Chinna Gowda vs State of Mysore

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos 172 and 173 of 1961

Decision Date: 27 April 1962

Coram: M. Mudholkar

In this case the Supreme Court recorded that the appellants had been found guilty of murder on the basis of the testimony of an approver and the confessions of two co‑accused. The Court observed that although a conviction may, in principle, rest on the evidence of an approver alone, prudence demands that such testimony be supported by corroboration of material particulars. The Court stressed that the requirement for corroboration was especially strong in the present matter because the approver possessed a bad reputation and could not be regarded as truthful after having withdrawn his confession before the trial court. The Court further held that the retracted confessions of the co‑accused could not be safely relied upon to corroborate the approver’s statement. It described a confession of an accomplice that is not subject to cross‑examination as a very weak form of evidence. Even where two or more accomplices independently make confessions that implicate a particular accused, such statements may carry some weight, but the Court found that the confessions in the present case did not rise to the level of reliable corroboration. The Court relied upon the decisions in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King [1949] LR 76 IA 147 and Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] SCR 526 in reaching its conclusion that the convictions could not be sustained.

The appeals were filed as Criminal Appeals Nos 172 and 173 of 1961, seeking special leave from the judgment and order dated 7 July 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos 352 and 355 of 1959 and Criminal Referred Case No 25 of 1959. Counsel for the appellants was the advocate for the accused, while counsel for the respondents represented the State. The judgment was delivered by Justice Mudholkar. The appellant, Chinna Gowda, had been tried together with six other persons for the alleged murder of an entire family of eight members on the night of 12 – 13 February 1958 in Handigodu hamlet of the village Viavalli. The learned Sessions Judge convicted each of the seven accused under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them all to death. On appeal, accused No 2, Sbivappa Naika, and accused No 7, Gunde Gowda, were acquitted, while the appeals of the remaining accused were dismissed. The High Court, however, upheld the conviction and death sentences of Chinna Gowda and Rame Gowda (the appellant in Criminal Appeal No 173) and, while confirming the convictions of the other three accused, commuted their death sentences to life imprisonment. The two appellants obtained special leave to appeal to this Court.

The Court noted that the appeal was placed before it under Article 136 of the Constitution. The prosecution’s case was summarized as follows: the deceased, Mariappa Gowda, had taken up residence in Handigodu roughly eight to ten years before the murders and had become a prosperous, industrious, and thrifty farmer. His increasing prosperity allegedly aroused the envy and jealousy of the appellant, Chinna Gowda. Over the years, a series of disputes arose between them concerning field boundaries, trespasses, and the flow of water. In the period leading up to the murders, the relationship between Mariappa Gowda and both the appellant Chinna Gowda and another appellant, Rame Gowda, had become severely strained. Rame Gowda had been living with Mariappa Gowda for some time and had been leasing land from him. Their relationship later deteriorated, and Mariappa Gowda sought to evict Rame Gowda from the leased lands. Consequently, Mariappa Gowda hesitated to issue rent receipts to Rame Gowda, which annoyed the latter. After the intervention of Chandiah Hegde, who was recorded as PW‑67, Mariappa Gowda eventually issued a receipt in favour of Rame Gowda. To Rame Gowda’s surprise, the receipt contained false statements indicating that he had surrendered the leased land to Mariappa Gowda. Rame Gowda complained to Chandiah, who promised to resolve the dispute, but Rame Gowda’s anger continued to grow. At one point he halted Mariappa Gowda’s bullock cart and challenged him to evict him from the leased lands. Later, Rame Gowda told a man named Singappagowda that Mariappa Gowda had cheated him and warned, “you will see what I will do to him in a few days.” The prosecution alleged that the remaining accused were friends of Chinna Gowda, but there was no suggestion that they held any personal grievance against Mariappa Gowda. It was accepted that Mariappa’s house was situated about one and a half furlongs from Chinna Gowda’s house, and that Chinna Gowda’s house was the nearest dwelling to Mariappa’s residence. Mariappa lived in that isolated house with his wife Bellamma and six children, kept a dog, maintained a light burning outside the house, and kept a loaded gun inside. A few days before the incident, the dog died of an unknown cause. On the morning of 13 February 1958, between 6.30 a.m. and 7.00 a.m., PW‑12 Narayan, a labourer employed by Mariappa Gowda, went to his master’s house as usual and was horrified to find all the doors open and the occupants lying on their beds in pools of blood, having been murdered. He promptly went to the house of Harithal Chandegowda, PW‑31, and informed him of the discovery; together with another man they proceeded to Handigodu village, after which the first information report was lodged with the police and investigations began.

