Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. vs Ghanshyam Das Gupta and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1959

Decision Date: 6 February 1962

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this matter, the petition was filed by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education of Uttar Pradesh against Ghanshyam Das Gupta and other respondents, and the judgment was delivered on 6 February 1962 by a Bench consisting of Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice S.K. Das, Justice A.K. Sarkar and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar of the Supreme Court of India. The case is reported in the 1962 AIR 1110 and the 1962 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports (page 36) and is cited under various reporters including 1962 SC 1217 (3A) and subsequent citations. The statutory framework relevant to the dispute was the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act of 1921, specifically section 15, together with the Board’s regulations under Chapter VI, rule 1 (1), which dealt with the powers of the Examination Committee to cancel examination results and the requirement, if any, to give the examinee an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

The factual background revealed that the three respondents had been declared by the Board to have passed the Intermediate examination, after which they pursued further studies. Subsequently, the fathers and guardians of the respondents received notice that the Board’s Examination Committee had cancelled the respondents’ examination results and had debarred them from appearing in the next examination. The respondents challenged this action by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad, asserting that the Examination Committee had failed to provide them an opportunity to rebut the allegations made against them, thereby violating the principles of natural justice and contravening the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The Board, while acknowledging that no hearing had been offered to the respondents, contended that the Examination Committee was a purely administrative body and therefore not obligated to grant a hearing to any party affected by its decision. The single judge hearing the writ held that the Committee was not required to act judicially and that no statutory duty existed for it to afford an opportunity to be heard. The respondents appealed this decision to a Division Bench. At the Division Bench, one judge opined that even though the Committee functioned administratively and was not bound to act in a judicial or quasi‑judicial manner, it nevertheless should have afforded the respondents a chance to be heard. Another judge disagreed, maintaining that the Committee’s purely administrative character exempted it from the requirement of a hearing. The matter was then referred to a third judge, who concluded that despite the Committee’s administrative nature, the respondents were entitled to a hearing. Dissatisfied with this conclusion, the Board appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

In the appeal to this Court, the appellant argued that the Examination Committee was merely an administrative body and that the principles of natural justice, including the maxim audi alteram partem, applied only to judicial or quasi‑judicial bodies. The respondents contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the Committee was only an administrative body. They further submitted that the mere fact that there was nothing express in the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder which might make it obligatory for the Committee to call for an explanation and to hear the examinee whose case it was required to enquire into was not wholly determinative of the question whether a duty is cast on the Committee in cases like this to act judicially.

The Court held that the inference whether an authority acting under a statute, where the statute is silent, has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of disposal provided, the objective criterion, if any, to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the persons affected and other indicia afforded by the statute. The mere fact that the Act in question or the relevant Regulations do not make it obligatory on the Committee to call for an explanation and to bear the examinee is not conclusive on the question whether the Committee acts as a quasi‑judicial body when exercising its powers under Chapter VI, rule 1(1), of the Regulations.

It is obvious that the Committee, when it proceeds to decide matters covered by rule 1(1), will have to depend upon materials placed before it and, before it decides to award any penalty, it must come to an objective determination on certain facts; this is the only manner in which it can carry out the duties imposed on it. Even though there is no lis in the present case in the sense that there are not two contending parties before it, the Committee should hear the examinees whose lives may be seriously affected by its decision, even subjecting them in some cases to criminal prosecution on charges of impersonation, fraud and perjury. Though therefore there is nothing express one way or the other in the Act or the Regulation casting a duty on the Committee to act judicially, the manner of disposal and the serious effects of the decision of the Committee lead to the conclusion that a duty to act judicially is cast on the Committee and, when it acts under rule 1(1), it is acting quasi‑judicially and the principles of natural justice will apply to its proceedings. The Court referred to the precedents Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, [1950] S.C.R. 621; Yagendranath Bora v. Commissioner of Ilills Division & Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1240; Shri Radheshyam Khore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1959] S.C.R. 1440; and Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpo‑ration, [1959] Stipp. 1 S. C.

