Hoshjar Singh vs Gurbachan Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 187 of 1959

Decision Date: 8 February 1962

Coram: S.K. Das, Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 8 February 1962. The case was styled Hoshjar Singh versus Gurbachan Singh. The judgment was authored by Justice S K Das, with Justices Raghubar Dayal and Subbarao also forming the bench. The petitioner was Hoshjar Singh and the respondent was Gurbachan Singh. The decision was reported in 1962 AIR 1089 and in the Supreme Court Reports Supplement (3) 127, and is referenced in citation E 1968 SC1348 (10). The principal issue concerned contempt of court arising from the alleged disobedience of a prohibitory order, particularly whether knowledge of the order obtained from sources other than official communication could satisfy the requirement of notice.

The appellants, one holding the position of Sub‑Divisional Officer and the other serving as Naib Tehsildar, were entrusted with the responsibility of allocating land to persons displaced by earlier events. The first respondent, Gurbachan Singh, forcibly occupied land that had been allotted to another individual referred to as B. On 9 May 1958 the first appellant issued an order directing that B and other similarly situated allottees should receive possession of the lands allotted to them on 20 May 1958. Subsequently, on 16 May 1958 the first respondent, together with others who faced possible dispossession, filed petitions before the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. These petitions obtained an interim stay of the delivery of possession effective until 19 May 1958, the date on which the petitions were to be presented before a Division Bench for admission.

On 19 May 1958 the Division Bench extended the operation of the stay order further, directing that it remain in force until 23 May 1958. The notice of this first stay order reached the appellants on the same day, 19 May 1958. However, the notice of the subsequent extension was not officially communicated to them until 21 May 1958. It was alleged that on 20 May 1938 the appellants, although they had been informed of the second stay order by certain interested persons and by the advocate representing one of the parties, nevertheless proceeded to dispossess the respondent in contravention of the Court’s order and handed possession of the contested land to B. Acting upon the respondent’s complaint, the High Court held that the appellants were guilty of contempt of court. Instead of committing them to prison for contempt, the Court issued a warning, reasoning that the appellants had honestly believed they were not bound to refrain from delivering possession in the absence of an official communication.

The appellants subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court by way of special leave. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justices Das and Subbarao, held that in a contempt proceeding arising from the disobedience of a prohibitory order—as opposed to an order that commands affirmative action—it is not necessary to demonstrate that the party against whom the order is made received formal service of the order. It is sufficient if it can be shown that the party had notice of the order from sources other than the Court, that is, notice “aliunde.” The Court referred to the decision in N Baksi v. O K (Thosh, A T R (19.) 7) Patn 528. The Court observed that while officials tasked with executing a legal order might, in certain circumstances, have valid reasons to doubt the authenticity of an order conveyed to them by interested parties, such doubt was not plausible in the present case. The Court concluded that the appellants had no reasonable justification for doubting the authenticity of an order communicated to them by an advocate. The Court further held that in a matter relating to contempt of court,

In this matter the Court observed that justification and apology cannot coexist, citing the decision in M.Y. Shareef v. The Hon’ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur [1955] 1 S.C.R. 757. The Court noted that even if the appellants honestly believed they were not required to deliver possession in the absence of an official communication, such belief did not constitute a defence to a charge of contempt of court; it could only be taken into account when determining the appropriate sentence. Referring to the observations of Justice Daval, the Court stated that contempt proceedings are of a criminal or quasi‑criminal character and therefore the allegation must be clearly specified before any action is taken. In the present case the respondent did not allege that he had been formally dispossessed, and consequently it could not be said that he had actually taken possession. Moreover, the Court held that the respondent could not be said to have appeared before the Court with clean hands. The High Court’s finding that the appellants delivered possession while honestly believing they were not bound to do so in the absence of an official communication was taken to mean that there was no defiance of the High Court’s order. Because the appellants did not recognize the existence of any prohibitory order, there could be no willful disobedience. The Court explained that it is not necessary for a party against whom a prohibitory order is directed to be formally served with the order, but the party must have notice of the order before it can be expected to comply. Such notice must come from a source connected with the court that issued the order; reliance on the alleged knowledge of the party, based solely on the credibility of witnesses produced by the party seeking relief, is insufficient. The Court referred to the authorities In re Bryant (L.R. (1987) 6 4 Ch.D. 98), Ex Parte Langly, Ex Parte Smith, In re Bishop (L.R. (1879) 13 Ch.D. 110) and The Seraglio (L.R. (1885) 10 P.D. 120) in support of this principle. The judgment proceeded under the criminal appellate jurisdiction concerning Criminal Appeal No. 187 of 1959, which was filed by special leave against the Punjab High Court order dated 18 August 1958 in Criminal Original No. 20 of 1958. Counsel for the appellants and for respondent No. 1 were instructed. The judgment of Justices Das and Subba Rao was delivered by Justice Das, while Justice Dayal delivered a separate opinion. The appeal challenged the High Court’s finding of contempt of court against the two appellants—identified as the Sub‑Divisional Officer, Sirsa, District Hisar, and the Naib Tehsildar, Sirsa, District Hisar—who were each ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 50 as costs to the respondent, Gurbachan Singh. The Court referred to the facts alleged against the appellants in the proceeding.

