Gurcharan Singh vs State of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 1962

Decision Date: 10 August, 1962

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Gurcharan Singh versus State of Punjab, the judgment was delivered on 10 August 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, with Justices K.C. Das Gupta and J.R. Mudholkar forming the bench. The case is reported in 1963 AIR 340, 1963 SCR (1) 236, and is also cited in RF 1965 SC 83 (7), E&D 1965 SC 87 (2, 9, 10) and MV 1982 SC 1325 (69). The petitioner, Gurcharan Singh, challenged the conviction of the respondents, the State of Punjab. The headnote records that the two appellants, designated G and S, together with three co‑accused B, D and A, were tried for the murder of four individuals by shooting. Two spent cartridges were recovered at the scene; G produced a firearm on the day of the incident, while D produced another firearm a week later. Both firearms and the cartridges were sent to a ballistic expert, but neither the expert nor his report was produced before the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge convicted G, S, B and D of murder and acquitted A. In a separate proceeding before the same judge, G was tried under section 19(f) of the Arms Act for possession of an unlicensed gun that he had surrendered; he was acquitted of that charge. On appeal against the murder convictions, the High Court affirmed the death sentences against G and S and acquitted B and D. The appellants raised three main points: (i) that G’s acquittal under the Arms Act meant the allegation of recovering his gun in the murder case could not be sustained; (ii) that the failure to produce the ballistic expert and his report created a serious infirmity in the prosecution’s case; and (iii) that the High Court had failed to consider these and other points raised before it.

The Supreme Court held that the murder convictions were not vitiated by any infirmity. It observed that the acquittal of G under section 19(f) of the Arms Act did not affect his conviction for murder. The Court explained that, had the acquittal under the Arms Act been pronounced before the murder judgment, the prosecution could not have argued that G was in illegal possession of the firearm. However, both judgments were pronounced on the same day, and there was no evidence that the Arms Act judgment preceded the murder judgment; in fact, indications suggested it was delivered after the murder judgment. The evidence clearly established that G had produced the gun. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 415, noting that there is no inflexible rule requiring expert ballistic evidence in every firearm‑related murder case. When direct evidence is satisfactory, the prosecution may succeed without expert testimony. In the present case, there was no necessity to examine a ballistic expert because G had fired twice and the injuries could have been caused by the gun in his possession. D had retained his gun for a week before surrendering it, making it unlikely that he had removed any usage traces. The report of the ballistic examiner, which the Supreme Court later ordered to be produced, did not assist the defence, and the failure to produce it at trial did not allow any inference against the prosecution. The Court also cited Mohinder Singh v. The State, [1950] S.C.R. 82 1, in support of its reasoning.

The Court observed that when the direct evidence concerning the cause of injuries is unsatisfactory, impartial, or when the injuries are alleged to have been inflicted by a firearm that appears to have been caused by a rifle, the inconsistency may be remedied by corroborating the oral testimony with the analysis of a ballistic expert. In the present matter, however, the Court held that there was no necessity to call a ballistic specialist because the accused Gurcharan Singh had discharged the weapon twice and there was no material to suggest that the injuries could not have been produced by the gun that was in his possession. The Court further noted that the individual identified as D had retained the firearm for a period of one week before relinquishing it, making it improbable that D had failed to leave any trace of its use. The report of the ballistic examiner, which the Supreme Court had ordered to be produced, was found not to assist the defence, and the Court indicated that no adverse inference could be drawn against the prosecution from the examiner’s failure to present the report at the trial. The Court referred to the earlier authority of Mohinder Singh v. The State, [1950] S.C.R. 82 1, in support of this position. In the context of confirmation proceedings, the Court emphasized that the High Court must examine the evidence meticulously and articulate its conclusions only after addressing every point raised by the defence. While the Supreme Court generally refrains from unsettling the factual findings of the High Court in criminal appeals, it found that certain reasons given by the High Court were erroneous and that some arguments advanced by the defence had not been duly considered, thereby necessitating a fresh appraisal of the evidence by the Supreme Court.

