Dokku Bhushayya vs Katragadda Ramakrishnayya

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal 483 of 1957

Decision Date: 27 April 1962

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, J.R. Mudholkar

The case of Dokku Bhushayya versus Katragadda Ramakrishnayya was decided on the twenty‑seventh of April, 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion in the case was authored by Justice A K Sarkar and the bench also included Justice J R Mudholkar. The judgment was recorded under the citation 1962 AIR 1886 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports as 1963 SCR (2) 499.

The petitioner in the proceeding was Dokku Bhushayya and the respondent was Katragadda Ramakrishnayya. The dispute concerned a decree for a sum of money that had been obtained against the appellant and his father. At the time the decree was passed the appellant was a minor; consequently his maternal grandfather acted as his guardian in the proceedings. During the execution of the decree certain properties belonging to the appellant were sold at auction. The appellant, through his guardian, filed an application seeking to set aside that sale.

Subsequently the guardian entered into a compromise with the decree‑holder and with the purchaser who had acquired the property at auction. Under the terms of that compromise the application for setting aside the sale was withdrawn. After the withdrawal the sale was confirmed and the property remained with the purchaser. When the appellant later attained majority, he filed a suit challenging the order that had withdrawn his application and he asked that the order be set aside and that his original application be reheard. The appellant contended that the guardian had entered into the compromise without first obtaining the leave of the court that is required by Order 32, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908).

The Court examined whether Order 32, rule 7 was applicable to the withdrawal of the application for setting aside the sale. The Court held, by a majority of Justices Suhba Rao and Mudholkar and with Justice Sarkar dissenting, that the rule was not applicable to that withdrawal and that the order effecting the withdrawal was binding on the appellant. The Court explained that Order 32, rule 7 is intended to apply only to an agreement or compromise that directly concerns the rights that are in issue in the suit. It does not apply to mere procedural steps that do not affect those substantive rights. Further, the rule applies only while the suit is pending, a period that includes any execution proceedings that follow the decree, and the agreement or compromise must be with a party to the suit.

Although the application for setting aside the sale was an application made in the execution stage of the decree, the compromise entered into by the guardian with the auction purchaser was solely for the purpose of withdrawing that application. The compromise did not alter the rights or liabilities that had been declared by the decree. Consequently, the Court concluded that leave of the court under Order 32, rule 7 was not required for the guardian to enter into that compromise. The Court also held that Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be invoked to make Order 32, rule 7 applicable, because Section 141 relates to original proceedings and does not extend to proceedings that are in the execution phase.

The judgment referred to several authorities to support its reasoning. These authorities included Virupakshappa v Shidappa and Basappa (1901) I L R 26 Bom 110, Arunachellam Chetty v Ramanadhan Chetty (1906) I L R 29 Mad 309, Muthalakkammal v Narappa Reddier (1933) I L R 56 Mad 430, Jitendra Nath Roy v Samarendra Nath Mitter (1943) L R 70 I A 68, Katneni Venkatakrishnayya v Garapati China Kanakayya (1938) I L R Mad 819 and Thakur Prasad v Sheikh Fakir Ullah (1894) L R 22 I A 44. These cases were cited to illustrate the principles concerning the scope of Order 32, rule 7 and the interaction between original and execution proceedings.

