Daya vs Joint Chief Controller of Import and Export

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 226 of 1961

Decision Date: 16 April, 1962

Coram: N.R. Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar, B.P. Sinha, K. Subbarao, T.L.V. Aiyyar

In this appeal, the Court noted that the matter reached the Supreme Court of India on the basis of a certificate of fitness that had been issued by the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay. The certificate was granted pursuant to Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The appeal is numbered as Appeal (civil) 226 of 1961 and bears the title Daya versus Joint Chief Controller of Import and Export. The judgment was delivered on the sixteenth day of April, 1962. The case was heard before a five‑judge bench consisting of Chief Justice B. P. Sinha, Justice K. Subbarao, Justice N. R. Ayyangar, Justice J. R. Mudholkar and Justice T. L. V. Aiyyar, and the written judgment appears in the 1963 volume 2 of the Supreme Court Reports at page 73. The author of the judgment was Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, who recorded that the appeal arose from a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur. In that petition, the appellant challenged the constitutional validity of certain notifications and directions issued under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, as well as the Export Control Order, 1958, which had been framed under that Act. The appellant’s principal relief was a prayer that the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Bombay, be ordered to consider his application for a licence to export manganese ore that he had obtained from his mines, and that the decision be made without reference to the impugned notifications. The High Court dismissed the petition, but it nevertheless granted the appellant a certificate of fitness, which enabled him to approach this Court.

The Court then set out the factual background necessary to understand the appellant’s grievance and the grounds on which he claimed that the governmental notifications violated the Constitution, particularly the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Part III. The appellant was the lessee of manganese mines located in two separate areas of Madhya Pradesh. Both leases had been granted in 1953 for a term of twenty years, with an option to renew if the appellant so desired, in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949. It was an admitted fact that the domestic demand for manganese ore in India was extremely small, and consequently the ore extracted from the mines was intended almost entirely for export. Because the leases were only obtained in 1953, the appellant could not have extracted any substantial quantity of manganese ore before that year, nor could he have exported any ore prior to 1953. To appreciate the appellant’s position, the Court found it necessary to trace the history of export restrictions on manganese ore from 1953 up to the date relevant to the petition. This historical narrative would illuminate the regulatory environment that the appellant contended infringed his constitutional rights.

At the time the appellant entered the manganese ore business, the export of manganese ore was wholly unrestricted. The commodity could be exported without any licence, and the Government exercised no control over the allocation of railway wagons for its transportation. As the volume of ore exported began to increase, the railways found themselves unable to satisfy the growing demand for wagons. Consequently, the railways were compelled to regulate the allotment of wagons. In response, the Government introduced a system of registration of shippers, granting priority in wagon allocation to those registered shippers. It is important to note that this regulatory scheme concerning wagon allotment and movement was coordinated with, and related to, certain changes that were simultaneously being made in the regulation of the export of manganese ore itself.

Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) provides that the Central Government may, by an order published in the Official Gazette, make provisions for prohibiting, restricting, or otherwise controlling, in all cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to any exceptions, the following: (a) the import, export, coastal carriage, or shipment as ship’s stores of goods of any described category; and (b) the bringing into any port or place in India of goods of a described category that are intended to be taken out of India without being reserved from the ship or conveyance in which they are being carried. The Act further declares that all goods to which an order under sub‑section (1) applies shall be deemed to be goods whose import or export has been prohibited or restricted under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and that all provisions of that Act shall have effect, except that Section 183 thereof shall operate as if the word “shall” were replaced by the word “may.” Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, the Central Government may, by an order published in the Official Gazette, prohibit, restrict, or impose conditions on the clearance—whether for domestic consumption or for shipment abroad—of any goods or class of goods imported into India. Exercising the powers conferred by this section, the Central Government issued the Exports Control Order, 1958 (commonly called the Control Order). Clause 3 of that Order states that no person shall export any goods of the description specified in Schedule I except under and in accordance with a licence granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II. Manganese and iron ore were listed in the First Schedule. Clause 6 of the same Order enumerates the grounds on which the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Exports and Imports may refuse to grant a licence or direct a licensing authority not to grant a licence. In view of certain points urged

The Court considered it appropriate to reproduce the complete wording of Clause 6 of the 1958 Control Order for the record. Clause 6, titled “Refusal of licence”, provides that the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports may refuse to grant a licence or may direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licence in any of the following circumstances: (a) where the application for the licence does not conform to any provision of the Order; (b) where the application contains any false, fraudulent or misleading statement; (c) where the applicant relies on any document in support of the application that is false, fabricated or has been tampered with; (d) where the applicant on any occasion has tampered with an export licence, has exported goods without a licence where a licence was required, or has been a party to any corrupt or fraudulent practice in his commercial dealings; (e) where the application for an export licence is defective and does not meet the prescribed rules; (f) where the applicant commits a breach of the Export Trade Control Regulations; (g) where the applicant is not eligible for a licence under the Export Trade Control Regulations; (h) where the licensing authority decides to channel exports through special or specialised agencies or channels; (i) where the applicant is a partner in a partnership firm or a director of a private limited company that is, at that time, subject to any action under Clause 8; and (j) where the applicant is a partnership firm or a private limited company, and any partner or director thereof, as the case may be, is at that time subject to any action under Clause 8.

The Court then noted that the initial restriction on the export of manganese and iron ore was introduced in June 1956. On 26 June 1956 the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued a public notice outlining the Government’s policy for the export period covering July to December 1956. The notice explained that the Government was of the view that the existing trading mechanism for ore exports was inadequate to keep pace with developments in the importing countries. It further observed that several exporters who had entered into contracts with foreign buyers were unable to fulfil their commitments, causing inconvenience to those buyers and eroding their confidence in India’s ability to provide a reliable supply of ores. To address this problem and to increase foreign‑exchange earnings from the export of these ores, the Government announced its intention to re‑orient ore trading on more rational lines. Specifically, it proposed to progressively channel the export of ores through the State Trading Corporation, which would rely on domestic mining interests and, as far as practicable, utilise the existing trade mechanism. For these reasons, the Government declared that a regulation would be put in place governing the export of these ores for the half‑year July‑December 1956.