In this case the two officials who were the appellants were dealing with the allotment of land to a displaced person named Budh Singh in the village of Jagmalera, Tehsil Sirsa, District Hissar. The appellants explained that Budh Singh had been allotted a parcel of land, but that the respondent, Gurbachan Singh, had forcibly taken possession of that parcel even though he was not a legitimate allottee. Because the appellants were responsible, in their official capacities, for the allocation and administration of land for displaced persons, they were understandably eager to remove the unlawful occupier and to give possession of the allotted land to Budh Singh. Accordingly, on 9 May 1958 the first appellant, who was the Sub‑Divisional Officer, issued an order directing that Budh Singh and other similarly situated allottees should be granted possession of the lands allotted to them, and he fixed 20 May 1958 as the date on which possession would be delivered. On 16 May 1958 the respondent, Gurbachan Singh, together with several other persons who faced the same threat of dispossession, filed petitions before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the legality of the contemplated dispossession. Those petitions were presented to the learned Chief Justice on the same day, and the Chief Justice issued an order staying the delivery of possession until 19 May 1958, the date on which the petitions were to be listed before a Division Bench. On 19 May 1958 the Division Bench extended the operation of the stay order further, declaring that the stay would continue until 23 May 1958. The appellants did not dispute that the initial stay order, which prohibited delivery of possession up to 19 May 1958, was communicated to them on that date, when the notice from the High Court reached Sirsa. However, the record shows that the notice of the second order, which extended the stay of delivery of possession to 23 May 1958, was not officially communicated to the appellants until 21 May 1958. The respondent alleged that on the critical date of 20 May 1958 the two appellants had been informed, by certain interested persons, that the High Court had granted an extension of the stay order up to 23 May 1958. Despite receiving that information, the second appellant, acting in consultation with and under the instructions of the first appellant, proceeded to dispossess the respondent and handed possession of the land over to Budh Singh. In those circumstances the respondent contended that the two appellants had committed contempt of court by disobeying the High Court’s order staying delivery of possession until 23 May 1958. The respondent therefore filed an application before the High Court on 27 May 1958 seeking suitable action against the two appellants. The High Court issued notice of that application, conducted a hearing of the parties, and the judge then presiding, Falshaw, J., concluded that the two appellants were aware of the High Court’s order extending the stay and nevertheless disobeyed that order.

Having observed that the respondents were dispossessed and possession was handed over to Budh Singh, the learned judge found the two appellants guilty of contempt of court. Nevertheless, the judge expressed the view that the appellants honestly believed they were not bound to refrain from acting in the absence of an official communication from the High Court confirming the extension of the stay order. Accordingly, rather than committing the appellants to imprisonment for contempt, the judge issued only a warning and ordered the appellants to pay the costs incurred by the respondent.

The appellants contended that they were not guilty of contempt and advanced several points in support of that position. First, they argued that the High Court erred in concluding, on the basis of the material before it, that the appellants had been informed by interested parties that the stay order had been extended to 23 May 1958 in the respondent’s case. They maintained that on 20 May 1958 the appellants were unaware that the stay order in the writ petition filed by the respondent, Gurbachan Singh, had been extended, although they had received information in a separate matter involving Didar Singh and the same village that the stay order had been extended to that date. The appellants further submitted that, lacking positive evidence that they possessed knowledge of the extension of the stay order in the respondent’s specific case, the High Court was wrong to conclude that they wilfully disobeyed its order. To appreciate these submissions, additional facts were recorded. Paragraph 17 of the respondent’s application to the High Court alleged that at 6:30 a.m. on 20 May 1958 two persons, Bir Singh and Avtar Singh, went to the house of appellant No 2 and informed him that the High Court had extended the stay order, a statement said to be based on a telephone communication from an advocate. This allegation was supported by an affidavit filed by the respondent, which appellant No 2 denied in his counter‑affidavit. Paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of the respondent’s petition further stated that at about 7:40 a.m. on the same day a written application, drafted by advocate Ganga Bishan on behalf of Didar Singh, was presented to appellant No 2 indicating that the High Court had stayed delivery of possession until 23 May 1958; the application was delivered in the presence of two other individuals.

At the time the affidavit on behalf of Didar Singh was prepared, it was delivered to appellant No 2 at approximately 8.15 a.m. After receiving the affidavit, appellant No 2 travelled in a jeep to the residence of appellant No 1 for the purpose of consulting him. Appellant No 2 entered appellant No 1’s courtroom, observed him for a few minutes and then emerged, informing Advocate Ganga Bishan that the affidavit should be forwarded to appellant No 1. Consequently, a second application, also prepared for Didar Singh, was drafted and presented to appellant No 1 together with the previously made affidavit. Appellant No 1, however, did not issue any order on the application until about 10 a.m., when he entered an endorsement directing that the Tehsildar of Sirsa should take the appropriate action. When the application was subsequently taken to the Tehsildar, he noted that the Naib Tehsildar, namely appellant No 2, had already departed for the village to effect delivery of possession. In response, Avtar Singh, Bir Singh, Didar Singh and Mastan Singh proceeded to the village of Jagmalera, the site of the disputed lands, where they again encountered appellant No 2. The application that had been submitted to appellant No 1, together with his endorsement, was shown to appellant No 2, and it was alleged that appellant No 2 was also shown the precise wording of the High Court’s stay order, which had been conveyed to the party by a special messenger. Appellant No 2, however, asserted that he had received an order to dispossess the respondent and insisted on continuing with the dispossession. In his counter‑affidavit, appellant No 2 admitted that on 20 May 1958 an application was presented to him by Didar Singh at about 7.40 a.m., and that an affidavit supporting that application was also handed to him. He then made a clear statement that, upon receipt of these documents, he told Shri Didar Singh that he could not act on the application or suspend the dispossession proceedings unless he was shown the High Court’s stay order. Appellant No 2 explained his reluctance to act by referring to a long‑standing quarrel and enmity between the parties, which had resulted in several criminal cases. He contended that, given this background, it would not be safe to accept the factual statements contained in the application or the supporting affidavit at face value. He further admitted that he consulted appellant No 1, who similarly advised that it would be unsafe to rely on the statements made in the application or affidavit. Appellant No 2 also acknowledged that Advocate Ganga Bishan had presented the applications to him, and that the application filed by Ganga Bishan with appellant No 1 was returned with appellant No 1’s orders at about six p.m. on the same day, while appellant No 2 was returning from the village.