In this case, after the discovery of the murders, the labourer identified as P.W. 12 Narayan of Handigodu went to the house of Harithal Chandegowda, P.W. 31, and told him what he had seen. Together with a third man they proceeded to the village of Handigodu, where they reported the incident to the authorities. The police then recorded the first information and began a formal investigation. During the investigation the police arrested seven persons alleged to have taken part in the killings and also arrested P.W. 40, Venkappa Naika, who later became an approver. While the investigation was under way, Venkappa Naika, as well as the third accused, Manjappa Gowda (accused No. 3), and the fourth accused, Manjappa Naika (accused No. 4), each gave a confession to the police. Venkappa Naika was offered a conditional pardon in return for his undertaking to give evidence for the prosecution. At the stage of committal, however, Venkappa Naika and the two other confessors withdrew their earlier statements. Nevertheless, all the accused except Venkappa Naika were committed to trial before the Additional Sessions Judge in Chikmagalur. At trial Venkappa Naika testified for the prosecution, repeating the substance of his earlier confession and alleging that he had withdrawn his confession only because the appellant, Chinna Gowda, had threatened his life. The Additional Sessions Judge, relying principally on the testimony of the approver and on the earlier withdrawn confessions of the two other accused, convicted and sentenced each of the accused as recorded in the earlier order. In addition to the approver’s testimony, the prosecution presented the evidence of two lay witnesses: P.W. 16, Dugamma, a neighbour of Chinna Gowda, and P.W. 59, Mariappa, the son of Rame Gowda and an agricultural labourer employed by Chinna Gowda. Both the trial judge and the High Court held that the statements of these two witnesses gave some corroboration to the approver’s account. The prosecution further relied on a circumstance that, shortly before the murders, Chinna Gowda, who was under severe financial pressure, had arranged to obtain a loan of Rs 600 from T. Shivaiah alias T. Shivaswamy, P.W. 75, who had agreed to advance the money on 13 February 1958. Although the loan was agreed, Chinna Gowda did not appear at T. Shivaiah’s house on the appointed day. It was suggested that after the murders the accused had taken the cash and jewellery found in the house and that Chinna Gowda retained the proceeds. The lower courts also noted that the accused, particularly the appellants in the two appeals, had not taken the step that other villagers did, namely to enquire about the incident or to visit the hospital where the bodies were taken. The trial court found that the testimony of Dugamma and of Mariappa did not materially corroborate the approver’s version, and in fact two statements made by the approver contradicted the evidence of the approver on important points. Consequently, the substantial material on which the case rested consisted primarily of the approver’s evidence and the withdrawn confessions of two of the accused.

The material upon which the prosecution’s case rested consisted of the testimony of the approver and the withdrawn confessions of two of the accused. The Court therefore examined whether the conviction of the appellants could be sustained on the basis of that evidence alone. It was acknowledged that section 133 of the Evidence Act does not prohibit a court from relying solely on the evidence of an approver to convict a accused. However, as has been observed in many decisions, including the Privy Council’s judgment in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1), prudence demands that the testimony of an approver be corroborated in material particulars. This requirement is founded on section 114(b) of the Evidence Act, which permits the court to presume that an accomplice is not trustworthy unless his statements are supported by independent evidence concerning material facts. The necessity for corroboration becomes even more compelling in the present case because the approver, besides being a participant in a grave offence and therefore of questionable character, had also retracted his earlier confession before the magistrate. This circumstance underscored the importance of obtaining corroboration for his statements on the essential points of the prosecution’s case. The Court then set out the substance of the approver’s evidence, which was given by Venkappa Naika. Venkappa Naika, described in the evidence as a bootlegger, recounted that on the day preceding the incident he and the appellant Chinna Gowda met at Thyavananda Angadi while returning to their village from Sringeri. Chinna Gowda inquired whether Venkappa Naika possessed any arrack, and upon receiving an affirmative answer, Chinna Gowda handed him five rupees and instructed him to deliver two bottles of arrack to his house the following evening for a party. Accordingly, on the evening of the day of the incident, Venkappa Naika arrived at the house carrying the two bottles of arrack. He did not meet Chinna Gowda there but observed Manjappa Gowda, identified as accused No. 3, preparing two bullocks in front of the house. Venkappa Naika then asked Manjappa Gowda where Chinna Gowda could be found. Manjappa Gowda directed him to the area garden where Chinna Gowda was expected to appear. Following that guidance, Venkappa Naika proceeded to the garden and saw three accused persons—Shivappa Naika, Rame Gowda (the appellant in the other appeal), and Gunde Gowda—sitting beneath a jack‑fruit tree. Subsequently, Manjappa Naika, accused No. 4, arrived, and shortly thereafter Chinna Gowda, Ramappa Naika (accused No. 5), and Manjappa Gowda joined the group. Manjappa Gowda brought rotti, chicken, and curry for the gathering. After everyone had been served arrack, the assembled men ate the chicken curry and rotti that Manjappa Gowda had provided, and after finishing the meal they took another round of arrack.

