Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills vs Workmen And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1956

Decision Date: 2 May 1962

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills versus Workmen and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 2 May 1962. The opinion was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo and the bench comprised Justices K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner before the Court was Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills and the respondents were the workmen and other persons affected by the dispute. The case is reported in the 1966 AIR 1158 and in the 1963 SCR (2) 716, and it is also cited in D 1971 SC 2454 (10). The central statutory provision concerned was the Industrial Disputes Act, specifically the issues of standardisation of wage structure and the designation of workmen. The case arose out of an industrial dispute wherein the parties contested the classification of certain employees as “line jobbers” and “fancy jobbers,” the appropriate method of wage increase, and the applicability of a standardisation scheme to their employment conditions.

The Court noted that the dispute between the appellants and the respondents was initially referred to an Industrial Tribunal, which was asked to consider both the increase and standardisation of wages as well as the proper designation of workmen performing the duties of fancy jobbers. The appellant argued that a previous award dated 1951 had never been terminated and that the reference to the Tribunal was therefore incompetent. The Tribunal, however, directed that wage standardisation be based on the Bombay Scheme and it accepted the claim of the respondents regarding the fancy jobbers. The Tribunal further ordered that wherever existing wages exceeded those stipulated by the Bombay Standardisation Scheme, such higher wages should be retained and not reduced. It also directed that operatives who were designated differently from the Bombay list should receive the same pay as persons performing identical work under any other designation in Bombay. The Tribunal prescribed that any anomalies arising from this application should be settled by a Committee consisting of representatives of management and the Union. The Supreme Court held that the agreement following the earlier award did not constitute a settlement within the meaning of section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and consequently the reference to the Tribunal was competent. The Court further observed that the Tribunal should have examined the applicability of the Bombay Standardisation Scheme to the conditions prevailing in Delhi by permitting evidence on the scheme’s operation in Delhi, rather than excluding such evidence. It emphasized that the Tribunal had not given the matter the careful consideration required and had failed to make necessary modifications. Moreover, the Court rejected the Tribunal’s delegation of the determination and adjustment of anomalies to a joint Committee, stating that the Tribunal itself should have decided those issues. The Court also recognized that, in the event of standardisation, it might be necessary to protect individual workmen who were receiving wages higher than those prescribed by the scheme, but any such protection must be subject to three conditions: (1) there could be no further increase in the wages of those protected under the standardisation scheme; (2) if the scheme established incremental scales, the protected workmen must receive wages within the minimum and maximum range unless they are otherwise entitled; and (3) the category of protected workmen should eventually cease as those workmen retire or otherwise leave service.

According to the Tribunal’s order, the protected workmen were to receive future wage increments that would be adjusted in line with their length of service until each workman occupied the appropriate position on the wage scale. The Tribunal further required that the class of protected workmen would ultimately disappear as the individuals left service either by retirement or by any other termination. The Court observed that the Tribunal’s direction could be interpreted as protecting all existing higher wages in a general sense, rather than safeguarding the higher wages of specific workmen, and held that such a general protection was incompatible with the principles underlying wage standardisation.

The appeal, filed under special leave, concerned Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1956 and challenged the Award dated 29 December 1958 issued by the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in Industrial Dispute No. 36 of 1957, which had been published in the Delhi Gazette on 5 March 1959. Counsel for the appellant were G. B. Pai and I. N. Shroff, while counsel for the respondent included M. K. Ramamurthi, B. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala, and D. P. Singh. The judgment was pronounced on 2 May 1962 by Justice Wanchoo. The dispute arose between Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited, referred to as the appellant, and its workmen. Numerous questions were referred to the industrial tribunal, but the present appeal focused on two matters: first, whether the wages of certain categories of workmen needed to be increased and standardised, and what specific directions should be given; and second, whether workmen performing the duties of fancy jobbers should be formally designated as such and receive the corresponding remuneration. The wage issue was limited to the categories of mistries and line jobbers because other categories of operatives were already covered by a separate award, reference No. 1.D. 52 of 1957, decided earlier by the same tribunal. That earlier award had been appealed to this Court, and the decision was reported in The Management of Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Its Workmen (AIR 1961 SC 1179), where the Court set aside the previous award and remitted the matter to the tribunal for reconsideration as directed. The parties subsequently reached a settlement. The workmen in the present reference alleged that the wages of mistries and line jobbers were inadequately low and had not been standardised despite repeated representations to the appellant, and therefore sought increased wages, standardisation, and the introduction of incremental pay scales. Regarding the fancy jobbers, the workmen claimed that they had been incorrectly re‑designated as assistant fancy jobbers while actually performing the duties of fancy jobbers, and consequently demanded proper designation and corresponding wage adjustments. The appellant opposed these claims on several grounds.

