Inder Lal vs Lal Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 280 of 1961

Decision Date: 8 February 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In the matter titled Inder Lal versus Lal Singh the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 8 February 1962. The decision was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and was pronounced by a bench consisting of Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo and Justice K. N. Wanchoo. The case is reported in 1962 AIR 1156 and in the Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports of 1962 at page 114. It has been cited in subsequent reports including RF 1965 SC 677, RF 1966 SC 773, RF 1967 SC 808, RF 1970 SC 1231, E 1970 SC 2097, RF 1971 SC 1262 and in the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, section 123(4), which deals with false statements concerning the personal character or conduct of a candidate.

The headnote records that the respondent identified as respondent 1 was declared elected to the Legislative Assembly, and his election was challenged on the ground that he had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The alleged corrupt practice involved making false statements about the personal character or conduct of respondent 2, a defeated candidate, in a pamphlet that was issued by an agent of respondent 1 with his consent. Among the statements, the pamphlet alleged falsely that respondent 2 was a “purchaser of the opponents of the Congress by means of money.” Respondent 1 argued that the statement related to the public or political character of respondent 2 and therefore did not fall within the ambit of section 123(4). The Court held that the statement indeed related to the personal character of respondent 2, constituting a corrupt practice under the said provision. The offending remark was interpreted as an allegation that respondent 2 had bought votes from opponents of the Congress by offering bribes. Since bribery itself is a corrupt practice and an allegation of bribery involves moral turpitude, the Court found that it unequivocally affected the private character of respondent 2.

The judgment proceeded under the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 280 of 1961, which was filed by special leave against the order dated 2 August 1960 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. E. Civil Miscellaneous (Election) Appeal No. 1 of 1960. Counsel for the appellant included G. S. Pathak, A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vohra, while G. C. Mathur represented respondent 2. The Court delivered its opinion on 8 February 1962, with Justice Gajendragadkar delivering the judgment. The appeal arose from an election petition filed by the appellant, who was an elector in the Chittorgarh constituency, challenging the validity of the election of respondent 1, Lal Singh, on several grounds. The election in question had been held in March 1957 for the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly. On 11 March 1957 respondent 1 was declared duly elected, having secured 7,272 votes, while respondent 2, Laxman Singh, son of Maharawal Sir Bijey Singh, obtained 7,261 votes, and respondent 3, Chhoga Lal, received 569 votes.

In the election for the Chittorgarh constituency, respondent No. 1, Lal Singh, received 7,272 votes, while respondent No. 2, Laxman Singh, son of Maharawal Sir Bijey Singh, secured 7,261 votes, and respondent No. 3, Chhoga Lal, obtained 569 votes. The appellant, an elector in the same constituency, alleged that the election of respondent No. 1 was invalid because respondent No. 1 had engaged in corrupt practices. According to the appellant, respondent No. 1 either personally procured, abetted, or attempted to procure invalid votes, or caused such procurement through his agents or other persons acting with his connivance. The appellant claimed that these improperly obtained votes had materially affected the election result. The appellant detailed the manner in which the invalid votes were said to have been secured. Additionally, the appellant asserted that respondent No. 1, his agents, and other persons acting with the consent of respondent No. 1 or his agents had published false statements of fact—identified as Exhibits 3 and 6—concerning the personal character or conduct of respondent No. 2. The appellant argued that these false statements were either known to be false or were published without belief in their truth and were likely to prejudice respondent No. 2’s prospects in the election. On the basis of these two grounds, the appellant sought a declaration that respondent No. 1’s election was void and that respondent No. 2 should be declared duly elected. Respondent No. 2 filed a written statement supporting the petition but did not appear before the Tribunal, while respondent No. 3 failed to appear at all. Respondent No. 1 denied all of the appellant’s allegations and contended that the election petition should be dismissed. The Election Tribunal, after considering the pleadings, framed twenty‑six issues for determination.