On the evening of May 20, 1958, at approximately six o’clock, appellant No 2 was travelling back from the village. He denied that anyone had shown him the precise wording of the High Court’s stay order, but he acknowledged that he had been instructed not to proceed with the delivery of possession because of the High Court’s intervention. Appellant No 1 made comparable admissions in his counter‑affidavit, stating that at around nine o’clock in the morning of the same day an application supported by an affidavit was presented to him on behalf of Didar Singh, after which he endorsed the application to the Tehsildar for the required action. The applications that were addressed to both appellant No 1 and appellant No 2 have not been produced for the record, and consequently their exact contents remain unknown. Nonetheless, the Court possessed affidavits filed on behalf of Didar Singh, Teja Singh, Ganga Bisban and Avtar Singh, and the learned counsel for the parties guided the Court through the material contained in those affidavits. The appellants argued that, although they were aware of an extension of the stay order in Didar Singh’s matter arising from the application and affidavit filed on his behalf, they were not aware that a similar extension had been granted by the High Court in the other pending cases. This contention was advanced before the Court with considerable force, and the Court now proceeded to examine it. It is noteworthy that this line of argument, which strikes at the very foundation of the dispute, had not been raised before the High Court. While it is not contested that disobedience of a judicial decree or order, other than a monetary direction, constitutes contempt of court and may be punished by attachment or committal, the appellants submitted that for such disobedience to be punishable as contempt, it must be willful; that is, the party against whom contempt proceedings are instituted must have known of the order beforehand. It appears surprising that, if the appellants’ position was that they were unaware of the High Court’s order dated May 19, 1958 in the respondent’s case, they did not articulate this point before the High Court. In his judgment, Justice Falshaw (as he then was) observed that it was not in dispute before him that on the morning of May 20, 1958 both appellants had been informed that the High Court had extended the stay order until May 23, 1958. This observation of the learned judge must refer to the respondent’s case under consideration. Apart from the fact that the appellants had not presented this argument in the High Court, the affidavits available to the Court lead to the reasonable inference that the appellants were indeed informed of the extension of the stay order in all four cases.

It was established that although the application and the affidavit were filed on behalf of Didar Singh, both of the appellants received information that the High Court had granted an extension of the stay order in all four of the cases involved. Both parties accepted that three separate suits required the delivery of possession of lands situated in the village of Jagmalera. The record further showed that on 9 May 1958 appellant No 1 issued an order directing that possession should be handed over to the allotted persons in each area and that any individuals occupying the land without authority should be removed. Subsequently, on 16 May 1958 three writ petitions were presented before the Chief Justice, who then made an interim stay order for a period of three days. On 19 May 1958 those writ petitions were placed before a Division Bench for consideration of admission, and that Bench extended the stay order to continue until 23 May 1958. These facts were expressly admitted by the parties. It was also undisputed that the respondent, Gurbachan Singh, did not appear before the appellants on 20 May 1958, a point that the learned counsel for the appellants had stressed.

The affidavits filed in the matter provided further clarification. In the affidavit of Teja Singh, it was stated that Harbans Singh Gujral, the advocate representing the petitioners in all of the cases, had telephoned him on 19 May 1958 to convey that the High Court had extended the stay order in every case up to 23 May 1958. Teja Singh further recounted that on 20 May 1958 he accompanied Didar Singh, Ganga Bishan, Mastan Singh and other individuals to the village, and that an application was then made to appellant No 2 indicating that the High Court had extended the stay. The affidavit of Ganga Bishan was described as particularly significant. He declared that on 20 May 1958 he drafted the application later submitted to appellant No 2, expressly stating that the stay order issued by the High Court concerned all of the Jagmalera cases. He added that appellant No 2 was informed that the stay of delivery of possession had been extended to 23 May 1958, but that appellant No 2 requested to see the High Court order. Consequently, an affidavit of Didar Singh confirming the extension of the stay to 23 May 1958 was filed. Ganga Bishan also affirmed that appellant No 1 received the same information regarding the extension. The affidavits filed on behalf of Didar Singh and Avtar Singh similarly reflected that the stay order had been extended in all matters. Considering the content of these affidavits, the Court found it difficult to accept the proposition that the appellants were aware of the stay order only in the case of Didar Singh and ignorant of it in the other proceedings.

