Girja Shankar Kashi Ram vs The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal 189 of 1961
Decision Date: 30 January 1962
Coram: Justice Wanchoo
In the case titled Girja Shankar Kashi Ram versus The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 30 January 1962, recording the petitioner as Girja Shankar Kashi Ram and the respondent as The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.
The bench considered an industrial dispute concerning the exclusive right of a Representative Union to represent employees under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (XI of 1947), specifically sections 27A, 32, 33 and 42(4). The headnote of the judgment outlines the factual backdrop.
The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. ceased its operations on 14 May 1953, thereafter selling all of its assets to Tarun Commercial Mills Co. Ltd.; at the time of closure the old company discharged every one of its workmen.
Within a week of the shutdown, the new company restarted the business and immediately re‑engaged the former workmen, thereby continuing the same employment relationship under a new corporate entity.
When the original closure occurred, a dispute concerning the payment of bonus remained unresolved between the old company and its workmen; the Textile Labour Association, a Representative Union of textile workers in Ahmedabad, subsequently filed an application before the Labour Appellate Tribunal where the bonus dispute was pending.
The Tribunal facilitated a compromise, and the old company consented to pay a specified bonus amount; the Textile Labour Association in turn gave an undertaking that it would not pursue any further compensation claim in any later proceeding.
Despite the compromise, three hundred and seventy‑six former employees of the old company later served notice under section 42(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1947, seeking additional compensation.
The Textile Labour Association then appeared before the Labour Court and argued that the employees’ application should be dismissed on the basis of the earlier compromise reached before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
The Labour Court accepted that contention and dismissed the employees’ application; the workmen subsequently appealed to the Industrial Court, which also dismissed the appeal.
Following the dismissal by the Industrial Court, the workmen instituted a petition in the High Court invoking Article 227 of the Constitution, but the High Court summarily rejected that petition.
The workmen therefore sought special leave to appeal to this Court, and the Supreme Court entertained the appeal, addressing the central question of who may appear in proceedings under the Act when a Representative Union is involved.
The Court held that when a Representative Union makes an appearance in any proceeding under the Act, no other person, including the employee whose case triggered the proceeding under section 42(4), may be allowed to appear.
The Court further explained that if the appearance is made by a representative of the employees who is not a Representative Union, the authorities empowered by section 32 may permit the employee to appear personally in all such proceedings, and the employee may also appear through another person in the specific proceedings listed in section 33.
However, whenever the Representative Union itself makes an appearance, the employee is barred from appearing in any proceeding under the Act, and representation must be confined solely to the Representative Union.
Accordingly, the complete prohibition imposed by section 27A on representation other than through a recognized representative of employees remains absolute when the appearing representative is a Representative Union; if the appearing representative is someone other than a Representative Union, sections 32 and 33 provide the limited exceptions outlined above.
The good faith or bad faith of the employee representative is irrelevant to the prohibition established by section 27A on any person appearing other than the employee representative defined in section 30. An argument invoking alleged tyranny of a Representative Union or questioning its motives for actions taken after it appears cannot affect the clear legislative intent expressed in the Act. The case before the Court concerned a civil appeal numbered 189 of 1961, taken by special leave from a judgment dated 27 November 1957 issued by the Industrial Court at Ahmedabad in appeal numbered I.C. 187 of 1957. Counsel for the appellants presented their submissions, while counsel for respondent No. 1, including the Solicitor General of India, and counsel for respondent No. 2, the Secretary of the Textile Labour Association, represented the respondents. The judgment in this appeal was delivered on 30 January 1962 by Justice Wanchoo of the Supreme Court. The appeal challenged the Bombay High Court order that had summarily dismissed the appellants’ petition under article 227 of the Constitution. The central issue was whether a Representative Union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, No. XI of 1947, could appear in a proceeding under that Act to the exclusion of an individual employee seeking relief under section 42(4). The factual background involved the Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Company Limited, referred to as the old Company, which ceased operations on 14 May 1953 and transferred its assets to the Tarun Commercial Mills Company Limited, referred to as the new Company. At the time of closure, the old Company terminated all its workers, an action that occurred before section 25F on retrenchment was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947. The new Company resumed its manufacturing operations a week later and re‑employed the former workers of the old Company under renewed contracts. A dispute concerning bonus payments was pending between the old Company and its workers when the closure happened. Because the closure occurred while the bonus dispute was unresolved, the Textile Labour Association, a Representative Union of Ahmedabad textile workers, filed an application under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, before the Labour Appellate Tribunal where the dispute was pending. The Tribunal facilitated a compromise; although the old Company claimed no surplus for bonus payment, it agreed to settle by granting a bonus of one‑eighth of earnings for disputed year, and that settlement the Association.
