Gondumogula Tatayya vs Penumatcha Ananda Vijaya Venkatarama

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: C. As. Nos. 631 to 645 of 1960

Decision Date: 20 February, 1962

Coram: S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

In the case titled Gondumogula Tatayya versus Penumatcha Ananda Vijaya Venkatarama, the Supreme Court of India issued its judgment on 20 February 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice S K Das and the bench was composed of Justices S K Das, M Hidayatullah and J C Shah. The petitioner was Gondumogula Tatayya and the respondent was Penumatcha Ananda Vijaya Venkatarama. The decision is reported in 1967 AIR 647 and in 1962 SCR (3) 324. The legal issue concerned the status of certain minor inams under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, as amended by sections 3(2)(d) and Explanation (1), particularly whether these inams constituted estates for the purpose of occupancy rights.

The headnote recorded that the respondents held inams in a village called Goteru, which was one of the Mokhasa villages incorporated into the assets of the Zamindari at the time of the permanent settlement of 1802. These inams were pre‑settlement inams and were not part of the Zamindari assets. The respondents had leased portions of the lands included in their inams to the appellant for a fixed term. After the leases expired, suits were instituted by the respondents to eject the appellant from the holdings. In those suits the respondents pleaded, among other grounds, that they possessed occupancy rights because the inams formed part of an estate, and therefore the appellant could not be lawfully ejected. They argued that the amendments made to section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act in 1936 and 1945 rendered these minor inams, situated within the village of Goteru, estates within the meaning of that provision.

The Court observed that it was not disputed that Goteru village was included in the Mokhasa sanad of 1802 and that the Mokhasa grant itself was an estate. However, the Court held that the minor inams in the present matter were not grants of whole villages and consequently could not be regarded as estates as defined by section 3(2)(d) of the Act. The decisive test, the Court explained, was whether at the time of the grant the subject matter comprised an entire village or merely a part of it. If the grant covered only a portion of a village, the amending Act made no difference and such a portion would not qualify as an estate; only a grant of a whole, specifically named village would meet the definition. The Court relied on the authorities District Board, Tanjore v M K Noor Mohamed Rowther, AIR 1953 SC 446 and Mantravadi Bhavanarayana v Mervgu Venkatadu, I L R 1954 Mad 116, applying the same test.

Procedurally, the case fell within the civil appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under appeals numbered 631 to 645 of 1960. These appeals were taken by special leave from a judgment and decree dated 20 April 1954 rendered by the Madras High Court in second appeals numbered 1228 to 1242 of 1949. Counsel for the appellants were R Mahalingier and Ganpat Rai, while counsel for the respondents were Sastri and T V R Tatachari. The judgment was delivered by Justice S K Das, who noted that the fifteen appeals were considered together because they raised common questions of law and fact, and that the ruling would apply uniformly to all of them.

On 20 February 1962, the judgment was delivered by Justice S K DAS. The matter before the Court consisted of fifteen appeals taken by special leave, all of which were heard together because they raised the same questions of law and fact. The appeals arose from fifteen separate suits that had been filed by a group of inamdars, who were the respondents, seeking to evict the tenants, who were the appellants, from various holdings in the village of Goteru after the expiry of the tenants’ leases. In addition to the relief of eviction, the inamdars also claimed arrears of rent and damages. The land involved lay in the village of Goteru, which formed part of the Nuzvid zamindari. Alongside Goteru, the villages of Gotera, Komaravaram and Surampudi constituted three Mokhasa villages within the same zamindari, and it was admitted that the Mokhasas had been included in the assets of the zamindari at the time of the permanent settlement of 1802. The inamdars asserted that in eight of the suits the land in dispute was a Karnam service inam, while in the remaining seven suits the land constituted a Sarvadumbala inam. Both categories of inam were settlement inams that had been enfranchised by the Government on the premise that they were excluded from the zamindari’s assets at the time of the permanent settlement, and separate title deeds had subsequently been issued to the inamdars.

