Ishwari Prasad Mishra vs Mohammad Isa

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 630 of 1960

Decision Date: 27 August 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

In the matter of Ishwari Prasad Mishra versus Mohammad Isa, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 27 August 1962, with P. B. Gajendragadkar authoring the opinion and a bench composed of P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal. The petition was presented by Ishwari Prasad Mishra as the petitioner and Mohammad Isa as the respondent. The citation of the decision appears as 1963 AIR 1728 and also in the Supreme Court Reports as 1963 S. C. R. (3) 722, with additional citator references recorded as C 1967 SC 1326 (8) R 1973 SC 2200 (3) F 1977 SC 1091 (7) F 1980 SC 531 (7,10). The principal issue involved the duty of appellate judges when reviewing a lower‑court judgment, particularly the propriety of criticizing the trial judge or the witnesses and the need to avoid extravagant language. In the underlying suit, the appellant sought specific performance of a sale agreement that had been executed by the respondent; the respondent contested the authenticity and validity of the agreement and its consideration. The trial court found in favor of the appellant, decreeing that the agreement was genuine, valid and supported by consideration, and ordered specific performance. On appeal, the Patna High Court reversed the trial court’s findings, dismissed the suit and, in its judgment, employed severe strictures against the trial judge, suggesting that the decision was based on extraneous considerations, and also criticized certain witnesses as having conspired to give false testimony. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, which examined the evidentiary record in detail and concluded that the trial court’s decision was correct and that the High Court’s reversal was erroneous. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in using extravagant language to criticize the trial court, emphasizing that strong language and accusations of corrupt motives must not be employed lightly because a judge against whom such imputations are made has no statutory remedy to vindicate his reputation. The Court further held that the High Court’s tendency to label every witness whose evidence it disbelieved as a perjurer or conspirator was likewise improper. The judgment was filed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 630 of 1960, arising from a special leave from the Patna High Court’s decree dated 29 September 1959, which itself stemmed from Original Decree No. 290 of 1953. The parties were represented by counsel, with the Solicitor‑General of India appearing for the appellant and senior counsel appearing for the respondent. The judgment was pronounced on 27 August 1962.

The Court noted that the appellant, Pandit Ishweri Prasad Mishra, instituted proceedings against the respondent, Mohammad Isa, seeking specific performance of a sale agreement that had been executed on 18 May 1950 before the 1st Additional Sub‑Judge at Muzeffarpur. Under that agreement the respondent had undertaken to execute a sale deed in favour of the appellant concerning the respondent’s house situated at Sitamarhi Bazar, Sitamarhi. The trial court found in favour of the appellant and decreed that the respondent should execute the sale deed within one month of the decree, provided the respondent first received the remaining balance of the purchase price, namely Rs 4,000. The respondent appealed the trial court’s decree to the Patna High Court. The High Court set aside the decree, dismissed the appellant’s suit and awarded costs throughout. The appellant thereafter obtained a certificate from the High Court and filed the present appeal. The principal issue before the Court was whether the agreement, which formed the basis of the appellant’s suit, was genuine, valid and supported by consideration. The subject matter of the agreement was the respondent’s house. According to the appellant, when the agreement was executed the total consideration for the transfer had been fixed at Rs 14,000, of which Rs 10,900 had been paid as earnest money. The agreement stipulated that the sale deed was to be executed within three months of its date, that is, on or before 18 August 1950. The appellant subsequently called upon the respondent to perform his obligations, offered to pay the outstanding balance of Rs 4,000, and demanded that the sale deed be executed. The respondent failed to comply with this demand and instead contested the genuineness and validity of the agreement, prompting the appellant to file a suit for specific performance on 27 August 1950. The appellant further recounted that negotiations for the sale of the respondent’s house had begun on 3 May 1950, when the appellant’s father, through the negotiator Bihari Lal Singh, discussed the matter with the respondent. The respondent initially quoted a price of Rs 20,000, whereas the appellant’s father was prepared to pay only Rs 10,000. On 8 May 1950 the parties met again; the appellant raised his offer to Rs 13,000, but the respondent refused to lower his price below Rs 15,000. Finally, on 18 May 1950 the respondent approached the appellant and agreed to sell the house for Rs 14,000, explaining that he wished to purchase an ice‑cream machine estimated to cost Rs 12,000 and therefore desired to conclude the agreement on that very day.

