 258 U.S. 50; 66 L. Ed. 458, and accordingly rejected it. The Court also considered the argument raised in Criminal Appeal 62 of 1960 that the State had initiated prosecutions under the Act both with and without sanction, alleging discrimination in violation of Article 14. This allegation was found to be unsupported and was likewise rejected. In the result, both appeals were dismissed, and the Court affirmed that the appeals stand dismissed.