While the parties were drinking arrack, Chinna Gowda said, “Handi godu Mariappa Gowda is harassing me. We must go and finish him today.” Shivappa Naika responded, “Work must be done carefully. Whatever punishment may be meted out, you should not open your mouth. I am there to see to the rest.” After this exchange, Chinna Gowda took Shivappa to his house, left him there, and returned alone to the garden. By that time it was midnight. All the persons present then rose at the urging of Chinna Gowda and proceeded to the house of the deceased Mariappa Gowda. Chinna Gowda, Manjappa Gowda, Manjappa Naika, Rame Gowda and the approver Venkappa Naika each carried a chopper. On the way, Chinna Gowda remarked, “We should not leave even a worm. You must do the work carefully.” When they reached Mariappa Gowda’s house they observed a bedside lamp burning on the jagali; Chinna Gowda extinguished the lamp. He and Rame Gowda each had torches, which they flashed intermittently. Rame Gowda struck Mariappa Gowda, who was sleeping on the jagali, on the neck with his chopper. Chinna Gowda delivered a similar blow to Bellamma, who was sleeping beside Mariappa. The approver himself struck Bellamma on the head. Rame Gowda then struck a male child on the neck with his chopper, while the others only looked on. Chinna Gowda, seeing Manjappa Naika watching, said, “Why are you looking on, fool?” Manjappa Naika then struck Gunda, the eldest son of Mariappa Gowda, on the neck with his chopper. Subsequently, Chinna Gowda, Manjappa Gowda and Rame Gowda entered the house and murdered the four children of Mariappa Gowda who were sleeping there.

After the murders, Chinna Gowda relit the bedside lamp that had been extinguished, removed the bundle of keys from Mariappa Gowda’s waist, and unlocked one of the rooms. Inside he found a trunk, which he opened. The trunk contained a gold chain, a pair of bangles, three gold rings, one gold flower, and two bundles of currency notes. Chinna Gowda took possession of all these articles. Meanwhile, Rame Gowda removed the gold earrings from Bellamma’s ears and also removed her “manisara” that she wore around her neck, handing these items to Chinna Gowda. Chinna Gowda wrapped the jewellery in a towel and gave it to Ramappa Naika, while he retained the currency notes for himself. The party then left Mariappa Gowda’s house and went to a nearby nala where they washed their hands and the choppers. On their way back to Chinna Gowda’s house, Chinna Gowda said, “Let the commotion be over. Thereafter let us distribute the gold and the money. Let no one demand it now.” The group then proceeded to distribute the stolen items as instructed.

Shivappa Naika declared that the gold and money would be distributed, and following this declaration Manjappa Naika, Rame Gowda and Gunde Gowda returned to their respective homes while Chinna Gowda, Manjappa Gowda and Ramappa Naika proceeded to the residence of Chinna Gowda, accompanied by the approver. Upon arrival at Chinna Gowda’s house, Chinna Gowda retrieved the jewellery that had been placed there by Ramappa Naika. He then handed a kambal to the approver and instructed him to sleep on the jagali. Consequently the approver, together with Majappa Gowda and Manjappa Naika, slept on the jagali. Early the next morning the approver left Chinna Gowda’s house and returned to his own dwelling.