The inamdars maintained that these inam lands did not qualify as “estates” under section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Lands Act, 1908, and that they were therefore entitled to both melavaram and kudivaram rights in the lands. According to their claim, the respondents had lawfully leased the lands to the appellants for a fixed period under an explicit contract that required the tenants to vacate and surrender possession at the end of each lease. The appellants, however, continued to occupy the lands after the leases expired. The total area of the suit lands comprised twelve acres and fifty‑two cents of Karnam service inam, with the remaining portion being Sarvadumbala inam. The appellants argued, inter alia, that the lands formed part of the Mokhasa of Goteru and were therefore included in the zamindari’s assets at the time of the permanent settlement. They further contended that the inams were part of an estate and that, under the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, they had acquired permanent occupancy rights in the suit lands. The appellants raised additional pleas, which the Court does not consider here. Their principal defence was that they possessed permanent occupancy rights, rendering the civil courts without jurisdiction to entertain the suits and precluding any right of the respondents to eject them.

The first instance proceedings were conducted by the learned District Munsif of Tailuku, who tried the suits in three separate batches. In each of the three judgments, the Munsif held that the suit lands were pre‑settlement minor inams, that they had not been included in the zamindari’s assets at the time of the permanent settlement, and that, consequently, they did not constitute “estates” within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. He also concluded that because the lease agreements contained a clear undertaking by the tenants to vacate the lands upon expiry of the lease term, no separate notice to quit was required. Based on these findings, the Munsif decreed in favour of the respondents and ordered the eviction of the appellants. Dissatisfied, the tenants filed fifteen appeals against the Munsif’s judgments and decrees. These appeals were heard together by the learned Subordinate Judge of Eluru, who, by a common judgment dated 29 March 1948, affirmed all of the Munsif’s findings and dismissed the appeals. The matter then proceeded to second appeals before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, where the appellants limited their contentions to two points. The first point asserted that the lower courts’ finding that the suit lands were excluded from the zamindari’s assets was flawed because the burden of proof had been incorrectly placed on the appellants.

In the earlier proceedings the learned Munsif had held that the lands in dispute were pre‑settlement minor inams, that they had not been included in the zamindar’s assets at the time of the permanent settlement, and that, accordingly, they were not “estates” within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. The Munsif also concluded that because the lease agreements contained a clear undertaking by the tenants to vacate the lands upon expiry, no separate notice to quit was required, and on that basis he decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. The tenants, who were also the appellants in the present matter, filed fifteen separate appeals against the judgments and decrees of the learned Munsif. All of those appeals were heard together by the learned Subordinate Judge of Eluru. By a common judgment delivered on 29 March 1948, the Subordinate Judge affirmed each of the findings of the Munsif and dismissed the appeals. Subsequently the appellants lodged second appeals before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. In those second appeals only two points were raised on behalf of the appellants. The first point contended that the lower courts’ finding that the disputed lands were excluded from the zamindar’s assets was flawed because the burden of proof had been incorrectly placed on the appellants. The second point argued that the inamdars, who in the plaints claimed that the tenants were holding over after the expiry of their leases, were not entitled to recover possession without first serving notices to quit as required by law. The High Court addressed the first point by recalling the settled legal principle that the landlord bears the burden of establishing his right to evict a tenant. However, the Court noted that sarvadumbala inams and other inams granted for public service prior to the settlement were typically excluded from zamindar assets at the time of permanent settlement, except in a few specified western Palayams—namely, the zamindaris of Venkatagiri, Karvetnagar, Kalahasti, and Sydapur—and in the Mokhasa of the Masulipatam district. Consequently, when a party alleged that such pre‑settlement inams formed part of the zamindar’s assets, the onus was on that party to prove the inclusion. The High Court observed that the lower courts had not based their decisions on the allocation of the burden of proof but had instead reached conclusions after a full consideration of the evidence presented in the suits; therefore, the question of burden of proof was immaterial in those proceedings. The Court further noted that the issue of whether the respondents’ predecessors had been granted both the varams and the melvaram was not raised before it, and that the parties’ contentions in the High Court centred solely on whether the disputed lands were pre‑settlement inams excluded from the zamindar’s assets or were included in those assets. The Court characterized this as a factual question and, observing that a second appeal could not intervene in a finding of fact absent permissible grounds, concluded that no such grounds existed and therefore affirmed the findings of the lower courts.