The appellant put forward several grounds of opposition to the reference. First, it argued that an earlier award dated 1951, rendered by Shri Dulat, remained in force and therefore the present reference was legally incompetent. Second, it contended that there was no appropriate basis for comparing the wage structures of Swatantra Bharat Mills and Delhi Cloth Mills with those of the appellant’s mills, and consequently the wages prevailing in those two mills could not be used as a benchmark for fixing the wages of the appellant’s workmen. Third, the appellant submitted that the textile industry as a whole did not contain any provision for incremental wage scales, and that this absence rendered the claim for such scales untenable. Fourth, the appellant maintained that the workmen who had been designated as assistant fancy jobbers had been correctly classified and therefore could not legitimately claim to be fancy jobbers. Finally, the appellant asserted that the conditions prevailing in Bombay differed in many respects from those in Delhi, and consequently there was no justification for applying the Bombay standardisation scheme to the appellant’s workmen.

The tribunal rejected each of the appellant’s contentions. It held that the award of 1951 issued by Shri Dulat had been duly terminated, and therefore the present reference was competent and could proceed. Regarding the comparison of wage structures, the tribunal observed that although there were differences in the manner of operation and the financial positions of Swatantra Bharat Mills, Delhi Cloth Mills, and the appellant’s mills, such differences were immaterial because variations inevitably exist between individual units within the same industry; consequently the wages paid in the two comparison mills were deemed comparable to those of the appellant’s mills. Concerning the claim for incremental scales, the tribunal found that no incremental wage scale had ever been incorporated in any standardisation scheme applicable to the textile industry, and accordingly dismissed the claim. On the question of designation, the tribunal concluded that the workmen presently labelled as assistant fancy jobbers were, in fact, fancy jobbers who had previously been identified as such; therefore it ordered that they be formally designated as fancy jobbers. Finally, the tribunal affirmed that the Bombay standardisation scheme should be applied to the categories of mistries, line jobbers and fancy jobbers employed by the appellant. It further directed that wherever the existing wages of any operative were higher than those prescribed under the Bombay scheme, such wages should remain unchanged and should not be reduced. The tribunal also directed that any operative classified under a different name, whether not listed in the Bombay schedule or materially different from a listed classification, should receive the same wage as an operative performing identical work under the Bombay list. To resolve any anomalies arising from the application of the Bombay scheme, the tribunal authorized the formation of a joint committee comprising representatives of management and the union; in the event of disagreement, the matter could be referred to the industrial tribunal either through a regular reference made with mutual consent or by appointing an arbitrator jointly agreed upon by the parties.

The appellant consequently challenged the award and advanced its principal objections. Firstly, it reiterated that the reference was incompetent because the Dulat award of 1951 had not been terminated. Secondly, it disputed the tribunal’s conclusion that the assistant fancy jobbers should be redesignated as fancy jobbers. Thirdly, it argued that the tribunal erred in applying the Bombay standardisation scheme to its workmen without affording the appellant an opportunity to present evidence concerning the scheme and to demonstrate the material differences between the conditions in Bombay and those in Delhi, which, it claimed, required modification of the scheme for proper application. Fourthly, it contended that directing the creation of a joint committee to investigate anomalies failed to resolve the dispute and would inevitably give rise to further conflicts. Finally, it maintained that the directive stating that “wherever the said existing wages are higher than those fixed under the Bombay standardisation scheme, they shall remain and shall not be lowered” contravened the fundamental principle upon which standardisation schemes are based.