In examining the counter‑affidavits filed on behalf of the appellants, the court observed that the appellants had asserted it was unsafe to rely on the applications and affidavits because of the long‑standing enmity between the parties. The counter‑affidavits did not contain any statement by the two appellants that they had learned of the stay order in only one of the cases and not in the others; indeed, no such specific claim appeared at any stage of the High Court proceedings. Consequently, the court concluded that the appellants were aware of the High Court’s stay order in all of the cases and rejected the proposition that their knowledge was limited to a single case. The court found it hard to accept the suggestion that Ganga Bishun might have failed to inform the appellants that the High Court had extended the stay order in all three village cases, especially since Bishun’s own affidavit declared that he had conveyed the extension to the appellants in each case and there was no counter‑affidavit disputing his statements. On that basis, the court overruled the first argument advanced by the appellants. The second argument presented by the appellants contended that, absent an official communication of the order, they were justified in ignoring information obtained from interested parties and their counsel. Their counsel further argued that, for liability of willful disobedience of a High Court order to arise, the order must be formally communicated or served on the appellants, and that without such service a contempt proceeding should fail. The court declined to accept this contention. Referring to the authority of Oswald, the court noted that a judgment or order should ordinarily be served personally on the party, except in certain circumstances such as prohibitive orders that are not yet drafted, orders requiring an undertaking by a specific date, orders directing interrogatories or discovery, orders for substituted service, or where the respondent evades service. Moreover, in cases of breach of a prohibitive order, it is not essential that the order be served on the party if it can be shown that the party had notice of the order by other means—such as a telegram, newspaper report, or similar communication—and understood that the order was intended to be enforced, or if the party consented to it.

In this case the Court noted that, as explained in Oswald’s Contempt of Court (third edition, pages 199 and 203), a prohibitory order does not have to be served on the party against whom it is granted if that party can be shown to have had notice of the order from some other source, such as a telegram, a newspaper report, or by being present in Court when the order was pronounced, or when the motion was made, even if the party left the Court before the order was finally pronounced. The order that arose in the present proceedings was a prohibitory order, and the appellants were aware that the High Court had prohibited delivery of possession until 23 May 1958. Consequently, the Court held that the appellants had an undisputed duty to obey that order. The Court rejected the contention that the appellants could ignore the order merely because it had not been formally communicated to them, emphasizing that the appellants were officers whose fundamental responsibility was to uphold the law, and that knowledge of a valid stay order imposed by the High Court required strict compliance.

The Court further observed that while there may be situations in which officials tasked with executing a legal order have legitimate reasons to doubt the authenticity of an order conveyed by interested parties, the present facts did not demonstrate any such reasonable doubt. The appellants knew that an interim stay order had been issued by the High Court on 16 May 1958 and that the order remained effective until 19 May 1958. After that date they were informed, not only by interested parties but also by an Advocate who was an officer of the Court—namely Ganga Bishan—acting on behalf of Didar Singh, that the High Court had extended the stay up to 23 May 1958. That information was supported by a formal application accompanied by an affidavit. Although the appellants argued that a background of enmity existed between the parties, the Court found that they offered no satisfactory reasons that would justify doubting the authenticity of the order communicated to them by the Advocate. It was further noted that the appellants had delivered possession in the respondent’s case but had refused to do so in Didar Singh’s case, demonstrating selective compliance. Taking all these circumstances into account, the Court concluded that, in the eyes of the law, the appellants willfully disobeyed the High Court’s prohibitory order, even if they honestly but mistakenly believed that acting on the information received from Ganga Bishan was unsafe. The learned Advocate for the appellants had cited several English and Indian decisions concerning mandatory orders, orders for payment of money, or orders that, under the Court’s rules, must be served in a particular manner; however, those citations were not deemed applicable to the present prohibitory order.

In discussing the authority cited by the appellants, the Court observed that the decisions in In re: Holt (an Infant) (1), Ex‑parte Lingley (2), In re: Tuck March v. Loosemore (3), Dwijendra Krishnan Datta v. Surendra Nath Nag Choudhury (4) and Gordon v. Gordon (5) each required that an order be properly served before a person could be charged with disobeying it. The Court held that those authorities did not apply to the present dispute because the order in question was a prohibitory order. It explained that, when a prohibitory order is involved, the law has firmly established that the order need not be served on the party against whom it is made, provided that the party is shown to have had notice of the order from another source. The distinction between prohibitory orders and affirmative orders was previously explained in N. Baksi v. O. K. Ghosh (6), and many decisions have supported the principle that service of a prohibitory order is not a prerequisite for instituting contempt proceedings. The Court declined to re‑examine those earlier cases and instead adopted, for the present case, the concise rule articulated by Oswald and quoted earlier in the judgment.

The Court then turned to the respondent’s submission recorded in paragraph 22 of his petition. The respondent claimed that although appellant No. 2 had reported that possession of the respondent’s land had been delivered, no actual dispossession could have occurred because a standing cotton crop covered the land and a large crowd of people was present there. The Court noted that the appellant’s argument was that, since, according to the respondent’s own statement, no real dispossession took place, the matter was not suitable for a contempt proceeding. The appellants further contended that contempt actions are extraordinary in nature and should be avoided where the alleged breach is slight, trifling, or does not cause substantial loss or prejudice to the complainant. They argued that the respondent’s admission of no actual dispossession removed any basis for proceeding against the appellants for contempt of court. In addition, the appellants pointed out that they had offered an apology should the High Court decide that they ought to have acted on the information supplied by Ganga Bishan. The Court observed that, in contempt matters, an apology does not constitute a justification, and both cannot coexist as a defence to a contempt charge.