In this case the Court observed that before a guardian could enter into an agreement or compromise to withdraw an application for setting aside a sale, leave of the Court was required under Order 32, rule 7. The Court rejected any limitation that the rule should apply only to execution proceedings where the compromise directly affected the rights and liabilities under the decree; instead it held that the rule applied to every compromise that terminated a proceeding and thereby impacted the rights and liabilities of the minor. The compromise in the present matter was not limited to procedural conduct; it substantially altered the liability of the appellant under the decree. Accordingly the Court referred to several authorities including Virupakshappa v. Shidappa (1901) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 109, Rhodes v. Swithenbank (1889) L.R. 22 Q.B.D. 577, Gurmallappa v. Mallappa (1920) I.L.R. 44 Bom. 574 and Katneni Venkatakrishnayya v. Ganapati China Kanakayya (1938) I.L.R. Mad. 819. The judgment was rendered in Civil Appeal 483 of 1957, an appeal from a judgment and decree dated 25 November 1949 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 66 of 1946. Counsel for the appellant and for the respondents were instructed, and the separate judgment was delivered by Justice Sarkar, while the judgment of Justices Subba Rao and Mudholkar was delivered by Justice Subba Rao. The factual background recounted that in 1929 a suit was filed by Bapiah against the appellant, who was then a minor, his father and another individual on the basis of a promissory note executed by the father and the third person. The appellant was represented in that suit by his maternal grandfather as guardian ad litem. A decree was passed and the decree holder obtained an execution order, resulting in the sale of certain properties in which the appellant had an interest, the sale being made to a clerk of the decree holder. Subsequently the guardian ad litem filed an application under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside the sale. Later the guardian reached a settlement with both the decree holder and the auction purchaser, agreeing to abandon the contention that the sale was invalid, to withdraw the petition, and to relinquish possession of the sold properties, while the decree holder and the purchaser would forgo their claim for costs of the petition. In compliance with this agreement the petition was withdrawn and dismissed by an order dated 12 August 1932. After the appellant attained majority, he instituted a suit in 1944 to set aside the 12 August 1932 order and to obtain a rehearing of the dismissed petition; the present appeal arises from that suit.

In this case, the trial court had granted a decree in favour of the appellant, but on appeal the High Court at Madras set aside that decree and ordered the suit to be dismissed. The parties did not dispute that the original suit had been properly filed and that the filing had been made within the prescribed period. Consequently, the sole issue that the court was required to consider on appeal was whether the order dated 12 August 1932 could be declared voidable under Order 32, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, at the instance of the appellant. That rule expressly prohibits a guardian representing a minor in a suit from entering into any agreement or compromise concerning the suit unless the court first grants permission, and it provides that any such agreement or compromise made without court approval shall be voidable against all parties except the minor himself.

Order 32, rule 7 of the present Code corresponds to section 462 of the earlier Code of 1882. It has long been settled, even when the 1882 Code was in force, that the provision applies to execution proceedings despite its wording referring only to agreements or compromises “with reference to the suit.” As early as 1901, Chief Justice Jenkins, speaking in Virupakshappa v. Shidappa (1901) I.R.L. 26 Bom. 109 at page 114, observed that the section does apply to compromises of execution proceedings because applications in execution are part of the suit, and therefore a compromise of such a proceeding is a compromise with reference to the suit. That interpretation has been consistently followed thereafter.

The High Court, however, took the view that order 32, rule 7 would be applicable to a compromise of an execution proceeding only when the compromise directly affected the rights and liabilities created by the decree. It held that the compromise in the present matter was not covered by the rule because it dealt merely with the rights and liabilities arising out of the auction sale and not with those arising under the decree itself. The court based this position on the observation that earlier reported decisions involved compromises that directly altered the rights and liabilities under the decree. The present court found that this distinction provided sufficient justification for limiting the rule’s operation.

The present court does not accept that limitation. It notes that no authority has been presented showing that order 32, rule 7 fails to apply to a compromise of execution proceedings merely because the compromise does not directly affect the decree‑based rights or liabilities. Moreover, while rule 32, rule 7 does not extend to every conceivable agreement, the case of Bhodes v. Swithenbank makes clear that an infant’s next friend may act in the conduct of the action without court sanction, provided the act is for the infant’s benefit. Therefore, an agreement concerning the conduct of the proceeding does not require prior court approval. On this basis, the court concludes that the rule should be understood to apply to all compromises of execution proceedings, except those solely concerning the conduct of the proceedings, irrespective of whether the compromise directly impacts the decree‑related rights or liabilities.