The appellant advanced five separate grounds of objection. First, it asserted that the reference could not be deemed competent because the Dulat award of 1951 had never been terminated. Second, it contended that the tribunal erred in holding that the workers who had previously been described as “assistant fancy jobbers” should be redesignated simply as “fancy jobbers.” Third, the appellant argued that the tribunal was incorrect in applying the Bombay standardisation scheme to its workmen without giving the appellant an opportunity to present evidence concerning that scheme, to demonstrate the disparity between conditions in Bombay and those in Delhi, and consequently to procure any necessary modification of the scheme for the appellant’s employees. Fourth, the appellant maintained that the tribunal’s order directing the formation of a joint committee to investigate the identified anomalies failed to resolve the dispute referred to it and would inevitably give rise to further controversies arising from that very direction. Fifth, the appellant submitted that the tribunal’s instruction that “wherever the said existing wages are higher than those fixed under the Bombay standardisation scheme, they shall remain, and shall not be lowered” conflicted with the fundamental principle upon which standardisation schemes are based.

Regarding the first ground, the Supreme Court examined whether the existence of the Dulat award of 1951 rendered the present reference incompetent. The Court had already considered this question in an earlier judgment and had rejected the contention. The Court noted that the Dulat award itself had emphasized that there was no justification for postponing standardisation and had directed the parties to devise a scheme based on Bombay award No 1. Pursuant to that direction, the parties formulated a scheme and mutually accepted it on 29 September 1951. The appellant argued that this September 1951 agreement, by virtue of its acceptance, had in effect become part of the Dulat award, and because the award was only terminated in November 1956—while the reference was made on 3 March 1956—the award should have barred the reference. The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it held that the September agreement could not be deemed a component of the Dulat award; consequently, the award could not impede the competence of the reference even if it had not been terminated before the reference. Second, the Court observed that the 1951 agreement did not constitute a settlement within the meaning of section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it stood in 1951, and therefore section 19(2) of that Act was inapplicable to the agreement. Applying the same reasoning, the Court concluded that the present claim of incompetence because the Dulat award remained in force must fail, and the contention was dismissed. On the second ground, the Court expressed the view that the tribunal was correct in holding that, shortly before the reference, the workers previously identified as “assistant fancy jobbers” should be designated as “fancy jobbers,” agreeing with the tribunal’s assessment.

The tribunal observed that workers formerly identified as “fancy jobbers” had been newly labeled “assistant fancy jobbers.” After reviewing all the material presented on this matter, the tribunal concluded that the appropriate designation for these employees should remain “fancy jobbers,” the term previously used. The tribunal reasoned that the introduction of the designation “assistant fancy jobbers” was a mere device intended to diminish the status of this class of workers. Accordingly, the argument that the change in terminology was proper was rejected.

The tribunal then appears to have followed the reasoning of its earlier award in ID 52 of 1957 when it applied the Bombay standardisation scheme not only to “mistries” and “line jobbers” but also to the “fancy jobbers.” That earlier award had been set aside by this Court on several grounds, and the Court indicated that those same grounds applied equally to the present award, which likewise introduced the Bombay standardisation scheme for the workers involved in the present dispute. The appellant had sought to introduce evidence concerning the operation of the Bombay standardisation scheme and had requested that two witnesses from Bombay and Kanpur be summoned to testify about that scheme. However, by an order dated 6 January 1958, the tribunal held that examining those witnesses was unnecessary given the conditions prevailing in Delhi, the region under its consideration. Despite refusing to hear the evidence on the Bombay scheme, the tribunal nonetheless adopted the scheme in its entirety, without any alteration, when it rendered its award, relying on the precedent set by the earlier award. The Court found it unfair that the tribunal excluded the appellant’s evidence on the functioning of the Bombay scheme and then applied that scheme unchanged to the appellant’s mill.

The tribunal also offered a second reason for applying the Bombay standardisation scheme: it claimed that the scheme was applicable to the same class of workers in the Delhi Cloth Mills and the Swatantra Bharat Mills. The Court examined the testimony of two witnesses presented by the workmen from those mills. The first witness, Manoharlal, a labour officer of Swatantra Bharat Mills, testified that the mill had voluntarily adopted the Bombay standardisation scheme for wage payments to ordinary workers, but not for “mistries” and “jobbers.” The tribunal apparently interpreted his statement as indicating that the scheme applied to “mistries” and “jobbers,” contrary to Manoharlal’s explicit clarification. The second witness, B. L. Saxena, a labour officer of Delhi Cloth Mills, stated that wages for line jobbers and “mistries” were sometimes higher than, and sometimes equal to, those prescribed by the Bombay scheme, and that those categories had not been formally incorporated into the scheme at the mill. From the combined evidence, the Court concluded that there was no uniform grade or fixed pay structure for “mistries” and “jobbers”; each individual received a pay amount that varied, sometimes exceeding and sometimes matching the Bombay standardisation rates. Consequently, the tribunal’s claim that the Bombay scheme was uniformly applicable to these workers was not supported by the evidence.