For the half‑year spanning July to December 1956, the export of manganese ore was organised into three distinct categories of exporters. First, established shippers received export quotas calculated on the average quantities they had exported during the three preceding years, namely 1953, 1954 and 1955. Second, mine‑owners were allotted quotas based on the annual average of ore on which royalty had been paid in the same three‑year period. Third, the State Trading Corporation was granted a quota on an ad‑hoc basis. It is noted that the State Trading Corporation, a corporation owned and controlled by the Union Government, had been incorporated under the Indian Companies Act in May 1956. In addition to the quota allocations, rail‑transport facilities commensurate with the granted quotas were assured for all quota‑receivers. Although a number of clarifications and minor, non‑substantive variations to this Press Note were subsequently issued, they are not material to the issues presently before the Court.

The manner in which control was exercised and restrictions were imposed meant that mine‑owners who had entered the field after 1953 were excluded from receiving any export quota. Recognising the concerns of these “new‑comers,” the Ministry of Commerce issued a public notice on 4 September 1956 stating that their situation was under consideration and that a further announcement would be made in due course.

The same policy framework and the same basis for allocation were continued for the next half‑year, that is, January to June 1957. For the period from July 1957 to June 1958, the Government altered its approach by announcing quotas for an entire year rather than for six‑month intervals. A Press Note dated 1 June 1957 allotted exporters and mine‑owners a quota equal to sixty per cent of the quantities they had exported in either 1956 or 1958, as selected by them. This quota was also made available for the State Trading Corporation on an ad‑hoc basis. The Press Note further directed that the State Trading Corporation would receive an adequate quota to enable it to maximise manganese‑ore exports and was advised to seek the cooperation of established trading and mining interests to ensure the success of this effort. Subsequent Press Notes introduced only minor, non‑substantive modifications, which are not discussed further.

Regarding the subsequent period of July 1958 to June 1959, the Government’s policy decision was communicated through a public notice issued on 26 May 1958. In that statement, the Government indicated that it had continuously reviewed the operation of the earlier Press Notes and concluded that the long‑term interests of Indian manganese ore would be better served by an export policy that discouraged the fragmentation of quotas and promoted bulk contracting, movement and shipment of ores. The Government also expressed a desire to maintain continuity in export arrangements where practicable. Accordingly, it announced that for July 1958 to June 1959 the export of manganese ore would be regulated as follows: (i) established shippers, mine‑owners, exporters and the State Trading Corporation would each receive an allotment of quota equal to the quota applicable for 1957‑58; and (ii) firms and parties whose individual allotments were small were advised to form cooperative or limited companies.

In this case the Court observed that the Government had expressly expressed a desire to preserve continuity in the export arrangements for manganese ore as far as practicable, and it then issued a policy statement for the period July 1958 to June 1959 that set out the manner in which the export of the ore would be regulated. The statement, quoted in the record, declared that the Government had decided that during that period the export of manganese ore would be regulated as follows: “The established shippers, the mine‑owners, exporters and the State Trading Corporation will be given an allotment of quota for a quantity equal to the quota for 1957‑58. Firms and parties whose individual allotments are small are advised to form co‑operative or limited companies.” When the writ petition, from which the present appeal originated, was filed, the policy statement dated 26 May 1958 was still in force, and the petitioner challenged the validity of the restrictions and controls imposed by that policy as being unconstitutional. The factual position at that time can be summarised. First, from July 1956 onward the export of manganese ore had been placed under a system of control or restriction. Second, that restriction operated through the allocation of export quotas to three categories: (a) established exporters – those who had exported manganese ore since 1953; (b) mine‑owners who had also exported ore they had extracted, subject to the same temporal limitation; and (c) the State Trading Corporation, which was given an ad‑hoc quota to cover any remaining quantity that could be exported to a foreign market. Traders and mine‑owners who lacked any export record in the prescribed earlier years were excluded from the scheme. Although the Government repeatedly announced in public statements that the situation of such “new‑comers” would be considered, no such consideration was ever made. The appellant fell within this excluded category and was therefore ineligible for any export quota, leaving him unable to export. Consequently, the ore he mined could be sold only in the domestic market, which was highly restricted because the principal domestic consumers – the steel manufacturers – obtained their required ore from their own mines, or, if the domestic market was unavailable, the ore had to be sold to either the established shippers or the State Trading Corporation. The established shippers were experiencing a progressive reduction in their export quotas, which naturally reduced their demand for ore and forced “new‑comers” to offer unusually low prices to induce purchases. The only other potential buyer was the State Trading Corporation, which received ad‑hoc quotas sufficient to enable it to acquire all the good ore it could find a foreign buyer for.

In this case, the Court noted that the appellant had alleged, with reference to a circular issued by the State Trading Corporation on 20 April 1957, that the terms offered for the purchase of ore were unfair to sellers because the corporation demanded an excessively large commission. The Court observed, however, that the State Trading Corporation had not been impleaded as a party in the writ petition before the High Court, nor had any relief been claimed on the basis of that allegation. The allegation was therefore relied upon only to highlight the hardship suffered by the appellant as a result of the exclusion of persons who lacked export performance in the years that had been fixed as the basic years for the allocation of export quotas to mine‑owners. The Court explained that the State Trading Corporation, being owned and controlled by the Central Government, functioned as an agency or instrument of the Government for implementing its commercial policy. Although it was open that, in the performance of its duties as a public authority, the corporation could be subject to judicial control if it acted in an improper or unfair manner, the Court found that because the appellant had not sought any relief based on that complaint, it was unnecessary to pursue the point or examine its merits. The Court then turned to the two admitted features of the appellant’s case that arose from the Government’s policy statements previously set out. First, mine‑owners who were “new‑comers,” meaning they did not have export performance in the specified basic years, were excluded from direct participation in the export trade, and consequently they faced a practically non‑existent internal market for manganese ore to sell to other parties who had been granted export facilities. Second, the only categories to which these mine‑owners could sell their ore were (a) established shippers and (b) the State Trading Corporation, and the nature of this market had already been described. The principal question presented for consideration by the appeal was whether the denial of the right to engage in export trade to this class of mine‑owners amounted to an unreasonable restriction on their constitutional right to carry on business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Court noted that one matter lay beyond the controversy, namely the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, which formed the ultimate source of the impugned notifications and executive actions, and that this validity was expressly conceded. The appellant’s counsel advanced two specific points: first, that Clause 6(h) of the Export Control Order, 1958 exceeded the rule‑making power conferred by Section 3 of the 1947 Act; and second, that even if Clause 6(h) and the canalisation of exports through “special” or “specialised” agencies or channels were valid, the notifications effecting such canalisation fell outside the contemplation of the “agency or channel” contemplated by Clause 6(h).