The appeal, designated as Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1959, arose from a certificate issued by the Allahabad High Court and challenged a judgment and decree dated 23 March 1956 in Special Appeal No. 291 of 1955. Counsel Veda Vyasa and C. P. Lal appeared for the appellant, while counsel J. P. Goyal represented the respondents. The judgment was delivered on 6 February 1962 by Justice Wanchoo. The matter before the Court concerned the cancellation of examination results and the debarment of three students from a forthcoming examination. The respondents, who were enrolled in G. S. Hindu Intermediate College at Sikandrarao, had sat for the Intermediate Commerce Examination conducted by the appellant in 1954. Their marks were made public in newspapers on 12 June 1954, and each of them had obtained a second‑division result, after which they continued their further studies. In December 1954, however, the principal of their college informed their fathers and guardians that the Examinations Committee of the appellant—referred to in the judgment as the Committee—had annulled their 1954 results and had also barred them from appearing in the 1955 examination. Reacting to this information, the respondents instituted a writ petition before the High Court, alleging that the Committee had not provided them any opportunity to contest the accusations of misconduct leveled against them. They maintained that they had never been told the specific nature of the alleged unfair means, and that the first notification they received was the Committee’s resolution canceling their results and prohibiting their participation in the subsequent examination. Consequently, they asserted that they were entitled to a hearing in which they could confront the allegations of cheating before any punitive action—namely, the cancellation of results and debarment—was taken by the appellant. The respondents argued that the procedure adopted by the appellant transgressed the principles of natural justice because they were afforded no chance to defend themselves or to show cause against the contemplated sanctions. Moreover, they contended that the appellant’s actions contravened the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, No. II of 1921, and the Uttar Pradesh Education Code, rendering the resolution that canceled their results and barred them from the later examination both extra‑jurisdictional and illegal. On that basis, they prayed for a writ or order setting aside the appellant’s resolution. The appellant, in its defense, denied any procedural impropriety and maintained that the respondents had indeed employed unfair means during the examination. It further submitted that the matter had been reported to the Committee under the applicable Regulations, and that the Committee had exercised the powers conferred upon it by the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder after conducting a thorough inquiry.

The Court noted that after a thorough inquiry the Committee had issued a resolution cancelling the examination results, but it was not contested that the respondents had been denied any opportunity to answer the accusations levelled against them during that inquiry. Numerous submissions had been made before the High Court, yet the Court focused solely on the question of whether the respondents were entitled to a hearing before the appellant resolved to cancel the results. The respondents argued before the learned Single Judge that the appellant, being under a duty to act judicially, was obliged to afford them a hearing prior to any order against them. The Single Judge held that no such duty was imposed on the Committee and that there was no statutory requirement for the Committee to provide every examinee an opportunity to be heard, and consequently dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed, and the matter was heard by Judges Dayal and Brijmohan Lall. Judge Brijmohan Lall expressed the view that the Committee was not required to act judicially or quasi‑judicially in cases of this nature and was functioning merely as an administrative body; nevertheless, he maintained that the principle of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem should still apply, and he voted in favour of allowing the appeal. Judge Dayal concurred with Judge Brijmohan Lall that no duty was cast on the Committee to act judicially and that its action was purely administrative, but he disagreed that the Committee’s failure to grant a hearing violated the principles of natural justice, reasoning that the maxim audi alteram partem applies only to judicial or quasi‑judicial tribunals. The two judges also diverged on two additional points, which the Court stated were not the subject of its present consideration. They subsequently referred three questions to another learned Judge, one of which asked whether the Committee’s omission of a hearing occasioned a defect in its administrative order.

The Court then described the consideration by the third Judge, Agarwala J. He expressed doubt as to whether the earlier view—that no duty was imposed on the Committee to act judicially—was correct, but noted that the two preceding judges had agreed that the Committee’s role was administrative. Accordingly, he examined the case on that basis. Despite treating the Committee’s function as administrative, Judge Agarwala concluded that the respondents were nonetheless entitled to a hearing and adopted Judge Brijmohan Lall’s perspective. On that basis, the appeal was allowed. This conclusion set the stage for the subsequent proceedings before the higher bench.