The Court first examined the testimony of PW 16, Duggamma, and of PW 59, Maryappa, son of Rame Gowda, to determine whether either account corroborated the statements of the approver. The Court noted that Duggamma’s evidence did not corroborate the approver’s account. Duggamma testified that, while she was preparing for bed, she heard Ramappa Naika say “Torch light fell,” and that at that moment Chinna Gowda and Manjappa Gowda were present on the jagali with him. The approver’s statement contained no reference to any torch light being flashed, and therefore no direct agreement existed between the two testimonies. The Court observed that a very limited overlap might be inferred, namely that some participants were present in the garden early in the evening and that Chinna Gowda and Ramappa Naika arrived together, later followed by Manjappa Gowda. However, the Court emphasized that such a partial coincidence could not be given any substantive weight. Duggamma further recounted that she awoke during the night, noticed a torch light flashing on her jagali, and saw Chinna Gowda approach. When she asked who it was, Chinna Gowda allegedly replied, “No one. Have you not got sleep? Sleep on.” The approver’s narrative made no mention of this incident, and consequently the Court concluded that Duggamma’s testimony offered no corroboration of any part of the approver’s evidence.

Subsequently the Court turned to the testimony of PW 59, Maryappa, who served as a servant in Chinna Gowda’s household. Maryappa stated that on the evening of the incident, the approver, Venkappa Naika, visited his master’s house and inquired of Manjappa Gowda as to the whereabouts of Chinna Gowda. Manjappa Gowda replied that Chinna Gowda was not at home and might have gone elsewhere. Following this exchange, Venkappa Naika proceeded to the garden at approximately nine or nine‑thirty p.m. While Maryappa was seated on his bed on the jagali of Chinna Gowda’s house, Chinna Gowda and Ramappa Naika entered the house and ate their meals. After they had finished, the three men—Chinna Gowda, Manjappa Gowda and Ramappa Naika—sat together on the jagali and conversed. During their conversation Maryappa observed a torch light flashing on a tree near the house. After this flash, all three men rose, stating that they should go to the garden, and they proceeded to the garden together. The Court noted that this account directly contradicted the approver’s statement, which claimed that he was instructed by Manjappa Gowda to go to the garden, that the participants in the crime had a barrack, chicken curry and rotti there, and that the entire party rose together in the garden. Maryappa’s testimony placed the meal inside the house, identified the torch flash occurring while the men were on the jagali, and described the men’s movement to the garden only after the flash, thereby undermining the approver’s version of events.

According to the testimony of PW 59, Maryappa, who served Chinna Gowda, the events of the evening unfolded as follows. After Venkappa Naika had visited the house and inquired about Chinna Gowda’s whereabouts, Manjappa Gowda told him that Chinna Gowda was not at home and might have gone elsewhere. Venkappa Naika then proceeded toward the garden at about nine or nine‑thirty p.m. While the witness was seated on his bed on the jagali of Chinna Gowda’s house, Chinna Gowda and Ramappa Naika arrived, ate their meals, and later sat together with Manjappa Gowda on the jagali. During their conversation a torchlight was seen flashing on a tree near the house. The three men then rose, stating that they should go to the garden, and walked to the garden. Five or ten minutes later they returned to the house. Chinna Gowda warned the witness not to tell anyone about the torch‑light flashing. The witness subsequently went to sleep and awoke at six or six‑thirty a.m., finding Chinna Gowda and Ramappa Naika still lying on the jagali. This account, taken as a whole, conflicted with the statements of the approver on several material points.