The appeal, recorded as Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 1962, was filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 21 February 1962 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1231 of 1961 and Murder Reference No. 98 of 1961. Counsel for the appellants comprised senior advocates, while counsel for the respondent represented the State. The judgment was delivered on 10 August 1962 by Justice Gajendragadkar. The factual background disclosed that the two appellants, Gurcharan Singh and Surjit Singh, together with three co‑accused—Baland Singh, Daljit Singh and Ajit Singh—were tried before the Second Additional Sessions Judge at Ferozepore for offences under Section 148 and Sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution, on or about 18 May 1961 the five individuals formed an unlawful assembly at the village of Jhote with the common intention of killing Arjan Singh, Sukhjit Singh, Gurdial Singh and Piara Singh alias Balo. It was alleged that the assembly was armed with deadly weapons, thereby constituting rioting under Section 148. The prosecution further contended that, at the same time and place, the members of the unlawful assembly pursued their common object, resulting in the murder of Gurdial Singh by Gurcharan Singh and the murder of Arjan Singh and Piara Singh by Surjit Singh, thereby attracting charges under Sections 302 and 149 IPC.

The trial judge recorded that the prosecution had alleged that the five accused – Gurcharan Singh, Surjit Singh, Baland Singh, Daljit Singh and Ajit Singh – had acted together in an unlawful assembly with the common object of killing Arjan Singh, Sukhjit Singh, Gurdial Singh and Piara Singh. Accordingly, each of them was charged under sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The judge found that the evidence against Daljit Singh did not satisfy the requisite standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; consequently, he concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the offence under section 148 and that the charge under section 149 could not be sustained. Regarding the remaining four accused, the judge held that they were guilty of murder on the basis of section 302 read with section 34 of the Code. On that finding, he sentenced Gurcharan Singh, Baland Singh and Surjit Singh to death and ordered that Ajit Singh be remanded to undergo imprisonment for life. The death sentences were forwarded to the Punjab High Court for confirmation, and all four convicted men filed appeals challenging both their convictions and the sentences imposed. The High Court, hearing the appeals together, concluded that the charge of murder under section 302 read with section 34 had not been proved against Baland Singh and Ajit Singh; therefore, those two were acquitted. By contrast, the court affirmed the conviction and death sentences of the appellants Gurcharan Singh and Surjit Singh. The two appellants then sought special leave to approach this Court, challenging the High Court’s order.

The factual backdrop to the criminal proceedings concerned events that occurred on 18 May 1961, resulting in the deaths of four individuals – Arjan Singh, Sukhjit Singh, Gurdial Singh and Piara Singh. According to the prosecution, at approximately 6:30 a.m. on that day, Gurcharan Singh was on his way to the residence of his friend Ajit Singh. Gurcharan Singh, Surjit Singh and Daljit Singh were the sons of Baland Singh. While proceeding to Ajit Singh’s house, Gurcharan Singh was required to pass by the dwelling of Saudagar Singh. Saudagar Singh objected to Gurcharan Singh’s passage, which sparked an altercation. In that confrontation, Saudagar Singh together with his two sons, Kulwant Singh and Darshan Singh, inflicted injuries upon both Gurcharan Singh and Ajit Singh, who arrived at the scene. Following the violence, Gurcharan Singh and Ajit Singh fled the locality. This incident constituted the first episode of that morning. Roughly half an hour later, a second episode unfolded when the five accused reconvened with the intention of taking revenge for the injuries they had suffered. Gurcharan Singh and Daljit Singh armed themselves with large local weapons known as gandasas; Surjit Singh carried a firearm for which his brother Daljit possessed a licence; Ajit Singh bore a traditional weapon referred to as a ‘dang’; and Baland Singh, the father of the accused, led the group although he himself was unarmed. This series of events set the stage for the subsequent murders for which the appellants were tried.

