Jai Dev vs The State of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 56 and 57 of 1962

Decision Date: 30 July 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Jai Dev versus The State of Punjab and connected appeals, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 30 July 1962. The opinion was rendered by a bench comprising Justice P B Gajendragadkar, Justice K C Das Gupta, and Justice J R Mudholkar. The case is reported in the 1963 All India Reporter at page 612 and in the 1962 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports (Third Series) at page 489, with subsequent citations in later reports.

The petitioners, identified as Jai Dev and several others, were charged under sections 148, 149, 202, 326 and section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860). The charge arose from a violent incident that occurred on 14 September 1960 in a cultivable field that was the subject of a dispute over possession between the appellants and a faction of complainants. During the disturbance, six persons were killed and nine sustained injuries. The appellants asserted that they possessed and were actively cultivating the field at the time of the rioting. Conversely, the prosecution alleged that the complainants’ party held lawful possession and that the appellants had effectively invaded the field, leading to the ensuing massacre.

The Punjab High Court examined the evidence and concluded that the appellant’s group, together with their companions, had ploughed the crop in the disputed field. While these agricultural operations were in progress on the day of the disturbance, villagers—who were hostile to the presence of strangers—arrived at the field armed with weapons and attempted to seize possession by force. The Court observed that, after firearms were discharged for the first time and a person was killed, the villagers fled the scene. Subsequent to the villagers’ retreat, the appellants discharged their rifles at the fleeing victims, who were at a considerable distance from the shooters.

Based on these findings, the High Court held that at the material time the property had been protected from trespass, and therefore no justification existed for employing force against the villagers who were retreating. Consequently, the appellants could not invoke the right of private defence and were deemed guilty of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants on that basis.

Addressing the scope of private defence, the Court explained that a person defending himself or his property may use only such force as is proportionate to the injury that is to be averted or that is reasonably apprehended, and the force employed must not exceed the legitimate purpose of protection. The Court emphasized that the force used must be restrained to what is necessary, and any excess beyond that would disallow the defence of private protection.

The Court explained that any force used in the exercise of a right of private defence must cease the moment the danger that justified it disappears. The exercise of that right must never be driven by a desire for retaliation or by ill‑will. When the Court applies its authority under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is required to present to the accused all material circumstances that emerge from the evidence, thereby giving the accused a reasonable opportunity to respond to the case presented by the prosecution. However, the Court clarified that it is not obliged to subject the accused to a line of questioning that would amount to a cross‑examination. In the present matter, the Court held that the trial was not invalidated by the failure to specifically put before the accused the question of the distance from which the appellants had discharged their rifles, as required by section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The omission of that particular point, according to the Court, did not vitiate the trial proceedings nor did it affect the correctness of the High Court’s conclusion.

The judgment was delivered in the Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction concerning Criminal Appeals numbered 56 and 57 of 1962. The appeals were entertained by special leave from the Punjab High Court’s judgment and order dated 4 October 1961, which pertained to Criminal Appeals numbered 635 and 636 of 1961 and Murder Reference number 59 of 1961. Counsel for the appellants comprised representatives appearing on their behalf, while the State of Punjab was represented by counsel from the office of the Assistant Advocate General and additional counsel for the respondents. The judgment was pronounced on 30 July 1962 by Justice Gajendragadkar. The two principal appellants, Jai Dev and Hari Singh, together with four other accused—Yudhbir Singh, Dhanpat Singh, Sajjan Singh and Parbhati—were charged with offences under sections 148, 302 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code, each read with section 149. The prosecution alleged that on 14 September 1960 the accused assembled unlawfully in Dhani Khord with the common purpose of rioting while armed with deadly weapons, thereby constituting the offence under section 148. In addition, the prosecution asserted that the same assembly had the further common object of murdering six persons—Hukma, Jai Narain, Jai Dev, Amin Lal, Mst Sagroli and Mst Dil Kaur—and that each of the accused participated in those murders as follows: Dhanpat Singh killed Hukma; Sajjan Singh assaulted Hukma; Yudhbir Singh shot at Amin Lal; Jai Dev shot at Mst Sagroli and at the victim Jaidev; Hari Singh shot at Jai Narain; and Parbhati killed Mst Dil Kaur. These killings gave rise to charges under sections 302 and 149, while an additional assault on Rama Chander, Jug Lal, Mst Chan Kaur, Sirya, Murti and Murli led to charges under sections 326 and 149.