In this case the parties first proceeded to Babu Amar Choudhary, who was a senior lawyer in the locality, at about nine o’clock in the morning. Because the lawyer was then attending a court that was in session, the parties could not meet him until two o’clock in the afternoon, when they found him at his office together with the scribe Khakhan Singh and a stamp paper that had been obtained earlier that day. After meeting the lawyer, the parties travelled to Mr. Choudhary’s residence, where the senior lawyer dictated the terms of the sale agreement in the presence of his son, who was also a practising lawyer. The scribe, identified as Khakhan Singh, wrote down the dictated draft. When the drafting was completed, the appellant, the respondent and the scribe moved to the appellant’s house. There, the scribe again copied the completed draft onto the stamp paper that had been purchased that morning. Following this, the appellant handed the respondent ten thousand rupees as earnest money, and the respondent signed the document in his own handwriting, acknowledging receipt of the ten thousand rupees. The signed document was subsequently attested by Ganesh Thakur, Jamuna Singh and Bihari Lal Saraogi. The appellant presented this sequence of events as the foundation of his claim for specific performance. The respondent, however, rejected the appellant’s claim in its entirety. He contended that the agreement bore only his thumb marks and that he had never entered into a sale agreement. According to the respondent, he had entrusted the appellant with stamp papers bearing his thumb marks so that the appellant could act as an arbitrator in a separate dispute with Ramzan Ali. The respondent alleged that the appellant misused those stamp papers for a different purpose, thereby creating a forged document on which the present suit was based. He further denied having received the ten thousand rupees and denied any intention to purchase an ice‑cream machine. The respondent maintained that the house in question was actually valued at sixty thousand rupees, not the fourteen thousand rupees reflected in the alleged agreement. In effect, the respondent challenged the authenticity of the agreement and opposed the appellant’s specific‑performance claim. In response to these pleadings, the trial court framed four issues, the principal one being whether the agreement was genuine, valid and supported by consideration. To prove his case, the appellant called as witnesses the stamp‑paper vendor Harikant Jha, who testified to the purchase of the stamp paper for the purpose of drafting the agreement, and the younger lawyer Mr. Choudhary, who confirmed that his father had dictated the draft. The appellant also produced the three attesting witnesses, the scribe, and gave his own testimony. In addition, the appellant produced a handwriting expert, Mr. Bennott, to verify that the endorsement on the document was indeed the respondent’s handwriting. The respondent, in turn, examined his own witnesses.

In the trial, the respondent called five witnesses to support his claim that the appellant had been appointed as an arbitrator and that, in that capacity, a stamp paper bearing the appellant’s thumb‑marks had been entrusted to him. He also examined Karim Bux, identified as defensive witness 6, to prove that the property was worth Rs 60,000. In addition, he examined Nasrat Hussain, defensive witness 7, who is a handwriting expert, to show that the disputed engrossed document was not written in the appellant’s hand. The learned trial judge rejected the defence’s theory that the appellant had been appointed as an arbitrator. He further held that the testimony of Karim Bux regarding the value of the property was unreliable and that the house in question could not be said to be worth more than Rs 14,000. The judge considered the evidence produced by the appellant and accepted it in its entirety. Accordingly, he found that the agreement of sale on which the suit was based had indeed been executed by the respondent, that the agreement was valid and was supported by consideration. On that basis, he passed a decree for specific performance in favour of the appellant.

The High Court set aside all of the trial court’s findings. It held that the story that the appellant had been appointed as an arbitrator could not be dismissed as wholly improbable and, when the competing narratives were weighed, appeared more probable than the appellant’s version. The High Court also ruled that the value of the property, including the land, could not be less than Rs 30,000, and after examining the evidence presented by the appellant, concluded that that evidence was unreliable and indicated a conspiracy between the witnesses and the appellant to create a false and forged document. The High Court observed that the respondent’s evidence in support of his theory that an attempted arbitration had taken place between the respondent and Ramzan Ali was, without doubt, deemed unworthy of credence; nevertheless, on a probability basis the Court was prepared to prefer that version to the appellant’s story. In sum, the High Court’s findings reversed the trial court’s decree. Consequently, the matter before this appeal turns on a factual question that lies within a very narrow compass: whether the respondent executed the agreement of sale and whether he received Rs 10,000 as earnest money under it. A related issue is the proper valuation of the house that is the subject‑matter of the agreement. These are the principal points that must be decided. Before assessing the evidence adduced by the parties in these proceedings, it is necessary to consider the broader and general features of the case upon which both parties have relied before this Court.