In this case the Court observed that it could not disturb a factual finding of the lower courts unless there existed permissible grounds for such interference. The High Court had determined that no such permissible grounds were present. It then turned once more to the documentary evidence that had been produced, specifically citing Exhibit A‑1, an extract from the register of village service inams in the unenfranchised Mokhasa village of Gotern; Exhibit A‑2, the title deed granted to the predecessors‑in‑interest of the inamdars in which it was expressly stated that the inams were held for service; Exhibit A‑5, a settlement dated 13 December 1942; Exhibit A‑7, a register of service inams of Goteru dated 13 December 1949; Exhibit A‑6, a public copy of the village account of Goteru; Exhibit B‑1, a register of inams of village Goteru prepared in 1859; Exhibit A‑27, the Bhubond accounts relating to Goteru, Komaravaram and Surampudi Mokhasas; and Exhibit A‑28, the Zamabandi Pysala Chitta, among other documents. After reviewing these materials, the High Court concluded that the inams in dispute – both the Karnam service inams and the Sarvadumbala inams – were pre‑settlement inams and that the records demonstrated they had not been taken into account when assessing the assets of the zamindari. Regarding the separate issue of notice, the High Court found that the appellants were not tenants holding over but rather persons who remained in possession after the tenancy had terminated and without the consent of the inamdars; consequently, the Court held that no notice was required and that the eviction suits were maintainable. In the appeals now before this Court, counsel for the appellants did not raise the question of notice. Instead, he advanced only two arguments: first, he contended, albeit rather weakly, that the lower courts’ finding that the service inams were pre‑settlement inams excluded from the zamindari’s assets was incorrect; second, he argued that amendments to section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act made in 1936 and 1945 rendered these minor inams as estates within the meaning of that provision, and that, pursuant to section 6 of the same Act, the appellants had acquired a permanent right of occupancy in their holdings, rendering them immune from eviction and placing the civil courts outside their jurisdiction. Concerning the first argument, it is sufficient to note that it concerns a factual issue on which the lower courts reached a concurrent finding, and the appellants have not demonstrated any special reason – such as a clear error of law, a disregard of judicial process, or a breach of principles of fair hearing – that would justify overturning that shared finding. Accordingly, the Court proceeds on the basis that the disputed inams were indeed pre‑settlement inams, comprising eight Karnam service inams and seven Sarvadumbala inams. The Court now turns to the second argument, which had not been raised before the High Court but is permitted to be addressed at this stage.

In this case the issue had not been raised before the High Court. Because the dispute concerned the construction of section 3(2)(d) and the accompanying Explanation (1) of the Madras Estates Land Act, the Court permitted counsel for the appellants to present arguments on the matter. Section 3(2)(d) together with Explanation (1) reads as follows: “3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context— (2) ‘Estate’ means … (d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognized by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees. Explanation (1) — Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject‑matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes.” It is noteworthy that when the Madras Estates Land Act was first enacted in 1908, section 3(2)(d) contained a different wording: “Any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has been made, confirmed or recognized by the British Government or any separated part of such village.” For reasons that need not be detailed here, the original clause (d) was later repealed and a new provision was inserted by section 2(1) of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 (Madras Act XVIII of 1936). The earlier Explanations (1) and (2) were renumbered as Explanations (2) and (3), and a fresh Explanation (1) was added by section 2(1) of the Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1945 (Madras Act II of 1945). The necessity of those amendments was discussed in the Full‑Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Mantravadi Bhavanareyana v. Merugu Venkatadu¹. In Narayanaswami Nayudu v. Subramanyam² the Madras High Court observed that service inams were very common in villages and that, if a later grant of the village were held not to constitute an estate under section 3(2)(d) because of the existence of minor inams, the result would be to exclude agraharams, shroutiyams and mokhasa villages from the operation of the Act, which could not have been the Legislature’s intention. Justice Srinivasa Ayyangar, speaking for the Court, remarked: “The definition in sub‑section 3, clause (d) was obviously intended to exclude from the definition of ‘Estate’ what are known as minor inams, namely, particular extents of land in a particular village as contrasted with the grant of the whole village by its boundaries. The latter …”