The Court observed that when a next friend acts beyond merely conducting the suit, any action taken must be for the infant’s benefit, and if the Court concludes that it is not, the infant is not bound by that action. Consequently, the Court held that an agreement dealing solely with the conduct of the proceedings does not require the Court’s sanction. The Court found no reason to restrict the operation of Order 32, rule 7 to such agreements only. It noted that Chief Justice Jenkins, in his earlier judgment, had stated that the rule “applies to a compromise of execution proceedings.” According to that observation, the rule applies to every compromise of execution proceedings, except for compromises that merely affect the conduct of the proceedings, irrespective of whether the compromise directly influences the rights or liabilities under the decree. The Court further referred to the reasoning of Justice Heaton when interpreting section 462 of the Code of 1882 in Gurmallapa v. Mallappa, where it was explained that the provision implies that while a suit is pending, the dispute between a minor and another party cannot be compromised except by the guardian ad litem of the minor and only with the Court’s leave. The Court therefore concluded that any compromise of a proceeding that concerns the dispute itself must obtain the Court’s approval. It also pointed out that sub‑rule (6) of rule 3 of Order 32 provides that a guardian appointed for a suit involving a minor continues in that capacity throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit, including execution proceedings. The purpose of Order 32, the Court explained, is to ensure that when an infant is involved, a guardian is assigned and remains under the Court’s control so that the infant’s rights and liabilities cannot be altered by an unapproved compromise. If this principle is accepted, there is no justification for limiting the rule’s operation only to compromises that directly affect the decree’s rights or liabilities. The rule, therefore, also applies to compromises that terminate a proceeding and thereby influence the infant’s rights or liabilities. The Court found support for this view in the observations of Justice Varadachariar in Katneni Venkatakrishnayya v. Ganapati China Kanakayya, noting that Rule 7 governs the conduct of a next friend, as previously highlighted in Bhodes v. Swithenbank.

The Court explained that a next friend functions as an officer of the Court to conduct the suit, and that the principle underlying rule 7 is that whenever the next friend proposes to do anything beyond the ordinary conduct of the suit, he must obtain the leave of the Court to do so. The Court observed that the term “suit” in that statement plainly includes a proceeding in execution. It was noted with interest that the learned Judges of the High Court were careful to use the word “directly” when describing the agreement or compromise in the present case. They held that the agreement or compromise “did not directly deal with or regulate the extent and nature of the rights and liabilities under the decree, which stand intact and unaffected as before.” This wording, the Court said, indicates that the Judges were aware that the compromise affected the appellant’s rights and liabilities under the decree at least indirectly. The Court further observed that if the rule bars an agreement that directly affects the rights and liabilities of a minor under a decree, there is no reason to think the rule would not likewise bar an agreement intentionally crafted to affect the same rights and liabilities indirectly. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the agreement challenged in this case belongs to that latter category. Turning to the facts, the Court found that the compromise was reached in the course of executing the decree. The proceeding concerned a challenge to the validity of an execution sale and therefore fell within a proceeding governed by Order XXXII, rule 7 according to the rule laid down in Virupakshappa’s case (1) (1901) I.L.R. 26 Am. 109. The Court further observed that the compromise was not a matter of the conduct of the proceeding; rather, it terminated the proceeding and resulted in the appellant losing his right to question the validity of the sale. Consequently, the appellant became bound by the sale, whether good or bad, and his liability under the decree was reduced only by the amount of the proceeds of that sale, even though the price obtained might have been inadequate. The Court pointed out that, had the proceeding to set aside the sale been continued rather than abandoned, the sale might have been set aside and a fresh sale, if undertaken, could have fetched a higher price, thereby further reducing the appellant’s liability under the decree. Thus, the Court held that this compromise could not be characterized as relating merely to the conduct of the proceeding; it substantially affected the appellant’s liability under the decree by depriving him of the opportunity to obtain a larger reduction of that liability through a proper sale.

In its analysis the Court first observed that the decree holder and the purchaser at auction could not rely on the precedent established in Jitendra Nath Rao v. Samarandra Nath Mitter. In that earlier decision the Judicial Committee had held that the agreement contemplated by Order XXXII, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be made with a party to the suit or proceeding. The Court pointed out that in the present matter the agreement arose in the execution proceeding and was entered into with both the decree holder and the auction purchaser, each of whom was a party to the proceeding; the decree holder was also a party to the original suit from which the execution proceeding originated. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appeal should be allowed.

Justice J. Subbarao then set out the factual background that gave rise to the appeal. The appeal concerned the interpretation of Order XXXII, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant, Bhushayya, together with respondents numbered seven and eight, were the sons of the deceased Dokka Adeyya. On the basis of a promissory note executed by Dokku Adeyya and respondent five in favour of a person named Bapayya, Bapayya instituted civil suit number 88 of 1929 before the Subordinate Judge at Bapatla and obtained a decree. In that suit the appellant, who at the time was a minor, was named as a defendant and was represented by his maternal grandfather, who acted as his guardian.