In the present matter, the Court observed that the testimony of the labour officer Manoharlal, who had earlier been quoted as saying that Swatantra Bharat Mills paid certain categories of mistries and jobbers more than the amounts prescribed by the Bombay standardisation scheme, did not, on its own, demonstrate that the Bombay scheme was applicable to every mistries and jobber employed by that mill. The Court noted that Manoharlal’s admission concerned only specific categories and that the scheme could not be inferred to cover all such workers in Swatantra Bharat Mills. The Court then turned to the evidence of the second witness, B. L. Saxena, the labour officer of the Delhi Cloth Mills. Saxena testified that the wages of line jobbers and mistries were, in some instances, higher than those fixed by the Bombay scheme and, in other instances, were exactly the same as the scheme’s rates. Nevertheless, Saxena also affirmed that the line jobbers and mistries of the Delhi Cloth Mills had not been brought within the ambit of the Bombay standardisation scheme. From the combined testimony of these two officers, the Court concluded that there was no uniform grade or fixed pay structure for mistries and jobbers in the two Delhi mills; each worker appeared to receive an individualized rate of pay. Consequently, while some jobbers or mistries might receive remuneration that was either greater than or equal to the rates prescribed by the Bombay scheme, such instances did not establish that the Bombay standardisation scheme had been fully applied to the mistries and jobbers of the Swatantra Bharat Mills or the Delhi Cloth Mills. The Court therefore held that the tribunal erred in its comparison of the two Delhi mills and was incorrect in concluding that the Bombay standardisation scheme should automatically be applied to the appellant mills as well. The Court further examined the tribunal’s award concerning the “fancy jobbers.” After correctly classifying assistant fancy bobbers as fancy jobbers, the tribunal proceeded to order that these fancy jobbers be paid according to the Bombay standardisation scheme without apparently scrutinising the scheme itself. The Court pointed out that a copy of the Bombay scheme, submitted for its consideration, categorised “fancy work” into three distinct classes: head fancy jobber, fancy jobber, and assistant fancy jobber. Accordingly, before imposing the Bombay scheme on the appellant mills, the tribunal should have compared the actual work performed by the fancy jobbers in those mills with the work description of either the fancy jobber or the assistant fancy jobber under the Bombay scheme, and then determined, on a case‑by‑case basis, whether each should be classified as a fancy jobber or an assistant fancy jobber, or as one or the other. The Court expressed the view that the manner in which the tribunal handled this issue was, as noted in an earlier decision, fundamentally perfunctory, even though the tribunal claimed justification in following its own previous award. Nevertheless, the Court maintained that, if the Bombay standardisation scheme were to be applied to the appellant mills with respect to the workers involved in the present dispute, a careful and detailed re‑examination would be required.

The Court observed that, with respect to the workmen who are the subject of the present appeal, the tribunal must revisit the issue in a careful manner, following the line of analysis that this Court had earlier set out. The tribunal is required to determine whether the entire Bombay standardisation scheme should be applied to the appellant‑mills for the workers involved in the present dispute, or whether any alteration of that scheme is warranted because of the differences that exist between conditions prevailing in Bombay and those in Delhi. This enquiry must encompass all categories of workmen who are parties to this appeal, namely the line jobbers, the mistries and the fancy jobbers. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that the appeal should be allowed and that the matter be remitted to the tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the guidance previously provided by this Court.

Regarding the tribunal’s direction that a joint committee should be formed to examine the so‑called “anomalies,” the Court referred to its earlier judgment in which a comparable direction had been made. In that earlier judgment, the Court had noted that by ordering the creation of a joint committee, the tribunal had left a portion of the dispute to be settled by the parties themselves, thereby failing to fulfil the function that the tribunal was expected to perform under its own terms of reference. Consequently, the Court set aside the tribunal’s direction and ordered that the tribunal should address the matter directly, with the assistance of assessors if it deems such assistance necessary, before it decides whether to apply the Bombay standardisation scheme either in its entirety or with any modification to the workmen employed at the appellant‑mills.