Proceeding further, the Court observed that the constitutional validity of Clause 6(h) of the Export Control Order, 1958 was not disputed before it, because the controversy surrounding that clause had already been resolved by the decision of this Court in Glass Chatons Importers and Users Association v. Union of India, 1961 AIR (SC) 1514. The argument advanced in support of the contention that Clause 6(h) lay beyond the terms of Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 was briefly articulated as follows: Section 3, by its language, its setting and its context, permitted restrictions or controls only with respect to goods that were the subject matter of export and did not permit restrictions to be imposed on persons engaged in the export trade. In other words, the Central Government, by a notified order made under Section 3, was authorised to (a) specify the particular goods in respect of which control or restriction was to be exercised, (b) prescribe the quantities that might be exported, (c) determine the quality of the goods that could leave the country, and (d) indicate the destinations to which such goods might be sent. The Court noted that the scope of a Section 3 order could not extend beyond those matters; it could not make provisions that restricted the persons who might participate in export trade, limit their number, or impose qualifications that they must satisfy before being permitted to export. Moreover, even assuming that a notified order could validly prescribe the persons who might engage in export trade, the Court held that such an order would still not authorise a scheme that canalised or channelled those persons in a manner that effectively created a monopoly in favour of any particular individual or group, which is precisely the effect of Rule 6(h). The argument was also presented in a slightly different form by reference to the provisions of Article 19(6). Article 19(1)(g) guarantees every citizen the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business, but Clause (6) of Article 19 subsequently allows the State to impose reasonable restrictions on that right in the interests of the general public. After the first amendment of the Constitution, Clause (6) read, to quote the material words: “Nothing in sub‑clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub‑clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub‑clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, – (i) (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.” The Court noted that the policy statements and directions issued to licensing authorities by virtue of the powers conferred by Clause 6(h) of the Export Control Order, 1958 had resulted in the creation of a monopoly, or a near‑monopoly, in favour of the State Trading Corporation. It was urged that such a monopoly could, on the language of Article 19(6)(ii), be effected only by the State making a law that related to the matters set out therein. Neither the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 nor the notified order made thereunder – the Export Control Order, 1958 – could be characterised as “a law relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade, business, industry or service”. Consequently, the Court held that the validity of the preferential treatment granted to the State Trading Corporation could not be justified or upheld by reference to the amendment effected to Clause (6) by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The Court accepted that portion of the argument but indicated that the remaining issue was whether the impugned provision could nevertheless be sustained as a reasonable restriction.

In this case the licensing authorities, acting under the power given by Clause 6(h) of the Exports Control Order, 1958, had effectively created a monopoly or a near‑monopoly that favored the State Trading Corporation. It was submitted that, according to the language of Article 19(6)(ii), such a monopoly could arise only if the State enacted a law that fell within the matters enumerated in that provision. The argument continued that neither the Export and Imports (Control) Act, 1947 nor the Export Control Order, 1958 could be characterised as “a law relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade, business, industry or service”. Consequently, the preferential treatment accorded to the State Trading Corporation could not be justified or upheld by referring to the amendment made to Clause (16) by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. This point could be accepted. However, the matter still required consideration of whether the impugned provision could be sustained as a “reasonable restriction” on the rights conferred by sub‑clause (g) of Article 19(1), in the interest of the general public, as indicated by the opening words of paragraph 1 of Clause (6). As already noted, the constitutional validity of Clause 6(h) insofar as it permits the canalising or channelling of export trade is no longer regarded as intact, a position that had been reaffirmed in the Class Chatons case. In these circumstances the narrow issue for determination was whether the restrictions and control for which a provision might be made under Section 3 would include a provision for canalising trade in any particular commodity. The Court was clearly of the opinion that a restriction or control manifested as channelling or canalising the trade did not fall outside the limitations that could be imposed on export trading by Section 3, and therefore Clause 6(h), in its present form, fell within the rule‑making power conferred on the Central Government by Section 3 of the Act. The submission that restrictions imposed or control exercised on exports by orders made under Section 3 could not extend to restrictions on persons permitted to engage in export trade was merely a statement of position. If the quantum of export of a commodity could be limited, the control necessary to achieve that limitation would inevitably have to extend to the persons who were engaged in or who wished to engage in the export of that commodity, and this would be even more evident if the restriction amounted to a complete prohibition of exports of that commodity. Accordingly, if the control or restriction could legally extend to the persons engaged in the trade, it logically followed that the restriction might take the form of classifying the persons who could participate in the trade and the conditions to which they would be subject.

The Court explained that the Government, as a matter of policy, must decide how to classify persons who may be permitted to export a particular commodity, taking into account the nature of the commodity and the circumstances surrounding its export trade. The Government therefore determines the basis for placing persons into different groups and for fixing the relative priorities of those groups. When Clause 6(h) of the Export Control Order authorises the “canalising” or “channelling” of exports through selected agencies, the provision merely creates a mechanism for such classification. This classification is one of the modes by which the control power conferred by Section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act may be exercised.