According to the evidence, the confrontation took place near the house of Jarnail Singh where Arjan Singh, fearing the men who were approaching, kept a licensed firearm with him. When Arjan Singh was seen, Baland Singh instructed his sons and Ajit Singh to attack him, and the group proceeded to assault Arjan Singh. During the assault a blow from a gandasa struck Arjan Singh’s forearm, causing him to lose his grip on the gun, which then fell to the ground. Gurcharan Singh immediately picked up the gun. After the blow, Arjan Singh pleaded with his assailants not to continue beating him and offered to go to the Gurdwara and take an oath that the accusation against him was false. The account suggests that Baland Singh accepted this offer and persuaded his sons and their associate to cease harassing Arjan Singh. This episode was identified as the second incident arising from the earlier clash and formed the prelude to the subsequent murders of four victims.

The testimony further states that while Arjan Singh was making his appeal and the attack had temporarily stopped, his son Gurdev Singh emerged from the Gurdwara, saw his father surrounded by a hostile crowd, and hurried to his home to summon his brothers for assistance. As Arjan Singh was returning home, he encountered his sons Gurdev Singh, Gurdial Singh and Gurcharan Singh, who were armed and moving toward the place where their father had been encircled. At the same time Rekha Ram arrived at the spot, followed by his brother Piara, and both Sukhjit Singh and Jagjit Singh also came on the scene. Arjan Singh addressed all of them, ordering them to retreat and assuring them that his promise to take an oath at the Gurdwara had calmed his opponents and that he was no longer in danger. Consequently, those who had come to aid him withdrew.

When the five accused observed Arjan Singh’s sons approaching, Baland Singh became enraged, renewed his exhortation to his companions, and directed them to finish their enemies. Shortly thereafter Gurcharan Singh discharged a shot from the gun, striking Gurdial Singh on the forehead; the wound proved fatal and Gurdial Singh fell dead at the spot. Surjit Singh then fired two successive shots that hit Arjan Singh, resulting in his death. Following this, Gurcharan Singh fired another round that struck Sukhjit Singh, leaving him seriously injured. Surjit Singh fired an additional shot that hit Piara, who also died on the spot. After these shootings, all five accused shouted “lalkaras” and verbally abused their victims. The entire series of events was witnessed by Gurdev Singh, who was recorded as the second prosecution witness.

Sukhdev Singh (identified as PW 3), Gurcharan Singh (PW 4), Rakha Ram (PW 5) and Jagjit Singh (PW 6) were examined as eyewitnesses. The victim, Sukhjit Singh, who had sustained serious injuries, was taken to the hospital at Ferozepur for medical treatment; despite the care he received, he later died from those injuries. The prosecution’s case against the accused was built primarily on the testimony of these eyewitnesses, namely Gurdev Singh, Sukhdev Singh, Gurcharan Singh and Rekha Ram, while Jagjit Singh was subjected to cross‑examination. The defence conceded that Gurcharan Singh and Ajit Singh were present at the scene and that Gurcharan Singh had discharged his firearm twice, but it maintained that the shooting was done in self‑defence. The remaining three accused denied ever having been at the incident site and asserted that they had been falsely implicated. The record showed a long‑standing and bitter hostility between the two groups, a fact underscored by earlier criminal proceedings and by the existence of prior animosity. For instance, Kulwant Singh (PW 7) had previously been arrested in an excise case for operating an illegal still, in which Gurcharan Singh had acted as a prosecution witness. Moreover, Gurcharan Singh had contested the election for the office of sarpanch against Arjan Singh and had been defeated. Consequently, the defence argued that the three accused who were not present were drawn into the case because of this enmity, and that the two who were present—Gurcharan Singh and Ajit Singh—had merely fired in private defence after being attacked by members of Arjan Singh’s party.

The trial judge evaluated all evidence, considered the arguments raised by the defence, and concluded that the charge of murder under section 302 read with section 34 was proved against Baland Singh, Gurcharan Singh, Surjit Singh and Ajit Singh. The High Court, in substance, affirmed the trial judge’s findings concerning the prosecution’s case against the appellants Gurcharan Singh and Surjit Singh. However, the High Court held that the allegation that Baland Singh had issued an exhortation to his companions was not supported by satisfactory evidence, and that the principal charge against Baland Singh and Ajit Singh had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, those two were acquitted, while the convictions and sentences of the appellants were confirmed. Counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court’s judgment suffered from serious infirmities and, in the interest of justice, the matter should be remitted for a fresh examination of the evidence. The first point raised by the counsel was that the High Court had failed to properly consider the plea of self‑defence advanced by Gurcharan Singh, and that the Court’s rejection of that plea rested on a prior statement of Gurcharan Singh that had been excluded from evidence by the trial judge.