In this case, the Court referred to the decision in M. Y. Shareef v. The Hon’ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur (1). Regarding the first argument presented by the appellants, the Court drew attention to the statements made by appellant number 2 in paragraph 21 of his affidavit, where he asserted that, concerning the respondent’s land, possession had been handed over to Budh Singh. The Court observed that this admission by appellant number 2 plainly demonstrated that the two appellants had taken the very action which the High Court had expressly prohibited by its order dated 19 May 1958. Consequently, the Court found it impossible to accept the appellants’ contention that there was no basis for instituting contempt proceedings against them, and this finding resolved all of the points raised on their behalf. Concerning the punishment imposed, the learned Judge had taken into account that the appellants, though erroneous, might have honestly believed that they were not required to refrain from acting until an official communication of the High Court’s order was received. The Court noted that such a belief did not constitute a defence to a charge of contempt, but it was a relevant consideration when determining the appropriate sentence. In the Court’s opinion, there were no grounds for interfering with the High Court’s order, and therefore the appeal failed and was dismissed. Raghubar Dayal, J., after reviewing the judgment of his learned brother S. K. Das, J., expressed regret that he could not hold that the appellants had committed contempt of court. He did not repeat the facts already set out in the majority judgment, but emphasized that a conviction for contempt could not rest on the High Court’s finding that the appellants delivered possession while believing they were not bound to refrain in the absence of official communication of the order. The Court explained that this finding indicated that the appellants acted not in defiance of the High Court’s stay but because, in their honest opinion, the original stay order—effective until 19 May 1958—had ceased to operate. When a party honestly believes that no stay order exists at the time of acting, such conduct cannot be described as willful disobedience of the High Court’s order extending the stay until 23 May 1958. The Court stressed that the issue of obedience or disobedience arises only after a party has knowledge of the order; if the party lacks such knowledge, the question does not arise. Furthermore, the Court observed that the allegations made in the petition filed by the first respondents in the High Court did not establish that the appellants delivered possession, an act which had been stayed up to 23 May 1958 by the order dated 19 May 1958. This conclusion was evident from the statements contained in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the petition.

In the present case the Court observed that appellant No 2 made an effort to begin the process of dispossessing the petitioner from the land situated at Jag Malera, but when he arrived at the site he discovered that a large gathering of people had assembled there. Fearing that the police force already present might be insufficient to maintain order should any disturbance arise, appellant No 2 withdrew from the spot and did not proceed with the dispossession. The Court further noted that on the same land the petitioner still had a standing cotton crop in several fields, and that because of the presence of the large crowd no formal dispossession proceedings could be initiated. Nevertheless respondent No 2 later produced a report claiming, contrary to the earlier facts, that the petitioner had actually been dispossessed of his land and that possession had been handed over to a person named Budh Singh at the spot. In other matters respondent No 2 reported that he was unable to deliver possession because a mob was present and because the police force accompanying him was too small to cope with the situation. From these statements the Court inferred that appellant No 2 had indeed attempted to start the dispossession, but had stopped and retreated because of an apprehension of breach of the peace, and subsequently fashioned a fictitious report asserting that the petitioner had been dispossessed and that Budh Singh had taken possession. The Court emphasized that actual delivery of possession could not have taken place while the cotton crop was still standing in the fields. Consequently, even the petition filed by the first respondent for contempt did not contain any allegation that the appellants had violated the stay order by handing over possession to Budh Singh. In the absence of such an allegation no contempt action could properly be taken against the appellants. The Court pointed out that contempt proceedings are either criminal or quasi‑criminal in nature and therefore require that the accusation made by the petitioner be precise and must clearly demonstrate that the opposite party, by a specific act, committed contempt of the Court. A conviction must rest upon facts alleged and proved by the petitioner; it may also rely on an unqualified admission by the alleged contemnor, but such admission must be considered in its entirety and not be dissected to isolate a incriminating fragment for the purpose of a conviction. Accordingly, the Court held that it was immaterial that appellant No 2, in his reply, asserted that actual possession of the land in question had been delivered to Budh Singh and that at that time no cotton crop was standing, thereby adopting a position contradictory to his earlier statements. The High Court had not arrived at any finding on this specific issue; it merely observed the matters as presented without reaching a definitive conclusion.

In this case the Court observed that the lower tribunal had misread the allegations set out in the petition. The petition asserted that the Naib Tehsildar had formally dispossessed the petitioner and had handed the land over to a person named Budh Singh. The respondent, however, never made any statement confirming that the Naib Tehsildar had formally dispossessed him or that the land had been conveyed to Budh Singh. The Court held that a clear finding on the disputed issue of whether actual possession had been delivered could not be made in summary contempt proceedings. If, in fact, possession had been handed to Budh Singh, there must have been a reason why the respondent chose not to admit that fact in his petition. One possible reason, the Court suggested, was that the respondent might wish to avoid confronting his own admission in any future dispute concerning possession between himself and Budh Singh. The Court noted that identical statements appeared in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the respondent’s affidavit. Although other explanations for the respondent’s refusal to admit delivery of possession might exist, the Court concluded that the respondent did not approach the Court with clean hands, and that the contempt application represented a wrongful exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the petition never alleged that the respondents had delivered possession. Moreover, the appellants had not been served with the High Court order extending the stay up to 23 May 1958 at the time the alleged delivery of possession might have occurred. A telegram sent by counsel for Gurbachan Singh from Chandigarh reached the first appellant, the Sub‑Divisional Officer, at 1:30 p.m. on 10 May 1958, and any order based on that telegram did not reach appellant No. 2 until 6 p.m., by which time, according to him, possession had already been delivered. The formal stay order from the High Court arrived considerably later. The Court further explained that while it may not be required to serve a prohibitive order on the party against whom it is granted, that party must have notice of the order before it can be expected to obey it; otherwise the party may be held in contempt for disobeying the order. The Court cited Oswald’s commentary, which states that proof of notice by telegram, newspaper report, or any other means suffices for a prohibitive order. However, the Court observed that later passages of Oswald’s text appear to suggest that any form of notice, especially by telegram or newspaper, is sufficient, a proposition that is not supported by the case law that Oswald relied upon.