The Court then turned to the final issue raised in the tribunal’s award. The award contained a direction stating that, wherever the existing wages are higher than those prescribed by the Bombay standardisation scheme, those higher wages should be retained and not reduced. The appellant objected to this direction. The Court recalled that a similar direction had been included in an earlier award, and that in the earlier case the Court had observed, at page 1182, that once a standardisation scheme comes into force it operates as an integrated whole and may sometimes result in certain categories of workmen receiving less than they previously earned. The purpose of a standardisation scheme, the Court explained, is to bring wages to a uniform level: to raise low wages up to the standardised level and to lower high wages so that they fit within the scheme. The Court therefore held that the tribunal had acted incorrectly when it upheld the principle of increasing low wages according to the scheme while refusing to lower high wages, thereby contradicting the basic principle of a standardised scheme. The Court noted that even the learned counsel for the workmen had conceded this principle. Finally, the Court remarked that the respondents’ argument that these observations might be misunderstood required further consideration.

In this matter, the respondents argued that the passage of a standardisation scheme should not give the impression that a tribunal lacks authority to preserve the higher wages of individual workmen who happen to be receiving more than the amount prescribed by the scheme at the moment it becomes operative. They emphasized that they do not contest the fundamental principle of a standardisation scheme as articulated by the Court, namely that the scheme seeks to bring wages to a uniform level. Nevertheless, they maintained that while, after a scheme is implemented, management may no longer be permitted to offer wages exceeding the scheme’s ceiling, this restriction does not automatically compel a reduction of the wages of those workers who were already drawing higher pay at the date of the scheme’s commencement. The respondents asserted that the tribunal retains the power to protect the existing higher wages of such workmen, even though, once the scheme is in force, the employer cannot lawfully pay a higher rate to any employee hired thereafter. Conversely, the appellant contended that the moment a standardisation scheme is applied, the wages of every individual, including those who presently receive more than the scheme’s prescribed amount, must be brought down to the scheme level, and that the tribunal lacks authority to safeguard the elevated wages of any such individuals. To support this position, the appellant relied upon the decision in Daru v. Ahmedabad Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited, reported in 1955 1 L.L.G. 355. In that case, the Bombay High Court examined the principles governing a standardisation scheme while referring to the report of the Textile Labour Inquiry Committee and to Dr D. R. Gadgil’s treatise “Regulation of Wages and Other Problems of Industrial Labour in India.” The Court observed that when an industry pays widely divergent wages, with a substantial gap between the highest and lowest rates, it becomes exceedingly difficult to achieve standardisation; consequently, the first step is to establish a minimum wage, typically positioned somewhere between the top and bottom levels. However, the Court added, if wages within a particular occupation are relatively uniform and not highly divergent, that is precisely the stage at which a labour tribunal may suitably standardise those wages, because although some workers may experience a modest reduction, the loss would not be significant and the overall benefit to labour—ensuring that all persons performing the same work receive the same remuneration—justifies the standardisation. The respondents stressed that these principles are sound and undisputed, and their validity becomes evident when applied to the factual circumstances of the present case.