The Tribunal concluded that the appellant’s allegations concerning the receipt of invalid votes were not proven, and therefore the first ground for challenging respondent No. 1’s election could not succeed. Regarding the second ground, the Tribunal held that Exhibit 3 had been published by an agent of respondent No. 1 but not with his express consent, and it was not satisfied that Exhibit 6 had been published by respondent No. 1’s agent. Consequently, the Tribunal found that the second ground also failed, and it dismissed the election petition. The appellant appealed this decision to the Rajasthan High Court. The High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s finding on the first ground, agreeing that the claim of invalid votes was unsupported, although it expressed dissatisfaction with some of the Tribunal’s reasoning on that point. On the second ground, the High Court accepted the Tribunal’s view that Exhibit 3 had been published by an agent without respondent No. 1’s consent, but it reversed the Tribunal’s conclusion regarding Exhibit 6, holding that Exhibit 6 had indeed been published for the benefit of respondent No. 1 and that both pamphlets were issued with his consent, placing them outside the scope of section 100(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

In this appeal, the High Court expressed that although the reasons offered by the Tribunal to support some of its conclusions were not satisfactory, the Tribunal’s overall final conclusion remained correct and therefore did not require reversal. Consequently, both the Tribunal and the High Court recorded findings adverse to the appellant concerning the first part of his case. Regarding the appellant’s second contention, the High Court accepted the Tribunal’s finding that Exhibit 3 had been published, but it disagreed with the Tribunal on Exhibit 6. The High Court held that Exhibit 6 had indeed been published for the benefit of respondent No. 1 and, unlike the Tribunal, concluded that both pamphlets were published by the agent of respondent No. 1 with his consent, making the publications fall outside the scope of section 100(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Having determined that the two pamphlets were published with the consent of respondent No. 1, the High Court proceeded to examine whether the factual allegations contained in those pamphlets against respondent No. 2 were true or false. The Court found that the material allegations were false and were intended to prejudice the electoral prospects of respondent No. 2. However, the Court was not satisfied that the allegations related to the personal character or conduct of respondent No. 2, and therefore held that the appellant had not proved a corrupt practice against respondent No. 2 under section 123(4) of the Act. Although the High Court departed from the Tribunal on certain findings concerning the second ground, its ultimate conclusion mirrored that of the Tribunal, and the appellant’s appeal was dismissed. The appellant subsequently obtained special leave to approach this Court. The sole issue for consideration before this Court is whether the two pamphlets justify the appellant’s claim that respondent No. 1 committed a corrupt practice under section 153(4) of the Act. The question of whether respondent No. 1’s election was materially assisted by the receipt of invalid votes has already been resolved by a concurrent factual finding against the appellant, and the appellant is not permitted to contest that finding. Before addressing the narrow point raised under section 123(4), the Court finds it necessary to set out the material portion of the pamphlets on which the appellant bases his allegation of corrupt practice. The relevant portion of Exhibit 3, which is the subject of the appellant’s objection, reads

In the pamphlet produced by the appellant, a series of hostile descriptions of respondent No. 2 were set out. The pamphlet listed, in numbered form, the following accusations: enemy of democracy; agent of foreigners strangling the freedom of Bharat; supporter and collaborator of the conspiracy of a Pakistani attack on Bharat; bringer of the tyrannical rule of Rajas in Rajasthan; destroyer of Hindu‑Muslim unity by raising the slogan of Ram Rajya; purchaser of the opponents of the Congress by means of money. The pamphlet then continued with a paragraph that began, “Maharawal of Dangarpur, Shri Laxman Singh, who was defeated in the last election by thousands of votes, has come to mislead the people of Chittor, has come to push back the backward district of Chittor by one hundred years, has come to destroy the peace and tranquility of Chittor under cover of communal organisation, has come to provide means to the public to spend their hard‑earned money on drinking orgies, has come to intensify again the tyranny of Raja Maharajas in Rajasthan, has come to make a gift of Kashmir to the aggressor Pakistan, has come to enslave India again by collaborating with Pakistan and Pakistan’s friends. He is a friend of Raja Maharajas and an enemy of cultivators and labourers. He wants to grant land to Bhooswamis and thereby oust the cultivators and wants to establish once more his pageant by exploitation of the hard labour of cultivators.” The other pamphlet in this case contained substantially the same passage, and therefore it was not reproduced in full. The appellant argued that describing respondent No. 2 as the agent of foreigners who strangle the freedom of Bharat amounts to a false and adverse attack on his personal character. The same contention was advanced with respect to the description of respondent No. 2 as the supporter and collaborator of a Pakistani attack on Bharat, relying on the further statement that respondent No. 2 had come to make a gift of Kashmir to the aggressor Pakistan and to enslave India by collaborating with Pakistan and its friends. The appellant further maintained that labeling respondent No. 2 as the purchaser of the opponents of the Congress by means of money invoked the provisions of section 123(4). The appellant’s case rested primarily on these three allegations, and it was submitted that by making such statements the private character of respondent No. 2 had been falsely vilified, and that such vilification was reasonably calculated to prejudice his electoral prospects. On the other side, the amicus curiae who appeared at the Court’s request, on behalf of respondent No. 1, contended that although the three allegations were false, they could not be said to affect the private character of respondent No. 2. The amicus argued that, in applying section 123(4), a distinction must be drawn between the personal or private character or conduct of a candidate and his public or political character, and that the criticism leveled against respondent No. 2, however extravagant, unreasonable, and false, was directed at his public and political persona and therefore could not give rise to a charge under section 123(4).