In the authorities cited, notice of a prohibitive order was given to the affected party either through the Court’s established procedures or by a solicitor acting on behalf of the Court. In the case reported as In re Bryant, the parties were informed by the solicitor representing the judgment‑debtor that the debtor had filed a liquidation petition in the London Bankruptcy Court and that an application would be presented at the next Court sitting to restrain further execution proceedings. The auctioneer involved received a telegram from Bryant’s solicitors which identified the parties to the proceeding and stated that an injunction staying the sale and any further actions had been granted that morning and that the order would be served as soon as practicable. Despite receiving this communication, the auctioneer nevertheless proceeded with the sale. Under those circumstances the parties were held to have disobeyed the Court’s order and were consequently found to be in contempt. The solicitor who conveyed the notice was an officer of the Court, and the judgment emphasizes that this case does not constitute authority for the proposition that information conveyed to the party concerned by telegram from a person who is not an officer of the Court satisfies the requirement of notice of a prohibitive order. The judgment further discusses the decisions in Ex parte Langley, Ex parte Smith and In re Bishop. In those matters Bishop had filed a liquidation petition in the London Bankruptcy Court on 6 August 1879, and on the same day the Court issued an order restraining, until 8 September, any further proceedings in several actions that had been commenced against the debtor, including a specific injunction restraining the Sheriff of Kent, his officers and servants, from taking any additional steps in an action brought by Messrs. Wade and Thurston. The Sheriff had scheduled the sale of the debtor’s attached furniture for 6 August, having previously adjourned it from 5 August to give the debtor an opportunity to settle the debt. Smith, the Sheriff’s officer, was placed in charge of conducting the sale, while his assistant Emmerson and the auctioneer Langley were to carry out the actual auction. Emmerson received explicit directions that the sale should commence at eleven o’clock and not a moment later. On his own initiative Langley postponed the start to twelve o’clock, citing a shortage of persons present, and thereby assumed personal responsibility for the delay. During that interval Langley was sent a telegram by Matthews, the manager of the hotel where the debtor operated as a licensed victualer, which read: “Smith gone to Canterbury. You had better stop Bale on your own account, as I know it is all right.” In addition, the debtor’s son and another individual informed the auctioneer, between eleven and twelve o’clock, that the debtor would arrive by the midday train from London with funds to satisfy the execution debt. Consequently the sale was again deferred, this time to one o’clock, when it finally began. After a few lots had been sold, Emmerson received a

In the course of the proceedings a telegram was produced that claimed to have been sent by Learyod and Co., Solicitors, London, to the sheriff’s officer who was in possession of the property. The telegram read: “Take notice, the London Court of Bankruptcy has made an order restraining you from selling or taking any further proceedings in the action against Bishop.” This telegram was shown to the auctioneer, Langley, who considered it to be a trick devised by the debtor, but he nonetheless decided to halt the sale temporarily until he received further instructions from the sheriff’s officer, Smith. The sheriff’s officer’s assistant, Emmerson, transmitted a telegram to Smith stating: “Langley just received telegram to stop sale. Shall we proceed? People are waiting your reply.” Smith replied that, unless the telegram to Langley expressly stated that the defendant had filed a petition or that money had been paid, the sale should proceed at once. Following Smith’s instruction, the sale continued. Both Langley and Smith were subsequently found guilty of contempt by the Chief Justice, Bacon, but the appellate court set aside those findings and acquitted them. Justice James, in his judgment at page one hundred sixteen, observed that the sheriff’s officer did not appear to be a party to the alleged contempt because the mere receipt of the telegram was insufficient to demonstrate his participation in any contemptuous act. At page one hundred seventeen, Justice James turned to the conduct of the auctioneer. He remarked that the auctioneer might have taken steps—though he could not specify what those steps should have been—to verify whether a court order truly existed. While some auctioneers might have made such inquiries, the auctioneer had instead sworn, without being cross‑examined, that no proceedings had been instituted in the Bankruptcy Court and that no order had been issued. Justice James noted that a person in the auctioneer’s position, and likewise a sheriff’s officer, faces considerable difficulty when a telegram of this nature arrives, especially when the sender is unknown and could be the debtor, a hotel manager named Matthews, or any other individual acting on the debtor’s behalf under the name of Messrs Learoyd. He clarified that he was not denying that a telegram could serve as notice of a court order, but he emphasized that it is difficult to hold someone in contempt when the individual, under circumstances that lend credence to his belief, may reasonably think that no such order exists and therefore has no suspicion that he is contravening a court directive by proceeding with the sale. Justice Thesinger, at page one hundred nineteen, stated that he did not dissent from the proposition articulated by the lower court regarding the circumstances in which a telegram may constitute sufficient notice for contempt.