In the same trial that had earlier dealt with the six persons described, the court also tried Basti Ram on the allegation that he had assisted the members of the unlawful assembly in committing the murder, thereby making him liable to punishment under sections 302 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial of these seven accused was conducted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge at Gurgaon. After examining the evidence, the judge concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges against Parbhati and Basti Ram beyond a reasonable doubt, and accordingly he acquitted both of them. Regarding the remaining five defendants, the judge held that the three charges framed against each of them had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. For the murder charge, the judge directed that all five should be sentenced to death by hanging. In addition, for the offence under section 326 read with section 149, each was sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment, and for the offence under section 148 each was sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment. The two lesser sentences were ordered to run concurrently and were to take effect only if the High Court did not confirm the death penalty. The convictions and sentences were challenged by three appeals filed on behalf of the five condemned men, and the death sentences were also submitted for confirmation. The Punjab High Court heard the confirmation proceedings together with the three appeals and held that the convictions of Yudhbir Singh, Dhanpat Singh and Sajjan Singh were not justified; consequently it set aside those convictions and ordered that the three be acquitted and discharged. In relation to Jai Dev and Hari Singh, the High Court departed from the trial court’s view and held that they were guilty only of murder under section 302, not of the combined offence under section 302 read with section 149. Their appeals were dismissed, their murder convictions were upheld and the death sentences imposed on them were confirmed. This order was contested by the two appellants in appeals numbered 56 and 57 of 1962, which were brought before this Court by special leave. The incident that gave rise to these criminal proceedings occurred at Khosra No. 388 in Mauza Ahrod, known as “Inamwala field,” on 14 September 1960 at about 10.30 a.m. The episode resulted in the deaths of the six persons previously mentioned as well as the death of Ram Pat, who belonged to the appellants’ faction. It also caused injuries to nine individuals, three of whom were on the appellants’ side and six on the complainants’ side. The episode can be described as a tragic and gruesome culmination of the violent struggle for possession of the disputed land between the appellants on one side and the complainants’ faction on the other.

In the trial court, a central question was identified: which party actually possessed the disputed field at the relevant time. The appellants argued that they were in possession of the field and that they were cultivating it when the incident occurred. The prosecution, on the other hand, asserted that the complainants’ party held possession and that the appellants had effectively invaded the field, thereby provoking the violence that followed. According to the prosecution’s narrative, between nine and ten o’clock in the morning on the day of the offence, the appellants together with their brothers Ram Pat and Basti Ram arrived at the field in a tractor and began ploughing the bajra crop that the tenant villagers had sown. At that moment, several members of the complainant side – namely Jug Lal, Amin Lal, Ram Chander, Sunda, Jai Dev, Hukma and others – approached the appellants and protested, insisting that the crops that the complainants had raised should not be destroyed. The prosecution stated that the driver of the tractor, Dhanpat Singh, was armed with a pharsi, while the appellants themselves were armed with rifles. Yudhbir Singh possessed a pistol, Sajjan Singh and Parbhati each carried a pharsi, and Ram Pat wielded a bhalla. Consequently, all of the appellants were armed with deadly weapons, and three of them had firearms. The prosecution further claimed that the protest by Jug Lal and the others failed to persuade the appellants, who replied that they now possessed the land and would not allow any interference with their ploughing. This led to a direct clash as the complainants attempted to stop the tractor. In the ensuing struggle, Sajjan Singh struck Jug Lal on the left arm with a pharsi, after which Ram Pat raised his bhalla and injured Jug Lal’s left abdomen and right‑hand wrist. Hukma then seized the bhalla from Ram Pat and struck him in self‑defence, causing Ram Pat to fall and die. Subsequently, Sajjan Singh, Dhanpat Singh and Parbhati each delivered blows to an unconscious Hukma with their pharsis. When Amin Lal pleaded with the appellants and their associates not to kill anyone, Yudhbir Singh shot him with his pistol. Following this, the complainant side fled. After the flight, the prosecution said, Hari Singh, an appellant, shot Jai Narain dead; Parbhati killed Dil Kaur; and Jai Dev, another appellant, shot both Jai Dev himself and Met Sagroli dead. This sequence of events formed the substance of the prosecution’s case.

The defence presented a contrasting version of the facts. It maintained that all of the accused had arrived at Inamwala field at approximately eight‑thirty in the morning on 14 September 1960 and that they were engaged in a lawful act of ploughing land which they claimed to have taken possession of. According to the defence, the accused had positioned the tractor on the portion of the bajra crop that was classified as “kharaba” with the intention of using it for manure. The defence contended that after nearly two hours of ploughing, a large group of residents from Dhani Sobha and Ahrod, including women, arrived armed with deadly weapons, began abusing the accused, and assaulted them with their weapons. The accused, the defence argued, responded by using jellies, kassi and lathi in self‑defence. The defence further stated that Amin Lal from the complainant side was armed with a pistol, which he aimed at the accused; Sajjan Singh then struck Amin Lal with a lathi, causing the pistol to fall to the ground, whereupon Yodhbir Singh picked it up and fired five or six rounds in retaliation. The defence asserted that Basti Ram, who faced charges of abetment, denied his presence at the scene, while the remaining six accused admitted being present but pleaded self‑defence. This version of events encapsulated the defence’s argument against the prosecution’s narrative.