In this case, the Court observed that although the statements in the pamphlet were extravagant, unreasonable and false, they constituted criticism directed at the respondent’s public and political character, and therefore Section 123(4) could not be applied. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to ascertain the proper scope and effect of Section 123(4). Section 123 deals with corrupt practices, and subsection (4) specifies one such corrupt practice. Subsection (4) reads: “The publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other person, of any statement of fact which is false, and which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate, or in relation to the candidature, or withdrawal, or retirement from contest, of any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate’s election.” From this language it follows that for a publication to fall within the provision it must be made by a candidate, the candidate’s agent, or any other person; the statement must be a false statement of fact which the publisher either believes to be false or does not believe to be true; the statement must relate to the personal character or conduct of the candidate, or to the candidate’s candidature, withdrawal or retirement; and the statement must be reasonably calculated to prejudice the candidate’s chances of election. The High Court held that all of these elements were satisfied except one. The High Court concluded that the statement in the pamphlet did not relate to the personal character or conduct of respondent No. 2. Counsel for the appellant argued that this conclusion was legally erroneous. The Court noted that the requirement that the false statement relate to the personal character of a candidate is intended to draw a distinction between a candidate’s private character and his public or political character. The provision therefore postulates that a false statement concerning a candidate’s public or political character does not amount to a corrupt practice, even if such a statement is likely to prejudice the candidate’s election prospects. This approach is based on the assumption that the electorate, being politically educated and mature, will not be misled by false criticisms aimed at a candidate’s public or political persona. The public and political character of a candidate is open to public scrutiny and criticism, and even if false statements are made about a candidate’s political views or public conduct, the electorate is presumed capable of judging the merits and not being deceived by such false allegations. The Court affirmed that this theory underlies the interpretation of Section 123(4).

The Court explained that false statements of fact that concern the public or political character of a candidate did not fall within the mischief contemplated by section 123(4). It held that for elections to be free, the electorate needed to be educated on political matters in a fearless manner, and therefore the Legislature deliberately left ample room for unrestricted and fearless criticism by candidates of the public and political character of their opponents. By contrast, the Court observed that the situation was markedly different with respect to the private or personal character of a candidate. It noted that circulation of false statements about a candidate’s private character in the period preceding an election could undermine the very freedom of the election, because the harmful effect created by such falsehoods could not be effectively remedied by timely denials. Consequently, the constituency required protection from the spread of false statements likely to influence voters. For this reason, the statute expressly classified the dissemination of false statements concerning a candidate’s private character as a corrupt practice, thereby making such dissemination itself a prohibited act.

The Court further observed that, although the statute intended to draw a broad distinction between public and political character on the one hand and private character on the other, a precise and sharp dividing line could not be drawn in practice. It explained that commentators sometimes described the distinction by referring to the “man beneath the politician,” suggesting that a factual statement that affected the individual behind the public figure touched private character, whereas a statement affecting only the politician’s public persona did not. The Court gave examples: a claim that a candidate was a cheat or a murderer plainly attacked the private character of the individual, and if proved false would unquestionably constitute a corrupt practice. Conversely, a false and vehement criticism of the economic policy or ideological stance of the party to which the candidate belonged, alleging that such policy would ruin the country, was deemed criticism of the candidate’s public character and thus fell outside the scope of the statute. However, the Court warned that many cases lay on the borderline where a false statement could affect both the politician and the private individual, creating difficulties in determining whether the statement amounted to a corrupt practice. It emphasized that such borderline situations required careful analysis to decide whether the falsehood pertained to private character, public character, or both.