The Court then turned to the next issue, namely whether the series of notifications issued by the Government were lawful. Those notifications provided that (1) the export of manganese ore would be limited to three categories of persons: (a) established shippers, (b) mine‑owners, and (c) the State Trading Corporation, with the first two categories receiving quotas based on their export performance during specific “basic years”; (2) the quotas allotted to categories (a) and (b) would be progressively reduced so that the available export business could be transferred to the State Trading Corporation; and (3) as a necessary consequence of the foregoing, the class of traders commonly referred to as “new‑comers” would be excluded from the export trade, all of which was permitted under Clause 6(h) of the 1958 Export Control Order. From these provisions the Court noted that the appellant raised two inter‑related grievances. The first grievance concerned the quotas allotted to the established shippers and mine‑owners based on their performance in the basic years. The counsel for the appellant did not treat this as a serious grievance, observing that persons already engaged in the trade and a newcomer such as the appellant could not legitimately object to existing traders receiving facilities or licences necessary for export. The appellant had, however, argued before the High Court that the selection of the basic years in the policy statement was arbitrary. The Court found that the Government had fixed the basic year as the three‑year period preceding the announcement of the policy, thereby basing the quotas on performance during that period, and saw no unreasonable or arbitrary element in that choice.

The second grievance targeted the inclusion of the State Trading Corporation among the entities entitled to export manganese ore and the ad hoc increase in its export quota without reference to any prior performance. The appellant’s counsel characterised this as creating a monopoly that the law did not permit. The Court indicated that it would limit its examination to the grounds upon which the successive notifications that increasingly favoured the State Trading Corporation were challenged. Finally, the Court noted that it would be convenient at this stage to set out the reasons why, according to the appellant,...

In this case, the State Trading Corporation was chosen by the respondent as the principal agency to channel the export trade of manganese ore. The importance of export earnings for sustaining the national economy was not contested, and the Government had to decide how best to obtain the maximum revenue from manganese ore exports. India did not possess a monopoly over the production of this ore, and consequently the world market price of the commodity depended on international factors. Because the ore is used principally by steel manufacturers, foreign buyers demanded a steady supply of ore of uniform quality, and in several foreign countries such trade is conducted through State agencies. Earlier, when trade in the commodity was unrestricted, purchasers complained that the ore supplied did not match the samples, causing even diligent exporters to suffer losses. In response to those complaints, the Government intervened in 1956, imposed export restrictions, and assured foreign buyers of a regular supply through the control mechanisms established in the country. The parties did not dispute these factual circumstances.

Having set out this background, the Court examined the challenge to the validity of the notification that imposed the export controls. Any restriction on persons entitled to engage in a trade necessarily excludes those who fail to satisfy the prescribed criteria, and this effect is intensified when the restriction takes the form of canalising the trade, because canalising by definition selects some groups and excludes others. Section 3 of the Act authorises the making of a rule to canalise export trade in a commodity, and such canalisation is not unconstitutional; therefore a person cannot maintain a viable legal grievance simply because he has been omitted from the group of persons permitted to trade. The issue of whether the canalising has been carried out properly, in the sense that the selected groups are no less favourable than the excluded groups, raises a separate question of possible discrimination. The Court noted, however, that the appellant did not allege that the established shippers and the mine‑owners who received quotas in addition to the State Trading Corporation had been improperly included among the persons entitled to export, and that there exists a rational and proper classification between those possessing experience in the trade and the newcomers who lack such experience. In

In the matters involving other commodities that were either exported or imported, the Court observed that newcomers—individuals who lacked any prior experience in the specific export line but who possessed experience in other areas of trade—had been allotted export quotas. The Court noted, however, that such allocations were to be made taking into account the particular circumstances of each trade. It was emphasized that no submission had been made suggesting that prior experience in the export trade itself was not a valuable qualification for granting a quota, whether that quota was ordinary or preferential, in the commodity that was presently before the Court. Consequently, the Court explained that had the statutory notifications restricted the entire export trade to persons who already had previous export experience, the arguments presented by the appellant’s counsel could not have given rise to any legal objection. Under that hypothetical situation, the appellant would have been excluded from participation, but the Court held that the appellant could not legitimately claim that such exclusion was illegal, because the exclusion would have been a necessary and foreseeable result of the policy of channelling or canalising exports through those who already possessed relevant experience in the field.

The Court then turned to the appellant’s principal grievance, namely that, in preference to the appellant and to other persons who owned the ore intended for export, the State Trading Corporation—an entity that did not have any prior experience in export trade—had been selected as the agency responsible for canalising the exports. The Court acknowledged that if the sole criterion for differentiation were prior experience, the preference shown to the State Trading Corporation over the appellant and others in the same class might appear unjustified. Nevertheless, the Court stressed that prior experience was not the exclusive test for assessing the propriety of the selection. Earlier, the Court had set out the various reasons on which the Government had based its decision to appoint the State Trading Corporation as the agency for effecting the export trade. In light of those reasons, the Court found no impropriety in the choice. Moreover, the Court observed that the overarching objective of the export trade—namely, to maximise foreign‑exchange earnings and to promote exports of a long‑range character for the country—could be more readily achieved with the State Trading Corporation acting as the principal agency. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the argument advanced by the appellant’s counsel, which contended that the appointment of the State Trading Corporation and the ad‑hoc granting of quotas to it either exceeded the powers conferred on the licensing authorities by Clause 6(h) of the Export Control Order or were otherwise open to objection, lacked any substantive basis.