The accused persons were working on the portion of the bajra crop that was described as “kharaba” with the purpose of using it as manure. After they had been engaged in this operation for nearly two hours, a large number of residents from Dhani Sobha and Ahrod, including women, arrived at the scene armed with deadly weapons and began abusing and assaulting the accused with the weapons they carried. In response, the accused used jellies, kassi and lathi in self‑defence. Amin Lal, who was part of the complainants’ party, was armed with a pistol which he aimed at the accused; Sajjan Singh then struck Amin Lal with a lathi, causing the pistol to fall to the ground. Yodhbir Singh picked up the pistol and, in retaliation against the assailants, fired five or six rounds. Basti Ram, who was charged with abetment of the principal offences, denied that he was present, while the six other accused admitted that they were at the spot and pleaded self‑defence. The prosecution sought to prove its case by presenting oral testimony of witnesses who were present at the scene, some of whom had themselves suffered injuries, and also relied on documentary evidence and the report of the investigating officer. Soon after the incident, the appellant Jai Dev filed a First Information Report in which he set out the version of the accused and made a case against the villagers; this FIR was the basis for the commencement of the investigation. Subsequently, when it was discovered that six persons on the complainants’ side had been killed and six injured, another information was lodged presenting the contrary version, which gave rise to two cross‑proceedings. In one proceeding the members of the complainants’ party were named as the accused, and in the other the appellants and their companions were the accused. The trial concluded with the conviction of the appellants and their companions, and the complaint filed by Jai Dev was held not proved. At this stage it is convenient to refer briefly to the findings recorded by the trial court and the conclusions reached by the High Court on appeal. The trial court found that the evidence advanced by the accused to show that they had obtained possession of the land before the date of the offence was not satisfactory, and that the documents and entries made in the revenue records were merely paper entries and not reliable. According to the trial judge, the actual possession of the land throughout remained with the complainants’ party, Jug Lal and his companions, and the crop standing at the spot at the time of the incident had been sown by and belonged to the complainants. This finding necessarily meant that the ploughing carried out by the accused was without any lawful justification.

In the trial, the court concluded that the accused had ploughed the land without any lawful justification, thereby committing an act of trespass. Accordingly, the trial judge held that the accused were the aggressors and that the complainants were entitled to private defence. The court further found that the six accused were members of an unlawful assembly; they had entered the disputed field armed with deadly weapons and shared a common purpose of committing the offences charged against them. On this basis, the trial judge did not consider it necessary to determine which specific victim had been killed by which particular accused. The judge expressed that the charge could not be proved against Parbhati or Basti Rama, but that, with respect to the remaining five accused, the evidence conclusively established the charges under section 148 as well as sections 302 and 326/149. Regarding the defence, the trial court categorically rejected the version that Amin Lal possessed a pistol which, after falling from his hands, was allegedly picked up by Yudhbir Singh. The trial court held that none of the complainants were armed with firearms, whereas three of the accused were. Specifically, Yudhbir Singh was said to have a pistol, and the appellants Jai Dev and Hari Singh were said to possess rifles. When the matter was argued before the High Court, the appellate court declined to accept the trial court’s finding on the question of possession. In its judgment, the High Court examined in detail the disputes that preceded the offences concerning the ownership of the land. The land, the court noted, had originally been given as a charitable gift by the proprietary body of the village Ahrod to a man named Baba Kanhar Dass many years earlier. Subsequently, the land continued to be cultivated by Amin Lal, Jug Lal, Charanji Lal and Duli Chand in the capacity of tenants. On 30 May 1958, Kanhar Dass sold the entire parcel to the appellants and their brothers Basti Ram and Ram Pat for a sum of Rs. 25,000. The purchasers, who hailed from the village of Kulana, were regarded by the residents of Ahrod as outsiders, and the villagers were displeased that land originally gifted to Kanhar Dass as a charitable endowment had been sold to strangers. In response, the proprietary body of Ahrod filed a declaratory suit challenging the sale deed shortly after its execution; that suit failed, and two subsequent pre‑emption suits were also dismissed. The appellants and their two brothers then instituted a suit for possession, and a decree was passed. Documentary evidence presented in that case demonstrated that, upon execution of the decree, possession of the land was delivered to the decree‑holders.