In this case, the Court observed that counsel for the respondent relied on several alleged anomalies to support the High Court’s final decision. The first point raised was that the plaint did not mention that a draft had been prepared by a senior lawyer, although such a reference was expected. It was conceded that the senior lawyer, Mr Choudhary, was a lawyer of standing in Sitamarhi, and the argument advanced was that if his services had been sought in preparing a draft before the agreement was finalized on stamp paper, the plaint would have recorded that fact; because the plaint omitted such a reference, the counsel suggested that the narrative concerning the draft should be rejected. The Court stated that it was not persuaded by this line of reasoning. Strictly speaking, the Court saw no necessity for the appellant to refer to the draft in his pleadings. Moreover, the story of the draft was corroborated by all the witnesses examined on the appellant’s side, including the sons of Mr Choudhary, and unless the Court were prepared to disbelieve the entire body of that evidence, it could not accept the contention that the draft narrative was false. The Court noted that the High Court had concluded that there was a conspiracy among all the witnesses; if that conclusion were correct, the draft would indeed have to be treated as a false document. However, for the present argument concerning the appellant’s failure to mention the draft in the plaint, the Court found no substance. The counsel further argued that certain recitals in the draft were so unusual that it was unlikely a senior lawyer could have dictated them. The agreement (Exhibit 6) described the property by its boundaries, set out the circumstances of its execution, recorded the receipt of Rs 10,000‑ as earnest money, stipulated that Rs 14,000‑ was the agreed price, prescribed the period within which the sale deed had to be executed, and contained two clauses that would become operative should the respondent fail to execute the sale deed. The first clause provided that if the respondent did not execute the sale deed by the due date, the appellant would be entitled to take necessary steps to have the deed of sale executed in respect of the property; otherwise, the deed of contract would be deemed to be the deed of sale. While the Court acknowledged that a literal reading of the phrase “the deed of contract shall be deemed to be the deed of sale” might appear unusual, it held that in context the provision simply meant that the sale deed would be executed on the same terms as the agreement of sale, and it was unreasonable to infer that the unusual wording alone disproved the senior lawyer’s involvement.

In this case, the Court observed that the unusual wording of the clause does not permit the inference that the senior Mr Choudhary could not have dictated it and that the entire narrative concerning the draft is false. The same observation was applied to the second clause on which the contention rests. That clause states, “if the claiment does not get the saledeed executed by me, the executant, within the due date or he does not pay the remaining consideration money at proper time, the executant shall be competent to realise the remaining consideration money in proper manner from the claiment and shall forfeit the earnest money.” The Court noted that this provision is also unusually worded, but it cannot sustain the argument that the allegation of the draft being dictated by Mr Choudhary is untrue. The Court held that the truth of that allegation must be determined by considering the oral evidence presented by the appellant, which purports to show that the senior Mr Choudhary indeed dictated the draft. Consequently, the two clauses relied upon by counsel for the respondent could not be used to conclude that the story about the draft is a fiction. Counsel for the respondent then argued that it was unusual for a payment of Re 10,000 as earnest money when the total price of the property was Rs 14,000. The Court explained that this circumstance becomes understandable if the recitals in the document are correct, namely that the respondent required Rs 12,000 urgently to purchase an ice‑cream machine. The respondent had represented this need to the appellant, and because the parties knew each other well and trusted each other, the appellant agreed to pay Rs 10,000 as earnest money. The Court stressed that this fact alone does not raise suspicion. Further, the respondent suggested it was improbable that the appellant possessed Re 10,000 in cash, arguing that such a large sum was normally kept in a bank. The Court found this contention inconclusive, noting that the assessment depends on the personal habits of the individual and that the mere fact that the appellant kept the cash at home does not, by itself, constitute a suspicious circumstance. The Court also rejected the argument that the appellant’s failure to examine the respondent’s title document was material, observing that the appellant was aware that the respondent had been residing in the house for many years and that the appellant’s father had also lived there, giving the appellant no reason to doubt the respondent’s title. Lastly, the Court dismissed the suggestion that, if the negotiations and the draft were genuine, the appellant should have consulted his father and his manager, deeming the argument unsubstantiated. The Court noted that on the day the agreement was executed, the appellant’s father was away in Lucknow, and the appellant, having taken an oath in support of his case, possessed knowledge of all relevant facts that needed to be proved.

In this matter, the final argument presented before the Court was made by counsel identified as Mr Sastri, who focused on the monetary value of the property that formed the subject of the dispute. Mr Sastri contended that the High Court’s finding that the property could not be valued at less than Rs 30,000 was a material factor that should influence the assessment of the authenticity of the alleged sale agreement. He admitted that a valuation of at least Rs 30,000 would support the respondent’s position that the respondent could not have consented to the sale, and that, contrary to the appellant’s claim, the respondent had indeed entered into a sale of the house to the appellant. To establish the value, the respondent relied upon the testimony of a witness named Karim Bux, who claimed to have worked as an estimator for the Public Works Department before retiring. Karim Bux produced a written statement that assigned a construction cost of Rs 29,358 to the house and a land value of Rs 33,900. The Court observed that this report had been prepared only two days prior to his examination, and that he had been summoned on the very day he gave his evidence. He acknowledged that he had not examined any other witnesses, nor consulted sale deeds of adjoining properties, and he had not inspected the foundation of the plinth, nor determined whether the plinth was underground. Moreover, he had not taken account of the quantity or quality of bricks, nor had he separately valued cement, mortar or lime. He also failed to ascertain the original purchase price paid by the respondent for the house or the amount expended on subsequent improvements. While the High Court had concluded that the property could not be valued below Rs 30,000, the Court found that such a conclusion could not be reasonably derived from the limited and unreliable evidence offered by Karim Bux.