The Court further addressed another point raised in connection with Clause 6(h), which authorises the licensing authorities to canalise exports “through special or specialised agencies or channels.” It was contended that the State Trading Corporation was neither a special nor a specialised agency or channel, and that, on that ground, the selection of the corporation fell outside the scope of Clause 6(h). The Court stated unequivocally that it could not accept this submission. While the term “specialised” might admit various interpretations, the Court rejected the narrow view that “special” must denote an agency possessing a type of prior experience that other entities could not claim. The Court clarified that a “special” agency could be understood as one designated for the purpose of canalising trade, chosen because, in view of the intended objective, it was more likely than other agencies to achieve that objective or to do so to a greater extent. In that sense, the Court expressed no hesitation in holding that the State Trading Corporation could qualify as a “special” agency or channel for the purpose of ensuring the continuity and adequacy of the country’s export trade in the commodity concerned. We are wholly

In this case the Court held that it could not accept the argument that the word “special” must be interpreted to mean an expert agency possessing experience that others could not claim. The Court explained that, irrespective of what the term “specialised” might signify, “special” should not be confined to a definition requiring exclusive expertise. It said that, without limiting the term to merely a designated agency, the proper construction of “special” was that it denoted an agency selected because of the purpose for which the canalisation or channeling was intended. In other words, an agency would be considered “special” if, given the objective of the canalising exercise, it was more likely than other agencies to achieve that objective or could achieve it to a greater extent. Applying this understanding, the Court found no hesitation in concluding that the State Trading Corporation could be regarded as a “special” agency or channel for the purpose of enabling the country to maintain and foster continuity of its trade in the commodity by ensuring exports in adequate quantity and of proper quality.

The Court further observed that the removal of the class to which the appellant belonged – namely “new‑comers” who had no prior experience of the export trade during the basic year or earlier – was the result of applying a permitted method of control and a type of restriction that was legally competent to be imposed under Clause 6(h) of the Export Control Order. The Court noted that, for other commodities, “new‑comers” had been granted quotas, but such grants naturally depended on the nature of the trade, the character of the export market and other factors that lie within the province of the Government to consider. The Court added that the Government’s view was not that the export trade in manganese ore was so restrictive that newcomers could never be allowed to participate; several policy statements issued from time to time expressly assured that the allotment of quotas to “new‑comers” was under consideration. Because manganese ore has a very limited internal market, the denial of export rights to any group or individual would adversely affect that party and would force him to sell to those who had been granted the facility. Persons such as the appellant were left hoping for some relief; the Court described this not merely as a hope deferred that made the heart sick, but as dashed hopes that compelled the appellant to approach the Court for relief. Although the Court concluded that the appellant possessed no legal right to the relief he sought, it recognised that his grievance was genuine and that it was for the Government to decide how best to protect the interests of this class, to make it worthwhile for them to obtain the ore, and thereby to expand, foster and augment the export trade in this valuable commodity.

The Court observed that the purpose of the provisions under discussion was to encourage the expansion and strengthening of the export trade in a commodity that was regarded as valuable, namely manganese ore. Turning to the legal issues raised in the appeal, the Court found that two premises were clearly established. First, Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 was a valid enactment of Parliament and therefore could not be said to be ultra vires. Second, Clause 6(h) of the Export Control Order was within the rule‑making authority that the Central Government possesses under the Act, and consequently it was constitutional. Because both of those premises were accepted, the Court concluded that the appellant did not possess any legally enforceable right that had been infringed. In other words, there was no right that could be enforced by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution, and consequently the appellant could not obtain any relief on that basis.

The Court further noted that it was unnecessary to examine the appellant’s request for a writ of mandamus that would compel the licensing authority to consider his application for an export licence for the half‑year that was current at the time his petition was filed, ignoring the terms of the contested notifications and policy statements. The half‑year in question had already elapsed, and therefore the High Court could not grant any relief on the petitioner’s petition, nor could this Court do so on appeal. While it was theoretically possible that a person in the appellant’s position might be entitled to a declaration concerning the validity of the restrictions that continued to operate beyond the period to which the licence related, the Court found that it need not pronounce on that hypothetical question because it did not arise in the proper context. The decisive point was that the restrictions and controls imposed on the trade were lawful, being founded upon the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety. No order as to costs was made. The judgment was delivered by a judge dissenting from the majority. The appeal, filed by certificate, challenged a decision of a division bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, which had dismissed an application made under Article 226 seeking a writ directing the first respondent, the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, to grant an export licence in the appellant’s favour. The appellant was identified as the lessee of manganese mines located in the State of Madhya Pradesh, engaged in the business of extracting and selling manganese ore. Because there was essentially no domestic market for manganese, the majority of the ore produced in India was exported. Up to the middle of 1956, miners, including the appellant, were free to negotiate directly with foreign buyers, sell their ore at railway sidings to exporters, or transport it to any port after obtaining the necessary wagon allotments from the Railways. However, starting in May 1956, the Government of India began issuing a series of notifications that progressively restricted the export quotas available to mine owners and shippers, eventually eliminating direct export by mine owners and routing the entire trade through the State Trading Corporation.

In this case, the Court described how the Government had gradually reduced the export quotas that were available to shippers and mine‑owners, eventually reaching a point where direct export by mine‑owners and shippers was completely prohibited and the whole trade was forced to pass through the State Trading Corporation. The State Trading Corporation had originally been set up by the Government as a private company under the Companies Act, 1956 and was later converted into a public company. The Court noted that it would later examine the specific details of this process. On 1 December 1958, the appellant submitted an application to the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, who was the first respondent in the appeal, seeking an export quota and a licence to export manganese ore under Clause (4) of the Exports (Control) Order, 1958 (referred to as the Order). The appellant also asked for permission to move the ore from the railway sidings to the port of Bombay. The first respondent replied on 17 December 1958, refusing the request on the ground that, according to the “existing” Government orders, export of manganese ore outside India was permitted only to established shippers and established mine‑owners. Feeling aggrieved by this refusal, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Bombay, but the High Court dismissed the petition. Consequently, the appellant brought the present appeal before this Court. The Court identified the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports as the first respondent and the Union of India as the second respondent. The appellant’s counsel argued that, under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the appellant possessed a right to carry on his business of producing, selling and exporting manganese ore, either directly or through exporters. According to the appellant, the policy statements issued by the Government from time to time, which formed the basis for rejecting his application, had crippled the trade of miners like him, who were newcomers to direct export. The appellant’s counsel further contended that Clause (6) of the Order, which authorized the Central Government, through the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, to channel exports through special or specialised agencies, was ultra vires because Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (the Act) did not grant the Central Government the power to assume such authority or to confer it on others. Even assuming that Clause 6(h) of the Order was valid, the counsel maintained that the Order only allowed export to be channelled through special or specialised agencies—meaning experts in export business—and could not be used to force trade through the State Trading Corporation, which was not a more competent exporter and lacked experience compared with established exporters. In the counsel’s view, the overall effect of the policy statements was to create a monopoly in the manganese export trade that favoured the State Trading Corporation and other qualified exporters.