In execution of the decree, the properties belonging to Dokku Adeyya were ordered to be sold, as reported in the 1943 law report (L.R. 70 I.A. 68), and were purchased by the decree‑holder’s clerk, Bapiraju, subject to a mortgage in favour of the decree holder. Before the sale received formal confirmation, on 29 March 1932 the appellant, again through his maternal grandfather, filed execution application number 136 of 1932 seeking to set aside the sale under Order XXI, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was listed for an inquiry to be held on 12 August 1932. On that date the guardian filed a memorandum stating that the matter had been settled and that the petition should be dismissed as withdrawn, yet he did not obtain the court’s permission required for such withdrawal under Order XXXII, rule 7. The court nevertheless issued an order dismissing the application, after which the sale was confirmed.

Later, on 9 October 1944, the appellant, who had by then attained majority, instituted suit number 80 of 1944 before the Subordinate Judge at Tenali, seeking to set aside the order dated 12 August 1932 and to have the application for setting aside the sale reheard. The suit pleaded, inter alia, that the earlier order was void because the guardian had withdrawn the petition without the sanction required by Order XXXII, rule 7 of the Code. The defendants, some of whom were later assignees, filed written statements contesting the validity of that order. The Court noted that for the purpose of the present appeal a detailed examination of those statements was unnecessary.

The Subordinate Judge concluded that the withdrawal of the petition and its subsequent dismissal were void because the guardian had not obtained the required sanction of the Court under Order XXXII, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Upon appeal, the High Court held that Order XXXII, rule 7 did not apply to an application for setting aside the sale in the circumstances before it. Consequently, the sole issue before this appeal was whether the guardian’s withdrawal of the petition contravened Order XXXII, rule 7 of the Code.

Before interpreting the provisions of that order, it was necessary to ascertain the precise terms of the agreement reached between the parties. The High Court, in its judgment, summarized the factual position as follows: “The agreement is that the guardian‑ad litem should give up the contentions regarding the invalidity of the auction sale and should withdraw the petition to set aside the sale and also deliver up possession of the properties purchased to the auction‑purchaser, and that the decree‑holder and auction‑purchaser should give up their claim for costs of the said petition. It was pursuant to this agreement that the petition was withdrawn and dismissed, with no costs awarded.” The court noted that this description accurately reflected the petition and did not require further elaboration.

Order XXXII, rule 7 contains two clauses. Clause (1) states: “No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.” Clause (2) provides: “Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor.” In the Madras jurisdiction, an additional clause (1‑A) was introduced by an amendment in 1910. Clause (1‑A) reads: “Where an application is made to the Court for leave to enter into an agreement or compromise or for withdrawal of a suit in pursuance of a compromise or for taking any other action on behalf of a minor or other person under disability and such minor or other person under disability is represented by counsel or pleader, the counsel or pleader shall file in Court with the application a certificate to the effect that the agreement or compromise or action proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor or other person under disability.” The order further requires that a decree for the compromise of a suit, appeal or matter to which a minor or other disabled person is a party shall recite the sanction of the Court and set out the terms of the compromise as prescribed in Form No. 24 in the Appendix to the schedule.

The Court observed that a guardian is not permitted to enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor in connection with a suit where the minor appears as next friend or as a guardian. The central issue therefore was how to interpret the phrase “an agreement or compromise with reference to the suit.” Counsel for the appellant, Mr Viswanath Sastri, advanced two arguments. First, he contended that execution proceedings are proceedings that relate to the suit; consequently, any compromise or agreement concluded by a guardian of a minor in those execution proceedings – whether the compromise affects the minor’s procedural rights or substantive rights, whether the matter is directly in issue in the suit or merely determined by the decree – would require the sanction of the Court, and a compromise entered into without such sanction would be void. Second, he submitted that an application to set aside a sale is a proceeding within the meaning of section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore Order XXXII, rule 7, insofar as it can be applied, would govern that proceeding. Since the guardian had entered into the compromise in that proceeding without the Court’s leave, the compromise and the consequent order were, in his view, void.