The Court further examined the credibility of Karim Bux’s valuation in light of the specific circumstances of the property. Considering that the land and the house were located in the Tehsil of Sitamarhi, the Court deemed an estimated land value of Rs 33,900 to be utterly implausible. A careful reading of his answers during cross‑examination revealed that the witness possessed scant knowledge of property valuation methods and had made no thorough attempts to perform a proper assessment. Consequently, the Court concluded that the testimony of Karim Bux could not be relied upon to determine the value of the property. This assessment was corroborated by the respondent’s own evidence, which indicated that the house had originally been purchased by the respondent’s father for a nominal sum of Rs 300, and that any subsequent improvements claimed by the respondent were not supported by credible financial records. In light of these observations, the Court ruled that the evidence of Karim Bux was inadmissible for the purpose of ascertaining the property’s value, and that the High Court’s finding based on that evidence could not stand.

The Court observed that the testimony of Karim Bux could be considered in ascertaining the value of the property, and it therefore turned to the evidence produced by the respondent. The respondent admitted that his father had bought the house for three hundred rupees. He further asserted that he had commenced improvements in 1939, completing the front portion about nine years before 1953 and the inner portion about three years before that date, and that he had expended roughly thirty thousand rupees in total. On the basis of those expenditures, he claimed that a sale of the house in 1950 would have yielded more than sixty thousand rupees. Because he alleged substantial improvements, the Court subjected his statements to extensive cross‑examination. The evidence indicated that in 1942 he had borrowed five hundred rupees, securing the loan against his own land. As a professional book‑binder, his financial capacity to marshal such large sums did not appear evident. Although construction proceeded over several years, he produced no accounts or documentary proof showing that thirty thousand rupees had been at his disposal and spent on the work. He initially claimed that he had purchased cement before the permit system was introduced from various shops, but later qualified that statement by saying that the cement was actually bought by his mason. He maintained that mortar had been bought from the shop of a man named Meghu Mal, yet he could not specify the amount spent on it. Bricks, he said, had been obtained from several sellers for which he had paid the prevailing price, but he possessed no receipts. Subsequently he added that he had not personally bought the bricks and estimated that about nine thousand rupees might have been paid for them. Consequently, the Court found the witness’s statements to lack credibility, and it could not accept his claim that the construction spanned many years and that he had spent thirty thousand rupees on improvements. In the Court’s view, given the material before it, there was no justification for the High Court to have overturned the trial court’s finding on the property’s value. Accordingly, the arguments that the property’s value was thirty thousand rupees and that this negated the alleged sale agreement were rejected. Conversely, the Court noted other broad circumstances supporting the appellant’s version, observing that the appellant’s father enjoyed a position of respect in Sitamarhi, having served as Chairman of the Sitamarhi Municipality for several years, and that the respondent had acknowledged his father’s status as a doctor.

It was established that the appellant’s father, who was a Vaidya, and the respondent’s father were friends, and that the two families maintained good relations. The respondent further stated that the appellant’s father had been looking after a matter that had arisen between the respondent and his own father, Muzaffaruddin. Given this background of cordial relations and the fact that both families lived in houses opposite each other, the Court found it difficult to accept the proposition that the appellant would suddenly decide to fabricate a document in order to acquire the respondent’s house. The suggestion that the appellant had recruited several persons to execute such a conspiracy was viewed as implausible and not supported by the evidence before the Court.

The Court explained that a finding of conspiracy may be made only when the evidence presented by the appellant is so profoundly unsatisfactory that it inevitably leads to the conclusion that the witnesses have committed perjury to further a conspiratorial purpose. In the present case, however, the Court observed that the material adduced by the appellant did not reach that level of deficiency and therefore could not justify a conclusion that the witnesses were part of a conspiracy. Consequently, the Court rejected the theory of conspiracy without any hesitation. It noted that three attesting witnesses and the scribe had supported the appellant’s version, and that the young lawyer, Mr Choudhary, had proved the draft document; these facts were deemed highly favorable to the appellant. The trial Court had drawn the same inference, and the present Court affirmed that the trial Court’s assessment was correct.

The Court also turned to the intrinsic evidence of the document itself, a factor on which the appellant was entitled to rely. After personally examining the document, the Court was satisfied that there was no indication of any attempt to force the contents onto the stamp paper. The handwriting appeared natural, and the endorsement by the respondent acknowledging receipt of Rs 10,000 showed no suspicious characteristics. These aspects of the document’s appearance and its intrinsic evidence were therefore considered to be in the appellant’s favour. Finally, the Solicitor General, representing the appellant, strongly advocated that if the arbitration narrative advanced by the respondent – namely, that a stamp paper bearing the respondent’s thumbprints was originally intended for an arbitration agreement but was fraudulently used for a sale agreement – could be disproved, the inevitable conclusion would be that the agreement in question was genuine and lawfully executed by the respondent.