In this case the Court observed that the High Court had dismissed the plea of self‑defence raised by Gurcharan Singh on the basis of a prior statement of his that the trial Judge had excluded from evidence. The record shows that Gurcharan Singh had filed a complaint against the prosecution witnesses, a document that was admitted at trial as Exbt. This document first described the injuries sustained by Gurcharan Singh and then gave a detailed narrative of the incident that caused those injuries. The defence, through Sub‑Inspector Udham Singh, proved this document in cross‑examination. When the document was tendered, only the portion relating to Gurcharan Singh’s injuries was marked and admitted; the remainder of the document was excluded. The High Court, while considering the self‑defence theory, held that the theory was untenable because it was inconsistent with Gurcharan Singh’s version of events as set out in the excluded part of Exbt. Mr Purushotam objected to this reasoning, and the Court agreed with his objection. It was noted with regret that the High Court had not been alerted to the fact that the portion of document DE on which it based its criticism had not been admitted. This omission represented a serious flaw in the High Court’s reasoning, and consequently the conclusion reached on that aspect of the defence could not stand without a fresh examination by this Court. Mr Purushotam also contended that the High Court had failed to refer to the injuries suffered by Gurcharan Singh when evaluating the self‑defence claim. The evidence on record shows that Gurcharan Singh sustained thirteen injuries, twelve of which were contusions and one was a grievous hurt confirmed by X‑ray, affecting his foot and possibly constituting a fracture. Whether these injuries decisively support the defence narrative is a separate question, but the argument that they should have been taken into account by the High Court is considered persuasive. Satisfied that both of these contentions are well‑founded, the Court examined the plea of self‑defence afresh and considered the oral evidence presented by the prosecution. It is true that Gurdev Singh and Gurcharan Singh are interested witnesses, and their testimony must therefore be scrutinised as partisan evidence. By contrast, the testimony of Sukhdev Singh and Rekha Ram does not appear to be hostile to the appellants; consequently, their evidence cannot be characterised as partisan. The Court therefore proceeded to assess the totality of the evidence, recognising the distinctions between interested and disinterested witnesses in determining the viability of the self‑defence plea.

It was observed that the testimony of Sukhdev Singh could not be described as partisan. Although Rekha Ram’s brother Piara had been killed, the evidence indicated that Piara’s death resulted from reckless shooting and there was no proof that Piara was an enemy of the appellants or that Rekha Ram bore hostility toward them. The attempt, during cross‑examination, to demonstrate that Sukhdev Singh was connected to the complainants’ side had failed, and consequently Sukhdev Singh was to be considered a disinterested witness. Counsel Purushotam fairly conceded that the accounts given by all of these witnesses concerning the incident were consistent and coherent, and his sole criticism of that testimony was that it appeared partisan. After reviewing the entire body of evidence, the Court was satisfied that the lower courts were correct in largely accepting it against the appellants. If this evidence is believed, the chronological series of events becomes clear, and it shows that the plea of self‑defence raised by the appellant Gurcharan Singh could not be sustained. The injuries sustained by Gurcharan Singh were of a minor nature and might have been caused when some of the victims struck him with a stick. Nevertheless, given the overall sequence, it was impossible to accept the argument that Gurcharan Singh discharged his firearm twice in order to save himself. It was relevant to recall that the party of the appellants was armed with deadly weapons. Gurcharan Singh had seized the gun that fell from the hands of Arjan Singh, Surjit Singh possessed a gun for which his brother Daljit Singh held a licence, and the remaining individuals were armed with gandasas and similar lethal instruments. Consequently, at the time of the incident, the two appellants were in possession of firearms, and, based on the evidence that was accepted, the aggression originated from them rather than from Arjan Singh or his associates. This fact further disproved the theory of self‑defence. Therefore, although the High Court had not examined this point as thoroughly as it should have, and although a portion of the High Court’s reasoning on this matter contained the infirmity previously identified, the ultimate conclusion reached by that Court on this issue appeared to be correct. It may also be noted that the plea of self‑defence was not vigorously argued before the High Court. This brings us to the next broad criticism raised by counsel Purushotam against the High Court’s judgment. He contended that the High Court had failed to consider the fact that Gurcharan Singh, who had been charged under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act, had been acquitted of that charge by the same learned Sessions Judge who had convicted him for murder under sections 302 and 149. The prosecution’s case was that Gurcharan Singh produced the firearm when he surrendered, and because he possessed no licence to keep a firearm and the weapon in question belonged to Arjan Singh, a charge under section 19(f) was framed against him.