Counsel for the respondents, Mr Bhimasankaram, while endorsing the test formulated by the High Court – that an agreement falling within the mischief of Order XXXII, rule 7, must deal directly with the rights and liabilities that arise out of the suit or are defined by the decree – sought to narrow the test further. He attempted to distinguish between an agreement that relates to rights conferred by the decree and one that merely relates to liabilities imposed thereunder. The Court explained that Order XXXII, rule 7, is intended to protect the interests of a minor during the pendency of a suit against hostile, negligent, or collusive actions by a guardian. The scope of the provision is implicit in its language, particularly the critical words “any agreement or compromise … with reference to the suit.” If the phrase “with reference” were taken in its broadest sense, it could encompass every procedural step in the conduct of a suit – such as adjournments, admission of documents, interlocutory applications, or inspections. The Court held that the Legislature could not have intended that agreements concerning such procedural matters be subject to the rule, because that would transform a protective measure into an obstacle to the disposal of suits in which a minor is a party. Consequently, consistent with the purpose of the rule, the words “with reference to the suit” must be limited to agreements that affect the rights that are actually in issue in the suit. Moreover, the protection afforded by the rule applies only during the pendency of the suit, and the end of the suit marks the point at which the rule ceases to operate.

It has been held that, for the purpose of the rule, an execution proceeding is treated as a continuation of the original suit, as stated in Virupakshappa v. Shidappa and Basappa (1), Arunachellam Chetty v. Ramanadhan Chetty (2), and Muthalakkammal Chetty v. Narappa Reddiar (3). Consequently, if the execution proceeding is a continuation, the rule also governs any agreement or compromise that relates to that execution proceeding. However, similar to the rule’s operation in a regular suit, an agreement or compromise in execution proceedings must affect the rights or liabilities that have been determined or declared by the decree that is being executed. Procedural measures that do not alter those declared rights or liabilities are excluded from the rule’s reach, just as they are in ordinary suits. For example, a guardian may consent to an adjournment of a sale, waive a fresh proclamation, or agree to a reduction of an upset price, without the requirement to follow the procedure laid down in Order XXXIII, rule 7, of the Code. The rule further limits the agreement or compromise to be entered only with a party to the suit or that party’s legal representative; it does not extend to dealings between a guardian and persons who are not parties to the suit. This limitation was directly considered by the Privy Council in Jitendra Nath Roy v. Samarandra Nath Mitter (4). In that case, a decree obtained for a minor, represented by his guardian, was assigned to another person for consideration without obtaining the court’s leave. Lord Atkin observed that the phrase “agreement or compromise … with reference to the suit” means an agreement with a party to the suit and does not cover a transfer of a decree to a person who is not connected with the suit, even if such a transfer might be described as an agreement. He noted that the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Katneni Venkatakrishna yy Garapati China Kanakayya (1) had reached the same conclusion. Lord Atkin further stated that it could not have been intended to require court leave for an agreement made with a non‑party, for example, to finance a suit, whether or not the agreement included a stipulation to receive part of the proceeds. The combined use of the terms “agreement” and “compromise” indicates the type of agreement that the rule intends to cover. The Court agrees with these observations. As a result, Order XXXII, rule 7, of the Code applies only to an agreement or compromise entered into by a guardian of a minor party to the suit, and only when it is made with another party to the suit during the pendency of the suit and any related execution proceedings.

The Court first examined whether an application seeking to set aside a sale of property constituted a proceeding that fell within the execution stage of a decree. Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates several modes of execution, one of which is execution against the property of the judgment‑debtor. The same Order also lays down a specific procedure for the sale of such property and for the setting aside of a sale when it is obtained by fraud or material irregularity. Under Rule 92 of Order XXI, if no application is filed under Rules 89, 90 or 91 to challenge a sale, or if an application is filed but subsequently rejected, the court is required to pass an order confirming the sale, after which the sale becomes absolute. Sub‑rule (3) of Rule 92 further provides that no suit may be brought by any person against whom such confirming order has been made. These provisions demonstrate that Order XXI contains a self‑contained mechanism for both carrying out a decree and resolving any disputes that arise in the course of execution, and that execution is deemed to continue until the decree is either fully satisfied or barred by limitation. Accordingly, the Court held that an application filed by a judgment‑debtor for the purpose of setting aside a sale is properly characterised as an application in the execution of a decree.