The Court observed that the respondent asserted that, at the material time, two suits were pending between him and his tenant, Ramzan Ali. According to his statement, he had instituted a suit against Ramzan Ali for rent, while Ramzan Ali had filed a petition in the Rent Controller’s Court seeking fixation of standard rent. The respondent claimed that the dispute between them had been referred to the appellant for arbitration, and that, in connection with that arbitration, stamps had been purchased on 15 May. He further alleged that three days later the appellant informed him that those stamps had been lost, prompting the respondent to purchase replacement stamps on 18 May. The Court noted that the respondent admitted the purchase on 18 May but explained it as a consequence of the alleged loss communicated by the appellant. Consequently, the purchase on 15 May became a pivotal element in the respondent’s narrative. The respondent identified the seller of the 15 May stamps as Raghubir Prasad of Dumra Katchery and, when questioned, replied that he could not say whether he would examine the stamp‑vendor. The Court held that the respondent’s failure to call Raghubir Prasad as a witness could not be ignored when assessing the veracity of the arbitration story. In addition, the respondent was asked whether he habitually alleged that his thumb‑marks on a blank paper had been fraudulently used against him; he angrily denied this. However, the Court pointed out that a document from Money Suit No. 129 of 1947, brought by Sahdeo against the respondent, showed that the respondent had advanced the identical plea that his thumb‑marks on a blank paper were misused. Thus, this was not his first reliance on such a claim in litigation. The Court further considered two additional circumstances. First, the Rent Suit filed by the respondent against Ramzan Ali (No. 103 of 1950) was dismissed on 15 May. Although the respondent contended that the dismissal occurred on the appellant’s advice, the Court noted that if the dismissal had resulted from an agreement to refer the dispute to the appellant for arbitration, the court record would have reflected such an agreement and Ramzan Ali would have endorsed it. No such reference appeared, indicating that the dismissal was effectively for default rather than by mutual arbitration.

In the suit filed by Ramzan Ali, identified as suit number 9 of 1950, the developments are especially significant. The suit had been proceeded against the respondent for default. On May 31, 1950 the respondent applied to the court requesting permission to adduce both oral and documentary evidence and also asked that the hearing be postponed to a later date. The court entertained this application and directed that the matter be listed for further hearing on or before June 23, 1950. If, as the respondent alleged, the dispute had been referred to arbitration, there would have been little reason for the respondent to present any evidence in the court proceedings. All that would have been required from the parties would have been a notice to the court stating that the suit should stand dismissed because the controversy was already being resolved by an arbitrator of the parties’ choosing. The respondent’s request made on May 31, 1950 therefore contradicts his claim that the appellant had been invited to arbitrate the controversy between the respondent and Ramzan Ali. Moreover, had the arbitration story been true, the respondent could have called Ramzan Ali as a witness to corroborate his version of events. When the respondent was questioned whether Ramzan Ali had placed his thumb impression on the blank stamp paper that was alleged to have been handed to the appellant for the purpose of preparing an agreement, the respondent replied that he did not know. He explained that his ignorance stemmed from the fact that he was not on speaking terms with Ramzan Ali at the relevant time. He further stated that on the day he gave evidence he remained out of touch with Ramzan Ali and therefore had not inquired whether Ramzan Ali had actually made the thumb impression on the stamp paper. However, under the pressure of cross‑examination the respondent eventually admitted that he had been in communication with Ramzan Ali since 1951, that Ramzan Ali was no longer his tenant but that Ramzan Ali’s brother was his tenant, and yet the respondent had never examined Ramzan Ali in court to establish any fact relating to the alleged arbitration. Consequently, the Court found that the solicitor‑General was correctly arguing that the evidence relevant to the issue clearly demonstrates that the claim of an arbitration agreement is false. If the arbitration claim is false, it follows that the two stamp papers purchased on 18 May were not bought because the appellant had told the respondent that previously used stamp papers were lost, but were instead purchased for a purpose other than the alleged arbitration. The record contains no suggestion that the stamp papers could have been obtained for any purpose other than the one described by the appellant. When the Court considered the overall features of the case as presented by the learned counsel for both sides, it observed that these features do not conflict with the appellant’s version of events but are inconsistent with the respondent’s narrative. The Court then turned to the evidence relied upon by the appellant, beginning with the testimony of the stamp‑vendor Harikant Jha, who stated that he had sold two stamps to the respondent on 18 May, one

The witness identified as Harikant Jha testified that he sold two stamp papers on 18 May, one for a price of one rupee eight annas and the other for twelve annas. He produced an endorsement indicating that these stamps had indeed been sold by him. Although the respondent did not sign either the register or the reverse side of the stamps, this omission did not affect the admission by the respondent that the stamps had been bought from the witness; consequently, the purchase of the stamps was no longer contested. Having already determined that the allegation concerning an arbitration agreement was false, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the term “Mahadnama,” which ordinarily denotes an agreement, referred to an arbitration pact or merely a sale contract. With the arbitration issue removed from consideration, the only logical purpose for which the stamps could have been acquired was to effect a sale agreement.