It was recorded that a few individuals opposed the hand‑over of possession and asserted a claim over fifteen bighas of the land. Subsequent litigation addressed that claim, but irrespective of the final determination regarding those fifteen bighas, the High Court affirmed that possession of fifty‑six bighas and six bighas was definitively delivered to Basti Ram and his brothers on 23 December 1959. In effect, the High Court overturned the trial‑court finding on this point and concluded that the field where the alleged offences occurred was in the lawful possession of the appellants and their associates.

The High Court further observed that the crop in that field had been ploughed by the appellants and their companions, and that the activities carried out by them on the morning of 14 September 1960 did not amount to trespass. On the basis of the evidence, the Court held that the villagers who opposed the strangers taking possession were armed and had come to the field with the intention of asserting possession. Although the number of villagers was considerably larger than the number of persons on the side of the accused, the latter were equipped with firearms, giving them superiority in arms. Consequently, the Court determined that the party of the accused was entitled to exercise the right of private defence.

The property in question was threatened by persons armed with weapons, and the Court held that when an assault threatens grievous injury or death, the right of private defence permits the use of force, even up to the extent of causing the death of the assailants. Relying on this finding, the High Court concluded that Sajjan Singh, Yudhbir Singh and Dhanpat Singh, who were held responsible for the deaths of three victims, were not guilty of any offence. The Court reasoned that they had been justified in defending their property against armed assailants who threatened their lives, and therefore these three accused were acquitted on appeal.

With regard to the appellants Jai Dev and Hari Singh, the High Court held that at the moment they caused the deaths of Jai Dev and Jai Narain, there was no longer any apprehended danger. The Court observed that immediately after Amin Lal was shot dead, the villagers who had entered the field fled, removing any justification for the use of force against persons who were running away. Since the property had already been secured from trespass and the assailants had been completely dispersed, the right of private defence had ceased to exist. Accordingly, the Court found that the appellants, having been proved to have caused the two deaths, could not invoke the protection of private defence, nor could they claim that they had merely exceeded that right. The appellants were therefore convicted of murder under section 302 and sentenced to death.

The judgment observed that the appellants could not invoke protection either under the right of private defence or even plead that they had merely exceeded that right; consequently, they were held guilty of murder pursuant to section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced to death by hanging. The appeal therefore raised a very limited issue for determination. The factual findings recorded by the High Court in favour of the appellants were treated as binding for the purpose of this appeal, meaning that the Court examined the case on the premise that initially the appellants and their companions possessed a right of private defence. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Anthony, argued that, given the circumstances under which the appellants discharged their rifles, it would be erroneous to conclude that the right of private defence had terminated. He submitted that an allowance must be made in favour of the appellants because it was now established that they were confronted by an angry mob whose members were armed and appeared resolved to dispossess the appellants and their associates of the disputed field. The resolution of the point raised by Mr. Anthony was said to depend substantially on the scope and effect of the provisions of section 100 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 100, inter alia, provides that the right of private defence of the body extends, subject to the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death when the offence that occasions the exercise of the right is an assault that may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise result from such assault. In other words, when a person claiming the right of private defence is faced with assailants who can be reasonably expected to cause grievous hurt, that person may lawfully defend himself by causing the death of the assailant. In assessing the validity of the appellants’ argument, it was necessary to recall the fundamental assumptions underlying the law of self‑defence. In a well‑ordered, civilised society it is generally presumed that the State will look after the persons and property of individual citizens and that the State’s usual function is to provide protection to such persons and their property. This presumption, however, does not require a person who is suddenly confronted with an assault to flee; rather, the person is entitled to resist the attack and defend himself. The same principle applies when an individual’s property is threatened. In other words, where an individual citizen or his property faces a danger and immediate assistance from the State machinery is not readily available, the citizen is entitled to protect himself and his property. That being so, it is a necessary