In March 1955 the Textile Labour Association, acting as the representative union of the discharged workmen, obtained an agreement from all those workers that they would not pursue any compensation for their termination. The workers who accepted the bonus under that settlement also undertook not to claim compensation in any future proceeding. Subsequently, in July 1956, a minority of the former employees, numbering three hundred and seventy‑six persons, gave notice under section 42(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, seeking compensation for the mill closure that had occurred in 1953. Because the parties could not reach a settlement, those workers filed an application under section 42(4) of the Act in the labour court in October 1956, alleging that they were entitled to adequate compensation in view of their past service. Both the old company and the newly re‑opened company were impleaded as respondents to that application. The two companies opposed the claim on several grounds, though those grounds are not the subject of the present appeal. In January 1957 the Association appeared before the labour court and argued that the application should be dismissed because of the earlier compromise reached before the Labour Appellate Tribunal in 1953. The labour court accepted the Association’s argument and dismissed the workers’ application. Dissatisfied, some of the workmen appealed to the industrial court, contending that although a representative union ordinarily precludes individual participation, the Association’s decision not to support the workers in the labour court was made in bad faith and therefore the union should not have been allowed to represent the employees, who ought to be permitted to continue their claim. The industrial court rejected that contention, holding that it was not within its jurisdiction to inquire into the bona fides or mala fides of a representative union’s appearance and that the statute was clear: when a representative union appears, it alone may represent the applicants even in proceedings under section 42(4). Accordingly, the industrial court dismissed the appeal. The aggrieved employees then filed a petition under article 227 of the Constitution in the High Court, which was summarily dismissed, and the High Court also denied leave to appeal. A petition for special leave was subsequently filed before this Court and was granted, bringing the matter before us. The principal submission of the appellants is that, upon a proper reading of the relevant provisions of the Act, an employee who files an application under section 42(4) is not barred from appearing before the labour or industrial court even when a representative union has also made an appearance.
In this case the Court considered the argument that an employee could continue his application even though a Representative Union had appeared in the proceeding. The appellants submitted that accepting the interpretation advanced by the respondents would amount to a tyranny of the Representative Union. They argued that such a result could not have been intended by the legislature when it enacted the Act. They further contended that if the respondents’ reading were correct, the statutory provisions might be liable to be declared ultra vires the Constitution. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the language of the Act was clear. They provided that whenever a Representative Union appeared in any proceeding, it alone—excluding even the employee who had filed an application under section 42(4)—was entitled to continue the proceedings. The Court noted that the employee thereafter lost locus standi once the Union chose to appear in the proceeding. They urged that the alleged tyranny of the Representative Union could not affect the construction of the provisions where the statutory intent was plain. The respondents also argued that there was no issue of constitutionality because the appellants had never challenged the validity of the provisions, not even in their special leave petition. Before addressing the interpretation of the relevant sections, the Court pointed out that the constitutionality of the provisions had never been contested. Consequently, it refrained from expressing any opinion on that question. The Court further held that arguments based on a supposed tyranny of the Representative Union were irrelevant to the statutory construction. It also found that the Union’s motives could not affect interpretation when the legislative intent was evident from the plain wording of the statute. Consequently, the Court proceeded to examine the provisions of the Act that dealt with the matter. The principal provisions concerned lay in Chapter V, titled “Representatives of Employees and Employers, and Appearance on Their Behalf.” At the outset, the Court noted that the Act contained detailed provisions for the registration of unions and approved unions in Chapters III and IV, distinguishing it from the Industrial Disputes Act. Under Chapter III, the Registrar was empowered to register a Representative Union for any industry in any local area, to cancel such registration under specified circumstances, and to entertain appeals against cancellation. Chapter V then addressed the representation of employees and employers and their appearance in proceedings under the Act. Section 27, for example, provided for the recognition of an association of
Section 30 of the Act listed the various categories of employee representatives and specified a hierarchy for their right to appear or act in any industry within any local area. The hierarchy placed a Representative Union for the relevant industry at the top of the order of preference. The Court observed that it was not contested that the Association involved in the present matter functioned as the Representative Union for the textile industry in the stipulated region, and therefore possessed the most preferential entitlement to appear or act as the employees’ representative in that sector and locality.