Ganesh Thakur, a resident of Mauza Riga located roughly six miles from Sitamarhi, attested to the execution of the disputed document. He stated that he habitually visited the shop owned by the appellant’s father to purchase Ayurvedic medicines and, on one occasion, bought a product called Raspipri there. It was undisputed that the appellant’s father operated a shop dealing in Ayurvedic medicines, and Thakur acknowledged that while Raspipri might also be available in ordinary grocery outlets, he preferred to obtain it from the larger, specialized store belonging to the appellant’s father. During his visit to the shop for the purchase, Thakur observed the execution of the document, remained present while it was being signed, attested to the document, completed his purchase of the medicine, and then left the premises. Thakur bears no familial relationship to the appellant and is not shown to be hostile toward the respondent; he is a neutral individual who was merely conducting ordinary business at the appellant’s father’s shop. He also referred to the document being written by Khakhan Singh and attested by two other witnesses. The High Court had criticized Thakur’s testimony on the ground that walking six miles to buy Raspipri on that particular day seemed unlikely and that he allegedly waited an implausible length of time for the document to be completed. The Court was not persuaded by this criticism. In assessing whether a witness’s evidence should be accepted, the Court must examine whether the witness is interested, whether his narrative is plausible, and whether it survived cross‑examination. A person such as Thakur, who claimed to purchase medicine from a large store and happened to be present when the document was executed, cannot be faulted for travelling the distance mentioned. Accordingly, the Court found no reason to deem Thakur’s testimony unreliable.

The subsequent attesting witness, identified as Jamuna Singh, resides in Mauza Manora and is employed as a teacher. He testified that he had previously delivered a book to the respondent for binding and, on the day in question, went to the respondent’s shop to retrieve the book. Finding the respondent absent, he waited in the shop for some time. Upon seeing the respondent later at the appellant’s shop, he proceeded there, observed the execution of the document, attested to it, and then returned to the respondent’s shop to collect his book before departing. Although his qualifications as a teacher were examined during cross‑examination, the Court, after considering his answers, found no justification for deeming him unreliable. The High Court had suggested that Singh might have been appointed as a teacher during the period when the appellant’s father served as Chairman of the Municipality, a suggestion Singh denied. Nonetheless, the High Court appeared to treat the suggestion as established and used it as a basis for distrusting his testimony. The present Court did not adopt that view.

Jamuna Singh, who resides at Mauza Manora and is employed as a teacher, gave a book to the respondent for the purpose of binding. On the same day he proceeded to the respondent’s shop to retrieve the book. Because the respondent was not present in the shop at that time, Jamuna Singh waited there for a short period. Later, when he saw the respondent inside the appellant’s shop, he walked over to that shop, observed the execution of the document, signed as an attesting witness, and then returned to the respondent’s shop to collect the book before leaving the premises. The witness was subsequently cross‑examined about his qualifications as a teacher. After reviewing the complete set of answers he gave during cross‑examination, the Court found no basis to deem his testimony unreliable. It was suggested to the witness that he might have been appointed as a teacher during the period when the appellant’s father held the office of Chairman of the Municipality; the witness expressly denied such an appointment. The High Court, however, appeared to accept that suggestion as proved and used it as a factor for disbelieving him. The Court emphasized that it would be unsafe to discard the evidence of a witness who otherwise appears reasonable and probable merely because unsubstantiated suggestions were made to him, especially when those suggestions have not been proved to be true.

The next witness whose evidence was considered is Bihari Lal Saraogi. He attested the document and stated that he went to attest it because the respondent asked him to do so. At the relevant time, Bihari Lal owned a pharmacy and stationery shop located to the west of the house that is the subject of the dispute. Since that period he has relocated to Sursand, but for about three years he carried on his business in Sitamarhi. According to his testimony, the respondent requested him to negotiate the sale of his house with the appellant’s father, and in the first stage of those negotiations he assisted the parties. When he was questioned whether he had paid any income‑tax or sales‑tax on the transactions conducted through his shop, his negative answer was later used by the opposite side in an attempt to show that he never resided in Sitamarhi. The Court observed that, like the two other attesting witnesses, Bihari Lal does not appear to be an interested witness and found no reason to disbelieve his testimony. The scribe, Khakhan Singh, also supported the appellant’s case by preparing the draft and by engrossing a fair copy on stamp paper. A criticism raised against him was that he could not recall who had drawn the four lines in the execution portion of the document above the entry indicating that the respondent had received Rs 16,000. The Court found that this criticism lacked substance. It examined the four lines itself and concluded that nothing unusual or suspicious about the lines could be inferred. The Court noted that differences in line drawing are matters of individual habit and do not, by themselves, cast doubt on the scribe’s evidence.