In this case, the Court observed that villages granted in full as inams were described as “whole inam villages.” The Court explained that the existence of “minor inams” within such whole inam villages was very common, and that if these whole inam villages were excluded from the definition of “Estate,” almost all agrabaram, shrotriyam and mokhasa villages would be excluded. The Court held that such an outcome could not have been the intention of the Legislature. This interpretation of section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act had been accepted without question until the decision in Ademma v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru (1), where for the first time a different view was expressed. In that decision it was held that where portions of an estate had previously been granted as minor inams, a subsequent grant of the remainder of the village did not constitute an estate because it was not a grant of the whole village. The Legislature subsequently intervened and enacted Explanation 1 with the object of restoring the view that had been held before the Ademma decision. The Court identified the crucial test for determining whether the subject‑matter of a grant falls within the definition of an estate under section 3(2)(d) as whether, at the time of the grant, the subject‑matter was a whole village or only a part of a village. If, at the time of the grant, it was only a part of a village, then the amending Act made no difference and such a part would not be an estate within the meaning of the term. Conversely, if the grant was of the whole, named village, then it would be an estate. The Court noted that counsel for the appellants referred to the Mokhasa sanad dated 8 December 1802, which listed a number of villages, including Goteru. Counsel argued that because the inam lands were within the village of Goteru, they should also be considered estates within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) read with Explanation 1. The Court found this argument to be clearly erroneous. While there was no dispute that the Mokhasa grant itself was an estate within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, that did not automatically mean that the minor inams would also constitute estates under section 3(2)(d). As pointed out in Mantravadi Bhavanareyana v. Merugu Venkatadu (2) (1) [1943] 2 M.L.J. 289, the decisive test is whether, at the time of the grant, the subject‑matter was a whole village or only a part of a village. The Court also referred to the decision in District Board, Tanjore v. M. K. Noor Mohammad Rowther (1), where it was observed that the phrase “any inam village” in section 3(2)(d) meant a whole village granted in inam and not anything less than a village, regardless of how large a part of the village might be. In other words, the grant must either comprise the entire area of a village or be expressed in a manner that is tantamount to granting a named village as a whole.

In this case, the Court explained that a grant must be expressed in a manner that is equivalent to granting an entire named village. The grant need not cover every part of the village’s area. To satisfy the definition, the grant must meet certain conditions. First, the language of the grant must explicitly, and not by implication, state that it is a grant of a specific village by name rather than a grant of a merely defined portion of land. Second, any area that is excluded from the grant must already have been given for service or another form of tenure. Third, the excluded area must have been set aside for communal purposes. The minor inams that were the subject of these proceedings were identified as pre‑settlement inams. The record shows that they were excluded from the zamindari’s assets at the time of the permanent settlement of 1802, a fact that cannot now be contested, whereas the Mokhasas were not excluded. Because of this factual situation, the minor inams did not constitute grants of whole villages and therefore did not qualify as estates within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. Consequently, the appellants were unable to rely on section 6 of that Act. Counsel for the appellants argued at length about the benevolent purpose of the Madras Estates Land Act and contended that the appellants should not be deprived of its benefits. However, the Court held that the appellants first had to demonstrate that their holdings fell within the protection of the Act. If the lands which they held were not an estate (1) A. I. R. [1953] S C. 446, as defined in the Act, no benefit could be granted. The Court found no merit in the second argument raised on behalf of the appellants. As a result, the appeals were dismissed, with the appellants ordered to pay costs and one hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.