Sections 28 and 29 dealt with the election of employee representatives in situations where no Representative Union existed for a particular industry in a given locality. Under those provisions, the elected representatives, as defined in Section 30, were placed fifth in the established order of preference for representation.
The Court then turned to Sections 27A, 32 and 33, which were the provisions most directly relevant to the appeal. The full text of those sections was reproduced. Section 27A declared that, except as provided in Sections 32 and 33, no employee was permitted to appear or act in any proceeding under the Act except through the designated representative of employees. Section 32 permitted a conciliator, Board, arbitrator, wage Board, Labour Court or Industrial Court to allow an individual—whether an employee or not—to appear in a proceeding before them if the authority deemed it expedient for the ends of justice, subject to the condition that such an individual could not be permitted to appear in any proceeding where a Representative Union had already appeared as the employees’ representative. Section 33 stated that, irrespective of any other provision of the Act, an employee or a Representative Union was entitled to appear through any person in specified categories of proceedings, including all proceedings before the Industrial Court, all proceedings before a wage board, and certain proceedings before a Labour Court concerning strikes, lock‑outs, closures, stoppages, changes, or orders under standing orders, as well as other proceedings that the Industrial Court might allow on application. However, it also barred a legal practitioner from appearing under clause (c) in any proceeding under the Act except before a Labour Court as provided in Section 83A or before the Industrial Court, and reiterated that no employee could appear through any person in any proceeding where a Representative Union had already appeared as the employees’ representative.
From this statutory language, the Court concluded that Section 27A imposed an absolute prohibition on any employee or any other person acting on the employee’s behalf from appearing or participating in a proceeding under the Act, unless an explicit exception was found in either Section 32 or Section 33. Consequently, the Court held that the effect of Section 27A was to entirely forbid the appearance of an employee or anyone on his behalf in such proceedings, the only possible avenues for exception being the narrowly defined provisions of Sections 32 and 33.
It was observed that, once a proceeding under the Act had begun, no person other than the representative of employees was permitted to appear, except as expressly allowed by sections 32 and 33. The Court indicated that the good or bad faith of the representative of employees could not affect the prohibition created by section 27A, which barred any appearance by anyone other than the representative defined in section 30. Consequently, if any other person were to appear, the authority for such appearance had to be found in either section 32 or section 33, the only statutory exceptions to section 27A. The Court noted that section 27A contained no specific exemption for an employee who might have filed an application under section 42(4) to represent himself; the ban imposed by section 27A applied equally to such an employee.
To mitigate the strictness of section 27A, the Court explained that it was possible for the representative of employees to decline to appear in many proceedings initiated by an employee under section 42(4). In those situations, sections 32 and 33 provided the necessary exceptions. The overall scheme of the three provisions was that, when the Representative Union appeared, no other person could join or continue the proceeding, even if the proceeding originated from an application under section 42(4). However, when the Representative Union chose not to appear, sections 32 and 33 authorised other individuals to appear in proceedings governed by the Act. Section 32, in particular, conferred power on a conciliator, a board, a wage board, a labour court or the industrial court to permit any individual—whether an employee or not—to appear before them. This demonstrated that the absolute ban of section 27A could be lifted whenever the authorities deemed it appropriate for the ends of justice, and that the permitted individual could be an employee. Nonetheless, a proviso attached to this power barred any such individual, including an employee who had filed an application under section 42(4), from appearing in any proceeding in which the Representative Union had already appeared as the representative of employees. By reading sections 27A, 30 and 32 together, the Court concluded that, as a general rule, only a representative of employees could appear in any proceeding under the Act, but the authorities were empowered to allow any other person—employee or otherwise—to appear when they considered it expedient, especially in cases where the representative of employees chose not to appear.