The Court observed that the manner in which lines are drawn on a document varies from person to person; some individuals draw lines, others do not, and the length of each line may differ. These differences are merely matters of personal habit and do not, in themselves, constitute a serious point of criticism against the scribe’s statement. Having examined the lines in relation to the thumb marks made by the respondent, the Court found nothing suspicious about them. The appellant had examined himself and had supported his own case. He was questioned about whether he and his father kept any account books, diaries, or other documentary evidence to show that he possessed Rs 10,000 in hand and that he had paid that amount to the respondent. The witness admitted that neither a diary nor an account book had been kept. Such answers were typical of most witnesses in this case when interrogated about their bookkeeping practices. Nevertheless, the Court held that the absence of an account book, or the failure to produce one if it existed, does not inevitably lead to the inference that the entire testimony of the witness is untrustworthy. In the present matter, the Court noted that the stamp paper bearing the respondent’s thumb marks had been purchased by the respondent himself, and that the respondent had been unable to explain why he had bought the stamp paper if it was not for the purpose of a sale agreement. The respondent advanced an alternative theory concerning arbitration, which the Court rejected. In light of this important circumstance, the oral evidence had to be assessed accordingly. After such consideration, the Court saw no reason for the High Court to interfere with the trial‑court’s conclusions that were based on the appellant’s oral evidence. The evidence of the young lawyer was then examined. The young lawyer testified that the draft was dictated by his father, that the scribe Khakhan Singh transcribed it, and that the draft had subsequently been produced. The draft corresponded with the suit agreement. It also appeared that the young lawyer had accompanied the appellant to the respondent’s house to serve a notice, a point that the High Court had severely criticized. The young lawyer also declared that he kept neither a diary nor an account book, a statement again subjected to adverse comment by the High Court. However, the crucial aspect of the young lawyer’s evidence was that he had no motive to swear a false oath, and his narrative concerning the preparation of the draft was deemed natural and probable. The High Court had even suggested that the young lawyer might have perjured himself because of the allure of the former Chairman of the Sitamarhi Municipality’s glamour and the prospect of future support, alleging that the lawyer had lost his sense of balance and had become overly eager to make statements for the appellant’s benefit.

In this case the Court examined the testimony of the young lawyer and concurred with the trial Court that his narrative was true and straightforward. Accordingly, the evidence presented by the appellant satisfactorily demonstrated that the respondent’s thumb‑marks were found on the purchased stamps, that the draft was prepared, that the scribe Khakhan Singh engrossed the draft on stamp paper, and that three witnesses attested to the document. Consequently, the Court saw no difficulty in accepting the trial Court’s finding that the suit agreement was genuine, valid, and supported by consideration. The Court further concluded that the High Court was not justified in overturning that finding on appeal.

The Court noted that it had not yet examined the expert evidence. The appellant’s expert, Mr Bennett, gave evidence that supported the appellant’s case, while the respondent’s expert, Mr Nasrat Hussain, gave evidence that supported the respondent’s case. Because handwriting analysis is opinion evidence and never conclusive, the Court held that the satisfactory testimony of the attesting witnesses, the scribe, and the appellant was sufficient to prove that the respondent had executed the document, and that expert opinion was not required to corroborate it. Nevertheless, the Court observed that Mr Bennett’s evidence favored the appellant, whereas Mr Nasrat Hussain’s evidence, although favouring the respondent, included a clear admission that the writing attributed to the respondent was a simulated forgery.

The disputed writing purported to acknowledge receipt of ten thousand rupees. The appellant claimed the writing was the respondent’s, while the respondent argued it was a forgery. Mr Nasrat Hussain described the writing as a simulated forgery and, when asked whether simulated forgery could be produced without first having a model of the respondent’s handwriting, he unequivocally answered that it was impossible to create a simulated forgery without such a model. This answer implied that the appellant or any alleged accomplice would have needed to possess a genuine sample of the respondent’s handwriting. The Court noted that no suggestion had ever been made that the appellant had any such sample, and therefore the expert’s evidence did not assist the respondent’s case. Before disposing of the appeal, the Court stated that it would make certain observations regarding the approach adopted by the High Court.