The approver, Venkappa Naika, had asserted that after being told by Manjappa Gowda to go to the garden he did so, that all participants in the alleged crime had taken barrack, chicken curry and roti in the garden, that the entire party rose at midnight, that Chinna Gowda returned to the house with Shivappa, left again, and that they all proceeded to the house of the deceased, Mariappa Gowda. By contrast, the witness testified that Chinna Gowda and Ramappa Naika ate in the house, that after the torch‑light flash they went to the garden and returned after only five or ten minutes, and that the time of their return was about nine‑thirty p.m. Moreover, the witness said that Chinna Gowda slept on the jagali, not inside the house, and made no mention of a midnight departure to Mariappa Gowda’s house. If the witness’s version were true, Chinna Gowda did not leave the garden at midnight for the house of Mariappa Gowda but instead returned to his own house and slept on the jagali. The approver’s claim that Chinna Gowda went with Shivappa to his house at midnight and then immediately returned was thus inconsistent with the witness’s timing of nine‑thirty p.m. Consequently, the witness’s evidence did not corroborate the approver’s account regarding the participation of Chinna Gowda; rather, it contradicted it on a material fact. The judgment also noted the alleged corroboration purportedly offered by the retracted concessions of the accused Manjappa Gowda and Manjappa Naika.

The Court observed that it had not been presented with the actual written confessions of the two accused individuals, but it was prepared to assume that their statements coincided with the narrative given by the approver. The question before the Court was whether those confessions could be relied upon as satisfactory corroboration of the approver’s testimony. Since the appellants and the confessing accused, namely Manjappa Gowda and Manjappa Naika, were tried together for the same series of offences, their confessions were admissible against the appellants pursuant to section 30 of the Evidence Act. However, the Court emphasized that a confession is not a fully satisfactory piece of evidence because it is not made in the presence of the persons it implicates and therefore cannot be subjected to cross‑examination. Consequently, a confession is a considerably weaker form of proof than the testimony of an approver, which does not suffer from that infirmity. While section 30 permits the Court to consider such confessions, as noted in Bhuboni Sahu’s case (citation suppressed), the provision does not elevate a confession to the status of conclusive proof. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1), this Court endorsed the decision in Bhuboni Sahu’s case and remarked that a judge may, in circumstances where the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction, call upon a confession to lend assurance to the other evidence and thereby strengthen the belief that would otherwise be lacking. After making this observation, the Court warned of the danger inherent in using the testimony of one accomplice to corroborate another. First, a confession of an accomplice cannot be tested by cross‑examination. Relying on illustration (b) to subsection 114 of the Evidence Act, the Crown argued in Bhuboni Sahu’s case (1) that when several participants in the alleged crime, in separate confessions, independently implicate a particular person without any prior concert, there is no reason to reject their statements and that the approver’s evidence, as the primary evidence, should be deemed sufficiently corroborated by those confessions. The Privy Council rejected this argument on several grounds, one of which was that the confessing accused had been produced before the magistrate together for the purpose of recording their confessions. The Board further observed, quoting page 157, that while the coincidence of multiple independent confessions of co‑accused implicating the same individual, given without prior coordination, may be accorded great weight, courts should remain cautious and not depart lightly from the long‑standing rule that requires independent evidence to implicate the particular accused.

The Court observed that the long‑standing rule of prudence required some independent evidence that directly implicated the accused, and that courts should be reluctant to abandon this requirement. It emphasized that the danger of relying on an accomplice’s testimony was not only that the accomplice, by his own admission, was a person of bad character who had participated in the offence and who, in order to save himself, might betray his former associates, thereby exhibiting a strong bias in favour of the prosecution. More importantly, the Court warned that an accomplice could present a narrative that was generally true while inserting false material, such that he might correctly identify many participants but falsely implicate others who were his enemies. The record showed that the confessions of the approver and of Manjappa Gowda were recorded on the same day, 27 March 1958, by the First‑Class Magistrate, V. Revanna, in Chikamagalur, whereas the confession of Manjappa Naika was recorded by another magistrate on 29 March 1958. Magistrate V. Revanna was examined as witness 41 and testified that on 22 March 1958 he received a requisition from Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ramaswamy, to record the statements of Manjappa Gowda and the approver, Venkappa Naika. He stated that those persons were produced before him on that day, that he informed them they would be removed from police custody and remanded to judicial look‑up until 24 March 1958, and that he told them they were not obliged to make any confession. Because the magistrate was on casual leave from 23 March to 26 March 1958, the three individuals were again produced before him on 27 March 1958. The evidence indicated that they had been held in the police lock‑up from the time of their arrests until 22 March 1958 and were subsequently brought together before the magistrate’s court; no material suggested that they were kept separate during that period.