The Court explained that a direct consequence of the doctrine of private defence is that the violence a citizen may employ while defending himself or his property must not be excessively disproportionate to the injury that is to be averted or reasonably anticipated, and it must not exceed the legitimate purpose for which it is used. The exercise of the right of private defence must never be motivated by vindictiveness or malice. The Court observed that when judging the conduct of a person who claims to have exercised a right of private defence, the tribunal must necessarily take into account the feelings that the person experienced at the relevant moment. If a person is confronted with an assault that creates a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt, such a situation inevitably stirs excitement and confusion in his mind. At that instant, the dominant feeling in his mind will be to remove the danger and to preserve his own life or his property, and consequently he will naturally be eager to deliver a decisive blow in the exercise of his right. The Court noted that while striking a decisive blow, the defender must not employ more force than appears reasonably necessary. However, in determining whether more force was used than was necessary or justified by the prevailing circumstances, it would be inappropriate to apply a detached, objective test that is typical of a courtroom long after the incident has occurred. For this reason, several judicial decisions have observed that the means a threatened person adopts and the force he uses should not be weighed on a precise scale. The Court set out the proper approach, beginning with the requirement that a person exercising a right of private defence must first consider whether the threat to his person or his property is real and immediate. If, after reasonable consideration, the person concludes that the threat is indeed immediate and real, he is entitled to exercise his right. In exercising that right, he must employ only the force necessary to achieve the purpose of averting the threat and must cease using force as soon as the threat disappears. The Court further held that, provided the threat continues and the right of private defence can be lawfully exercised, it would be unfair to require, as Mayne observed, that “he should modulate his defence step by step, according to the attack, before there is reason to believe the attack is over.” The law of private defence does not obligate a person who is assaulted or who anticipates an assault to flee for safety; rather, it authorises him to defend himself and to secure his victory over the assailant by using the necessary force, as noted in Mayne’s Criminal Law of India, fourth edition, page 23. This principle necessarily implies that as soon as the cause for the reasonable apprehension has disappeared and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to rout, there is no longer any occasion to invoke the right of private defence. If, however, the danger persists, the right remains operative.

In this case, the Court observed that the legal right of private defence terminates as soon as the danger or the apprehension of danger disappears, according to sections 102 and 105 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court held that this principle had not been contested before it, and therefore the precise issue to be examined was whether the appellants could be said to have possessed a right of private defence at the moments when appellant Jai Dev discharged his weapon at victim Jai Dev and when appellant Hari Singh fired at victim Jai Narain.

The Court noted that the most significant fact opposing the claim of private defence was that both victims were situated at a considerable distance from the appellants when they were shot. Regarding the death of Jai Dev, the Court referred to the testimony of Assistant Sub‑Inspector Gurbux Singh, identified as witness 37. He stated that the body of Jai Dev was discovered approximately seventy paces from the tractor’s position, but that it had been dragged from a farther location where Jai Dev originally stood when the fatal shot was fired. The Court explained that a trail of blood between the original location and the place where the body was finally found clearly indicated that Jai Dev had fallen at a more distant spot and was subsequently moved nearer to the scene of the offence. This observation was supported by a memorandum dated 14 September 1960, recorded as item number 104, which described the collection of blood‑stained earth from both positions. The Court estimated that the point where Jai Dev was shot was roughly three hundred paces away from the tractor where appellant Jai Dev was standing.

The Court acknowledged that Gurbux Singh’s rough site plan, prepared on the day of the incident, did not explicitly mark the blood trail. However, the Court pointed out that item 8 in the plan made a reference to the dragging of the body, which was sufficient to corroborate Singh’s testimony. The Court further explained that the omission of the blood trail in the plan could be attributed to Singh’s focus on the FIR filed by appellant Jai Dev, which likely led him to regard the deceased as part of the aggressor’s party, thereby rendering the blood marks seemingly insignificant to him. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the sworn evidence of Gurbux Singh, reinforced by the contemporaneous memorandum, should not be disbelieved merely because the rough plan failed to mention the blood trail. Counsel for the appellant has raised additional points, but the Court considered the evidence on the location and movement of the victim’s body to be reliable and persuasive.

In this case the Court examined the testimony of Juglal, identified as witness 13, who recounted that the accused Jai Dev opened fire from his rifle and killed the victim Jai Dev “at the spot”. The Court held that the expression “at the spot” was not intended to indicate that the victim was standing at the exact location from which the accused fired. Rather, it meant that the accused fired from his own position toward the victim. The Court further stated that it would be inappropriate to interpret the phrase in a strictly technical sense when the entire narrative of Juglal is considered. The Court also rejected the argument that all the shots were fired almost simultaneously. It observed that a witness, when describing a sequence of events, naturally mentions one incident after another, which does not imply that the accused and his companions discharged their weapons at the same moment. Consequently, the Court was not satisfied that Juglal’s evidence demonstrated that the victim Jai Dev was near the point of discharge. The Court also dismissed reliance on the testimony of Chuni Lal, identified as witness 16, because the witness appeared to confuse two documents, P.N.F. and P.N.E., and such confusion could not be used to prove the victim’s proximity to the scene. Likewise, the Court found that Hira Lal, witness 5, who had earlier said the victim was injured “at the spot”, later qualified that statement by noting he saw the dead body near the scene only after the incident. Taking the entire record into account, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in finding that the deceased Jai Dev was standing at a considerable distance from the place where he was shot.