In reviewing the judgment of the trial court that had been the subject of an appeal, the Court noted that the High Court had issued strong criticisms against the trial judge. The High Court had described the trial court’s decision as not merely erroneous but perverse and founded on irrelevant considerations. It had further observed that the subordinate judge’s mind appeared to be already biased in favor of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had apparently calculated that the evidence he intended to present, together with the influence and support he could draw from external sources, would be enough to secure a favorable outcome. In addition, the High Court had taken issue with the trial court’s acceptance of the testimony of Jamans Singh, stating that the presumption made by the trial court—that a teacher, as a rule, is a respectable person—was not a legal assessment of the evidence but rather a convenience adopted by the court to favor the plaintiff. Consequently, by overturning the trial court’s decision, the High Court suggested that the trial judge had been swayed by extraneous factors and by undisclosed pressure applied in the appellant’s favour.

The Supreme Court, however, found that the High Court was not justified in casting such severe aspersions on the trial judge in this case. It observed that judicial experience demonstrates that deciding where the truth lies in disputes involving opposing claims is often difficult. Both parties present evidence to support their conflicting positions, and various circumstances are invoked in support of those positions. The judge’s duty, therefore, is to consider the evidence objectively and dispassionately, to evaluate it in light of probabilities, and to determine which version of the facts is more plausible. The impression that a judge forms regarding the character of the evidence ultimately shapes the conclusion reached. Yet it is unsafe to assume that all judges will react identically to the same evidence; evidence that appears trustworthy to one judge may not appear so to another. This explains why appellate courts sometimes reverse findings of fact recorded by trial courts based on differing appreciation of oral testimony. Recognizing that alternative interpretations are possible should encourage temperate language in judicial pronouncements. Moreover, judges should be mindful that they may err, and therefore should avoid using overly strong or intemperate criticism toward contrary views, which often stems from a misplaced sense of infallibility.

In the present matter, the High Court employed language that was excessively harsh and even went so far as to attribute a corrupt motive to the judge who had decided the suit in favour of the appellant. The Court expressed the view that such intemperate language may, in certain cases, reveal either a lack of experience in judicial matters or an absence of proper judicial poise and balance. After a careful examination of every piece of evidence that was highlighted by counsel on both sides, it was concluded that the criticisms levelled by the High Court against the impartiality and objectivity of the trial judge were entirely without justification. It was deeply regrettable that the High Court chose to indulge in such extravagant language in its commentary on the trial Court, particularly because the present appeal demonstrates that the trial Court’s decision was correct and the High Court’s view was erroneous. Even if the findings of the trial Court had not been upheld, the Court would still have disapproved of the unbalanced and sweeping criticism directed at the trial Court. Of course, should it be established that a trial Court’s decision stems from a corrupt motive, the High Court is obliged to condemn such conduct and to initiate the appropriate further measures. Nevertheless, the attribution of corrupt motives must not be made lightly, as the judge against whom these accusations are made possesses no legal remedy to defend his reputation. The same observation concerning extravagant criticism made by the High Court toward the trial judge must also be applied to similar harsh remarks made by that Court against several witnesses examined in the case. Judicial administration must be fearless; judges must be free to render conclusions on the evidence presented by witnesses without favour or fear, and the judicial power to appraise oral evidence is indeed very broad. Yet the breadth of that power inevitably imposes a healthy restraint on its exercise, requiring careful and balanced expression. For example, the criticism advanced by the High Court against the young lawyer, Mr Choudhary, was found to be wholly unwarranted. It is conceivable that, in a particular case, a fact‑finding court may determine that all witnesses supporting one party have conspired to give false testimony, and in such circumstances the court must unequivocally record that conclusion. However, before arriving at such a conclusion, all arguments for and against must be scrupulously examined, and a conscientious effort must always be made not to label evidence that appears unreasonable or improbable as false or perjurious. The Court noted that the judgment of the High Court displayed a tendency to adopt an overly severe stance toward evidence and witnesses, a tendency that further underscores the need for judicial restraint and balance.

In this case the Court observed that the High Court appeared to treat every witness whose evidence it was unwilling to accept as a perjurer and conspirator. The Court stated that such an approach could indicate a lack of experience or a deficiency of judicial poise and balance. It further noted that the judgment of the High Court displayed these serious infirmities. The Court recalled that counsel for the appellant, Mr Bastri, had declared at the very beginning of the appeal that his sole objective was to defend the respondent and not to challenge the judgment of the High Court that had been pronounced in his favour. After reviewing the material, the Court concluded that the appeal must be allowed. Accordingly, the decree that had been passed by the High Court was set aside. The decree originally passed by the trial Court was restored and the costs of the proceedings were awarded throughout. In summary, the appeal was allowed, the High Court’s decree was overturned, the trial Court’s decree reinstated, and costs were awarded in favour of the appellant.