The Court observed that, as previously laid down by Bacon, C.J. in the present case and also in In re Bryant, a telegram can, under certain circumstances, serve as a valid notice of a judicial order. When such a telegram constitutes proper notice, a person who disregards it and acts contrary to the order may be held liable for contempt of Court. However, the Court emphasized that in each case the existence of such notice must be determined according to the specific facts. It must be shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the individual charged with contempt actually received factual notice of the order. In matters affecting personal liberty, the burden of proof rests on those who assert that notice was given, and they must satisfy this burden to the highest standard.

The Court noted that the accused had positively sworn that, considering the events that preceded the telegram, he honestly believed that he was not bound to act on the telegram he received and that no proceeding existed which would justify halting the sale. The accused had not been cross‑examined, and no evidence was presented to disprove his affidavit. In these circumstances, the Court found the observations of Lord Eldon in Kimpton v. Eve to be pertinent and material, and it held that any doubt should be resolved in favour of the person accused of contempt. Further, James L. J. explained the proper method for communicating injunction orders. He suggested that when parties obtain an injunction, they should instruct their solicitor to send the telegram not to the sheriff’s officer but to a solicitor acting as an agent at the relevant place, who would then serve notice of the order. This approach would place the responsibility for compliance on the officer of the Court who receives the notice.

The Court observed that this case illustrates the difficulties faced by parties against whom a prohibitive order is made when they are informed only by a telegram, especially when the telegram originates from a solicitor of the Court. The difficulties would be greater if the telegram came from someone who was not a solicitor and therefore not an officer of the Court. The Court cited the example of The Seraglio, where notice of a warrant was sent by telegram from the marshal to the customs officer at Plymouth, who then went aboard the vessel to inform those in charge. The Court highlighted that such mode of communication raises serious concerns about the adequacy of notice and the proper attribution of responsibility for compliance with judicial orders.

In the case involving the ship Seraglio, the master sailed from Plymouth after receiving an order from the owner, even though the custom‑house officer was on board. The warrant relating to that voyage was later served upon the master. Sir James Hannon, observing the matter on page 121, explained that a litigant may not disregard a telegraphic notice issued by an officer of the Court. None of the authorities cited in the judgment reported a situation in which a party learned of an injunction through a source not connected with the Court. The Court was reluctant to extend the practice of finding a person in contempt when that person had not been formally served with the order, especially where the alleged knowledge of the order depended on the credibility of witnesses presented by a party seeking relief. Accordingly, the Court held that a conviction for contempt must rest on incontrovertible proof that the alleged contemnor actually knew of the order that he is alleged to have disobeyed. To support the proposition that knowledge could be established by newspaper reports or other indirect means, Oswald referred to Daniell’s Chancery Practice, volume 1, edition 7, page 1368; that edition is not available, but the eighth edition, volume II, page 1413, states the practice in urgent cases: the party enjoined must be served personally with a written notice that an injunction has been granted, or a transcript of the minutes signed by the Registrar must be delivered together with the original transcript. Either the personal notice or the copy of the minutes is sufficient to render the defendant guilty of contempt if he contravenes the injunction. No authority was found indicating that knowledge obtained through a newspaper report, or any source other than the Court, is sufficient for contempt proceedings. At page 1419 the same source lists additional ways by which the party could be informed of the injunction, but these are essentially the methods summarized in Oswald’s note.

Applying these principles to the present appeal, the Court was not convinced that the appellants had been properly informed that the High Court had issued an order staying the delivery of possession in the writ petition filed by respondent Gurbachan Singh. The communication alleged to have been made to the appellants consisted of applications and an affidavit presented by Didar Singh on 20 May 1958, together with a chit purportedly sent by an advocate of the High Court regarding the injunction. The Court noted that these documents do not demonstrate that the appellants were aware that the stay order extended to all three related proceedings – the writ applications of Gurbachan Singh, Didar Singh, and a third petitioner. None of the affidavits expressly state that the High Court had stayed delivery of possession in each of the three cases, and it is not clear from the chit what its contents were. Consequently, the Court found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the appellants possessed the requisite knowledge of the High Court’s stay order, and therefore the basis for a contempt finding was lacking.

In this matter, the Court observed that the communication allegedly received from the advocate of the High Court concerning the injunction order was not adequately substantiated. Didur Singh had filed an additional writ petition challenging a threatened dispossession by appellant No. 1 through appellant No. 2. A further writ petition was said to have been filed by another individual seeking comparable relief. The High Court examined each of these petitions separately and issued distinct stay orders in respect of each case. The record contained five affidavits, but, considering their content, the Court found that they did not demonstrate that the appellants were informed, through those affidavits, that the High Court had extended the stay orders to all three matters – namely the writ applications of Gurbachan Singh, Didur Singh and the third petitioner. None of the affidavits expressly stated that the applications and affidavits presented to the appellants indicated a stay of delivery of possession in all three cases. Moreover, neither Didur Singh nor Mastan Singh disclosed the precise wording of the chit allegedly sent by the High Court advocate, nor clarified whether that chit referred solely to the order in Didur Singh’s case or to the orders in all the cases.