In the circumstances described, the export policy was applied exclusively to the benefit of the State Trading Corporation, while no measures such as fixed quotas were introduced to protect the interests of miners like the appellant. Consequently the miners were forced either to abandon their trade altogether or to place themselves at the mercy of third parties who could dictate the terms of sale and who might, or might not, purchase the ore from them. The Court observed that this manner of implementing the policy amounted to an unreasonable restriction on the miners’ constitutional right to conduct their mining and manganese‑ore selling business.

The respondents’ counsel argued that the appellant’s petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should be dismissed because it had become moot; the licence for the year 1959, which the appellant had sought, had already expired. The counsel further contended that the order issued by the first respondent was valid because Clause 6 of the Order had been lawfully made, and that the Government’s scheme of implementing the policy was authorised by Clause 6(h) of the Order. Moreover, the counsel submitted that the limitation placed on the petitioner’s fundamental right was a reasonable restriction.

The Court identified the first issue as whether Clause 6(h) of the Order was ultra vires the Export Control Act. It referred to the relevant statutory language. Section 3 of the Act provides: “Powers to prohibit or restrict imports and exports. – (1) The Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, in all cases of specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions if any, as may be made by or under the order: (a) the import, export, carriage coastwise or shipment as ship’s stores of goods of any specified description.” The Order, in Clause 6, states: “Refusal of licence. – The Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports may refuse to grant a licence or direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licence … (h) if the licensing authority decides to canalise exports and the distribution thereof through special or specialised agencies or channels.” The Order was enacted under the powers conferred by Sections 3 and 4A of the Act. The respondents argued that Section 3 does not empower the Central Government to issue an order that confers on itself or another authority the power to canalise exports through special agencies or channels. The Court rejected this argument, noting that Section 3 gives the Central Government a very wide authority to make provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling exports in all cases or in specified classes of cases, and that such authority necessarily includes the power to canalise exports through specialised agencies or channels as a means of exercising control.

In the present matter, the Court observed that directing exports through specialised agencies or channels constitutes a method of exercising control over export trade. The petitioners argued that Section 3 of the Act applied only at the moment of export and therefore did not authorize the Government to grant any power for regulating internal trade as a means of influencing exports. The Court rejected this narrow interpretation, noting that while the Central Government may not intervene in ordinary internal trade under the pretext of export regulation, the authority to prohibit, restrict or control the export of goods necessarily includes, by implication, all measures that are closely connected with the regulation of export trade. The Court reasoned that limiting the power to the point of export would frustrate the purpose of the statute, whose main objective was to support the national economy by promoting exports and securing a favourable balance of trade. To achieve this objective, the Government must be able to select goods that the country can afford to export, identify appropriate foreign markets, establish a reputation for Indian products by ensuring quality standards, timely delivery and honest dealings, allocate quotas or apply equitable principles to prevent hardship, fix reasonable rates and perform other related functions. Such comprehensive regulation could not be accomplished if the Government’s control were confined solely to the export point; in some cases, regulation might need to begin at an earlier stage, even at the stage of production. Accordingly, the Court held that the power conferred by Section 3 of the Act was wide enough to include the authority granted under Clause 6(h) of the Order to canalise exports through special or specialised agencies or channels.

Addressing the appellant’s additional submissions, the Court considered the contention that the terms “special” or “specialised” agencies or channels implied only export agencies with particular expertise. The Court referred to standard dictionary definitions, noting that “special” means “for a particular purpose” and “specialised” means “set apart for a particular purpose.” These definitions do not require that the agency possess expert qualifications in a specific line of trade. While the Government might prefer to appoint agencies that are well‑versed in the export of particular commodities to achieve optimal results, the statutory language of the clause did not impose such a qualification requirement. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the argument that only agencies with specialized expertise could be used, and it concluded that the clause permitted the Government to designate suitable agencies without mandating a specific level of expertise.

It was held unnecessary to express an opinion on whether the State Trading Corporation occupied a superior position or possessed greater qualifications than the experienced exporters who were engaged in the export of manganese ore, because the authority to select the agency rested exclusively with the Government. Nevertheless, the appellant argued that the scheme, as it was gradually unfolded by the Government through a series of policy statements, violated the appellant’s fundamental right and the rights of similarly situated persons under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. To evaluate this contention, the Court found it necessary to briefly examine the various policy statements issued by the Central Government and to assess their impact on the appellant’s business.

The first relevant statement was a Press Note dated 26 June 1956, issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi. Prior to the issuance of that Press Note, miners who produced manganese ore were permitted to enter into contracts with foreign buyers and to export their product, subject only to the prevailing export control regulations. The Press Note introduced a change in this policy, and it set out four reasons for the alteration. First, the existing trading mechanism was deemed inadequate to cope with developments in certain countries regarding the purchase of ores and the consequent effects on Indian foreign trade. Second, the pre‑occupation of the controlling authorities with the equitable distribution of available wagon space among mining and trading interests had made it virtually impossible to utilise limited resources to their maximum advantage or to arrange economical transportation of ores and their handling at the ports. Third, the trading interests had entered into large contracts, and some of those contracts could not be fulfilled. Fourth, the mining industry did not enjoy an adequate scope for development on sound lines. In view of these reasons, the Government articulated a new policy, stating that it considered it necessary to play a more positive role in overcoming obstacles to augment foreign‑exchange earnings from ore exports. The Government therefore decided to re‑orient trading in ores on more rational lines and to progressively channel the export of ores through the State Trading Corporation, relying principally on the country’s mining interests while using the existing trading mechanism to the extent practicable. At the same time, the Government proposed to provide limited opportunities for direct participation by mining and trading interests in the export trade, within the limits of a Board policy to be laid down by the Government of India. Pursuant to the said policy, the Press Note informed the trading public that it had been decided to regulate the export of