The Court then turned to the facts concerning the second victim, Jai Narain. Evidence presented showed that Jai Narain was not present in the Inamwala field but was on a machan in an adjoining cultivated field. The prosecution alleged that the appellant Hari Singh fired at Jai Narain from his position, and the distance between the shooter and the victim was approximately four hundred paces. This conclusion was supported by multiple pieces of evidence. Chand Kaur, identified as witness 10 and the mother of the deceased, testified that she saw her son fall from the machan, indicating that he was on that structure at the time of the shooting. The rough plan and sketch prepared by the Sub‑Inspector, identified as P.A.J., corroborated the location of the machan. Further, the testimony of Hira Lal (witness 5) and the sworn statement of Gurbux Singh confirmed that the dead body of Jai Narain was found more than four hundred paces away from the point where the tractor had been positioned during the incident. The account of Juglal (witness 13) also supported this finding. On the basis of this consistent evidence, the Court found no doubt that Jai Narain was at a long distance from the shooter. It therefore affirmed the High Court’s finding that, just as appellant Jai Dev had taken a clear aim at a victim standing at a distance and shot him dead, appellant Hari Singh likewise aimed accurately at Jai Narain, who was far from him, and shot him dead.

The testimony indicated that Jai Narain was positioned on a machan that stood in the field over which he held ownership. The exact location of this field was depicted in a rough plan and sketch that had been prepared by Sub‑Inspector P.A.J. Multiple witnesses corroborated this description. Hira Lal, identified as PW 5, gave evidence that confirmed the same conclusion, and Gurbux Singh also affirmed the fact under oath. According to their statements, the dead body of Jai Narain was discovered lying at a distance of more than four hundred paces from the spot where the tractor was reported to have been stationed at the time of the incident. The testimony of Juglal, recorded as PW 13, produced a similar effect, reinforcing the view that the victim was far away from the field in question. Consequently, there was no doubt that Jai Narain was situated at a considerable distance when he was shot. The Court observed that, just as the appellant Jai Dev had taken a clean aim at a victim who was standing at a distance and had shot him dead, the appellant Hari Singh also aimed cleanly at Jai Narain, who was away from him, and discharged his firearm, causing the victim’s death. The High Court reached this conclusion and found no reason to disturb it.

During the arguments, counsel for the appellant, Mr Anthony, relied upon the proposition that several prosecution witnesses whose evidence had been accepted by the High Court were not regarded as truthful by the trial Court, and he contended that the High Court should not have departed from the trial Court’s appreciation of the evidence. Two responses were given to this contention. First, it is not wholly accurate to claim that the trial Court entirely disbelieved the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. While it can be conceded that, with respect to the portion of the prosecution case involving Parbhati and Basti Ram, the trial Court did not accept the incriminating testimony of certain witnesses and had noted the forcefulness of the defence’s criticism of those witnesses, the trial Court nevertheless, regarding the principal occurrence, accepted the bulk of the prosecution’s evidence. It held that this evidence was in substantial harmony with the medical findings. In other words, the sequence of events, the role played by the assailants against the specific victims, and the remainder of the prosecution’s narrative were, on the whole, believed by the trial Court. Moreover, the trial Court did not consider it necessary to examine the individual liability of each accused because it determined that a charge under section 149 had been proved. When the High Court arrived at a contrary view on that point, it became essential for it to scrutinise each accused separately, and therefore it would be inaccurate to say that the High Court merely adopted the trial Court’s view of witnesses that the trial Court had completely rejected. The second response noted that even if the trial Court had disbelieved certain testimony, the High Court was at liberty to reassess the material and reach a different conclusion. Although appellate courts generally exercise caution in overturning a trial judge’s assessment of oral evidence—given the trial judge’s advantage of observing witness demeanour—this does not preclude the appellate court from intervening where it finds the trial court’s reasoning unsatisfactory. The criticism levelled by the trial court concerned not only the demeanour of the witnesses but also their partisan character and the exaggerated statements they made, which the High Court was entitled to evaluate independently.

In response to the contention raised by Mr. Anthony, the Court first explained that the High Court had examined the case against each individual accused and therefore it could not be said that the High Court simply accepted the testimony of witnesses whom the trial Court had wholly disbelieved. The Court then addressed the second part of Mr. Anthony’s submission. It observed that even if the trial Court had rejected the evidence, the High Court was entitled, on a fresh consideration of the material, to arrive at a different conclusion. The Court acknowledged the general principle that an appellate court is usually hesitant to depart from the trial Court’s assessment of oral evidence because the trial judge observes the witnesses’ demeanor directly. However, the Court emphasized that this reluctance does not preclude an appellate court from intervening when it is justified to do so. Moreover, the trial Court’s criticism was not directed primarily at the witnesses’ demeanor but at their partisan character and the exaggerated statements that partisan witnesses tend to make. Consequently, the Court found no reason to reject the High Court’s finding concerning the distances at which the victims Jai Dev and Jai Narain were shot.