The Court observed that the power to permit a person who had filed an application under section 42(4) to appear before the authorities was limited by a proviso, which barred any appearance when the Representative Union had already made an appearance. This proviso placed the Representative Union in a special position among the six classes of representatives of employees listed in section 30. Accordingly, section 32 made clear that if the Representative Union, which is one of those six classes, appeared, no other person—including the applicant under section 42(4)—could be allowed to appear. However, when any of the other five classes of representatives named in section 30 appeared, the authorities retained the discretion to allow the employee or any other person to appear together with that representative.
Turning to section 33, the Court noted that the section began with an “obstant” clause and dealt with the appearance of an employee or a representative union through any other person. Section 33 therefore operated as an exception to section 27A, authorising an employee, who otherwise could appear only through a representative of employees under section 27A, to appear through any other person in the specific proceedings listed in section 33. This exception was also subject to provisos. While the first proviso was not relevant to the present analysis, the second proviso stipulated that no employee could appear through any other person in any proceeding under the Act if the Representative Union had appeared as the representative of employees. This again gave the Representative Union a distinctive status among the six classes of representatives in section 30, confirming that even though an employee might be permitted to appear through any person in the proceedings mentioned in section 33, such a right was denied whenever the Representative Union had made an appearance.
The Court further explained that the effect of sections 27A, 32 and 33 taken together was as follows: section 27A initially imposed an absolute prohibition on an employee’s appearance in any proceeding under the Act once the proceeding had commenced, except through a representative of employees. Two exceptions to this ban existed. Section 32, which applied to all proceedings before the authorities, empowered the authorities to permit the employee himself to appear even if a representative of employees had appeared, but this permission was unavailable where the Representative Union had appeared as the representative. Section 33 provided a second exception, allowing an employee to appear through any other person in the particular proceedings specified in that section, yet again barring such an appearance if the Representative Union had already appeared. Consequently, the combined operation of these provisions meant that the Representative Union’s appearance excl used every other person from appearing, including the employee whose application under section 42(4) might have initiated the proceeding, whereas appearances by any other class of representative could be supplemented by the employee’s own appearance or by appearance through another person as permitted by sections 32 and 33 respectively.
Another exception under section 33 permits an employee to appear through any person in certain proceedings even if a representative of employees has already appeared. However, this permission is lost when a Representative Union has made an appearance as the representative of employees, because then no other person, not even the employee who filed the application, may appear. The scheme of the Act therefore makes it clear that if a Representative Union appears in any proceeding, no one else, including the employee who originated the proceeding under section 42(4), can be allowed to appear. Conversely, when the appearance is made by a representative of employees other than a Representative Union, the authorities empowered by section 32 may permit the employee to appear personally in all proceedings before them. In addition, that employee is also entitled to appear through any person in the specific proceedings listed in section 33. Nevertheless, whenever a Representative Union has made an appearance, even the employee himself cannot appear in any proceeding under the Act, and representation must remain confined to the Representative Union alone. Thus, the absolute prohibition created by section 27A on representation other than through a representative of employees persists fully when the representative who has appeared is the Representative Union. If, however, the representative who has appeared is not the Representative Union, sections 32 and 33 supply the exceptions that have already been discussed. Consequently, there is no way to escape the conclusion that the Act plainly intends that when a Representative Union appears in any proceeding, even if that proceeding was initiated by an employee under section 42(4), only the Representative Union may represent the employee and the employee may not appear or act in that proceeding. On this ground the appeal must fail and is therefore dismissed. In the circumstances no order as to costs was made. The appeal is dismissed.