In July‑December 1956, the Government announced that the export of iron and manganese ores would be conducted only through established shippers, mine‑owners and the State Trading Corporation, and that export quotas would be allotted according to three separate criteria. Established shippers were to receive quotas calculated on the basis of the average annual quantity they had actually exported during the three calendar years 1953, 1954 and 1955. Mine‑owners were to receive quotas calculated on the basis of the average annual quantity of ore on which royalty had actually been paid, excluding any ore supplied for domestic consumption, during the same three‑year period. The policy further provided that any mine‑owner whose mining lease had expired on 31 December 1955 and whose lease had not been renewed thereafter would be ineligible for a quota. The State Trading Corporation was to be allotted quotas on an ad‑hoc basis as determined by the Government. In addition, the Government stipulated that the quotas would be valid only for rail‑transport facilities on the railway sections that had previously been used by the respective shipper, and that quota‑holders would not be permitted to transport on any section a quantity greater than the amount they had moved on that section during any of the three years 1953, 1954 or 1955.

Subsequent Press Notes issued from time to time implemented the policy announced in the first statement by gradually eliminating shippers other than the State Trading Corporation. The High Court examined all of these Press Notes in detail and provided a concise summary of the steps taken by the Government, deeming it unnecessary to revisit each notice again. The Court described the progression as follows: initially, the manganese trade was regulated through a system of licensing export quotas; Press Notes dated 14 July 1956, 30 July 1956, 6 August 1956, 4 September 1956 and 1 June 1957 showed that the quotas granted to shippers and mine‑owners were reduced incrementally with each successive issuance; until the fifth statement dated 4 September 1956, the situation of mine‑owners who had no previous shipments was not contemplated by the policy, although the Government announced in that statement that it was considering their case, and no specific provision for them appeared until the State Trading Corporation assumed a dominant role; during the period covered by the seventh statement, the State Trading Corporation entered the arena and competed freely with private interests, while small quota‑holders were advised to form co‑operatives or companies and were discouraged from operating independently; from the date of the eighth statement, viz. 12 March 1959, it became clear that the full freedom previously enjoyed by private traders was effectively halted, as all orders were required to be “canalised” through the State Trading Corporation, a process that imposed onerous terms and conditions difficult for small interests to meet, with the Corporation itself prescribing certain terms; finally, there were no restrictions placed on the activities of the State Trading Corporation and its quota was unlimited.

The Court noted that the State Trading Corporation and its allotted quota were not limited by any numerical ceiling. It explained that the policy had been put into operation with assistance of licensing authorities created under Imports and Exports (Control) Act and Order, together with port authorities, and by controlling allocation of railway wagons. It observed that the summary of the various notifications showed that the policy announced in the first statement had been applied step by step. Initially it restricted the issue of quotas and licences to recognised exporters and to the State Trading Corporation, and later it effectively gave a monopoly to the State Trading Corporation. It further noted that although earlier Press Notes had indicated that the Government was reviewing the situation of mine‑owners who had no previous shipments to their credit. No measures were taken during the prescribed period to assist those owners. Consequently, mine‑owners without shipments, such as the petitioner, were unable to transport manganese ore from their mines for export because they could sell only to shippers and to State Trading Corporation by 12 March 1959. After that date only to the State Trading Corporation. The Court further observed that, in the Government’s eagerness to increase manganese‑ore exports, persons who were not already engaged in export trade during the relevant period were completely disregarded. This disregard caused their businesses and industries to suffer severe damage.

The Court recorded that counsel for the respondents argued that the appellant had filed an application for a licence on 11 December 1958. The appellant sought permission to export not merely to State Trading Corporation but also to other shippers, mine‑owners and exporters. The Court indicated that it would examine the merit of that contention. It also observed that the petition did not clearly specify whether the requested export licence pertained to a period preceding the issuance of the eighth statement dated 12 March 1959. The earlier licence period was scheduled to terminate on 1 June 1959. The eighth statement, issued on 12 March 1959, covered the interval from July 1959 to 1960, a span during which the State Trading Corporation had effectively secured a virtual monopoly over manganese export trade. The Court inferred that the licence and quota sought by the appellant were more likely related to the financial year 1959‑60. This conclusion was supported by the fact that the first respondent disposed of the application by an order dated 17 December 1958. Notwithstanding these considerations, the Court stated that it would evaluate the argument by alternative reasoning. It held that the claim of a free market in which the petitioner could sell his manganese ore to recognised exporters was both unrealistic and unjust to the petitioner. The Court questioned what market, if any, existed where the petitioner could obtain reasonable prices for his ore, noting that he could not sell in the domestic market because, in practice, no such market existed.

The Court observed that the recognised exporters, which included the established shippers as well as the State Trading Corporation, were not obliged to purchase any quota offered by the petitioner or by other miners who were in a position similar to the petitioner. These recognised exporters possessed the power to dictate the terms of sale and could even disregard certain mine‑owners. Consequently, an artificial market had been created for mine‑owners such as the appellant, a market in which they could sell their manganese ore only to the established shippers, and only if those shippers were willing to purchase the ore at a price set by the shippers themselves. After March 1959, this artificial market became even more restricted because the sole purchaser was limited to the State Trading Corporation. The appellant complained that, because of these restrictions on sale and export, he was unable to sell his manganese ore. In his petition the appellant set out the following allegations: “The State Trading Corporation, under the colour of impugned Notices, has been dictating its own price and has been thus in effect demanding every exorbitant commission for the purpose of giving facilities of exporting the petitioner's ore out of the unlimited quota allotted to it. The respondent No. 1 is thus bent on putting the petitioner in heavy losses by forcing him to sell his ore to the Corporation at lesser price. The petitioner has now at hand 200 tons of manganese ore lying at his mines or sidings and valued at about Rs. 20, 000/- which is just being wasted as will be clear from the circular dated 20‑4‑1957 issued by the Corporation to the various mineowners. If the petitioner is not allowed to export his ore he would be stock piling about 50 tons of ore per month valued at Rs. 10, 000/- without any outlet or rolling of the capital which he has already invested as also the running cost including the wage bill of about Rs. 4, 000/- per month. If on the other hand the petitioner has to close his mines for want of sale of the ore he will have to pay a compensation running into several thousands of rupees to the workmen under the Industrial laws. Besides, he may be threatened under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 for cancellation of his lease for having a stopped working of his areas. The petitioner therefore submits that an impossible situation has been created by the respondent No. 1 by issue of various Notices referred to above.” The Court noted that these factual allegations were not contested by the respondents.