Mr. Anthony further argued that the fact that the victims were at a considerable distance from the assailants when they were shot should not be decisive for the issue before the present appeal. He maintained that, if the assailants were surrounded by a large mob, some members of which were armed with deadly weapons and determined to dispossess the assailants at any cost, the appellants and their companions would be justified in firing at the mob. He contended that the appellants could have acted out of a reasonable apprehension of a violent assault that might have resulted in grievous injury or death. He also suggested that if three armed assailants fired almost simultaneously, such conduct would fall within the lawful exercise of the right of private defence, and the killing of a person who was standing at a distance would not affect the legal analysis.

The Court noted that this line of argument, although apparently persuasive at first glance, rested on factual assumptions that were not supported by the evidence in this case. The High Court had found that, at the moment the appellants discharged their rifles, the villagers were already fleeing and no danger remained either to the property of the appellants or to their own persons. The Court also recalled that both the trial Court and the High Court had rejected the defence’s claim that Amin Lal possessed a pistol. As a result, although the crowd threatening the appellants and their friends was larger in number, the weapons held by the appellants were far more powerful than those in the hands of the crowd.

It was observed that the weapons possessed by the crowd were considerably less powerful than the firearms that were in the hands of the appellants. In view of the sequence of events and the character of the assault as it unfolded, the Court noted that Amin Lal, who was one of the leaders of the villagers, was shot dead. According to the evidence, his death caused the villagers to become completely frightened and they began to run away in a disorderly fashion. The witness identified as Sunda (PW‑4) described how Amin Lal stepped forward to assist Hukma, when he was fired upon with a pistol by Yudhbir Singh. The bullet struck a vital part of Amin Lal’s chest, causing a fatal injury, and he collapsed dead on the ground. Sunda further stated that the members of the complainant’s party, feeling terrified by the gunfire opened by Yudhbir Singh, fled in the direction of the village known as Abadi. In a similar vein, the testimony of Mst. Sarian (PW‑12) indicated that when the victim Jai Dev was targeted by gunfire, he also attempted to escape. From the surrounding circumstances it is easy to infer that, upon seeing the appellants and their associates prepared to employ their firearms, the villagers must have been seized by fear; the large size of the crowd would have contributed nothing to their sense of safety. On the contrary, a larger crowd could only have resulted in a greater number of deaths. Consequently, as soon as weapons were discharged for the first time, resulting in the immediate killing of Amin Lal, the villagers understandably fled. This version of events was supported by several witnesses and formed the basis of the High Court’s finding. In light of this finding, the Court turned to the argument advanced by counsel for the appellant, Mr Anthony. He contended that if, at the moment when the two appellants discharged their rifles at victims who were standing at considerable distances, all of the villagers had already fled, there was no longer any threat persisting. Accordingly, the right of private defence would have ceased unambiguously. The Court concurred with the High Court’s view that, under those circumstances, the appellants were liable for murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Two ancillary issues were then considered. First, Mr Anthony argued that the examination of the appellant Hari Singh under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was seriously defective, particularly with respect to the question of distance that the prosecution had heavily relied upon before the High Court. He maintained that this defect rendered the trial itself invalid. While it is true that the trial judge, in questioning Hari Singh, did not explicitly clarify the distance between him and the victim Jai Narain, the Court held that this omission alone does not automatically vitiate the trial or overturn the High Court’s conclusion. The Court emphasized that the proper approach is to examine all the questions posed by the trial judge to the appellant, and that the issue of distance, in isolation, is not decisive for determining liability.

In this case, the Court observed that the question of distance alone did not operate against the appellant Hari Singh because the conclusion was that the threat had ceased at the moment he fired at Jai Narain; consequently, if the threat had indeed ceased and there was no justification for using the firearm, the appellant would be guilty of murder even if Jai Narain had not been far away. The Court emphasized that the party relying on self‑defence must prove the circumstances that give rise to the exercise of that right, and such a right could not be deemed proved merely by concluding that, at the relevant time, there was no threat to the appellant or to his companions’ person or property. Counsel for the appellant argued that the failure to put the specific point of distance before Hari Singh would affect the High Court’s final conclusion, and he relied on the decision in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat (1). In that decision, the Court had stressed the importance of putting every material fact intended to be used against the accused before him and giving him a chance to explain it. However, the Court stated that those observations must be read in the context of the other conclusions reached in that case and should not be construed as laying down a rigid rule that any omission of a point used against an accused automatically vitiates the trial or renders the conviction bad. The examination of an accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is undeniably meant to provide the accused an opportunity to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. When exercising its powers under that provision, the Court must ensure that all relevant circumstances disclosed by the evidence are put to the accused. It would be insufficient to ask only a few general and broad questions, because such an approach might deprive the accused of the chance to address every pertinent circumstance. Conversely, it would be unfair and inappropriate for the Court to pose overly detailed questions that would amount to a cross‑examination. The proper test for determining whether the accused has been fairly examined under section 342 is to consider, in light of all the questions asked, whether the accused was given a real opportunity to say what he wished in response to the prosecution’s case. If the examination were found to be defective and to have caused prejudice to the accused, that would constitute a serious infirmity. The Court concluded that no universal rule could be laid down regarding the exact manner in which an accused should be examined under section 342.