In this case the appeal was again placed before the Bench, and following the opinion of the third Judge the appeal was allowed. After that the appellant filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court, the application was granted, and consequently the matter came before us. The appellant’s principal argument was that the High Court had erred in holding that a hearing was required in the present dispute even though the Committee was functioning only in an administrative capacity. The appellant maintained that when a body acts merely administratively there is no duty to grant a hearing to any party that might be affected by its decision, and that the principles of natural justice, including the maxim audi alteram partem, apply solely to judicial or quasi‑judicial bodies—those bodies on which a duty to act judicially is expressly cast. Accordingly, the appellant submitted that where no such duty exists, the body is not obliged to hear the person whose rights may be impacted by its order.

The respondents, on the other hand, accepted that the final decision of the High Court was correct but challenged the High Court’s characterization of the Committee as merely administrative in a matter of this nature. They argued that, after considering the totality of circumstances that normally govern cases of this type, the High Court should have concluded that the Committee was bound by a duty to act judicially and therefore was required to provide the respondents an opportunity to be heard before any adverse action could be taken. The respondents further submitted that the mere absence of an explicit provision in the Act or the Regulations made under it, which would obligate the Committee to summon explanations and hear the examinees whose cases were under inquiry, could not by itself determine whether a statutory duty was cast on the Committee to perform a judicial function in similar situations.

The first issue that therefore fell for consideration was whether any duty was imposed on the Committee by the Act and the Regulations to act judicially, which would render the Committee a quasi‑judicial body. The Court examined the definition of a “quasi‑judicial act” as discussed in Province of Bombay v Kusaldas S Advani. The principles articulated by Das, J., at page 725 were summarised as follows: first, if a statute empowers an authority, which is not a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes that arise from a claim made by one party under the statute and that claim is opposed by another party, and to determine the respective rights of the opposing parties, there is a presumption, and prima facie, that the authority must act judicially, and in the absence of any contrary statutory provision the authority’s decision constitutes a quasi‑judicial act. Second, if a statutory authority possesses the power to carry out any act that may prejudicially affect the subject, then even when there are not two distinct parties apart from the authority, the final determination of the authority will nevertheless be a quasi‑judicial act, provided that the statute requires the authority to act judicially. These principles formed the basis for the Court’s analysis of whether the Committee’s functions fell within the ambit of quasi‑judicial activity.

The Court explained that when a statutory authority possesses the power to take an action that may prejudice an individual, the final decision of that authority is regarded as a quasi‑judicial act if the statute obliges the authority to act judicially. This principle applies even though the situation may involve only the authority and the individual who opposes the proposed action, rather than two opposing parties contesting each other. The Court cited the earlier decision in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, reporting that the authority’s determination remains a quasi‑judicial act provided the statutory scheme requires a judicial mode of decision‑making. The citation for that authority was recorded as (1) [1950] S.C.R. 621, 725.

In further elaboration, the Court observed that the mere existence of two parties besides the deciding authority normally creates a presumption that the authority must act judicially. However, the absence of two distinct parties does not automatically remove the authority’s decision from the category of quasi‑judicial acts. If the enabling legislation still mandates that the authority act in a judicial manner, the duty to do so continues irrespective of the number of parties involved. Thus, the statutory requirement controls the classification of the authority’s function, not the procedural posture of the parties.

The Court noted that these principles have been applied in later cases, referencing several authorities to illustrate their continued relevance. The decisions cited include Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam (1), Shri Radheshyam Khare v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2), Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (3), and Shivaji Nathubhai v. The Union of India (4). Each of these cases reaffirmed the criteria for determining when a statutory body must perform a quasi‑judicial function.

The Court further explained that statutes rarely contain explicit language stating that an authority must act judicially. Such a requirement must usually be inferred from the express provisions of the statute taken together with the nature of the rights affected, the method of disposal prescribed, any objective criteria that may be imposed, the impact of the decision on the affected person, and other indicia embedded in the legislation. Consequently, no single circumstance can alone determine whether a statutory body is obligated to act judicially; the determination must consider the whole statutory context.