Consequently, the Court concluded that there was no guarantee that the accounts given in their confessions were independent or that the accused had not previously conspired with one another. In the absence of such assurance, the confession of Manjappa Gowda was deemed a very weak form of evidence, lacking any intrinsic corroboration to confirm that every detail was true. While the general outline of the incident described by Manjappa Gowda might be correct, the Court found no certainty that the portions of his statement relating to the appellants were accurate, and therefore it could not be treated as corroborating the approver’s testimony. The defect identified in Manjappa Gowda’s confession was not present in the confession of Manjappa Naika, a point noted for further consideration.

In this case the Court observed that the defect identified in the confession of Manjappa Gowda does not appear in the confession of Manjappa Naika. Manjappa Naika was first produced before a magistrate for the purpose of recording his confession on 27 March 1958, after which the magistrate remanded him to judicial custody until 29 March 1958. The record shows that Naika had been arrested on 15 March 1958, the same date on which the approver and the other accused, including Manjappa Gowda, were presumably arrested, making it possible that they were held together in police custody for a period of time. However, the evidence does not clarify whether they were detained at the same location, and therefore the circumstance noted in the Privy Council case may not apply to Naika. The Court nevertheless found a serious infirmity in Naika’s confession. The record does not demonstrate that, when Naika was produced before the magistrate on 27 March 1958 and remanded to judicial custody, the magistrate gave him the mandatory warning that he should consider whether to make any confession at all. In the testimony of the magistrate, identified as Mr K S Malle Gowda, it was stated that on 27 March 1958 the Deputy Superintendent of Police produced Naika before him and presented the requisition, Exhibit P 23, for recording a statement under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The magistrate then remanded Naika to judicial custody until 29 March 1958. On 29 March 1958 the magistrate recorded that Naika was brought before him in the court hall by the Sub‑Jail authority at about 11.00 a.m.; the magistrate said he asked the usual preliminary questions and then recorded Naika’s statement. It appears that on 29 March 1958 the magistrate asked Naika whether he required time to reflect on the matter, to which Naika replied “write,” presumably indicating that he did not wish to take any time. The Court held that this response was insufficient to satisfy the legal requirement that the accused be warned that he is under no compulsion to confess and that any confession may be used against him. Referring to the decision in Sarwan Singh v State of Punjab, the Court emphasized that when an accused is produced before a magistrate for the purpose of recording a confession, it is essential that his mind be completely free from any possible police influence, that he be sent to jail custody, and that he be given adequate time to decide whether to make a confession. Although Naika was remanded to judicial custody for two days, the magistrate failed to make clear to him that he was not bound to confess and that a confession could be used against him. Consequently, the Court concluded that the confession could not be relied upon as proper evidence.

In this case the Court noted that the magistrate, Mr Malle Gowda, did not inform Manjappa Naika of the essential safeguards that should have been explained to him at the time he was remanded to judicial custody, namely that he was under no obligation to confess and that any confession might be used against him; consequently the Court held that the confession could not be relied upon as a proper basis for a conviction. The only remaining point on which the High Court had relied was the appellant, Chinna Gowda’s failure to appear at the house of T Shiviah alias T Shivaswamy, identified as PW 75, to receive a loan on 13 February 1958. It was asserted that he did not go because he already possessed the booty taken from the house of the deceased Mariappa Gowda and therefore no longer needed the loan. Although several explanations might exist for his not keeping the appointment, even assuming that he had acquired money as a result of the incident that occurred during the night of 12‑13 February 1958, the Court found it improper to infer that he himself had taken part in the murders. Thus the prosecution’s case rested solely on the testimony of the approver. The Court reiterated that this testimony was defective in two respects: the approver himself described himself as a man of bad character, and he later repudiated his earlier confession before Mr Revanna, a First‑Class Magistrate, in the committing magistrate’s court. Moreover, the approver’s occupation involved the illicit manufacture of liquor, indicating a continued pattern of unlawful conduct. On these grounds, the Court concluded that the approver’s evidence, standing alone, could not sustain a conviction. Neither the Sessions Judge nor the learned Judges of the High Court considered the approver’s evidence sufficient to justify conviction of the accused. Accordingly, the Court held that the approver’s testimony could not safely serve as the sole basis for upholding the convictions of the two appellants. The Court therefore allowed each of the two appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences imposed on the appellants, and ordered that they be set at liberty. Appeals allowed.