In this case, the Court considered how the accused should be examined under section 342, referring to the earlier decision reported in A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 468. The Court observed that a desire for brevity, which leads to asking only a few general or omnibus questions, conflicts with the requirements of section 342 just as an over‑eagerness for thoroughness, which results in an excessively large number of detailed questions that amount to a cross‑examination, also conflicts with those requirements. The Court further noted that, as already shown, the failure to address the precise issue of distance in the present case was not a material defect. The final argument advanced by counsel for the appellant was that the prosecution ought to have examined a ballistic expert, and because no such expert was examined, the prosecution could not be said to have proved that the appellants caused the deaths of the two victims by shooting from the rifles they were alleged to have carried. Counsel relied on the Court’s ruling in Mohinder Singh v. The State (1), which held that when death results from injuries inflicted by a lethal weapon, the prosecution has a duty to produce expert evidence showing that the injuries could have been caused by the weapon alleged to have been used. The Court held that this principle could not be applied in the present matter because the rifles alleged to have been used by the appellants have not been recovered, and therefore there was no occasion to call an expert to comment on injuries allegedly caused by those rifles. The appellant’s counsel suggested that an expert should have been called to determine whether any of the injuries observed on the various victims could have been inflicted by the revolver that had been recovered in this case, citing A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 415. The Court then examined the circumstances surrounding the recovery of the revolver. According to the defence, Amin Lal was carrying a revolver and, after being struck with a lathi by Sajjan Singh, the weapon fell from his hand; Yudhbir Singh is alleged to have picked up the revolver and fired it at Amin Lal. The defence further asserted that Yudhbir Singh took the revolver to his house and later produced it before the investigating officer. In contrast, the prosecution’s version, presented by the witness Gurbux Singh, stated that after his arrest, the accused Sajjan Singh produced the pistol together with two live cartridges before the investigating officer.

The Court noted that, as alleged by the defence, the revolver was reportedly employed by Yudhbir Singh in self‑defence after it had unintentionally dropped from Amin Lal’s hands. However, the prosecution never asserted that this particular revolver was the weapon actually discharged by Yudhbir Singh, nor did it form part of the charge against him. The Court considered the possibility that the accused deliberately surrendered the revolver in order to create additional complications and to obstruct the investigation. In such circumstances, the Court found it difficult to discern any legitimate purpose for which the prosecution might have required an expert examination of the weapon, such as establishing the identity of the bullet or the source of the firearm. Consequently, the Court concluded that the precedent set in Mohinder Singh v. The State (1), which concerned a different factual scenario, was inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the High Court’s finding that the two appellants were guilty of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Having resolved the question of guilt, the only remaining issue was the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the convicted appellants, including whether the death penalty or a lesser term should be imposed. Counsel for the State, Mr. Bindra, refrained from urging the death penalty and expressed that he was not convinced that the circumstances merited capital punishment, thereby leaving the sentencing decision entirely to the Court. After a careful review of the entire factual matrix, the Court declined to adopt the High Court’s view that the circumstances warranted the maximum penalty and examined the High Court’s reasoning, finding it unpersuasive. In determining a suitable sentence, the Court said it must consider the background of the disturbance, the nature and extent of the threat posed by the villagers, and the excitement generated at the time, as well as the emotional state of the shooters at that moment. The Court agreed with the High Court that when the appellants discharged their rifles, the immediate threat from the crowd had already dissipated. Nevertheless, the Court held that the lingering mental excitement of the appellants could be regarded as a mitigating factor, lessening their moral culpability under the special facts of the case. Therefore, the Court believed that justice would be better served by setting aside the death sentences and substituting life imprisonment for each appellant. Accordingly, the Court confirmed the conviction under section 302 and altered the punishment from death to imprisonment for life, thereby substituting the earlier death order with a life term. The conviction was thus upheld and the sentence reduced.