The trial judge noted that Gurcharan Singh possessed no licence to keep a firearm and that the weapon in question belonged to Arjan Singh. Consequently, a charge under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act had been framed against Gurcharan Singh. The learned trial judge accepted the testimony of two witnesses, Puran Singh and Sohan Singh, as well as the evidence of Sub‑Inspector Udham Singh, and concluded that at approximately 6.30 p.m. on 18 May 1961 Gurcharan Singh had produced the firearm. The record further showed that Arjan Singh, who was the Sarpanch of Valtoha, escorted Gurcharan Singh and Ajit Singh to Sub‑Inspector Udham Singh, after which the two individuals surrendered. The memorandum documenting this surrender was duly proved and is annexed as Exhibit P.21. The trial judge rendered his judgment in the principal murder case on 18 November 1961, and on the same day he delivered a separate judgment in the companion firearms case in which Gurcharan Singh had been charged under section 19(f). In that companion judgment the judge held that the charge under the Arms Act had not been proved and consequently acquitted Gurcharan Singh of that offence. Notably, the companion judgment disbelieved the same evidence concerning Gurcharan Singh’s production of the weapon that had formed the basis of the finding in the murder case.

On the basis of these facts Mr Purushotam submitted that the issue concerning the trial judge’s finding in the principal case – namely the recovery of the weapon from Gurcharan Singh – had been argued before the High Court and that the High Court had failed to consider the argument, which was premised upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab (1). He argued that, had the acquittal under section 19(f) been pronounced before the judgment in the murder case, the prosecution could not have maintained that Gurcharan Singh possessed the firearm illegally, a point that is not disputed. The remaining question, therefore, was whether the judgment in the firearms case was delivered before or after the judgment in the murder case. Mr Purushotam frankly acknowledged that he could not establish that the judgment on which his relief was based had been pronounced before the murder judgment. He further observed that the manner in which this judgment was produced before the Supreme Court was highly irregular: the judgment had not been filed in the High Court as would normally be required if it were to be relied upon, although the petition for special leave claimed that it had been used to raise the issue on appeal before the High Court. Moreover, the judgment was not presented to this Court with the petition for special leave but was introduced at a later stage when the index of papers was being prepared for inclusion in the court’s paper‑book. In the view of the Court, this method of producing the document was irregular.