In the matter under consideration, a standardisation scheme had been introduced in 1948. By 1951 one of the mills that fell within the scope of that scheme created a new department, and the wages payable to employees in that department were placed under the coverage of the standardisation scheme. The mill, however, fixed wages for the new department at a level that was higher than the rates prescribed by the standardisation scheme. In 1953 the mill issued a notice to the work‑men informing them that their wages, as fixed in 1951, would be reduced so that they would correspond with the wages laid down by the standardisation scheme. The work‑men whose pay was to be lowered objected to the notice, and the dispute consequently arose before the High Court. The High Court, after examining the facts, held that because the standardisation scheme had been operative since 1948, the employer could not lawfully pay wages that exceeded the rates fixed by the scheme in 1951. The Court explained that a core requirement of any standardisation scheme is that workers performing the same job receive equal remuneration, and therefore any wage that was higher than the scheme‑prescribed amount had to be brought down to that level. The Court further observed that the case before it did not concern the protection of those individual work‑men who, at the moment the scheme came into force, might have been receiving wages above the prescribed rates. Those observations of the High Court must therefore be read in that specific context, and the principles that the Court articulated with respect to the operation of a standardisation scheme were, in the Court’s view, sound. The respondents, however, submitted that the tribunal’s protection in the present case was limited only to safeguarding those individual work‑men who were receiving higher wages at the time the scheme was implemented, and that such a direction was legally permissible. They argued that there was no statutory bar to the tribunal granting a protective direction for individuals whose wages exceeded the scheme rates when the scheme commenced. The Court considered that extending protection to those individuals would not contravene the fundamental principle of standardisation previously explained. It would be for the tribunal to decide whether to afford such protection. Should the tribunal decline to issue a protective direction, the individual work‑men would lose that protection and their wages would have to be reduced to the level prescribed by the scheme. Conversely, if the tribunal found that justice required protecting the wages of those individuals, it could issue a direction to that effect, even though the wages in question were higher than the amounts fixed by the standardisation scheme.

When a standardisation scheme is brought into operation, the Court explained that three conditions must always be observed. First, after the scheme becomes effective, management may not increase the wages of any workmen who are being protected by the scheme, because any such increase would contravene the principle of standardisation.

Second, where the scheme establishes an incremental wage scale and a protected workman is receiving a wage that lies between the minimum and maximum levels, but his length of service does not yet qualify him for that particular level, the surplus amount that he is presently earning must be absorbed through future increments until he is properly placed on the scale according to his seniority.

Third, when a workman’s service terminates for any reason, no other employee, whether newly appointed or incumbent, may claim the higher pay that the departing employee was receiving on the basis that a vacancy with that higher wage has arisen.

Subject to these three conditions, the Court held that a tribunal may choose to protect the wages of individual workmen even if those wages exceed the amounts fixed in a standardisation scheme at the time the scheme is introduced.

The Court then examined the specific direction issued by the tribunal in the present case. The tribunal had ordered that “wherever the said existing wages are higher than those fixed under the Bombay standardisation scheme, they shall remain, and shall not be lowered.” The Court observed that this direction served to protect the level of wages rather than to protect individual workmen, and that such protection of wages ran contrary to the basic principles of a standardisation scheme as articulated in earlier authority.

According to the Court, the effect of the tribunal’s direction would be to preserve a particular post with its higher wage, so that when the individual currently occupying that post ceases to be employed, other workers could claim the same higher wage on the ground that the wage had been protected. The Court considered this outcome inconsistent with the purpose of a standardisation scheme.

The Court explained that the proper method of protecting individuals who receive wages above the standardised level is to fix their wages according to the scheme and to pay any excess amount as personal remuneration for as long as they remain in service. Once such an individual leaves service, a successor in the same position would not be entitled to the personal pay that the predecessor received and would instead be paid the wage prescribed by the standardisation scheme.

Finally, the Court concluded that the tribunal’s direction, as presently framed, was intended to protect wages rather than individuals, and therefore could not be sustained under the principles governing a standardisation scheme.

The judgment observed that the direction issued by the tribunal was being interpreted not as a measure to protect individual workmen but rather as a means to protect the wage level itself, and that, in the view of the court, such an interpretation could not be reconciled with the fundamental principles that govern any standardisation scheme. Consequently, the judgment held that the specific direction which sought to preserve existing wages in the form in which the tribunal had framed it must be set aside. At the same time, the judgment left to the tribunal the discretion to determine, upon the matter’s return for reconsideration, whether it would be just to protect individual workmen even when a standardisation scheme is introduced, applying the approach previously indicated by the court. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the tribunal’s order was partially set aside insofar as it pertained to the matters that had been addressed during the course of this judgment. The tribunal was directed to rehear the reference and to rehearse its award with respect to the categories of miseries, line‑jobbers and fancy jobbers, taking into account both the present judgment and the earlier judgment. This rehearing must be guided by the following term of reference: “Whether the wages require to be increased and standardised, and what directions are necessary in this respect.” The parties were granted liberty to adduce further evidence on any issue that was remitted for reconsideration, as they deemed appropriate. In the circumstances, each party was ordered to bear its own costs, and the appeal was thereby allowed.