The Court then turned to the applicability of Order XXXII, Rule 7, which requires that any agreement or compromise affecting the rights or liabilities declared by the decree must obtain the leave of the court. To attract this provision, the agreement entered into by the guardian of the minor plaintiff with the purchaser at auction needed to influence the rights or liabilities that the decree had determined. In the present case, the suit was instituted on the basis of a promissory note executed by the father and brother of the appellant, who was also a party to the suit. The decree that emerged from that suit ordered the recovery of the amount specified in the promissory note together with interest; it made no determination as to the ownership of the family property that was later sold in execution of the decree. The guardian, acting on behalf of the minor appellant, filed an application to set aside the sale on the ground that the sale had been conducted fraudulently and with material irregularity. The guardian subsequently agreed to withdraw the application subject to certain conditions, but that agreement did not alter the rights or liabilities that the decree had established. The decree remained in force, and the sale price was applied towards discharging the monetary liability imposed by the decree. Because the agreement did not affect the decree’s asserted rights or liabilities, the Court concluded that the leave of the court under Order XXXII, Rule 7, was not required in this circumstance.

In this case the Court observed that the decree for recovery of the amount specified in the promissory note could have been satisfied even if the father of the appellant had sold the family property outside the court and used the sale proceeds to discharge the decree. Consequently, it could not be said that a sale conducted through the court would affect the rights or liabilities declared by the decree. The Court therefore held that the agreement or compromise entered into by the guardian with respect to such a sale did not alter the rights ascertained and declared by the decree, and accordingly the leave of the court under Order XXXII, rule 7, of the Code was not required. The Court further clarified that it was not laying down a universal rule that no agreement or compromise entered into by a guardian to withdraw an application for setting aside a sale would ever be governed by Order XXXII, rule 7. It recognised that there could be arrangements or compromises in respect of such petitions where the rights declared by decrees might be affected. For the purpose of analysis the Court assumed, for convenience, that the purchaser at the auction was a party to the suit, because there was a controversy as to whether he was a benamidar for the decree‑holder. The Court also addressed the contention that, by virtue of section 141 of the Code, the procedure prescribed in Order XXXII, rule 7, should extend to an agreement or compromise made by a guardian in relation to an application to set aside a sale under Order XXI, rule 90. The argument advanced was that an application under Order XXI, rule 90, constitutes an independent proceeding, and since the agreement to withdraw that proceeding affects the right created by the sale, it falls within the ambit of the said rule. Section 141 of the Code states: “The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.” The corresponding provision in the Code of 1882 read: “The procedure herein prescribed shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction other than suits and appeals.” A conflict arose as to whether this section applied to execution proceedings. To resolve the conflict, the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act of 1892 inserted an Explanation: “This section does not apply to applications for the execution of decrees which are proceedings in suits.” The Privy Council, even without reference to the Explanation, interpreted the section in Thakur Prasad v. Sheikh FakirUllah, observing that the provision was not intended to apply to execution proceedings. The Court therefore concluded that the application by the judgment‑debtor to set aside the sale was a proceeding in execution, and consequently section 141 of the Code would not apply to it.

The Court examined whether the provision could, by its own force, apply to execution proceedings and observed that the suggestion was that it might operate through the authority of section 647, which corresponded to section 141 of the then‑applicable Code. However, the Court noted that the entirety of Chapter XIX of the Code, comprising one hundred and twenty‑one sections, was dedicated to the procedure governing executions. Consequently, it would be surprising if the framers of the Code had intended to impose an alternative, largely inappropriate procedure on execution matters by a broad statement that the procedure for suits should be followed as far as it was applicable. The Court held that the proceedings referred to in section 647 encompassed original matters of the nature of suits, such as probate and guardianship proceedings, and did not extend to execution proceedings. This interpretation had been consistently followed in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court further affirmed its earlier finding that an application by a judgment‑debtor seeking to set aside a sale constituted a proceeding in execution; therefore, section 141 of the Code was inapplicable for two reasons. First, because execution proceedings were a continuation of a suit within the meaning of Order XXXII, rule 7 of the Code, the Code’s specific provisions for suits barred the invocation of section 141. Second, section 141 applied exclusively to original proceedings, and an application by a judgment‑debtor to set aside a sale was not an original proceeding but an execution proceeding. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, ordering that the appellant bear the costs of the contesting respondent, in line with the majority opinion.