The Court noted that Didur Singh claimed to have obtained a receipt for the delivery of the application and affidavit to appellant No. 2. After consulting the prosecuting inspector, appellant No. 2 proceeded to appellant No. 1 for advice and was instructed to return the application to Didur Singh if a receipt was insisted upon. Consequently, the application and affidavit were returned to a person identified as Ganga Bishan. The chit purportedly sent by the High Court’s advocate was never produced. The application that had been presented to appellant No. 2 in the village and later returned by him to the Sub‑Divisional Officer’s Court—presumably now in the possession of Didur Singh—had not been filed and therefore could not reveal its contents. The Court held that such a document would have been the most reliable evidence of what had been communicated to appellants No. 1 and No. 2. Ganga Bishan’s assertion that he had drafted an application addressed to appellant No. 2 indicating that the stay order issued by the High Court in the Jag Malera Namdhari cases had been extended was not, in the Court’s view, the strongest proof of what the application (likely a fair copy) actually contained, especially since the original application remained with Didur Singh. Additionally, the application and affidavit submitted to the Sub‑Divisional Officer were in the State’s possession, yet the respondent made no effort to summon these documents or to produce certified copies in the present proceedings. In the absence of the best evidence of the documents, the Court was not prepared to conclude that Didur Singh’s application and affidavit necessarily referred to all three cases. Ordinarily, the applicant would have had no reason to invoke the stay orders in the other matters or to request a stay of delivery of possession across all cases; his petition should have been confined to the relief sought in his own case.

In this matter the Court observed that the content of the application and the accompanying affidavit could not be said to rest on the personal knowledge of the applicant, Didar Singh. The Court noted that Didur Singh himself had not participated in any telephone conversation with the counsel stationed at Chandigarh; the telephonic exchange mentioned in the records was in fact between Teja Singh and that counsel. The second appellant, whose statement the Court found no reason to doubt, explained that, considering the circumstances surrounding the possession of the land, it would not have been prudent or safe for him to accept the factual assertions contained in the application and affidavit at face value. The Court further examined the role of the advocate who was present on the occasions when the application and affidavit were submitted to appellants one and two. All affidavits referred to the advocate’s presence, yet only paragraph five of Didur Singh’s affidavit specifically recorded that the advocate presented the documents to the Sub‑Divisional Officer. The advocate himself made no such claim, and nowhere in the record was it indicated that the advocate had been retained as counsel for Didur Singh. The Court found it unusual that, in the presence of a duly appointed advocate, the applicant would present applications and affidavits personally rather than through counsel. Consequently, based on the statements and the affidavits, the Court was not prepared to conclude that the advocate was the duly appointed legal representative of Didur Singh. It was possible that the advocate was merely accompanying Didur Singh out of a personal interest in the matter.

The Court also considered the effect of a request made by the advocate to the Sub‑Divisional Officer for the issuance of the necessary orders on the basis of Didur Singh’s application, as set out in paragraph three of the advocate’s own affidavit. The Court held that such a request could not be taken as proof that Didur Singh was professionally represented, because similar petitions had been made by other individuals who were also present with Didur Singh at the Sub‑Divisional Officer’s court. Accordingly, the Sub‑Divisional Officer could not treat the advocate’s request as a factual statement concerning the extension of the High Court stay order up to 23 May 1958. Moreover, the advocate did not assert that he had informed the court that the High Court had extended the duration of the stay order, nor did he claim to have asked the Sub‑Divisional Officer—who also functioned as the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate—to stay the delivery of possession in light of Didur Singh’s application. The advocate’s affidavit merely recorded that “several requests were made to the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate by us that necessary orders on the application presented to him be made and the Managing Officer be called back.” Even if the advocate had stated that the High Court had extended the order, his statement would have lacked evidentiary value because he could not speak of the order on the basis of personal knowledge or any communication from the High Court’s counsel. The advocate’s affidavit did not indicate that he was present when the order was passed, nor that he had received any communication from the High Court advocate. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the advocate’s mere presence alongside Didur Singh and other parties did not lend greater credibility to the assertions made in the application and the affidavit. Public officers, the Court held, could not be faulted for refusing to accept at face value the contents of deliberately prepared applications and affidavits that were not supported by independent proof.

The affidavit did not state that the deponent had been present when the High Court order was passed, nor did it indicate that he had received any communication from the Advocate of the High Court. Consequently, the Court formed the view that his mere presence alongside Didar Singh and other individuals did not lend additional credibility to the correctness of the statements contained in the application and the accompanying affidavit. The Court further observed that public officers cannot be faulted for refusing to accept at face value the contents of deliberately prepared applications and affidavits. It had already been noted that the petition for contempt proceedings against the appellants omitted a crucial basic fact, and that the statements were framed in a manner that could initially give the impression that possession was delivered in defiance of the High Court order. The omission of that essential fact, according to the Court, undermined the foundation of the contempt petition and created a misleading narrative. Accordingly, the Court held that it was not established that the respondents had relied on the statements in the application and affidavit maliciously, for the purpose of delivering possession contrary to the High Court orders. The record showed that on May 16, orders of the High Court were obtained to serve the stay order upon the appellants through the petitioner‑respondent, but no similar order was secured for serving the order dated May 19. This failure to obtain the May 19 order left a gap in the procedural safeguards that were intended to prevent unlawful possession delivery. Given the urgency of the matter, the respondent and others who had obtained an extension of the stay orders on the 19th could and should have secured comparable High Court orders for serving the new order. Had that precaution been taken on May 19, 1958, the subsequent events at the spot and thereafter probably would not have occurred. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the appellants had not committed contempt of court and accordingly allowed their appeal. In accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal was dismissed.