According to the Court, a duty to act judicially may arise in a wide variety of situations, making it impractical and unwise to attempt an exhaustive definition of the duty. The Court referred to the observations of Parker, J. in R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (5) to underscore the complexity of identifying every possible scenario that could give rise to a quasi‑judicial obligation. The cited authorities for these observations were (1) [1958] S.C.R. 1240, (2) [1959] S.C.R. 1440, (3) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319, (4) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775, and (5) [1952] 2 Q.B. 413.

Having set out the guiding principles, the Court said it must now examine the specific provisions of the Act and the Regulations made thereunder to decide whether the Committee created by the Act has a duty to act judicially when it deals with cases of candidates using unfair means in examination halls. Under section 7 of the Act, the Board established by the Act is empowered, among other things, to prescribe courses of instruction, to grant diplomas and certificates, to conduct examinations, to admit candidates to those examinations, and to publish the results of the examinations.

The Court explained that the Board was authorised to carry out any action necessary to promote its purpose of regulating and supervising higher secondary and intermediate education. Under section 13 the Board possessed the authority to appoint and constitute various committees, including an examinations committee, and section 14 permitted the Board to delegate its powers to such committees by means of Regulations. Section 15 conferred upon the Board the power to formulate Regulations concerning the constitution, powers and duties of committees, the conduct of examinations and any other matters that the Act authorised to be dealt with by Regulations. Section 20 further empowered the Board and its committees to make bye‑laws that were consistent with both the Act and the Regulations. From these provisions it was evident, the Court observed, that the Act did not contain any express provisions describing the specific powers of the committees or the procedures they must follow in performing their duties; those details were intended to be supplied by the Regulations made under section 15. Accordingly, the Court turned to the Regulations framed under that section to ascertain the powers and duties assigned to the various committees established therein. Section 13(1) obliged the Board to appoint the examinations committee, and Chapter VI of the Regulations set out the powers and duties of that committee. The Court focused particularly on Rule 1(1) of Chapter VI, which provided that “It shall be the duty of the Examinations Committee subject to sanction and control of the Board” to consider cases in which examinees had concealed any fact or made a false statement in their application forms, breached rules or regulations to obtain improper admission to an examination, employed unfair means or committed fraud—including impersonation—at the examination, or were guilty of a moral offence or indiscipline, and to impose any of the following penalties: withdrawal of the certificate of having passed the examination, cancellation of the examination, or exclusion from the examination. The Court noted, however, that Chapter VI contained no provision describing how the committee was to discharge the duty imposed by Rule 1(1). Moreover, there was no express provision in either the Act or the Regulations imposing a judicial duty on the committee when it exercised the powers under Rule 1(1). The Court therefore held that the question of whether the committee must act judicially when exercising those powers required an examination of all relevant circumstances. Simultaneously, the Court observed that nothing in the Act expressly exempted the committee from a judicial duty. It was true, the Court said, that the Act and the Regulations did not prescribe a specific procedure for the committee’s exercise of its powers under Rule 1(1), and it was also true that the rule did not expressly require the committee to call for an explanation from the examinee.

It was observed that, although the Act and the Regulations did not expressly obligate the Committee to invite an explanation from the examinee or to hear the examinee whose case required consideration, this omission did not conclusively determine whether the Committee functioned as a quasi‑judicial body when it exercised the powers granted under rule 1(1). The absence of a mandatory requirement in the statutory provisions did not prevent the Committee, once it proceeded to decide matters covered by rule 1(1), from having to rely on the materials placed before it in order to reach its decision. Before imposing any penalty, the Committee had to make an objective determination regarding certain factual allegations; only after concluding that those facts were established could it lawfully punish the examinee involved.

The Committee was required to ascertain, before taking action, whether any of the following five factual circumstances existed: (i) the examinee had concealed a material fact or made a false statement in the examination application; (ii) the examinee had breached the Rules and Regulations in order to secure admission to the examination; (iii) the examinee had employed unfair means during the examination; (iv) the examinee had committed fraud, including impersonation, at the examination; or (v) the examinee was guilty of a moral offence or indiscipline. Until at least one of these five facts was established, the Committee could not proceed under rule 1(1). To reach a conclusion that any of these facts was proved, the Committee necessarily had to depend on the evidence and documents presented to it, since it possessed no personal knowledge of the matters in question.