The Court observed that the document produced was irregular, but noted that unless it was demonstrated that the judgment on which the defence relied had been pronounced before the judgment in the murder case, no argument could be made that the conclusion in the murder case—that Gurcharan Singh had surrendered the gun—was invalid. The Court considered that, on its face, the murder‑case judgment appeared to have been delivered first because it was numbered 88 and 93 of 1961, whereas the arms‑case judgment carried the numbers 89 and 94 of 1961. Consequently, the Court held that the appellants could not successfully contend that the acquittal of Gurcharan Singh under section 19(f) preceded his conviction under sections 302 and 149, and therefore the finding that he had surrendered the weapon could not be rejected. The Court expressed regret that the same learned judge had rendered two inconsistent findings in two companion cases whose judgments were pronounced on the same day, and it suggested that the High Court should draw the judge’s attention to this inconsistency. Although the point sought to be raised on the basis of the irregular judgment could not technically arise, the Court felt it necessary to examine the evidence concerning the production of the weapon. It reviewed the testimony of Puran Singh, Sohan Singh and Udham Singh and also considered the fact that Gurcharan Singh had been produced by Arjan Singh, who was the Sarpanch of Valtoha. After this review, the Court stated that it had no hesitation in concluding that the evidence clearly established that Gurcharan Singh had produced the weapon, as reflected in the production memo (Exhibit P21). The Court further recalled that Gurcharan Singh had admitted using a firearm and having fired twice in self‑defence, although he had not admitted that the firearm was the one taken from the hand of Arjan Singh, a matter which the Court regarded as separate. Accordingly, the argument that the acquittal of Gurcharan Singh in the arms case affected the finding that he had surrendered the gun could not be sustained. The Court then turned to the final argument raised by counsel for the petitioner, which alleged that a ballistic expert had not been examined in this case. It was urged that this ground had been raised before the High Court and had not been considered, and that the petition for special leave made a specific averment to that effect. Counsel for the petitioner had assumed that a report from the ballistic expert had been received, but the Court noted that such a report had not been produced because the prosecution feared that it would undermine its case. The Court affirmed that there was no doubt that two firearms together with two empty cartridges had been sent to the Scientific Laboratory in Chandigarh (Exhibit P.Z.) on 28 June 1961. Of the two guns sent for examination, one was the gun that Gurcharan Singh had picked up as soon as it fell from the hand of Arjan Singh, and the other gun was used by …

Surjit Singh had taken a gun from Daljit Singh, who produced that weapon and surrendered it on May 27 1961, almost a week after the incident occurred. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Purushotam, argued that because the firearms had been sent to a ballistic expert and a report had apparently been received, the prosecution was obliged to call that expert for examination. The Court found this argument persuasive, therefore it postponed the hearing and directed counsel for the State, Mr Bindra, to produce the report before the Court. The report, once produced, stated that of the two fired cartridges sent for expert examination, one had been discharged from the right barrel of the gun contained in parcel No 1 and the other from the left barrel of the same gun. In other words, the report concluded that the two empty cartridges discovered near the scene had been fired from the same firearm. After the report was received and a copy was served on Mr Purushotam, he acknowledged that the report was not inconsistent with the prosecution’s case, although he maintained that it did not expressly corroborate it. The report has not been formally proved, and no ballistic expert has been examined in this matter.

The Court observed that, on its face, the report was not inconsistent with the prosecution’s case, and therefore it could not be argued that the prosecution avoided calling the expert out of fear that the opinion would be adverse. The same argument had been raised before the High Court but had not been considered, and it was now conceded that it lacked substance. Consequently, the Court saw no practical benefit in examining the ballistic expert at this stage. For completeness, the Court briefly outlined the prosecution’s position regarding the use of the guns. It alleged that the appellant Gurcharan Singh fired two shots, one killing Sukhjit Singh and the other killing Gurdial Singh. It further alleged that the appellant Surjit Singh discharged three shots, two aimed at Arjan Singh and one at Piara. Evidence indicated that Surjit Singh loaded his gun once in the presence of witnesses, placing two cartridges in the weapon and retaining the spent cartridges in his pocket. The two empty cartridges that were sent for expert examination had been found on a thoroughfare in front of Jarnail Singh’s house. According to the prosecution, those two cartridges had been fired by the appellant Gurcharan Singh.