The Court then asked whether the result of these restrictions, which had effectively destroyed the petitioner’s trade, could be described as a reasonable limitation on his fundamental right. It held that, under the pretext of channeling exports through specialised agencies or channels, the Government had virtually conferred a monopoly on a public corporation, an action that had crippled the business of mine‑owners such as the petitioner. The Court said that such an unjust situation could not be dismissed merely on the basis that the petitioner could export his ore through the Corporation. The Court further observed that a justification for the restriction might exist only if, after March 1959, the Corporation and, before that date, the established exporters had been bound by a quota that applied equally to mine‑owners such as the appellant. The discussion continued on the need to examine whether any such quota arrangement had been in place.

The Court observed that a person’s means of livelihood should not be left to fluctuate according to the changing preferences of an officer of a State corporation, however well‑meaning that officer may be while performing his duties. It held that the policy of directing all manganese ore exports through one or more designated agencies could be reconciled with a fair distribution of export quotas among the various producers and traders of manganese ore, without undermining the purpose of encouraging export trade. The Court stressed that any system that routes exports through specialised agencies must be based on clear, written rules that provide stability and assure equitable treatment both in normal circumstances and during emergencies. As an illustration, it suggested that the government could formulate rules that assign each mine‑owner a specific quota representing the expected total volume of his export, taking into account both the quality and the quantity of manganese he produces. The Court further proposed that an expert body might be created under those rules to advise the State on the appropriate quota for each owner and to determine reasonable prices in view of the prevailing conditions. It acknowledged that other methods might also be devised to achieve the same objective, and that the responsibility for such design lies with the Government and the appointed experts. However, the Court emphasized that uncertainty must not be allowed to linger in the minds of those affected by the scheme; instead, the Government should establish definite principles by issuing comprehensive rules that also accommodate emergencies and changing circumstances. Finally, the Court clarified that these observations were not intended to restrict the Central Government’s freedom to make suitable regulations, but merely to guide it in formulating appropriate rules in light of the points raised.

At this point, the Court noted another argument raised by counsel for the appellant. The appellant’s counsel contended that, in the absence of a specific statute authorising the State or a State‑controlled corporation to conduct a business to the exclusion, whether total or partial, of citizens, any de‑facto monopoly created by administrative action under the guise of a power to channel trade in a particular commodity through designated channels must be regarded as an unreasonable restriction on a citizen’s right to engage in that trade. To support this position, the counsel relied upon Article 19(6) of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The relevant portion of that amendment states: “Nothing in sub‑clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub‑clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub‑clause, shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, – (i) …………. (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation, owned or controlled by the”. The Court indicated that this constitutional provision does not itself grant the State power to create monopolies by administrative measures; rather, it merely provides that if a valid law confers such a power, that law will not violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). The Court further observed that the amendment does not imply that, unless such a law exists, every state interference with a citizen’s trade automatically constitutes an unreasonable restriction, but that such interference must be evaluated against the standard set out in the first part of Article 19(6).

The Court observed that the amended provision of Article 19(6) states that the State may, “of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.” The Court explained that this amendment does not, in itself, confer any inherent power on the State to create monopolies through administrative action. Rather, the amendment merely provides that if a valid statute expressly empowers the State to conduct a trade or business to the exclusion, whether wholly or partially, of citizens, such a statute would not violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). The Court further noted that the amendment does not support the argument advanced by counsel for the appellant that, in the absence of such a statute, every act of State interference with a citizen’s trade, exercised under some other legislative authority, would automatically constitute an unreasonable restriction. The Court clarified that such interference would not enjoy the shield of the amended Article 19(6); instead, it must be assessed according to the standard set out in the first part of Article 19(6) and would be valid only if it constituted a reasonable restriction on the petitioner’s fundamental right pursued in the public interest. The Court then turned to the earlier decision in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P., 1955 (1) SCR 707, 727, and concluded that the precedent does not assist the appellant. In that case, the Court examined whether the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 (11 of 1951) infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) and whether it was protected by Clause (6) of Article 19. The issue was considered on the basis of the provision as it existed before the First Amendment. The Court held that the Act did offend the fundamental right and observed: “It is quite true that if the present statute was passed after the coming into force of the new clause in Article 19(6) of the Constitution, the question of reasonableness would not have arisen at all and the appellant’s case on this point, at any rate, would have been unarguable. These are however considerations which cannot affect our decision in the present case, the amendment of the Constitution, which come later, cannot be invoked to validate an earlier legislation which must be regarded as unconstitutional when it was passed.” The Court found that these observations merely restate the obvious—that a law falling within the scope of the amended article would not raise a question of infringement—and offered no persuasive support to the appellant. Consequently, the Court determined that the matter of the earlier decision does not influence the present ruling. The Court then concluded that the Press Notes issued by the Government clearly infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right. However, because the period for which the licence was sought had expired, the application became infructuous and therefore had to be dismissed. In the result, the appeal was dismissed, without costs.

The Court concluded that the appeal could not be allowed and therefore ordered its dismissal. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the earlier observation that the licence period sought by the petitioner had expired, rendering the application ineffective and without any substantive relief to be granted. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed on the basis that it had become infructuous. However, the Court also considered the particular circumstances surrounding the case and decided that imposing costs on either party would be inappropriate. Consequently, the dismissal of the appeal was made without the award of costs to either side. This disposition reflected the Court’s assessment that, while the appeal could not succeed, the circumstances did not justify a cost order against the appellant.