Consequently, even though the Act and the Regulations did not make it expressly obligatory for the Committee to call for an explanation and to hear the examinee, the nature of rule 1(1) implicitly required the Committee to be satisfied on the basis of the materials placed before it that one of the specified facts was established before it could take any action. The Committee could not function without such materials, because it needed to determine whether the examinee had committed the particular misconduct that formed the basis for any action under rule 1(1). It was therefore clear that the consideration of the materials placed before it was a necessary precondition for the Committee to reach any decision in the exercise of its powers under rule 1(1). Accordingly, the Committee could discharge its duties under rule 1(1) only by assessing and judging the materials submitted to it.

The Committee may only act after the relevant materials have been placed before it. Although there is no dispute in the technical sense—because the proceeding does not involve two opposing parties but rather the Committee and the examinee—material must be submitted to the Committee to allow it to decide whether any action is warranted under rule 1 (1). Consequently, it is just that the examinee against whom the Committee is moving should be given an opportunity to be heard. The Committee’s decision can, in an extreme case, destroy the future of a young student, and it will inevitably attach a serious stigma that may harm the examinee’s prospects in later life. The misconduct that the Committee may be required to find under rule 1 (1) includes grave offences such as impersonation, fraud and perjury; the decision in such cases may even give rise to criminal prosecution of the examinee in a court of law. Because of the potentially severe consequences of the Committee’s determination and because the alleged misconduct may be of a very serious nature, it follows that the Committee must conduct its proceedings in a manner comparable to that of a judicial body.

There is no explicit provision in the Act or the Regulations that imposes a duty on the Committee to act judicially, yet the necessity of basing any disposal on the materials placed before it, coupled with the serious impact of its decision on the examinee’s rights and career, leads to the logical conclusion that the Committee is required to act judicially. It must decide objectively on facts that could fundamentally affect the examinee’s future before exercising any power under rule 1 (1). Accordingly, the Committee, when acting under rule 1 (1), functions in a quasi‑judicial capacity, and the principles of natural justice—particularly the rule that the other party, i.e., the examinee, must be heard—apply to its proceedings. This position was endorsed by the Calcutta High Court in Dipa Pul v. University of Calcutta and in B. C. Das Gupta v. Bijoyranjan Rakshit, which the Court finds correct. The appellant argued that the Committee handles a large number of cases under rule 1 (1) and that imposing a quasi‑judicial duty would render its task unmanageable. The Court holds that the volume of cases is not a valid reason to deny the imposition of a judicial duty, given the overall circumstances of the matter.

The Court noted that, after examining the whole set of circumstances, it was clear that the Committee was required to act in a judicial manner whenever it exercised its authority under rule 1 (1). Regarding the method by which the Committee must afford the examinee an opportunity to be heard, the Court observed that the specific procedure could be set out in the Committee’s Regulations or Bye‑laws, if necessary. The Court referred to the decision in Local Government Board v. Alridge, stating that the essential requirement is that the other party be given a sufficient chance to present his case adequately. The precise procedural details, however, were said to depend on the nature of the tribunal conducting the proceedings. The Court acknowledged that many of the powers conferred on the Committee by Chapter VI were administrative in character; nevertheless, where quasi‑judicial functions are assigned to an administrative body, that body assumes a quasi‑judicial character for the purpose of performing those functions. In such a situation the body may prescribe its own procedure, provided that the principles of natural justice are observed and the examinee receives an adequate opportunity to present his case. The Court further observed that it was unnecessary to elaborate further on the procedural issue because it was undisputed that the respondents in the present matter had not been given any opportunity to explain themselves or to present their case before the Committee. Consequently, the Court held that although the view of the High Court—that the Committee was acting merely administratively when it acted under rule 1 (1)—was incorrect, the High Court’s ultimate decision to allow the writ petition on the ground that no opportunity had been provided to the respondents was correct. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs was made in the circumstances. The appeal was dismissed. (1) [1951] A. C. 120.