It was observed that the firearm recovered from Arjan Singh had been handled by the appellant Singh. The forensic report indicated that the two spent cartridges found at the scene had been discharged from the same weapon, and therefore the inability to produce the report was not regarded as having caused any prejudice to the appellants’ case. Counsel for the respondent, identified as Mr Purushotam, contended that a ballistic expert ought to have been called to determine whether the gun that Daljit Singh later surrendered had in fact been used in the incident. The Court found this suggestion untenable because the surrender of Daljit Singh’s firearm occurred more than a week after the shooting, and it was reasonable to infer that the gun would have been cleaned at the time of surrender, thereby eliminating any trace of the person who had used it on the date of the offence. The argument was further advanced that, in every murder case involving a lethal weapon, the prosecution is obliged to prove, through expert testimony, that the injuries alleged could have been inflicted by the weapon alleged to have been used. To support this proposition, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Mohinder Sinqh v. The State (1). In that precedent, the Court held that where the prosecution alleged that the accused shot the deceased with a gun, but the pattern of injuries suggested they were caused by a rifle, and no qualified expert was produced to establish that a gun could have caused such injuries, the case was seriously weakened. The Court further noted that the injuries appeared to require more than one shooter, that there was no evidence of a second shooter, and that the oral witnesses were not independent. Consequently, the failure to produce expert evidence was described as a serious infirmity. The Court observed that those findings were made in a case where the prosecution’s evidence suffered from significant deficiencies, and it would be unreasonable to disregard the factual context that gave rise to those observations. The Court stressed that the observations do not create an inflexible rule mandating expert evidence in every murder case involving a lethal weapon. Rather, the Court recognised that circumstances may arise where the direct evidence is so reliable and the post‑mortem findings so clearly aligned with that evidence that a ballistic expert’s testimony may not be essential. Conversely, where the direct evidence is unsatisfactory, unreliable, or not impartial, the need for expert assistance becomes more pressing.

When the injuries were alleged to have been caused by a gun but appeared on first impression to have been inflicted by a rifle, the apparent inconsistency could be removed or the oral testimony could be supported by the evidence of a ballistic expert. The necessity of consulting a ballistic expert for the prosecution’s case must, of course, be decided according to the specific facts of each case. Accordingly, the Court does not accept Mr Purushotam’s general contention that in every case where a firearm is alleged to have been used by an accused, the prosecution must also produce ballistic expert evidence, irrespective of how strong the direct evidence may be or whether the record shows any reason to doubt that direct evidence. In the present matter, obtaining the testimony of a ballistic expert to demonstrate that the weapon had been used by Surjit Singh would have served no useful purpose, because, as the Court has already observed, Daljit Singh retained the gun for more than a week before surrendering it. It would be idle to suggest that an expert’s evidence was required when it is extremely unlikely that any traces of use remained after Daljit Singh surrendered the weapon. With respect to Gurcharan Singh, it is admitted that he discharged the firearm twice, and the record contains no indication that the injuries noted in the post‑mortem report, as testified to by the doctor, could not have been caused by the gun that was alleged to belong to Arjun Singh and that Gurcharan Singh picked up after it fell from his hands. Consequently, under the circumstances, the Court cannot accept the submission that the prosecution’s failure to call a ballistic expert created a serious infirmity in the case against the accused. Nevertheless, having been satisfied that the High Court’s judgment contained certain infirmities and was not as satisfactory as required, the Court examined the evidence together with Mr Purushotam and heard his observations. After a careful review, the Court found no reason to depart from the conclusions of the lower courts, namely that the incident occurred as narrated by the prosecution witnesses, that this narration defeats any claim of private defence by the appellants, and that the appellants used their firearms in an aggressive manner, thereby committing murder under sections 302 and 34. Finally, the Court notes that in confirmation proceedings the High Court must scrutinise the evidence thoroughly and articulate its findings clearly after addressing all points raised by counsel.

The counsel for the defence was heard, and the Court noted that in every criminal appeal the findings recorded by the High Court are binding on the parties. Typically, this higher Court shows great reluctance to disturb those findings, and that reluctance ordinarily extends even to confirmation proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that when handling confirmation cases, the judicial approach at both the trial stage and on appeal must be especially careful and thorough. It is therefore essential that no possibility remains for a legitimate grievance by the defence that important issues raised before the High Court were ignored or insufficiently examined. In the present appeal, the Court arrived at the conclusion that certain reasons offered by the High Court were erroneous and that, apparently, some of the arguments presented to it had not been duly considered. Because of these shortcomings, the Court felt compelled to examine the evidentiary material independently. After reviewing the evidence afresh, the Court determined that the appeal could not succeed. Consequently, the order of confiction and the sentences imposed on the appellants were confirmed, and the appeal was dismissed.