In assessing whether the impugned false statement amounted to a corrupt practice, the Court recognised that borderline cases required a careful distinction between attacks on a candidate’s public character and attacks on his private character. For example, a claim that a candidate had used his public office to secure employment for his relatives could be framed as criticism of his public conduct, yet it could also be said to impinge on his private reputation. Consequently, the Court held that when applying section 123(4), it must draw a functional line to separate public‑character criticism from private‑character criticism, while remaining aware that certain false statements may affect both dimensions simultaneously.

Applying this principle to the matter before it, the Court found that the pamphlet alleged that respondent No 2 acted as a purchaser of votes for opponents of the Congress by means of money. The Court explained that, in plain language, the allegation asserted that respondent No 2 bought votes by offering bribes. Because bribery itself constituted a corrupt practice, the statement undeniably impugned the respondent’s private character. The Court noted that offering a bribe in an election involved moral turpitude and inevitably damaged the individual’s reputation in the eyes of the public. While the statement also suggested that the bribe was offered for electoral purposes, thereby casting aspersions on the respondent’s public character, the Court rejected the contention that the falsehood concerned only the public aspect. In view of the moral turpitude associated with bribery, the Court concluded that the statement inevitably harmed the respondent’s private character as well.

The Court observed, with disappointment, that the High Court had failed to address this specific statement. Instead, the High Court had dealt with the issue in very general terms, noting that the impugned statements referred to “the Maharawal” as one among a class of persons allegedly responsible for political mischiefs, and that a broader reading of the document suggested an attack on a larger organisation rather than on respondent No 2 individually. The Court agreed that, in determining whether the false statement in the pamphlet constituted a corrupt practice under section 123(4), a detailed examination of the particular allegation against respondent No 2 was essential, and that the High Court’s general observations were insufficient to resolve the question.

It was essential, in the Court’s view, to examine the pamphlet in its entirety before judging the impact of any single objectionable passage. Having read the whole document, the Court found no support for the High Court’s reasoning that the criticism was aimed at a class of people rather than at respondent No 2 personally. The High Court had overlooked the several specific statements on which the appellant based his argument, and this omission created a serious weakness in its final judgment. The Court considered that, had the High Court examined the allegation that respondent No 2 had bought opposition to the Congress with money, it would not have dismissed the appellant’s case by resorting to broad, general observations. Consequently, the Court was satisfied that the appellant correctly contended that the false factual statement identified by the Court amounted to a corrupt practice under section 123(4) of the Act. In this regard, the Court saw no need to decide whether the remaining impugned statements also fell within section 123(4). Accordingly, the Court reversed the High Court’s finding that the publication of the pamphlets did not constitute a corrupt practice under that provision.

The reversal meant that the election of respondent No 1 had to be declared invalid, because the proven corrupt practice clearly fell within section 191(b) and was outside the scope of section 100(2). This raised the further question of whether respondent No 2 could be declared to have been validly elected in the same contest. The Court noted that this issue must be resolved according to the provisions of section 101(b) of the Act, which provides that if a petition‑presenting party also claims that another candidate should be declared elected, and the Tribunal is of the opinion that, but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate through corrupt practices, the other candidate would have secured a majority of valid votes, then the Tribunal shall, after voiding the election of the returned candidate, declare the other candidate duly elected. The High Court had not addressed this question, and normally the matter would have been remanded for the High Court to consider the facts on their merits. However, the Court decided not to adopt that approach because it would serve no useful purpose to prolong the petition further, given that the contested election had taken place in 1957 and fresh elections were imminent.

The Court observed that fresh elections were imminent and were scheduled to take place in the current month. In view of this imminent electoral schedule, the Court said that it would be pointless to remit the matter to the lower tribunal for a determination on whether, based on the evidence presented, respondent No. 2 could be declared to have been validly elected. The Court explained that any decision on the validity of respondent No. 2’s election would become irrelevant because the election process was about to be renewed. Accordingly, the Court set aside the election of respondent No. 1 and allowed the appeal. The Court noted that respondent No. 1 had not appeared before it, and therefore there was no basis for ordering costs against that party. Consequently, the Court made no order as to costs. The final result was that the appeal was allowed and the election of respondent No. 1 was set aside. This disposition concluded the proceedings.