Bipat Gope vs State Of Bihar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 153 of 1960

Decision Date: 01/02/1962

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

In the matter titled Bipat Gope versus State of Bihar, a judgment was delivered on the first day of February 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice M. Hidayatullah and was rendered by a bench consisting of Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J. C. Shah, and Justice M. Shah. The petitioner in the proceedings was Bipat Gope and the respondent was the State of Bihar. The case citation appears in the All India Reporter as 1962 AIR 1195 and is also reported in the Supreme Court Reports Supplement, part two, page 948. Subsequent citations of the decision include references in the 1967 Supreme Court reports, the 1970 Supreme Court law reports, and the 1975 Supreme Court law reports, among others. The statutory provision at issue concerned the Criminal Procedure Code, specifically the procedure for a magistrate of the first class to issue an order of discharge after hearing the entire case under section 207A sub‑section six, as originally enacted in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898. The headnote of the judgment explained that in proceedings governed by this provision, the magistrate had recorded the evidence, examined witnesses, and conducted a spot inspection before discharging the accused. The High Court, on revision, set aside that discharge and instructed the magistrate to commit the accused for trial before the court of session. The Supreme Court observed that the magistrate had not limited his inquiry to determining whether any evidence, if accepted, would establish a prima facie case, but had instead undertaken a full trial, evaluating inconsistencies and improbabilities, and arriving at a detailed order of discharge. The Court held that the jurisdiction granted by subsection six of section 207A does not empower a magistrate to conduct a complete trial and to pre‑empt the decision of the session court. Consequently, the magistrate’s order of discharge was deemed to have exceeded his jurisdiction and was set aside. The case was an appeal by special leave under criminal appellate jurisdiction, designated as Criminal Appeal number 153 of 1960, arising from a revision order dated twenty‑eighth July 1960 issued by the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision number 1243 of 1959. The appeal was argued by counsel representing the appellants, while counsel for the respondent presented the State’s position. The judgment delivered on the first of February 1962 summarized that the sole question for determination was whether the High Court was justified in overturning the magistrate’s discharge order, which it had claimed was exercised within the proper limits of the authority conferred by section 207A sub‑section six of the Criminal Procedure Code. The factual background of the case involved an alleged assault that occurred on twenty‑sixth March 1959, wherein the appellants were accused of attacking a person named Rajbahadur Rai, also known as Chhote Rai, at a pan shop, an incident that led to their prosecution under sections 307, 34, and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The magistrate had heard the testimony of nine witnesses, including the victim and the author of the first information report, before rendering his discharge order, which he justified by describing the prosecution evidence as discrepant, unreliable, incredible, and heavily influenced by vested interests, thereby concluding that no court could consider it sufficient to establish even a prima facie case.

At about ten to fifteen minutes past midnight, Rajbahadur Rai, also known as Chhote Rai, was alleged to have been assaulted by the appellants at a location where he was seated in the pan shop owned by Raghunath Prasad. According to the prosecution, the appellants arrived in a private car and a tandem, assaulted Chhote Rai, and then departed in those same two vehicles. Following investigation, the appellants were charged under sections 307, 34 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code, which led to the proceedings already mentioned. Before passing the order of discharge, the Magistrate examined the testimony of nine witnesses, including Chhote Rai himself and Raghunath Prasad, who had lodged the first‑information‑report. The remaining witnesses comprised two alleged eye‑witnesses, namely Bhushan Singh (identified as P.W. 2) and Sheonandan Yadev (identified as P.W. 6). After recording the evidence, conducting a spot inspection, and hearing the parties, the Magistrate discharged the appellants. In his own words, he explained that “in view of the aforesaid discrepant, unreliable and incredible and highly interested prosecution evidence, no Court can consider it worthwhile prima facie even for a trial. In a case of this nature, it is the legal obligation of a Magistrate to discharge the accused persons, as discussed above.” The Magistrate reached this conclusion after a fairly extensive appraisal of the material, considering the credibility and antecedents of the witnesses, the probabilities involved, the nature of the alleged weapon, the medical evidence, and other relevant factors. In effect, he examined the case on its merits rather than merely determining whether any ground existed for committing the appellants to a trial before the Court of Session.

The High Court, in the order now appealed, held that the Magistrate had exceeded the authority granted to him for the purpose of an enquiry aimed at committing the case to the Court of Session. Section 207A, a new provision introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1955 (Act 26 of 1955), prescribes the procedure that Magistrates must follow in such enquiries initiated on a police report. Sub‑sections (1), (2) and (3) deal respectively with fixing dates, issuing processes and ensuring that the accused receive copies of the documents referred to in section 173 of the Code. Sub‑section (4) requires the Magistrate to take evidence from persons produced by the prosecution who are witnesses to the actual commission of the alleged offence and also empowers him to call any other prosecution witnesses he deems necessary. This sub‑section categorises witnesses into two groups: those who directly witnessed the offence and other formal witnesses. The former must be examined, whereas the latter may be examined only if the Magistrate considers it necessary, and the prosecution cannot compel their examination. Sub‑section (5) grants the accused the right to cross‑examine the witnesses who are examined, and it also allows the prosecution to re‑examine them. Sub‑section (6) then states that after taking the evidence under sub‑section (4), considering all documents referred to in section 173, and, if required, examining the accused to enable him to explain any circumstances appearing against him, the Magistrate, having given both the prosecution and the accused an opportunity to be heard, shall, if he is of the opinion that the evidence and documents disclose no grounds for committing the accused for trial, record his reasons and discharge him, unless he finds that the person should be tried before himself.

In the provisions under discussion, witnesses who are unable to testify to the actual commission of the offence are placed in a separate category. The first category consists of those witnesses whom the prosecution produces; these must be examined by the magistrate. The second category comprises witnesses who cannot attest to the actual commission of the offence; such witnesses may be examined only when the magistrate deems it necessary. On the face of it, the prosecution does not have a right to insist upon the examination of these latter witnesses. Sub‑section (5) confers upon the accused the right to cross‑examine the witnesses who have been examined, and it also permits the prosecution to re‑examine those witnesses.

Sub‑section (6) then provides the following language: “When the evidence referred to in subsection (4) has been taken and the Magistrate has considered all the documents referred to in sections 173 and has, if necessary, examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and given the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, such Magistrate shall, if he is of opinion that such evidence and documents disclose no grounds for committing this accused person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him, unless it appears to the Magistrate that such person should be tried before himself or some other Magistrate, in which case he shall proceed accordingly.” The argument advanced by counsel is that this sub‑section gives the magistrate the discretion either to commit the accused for trial or to discharge him, provided the magistrate records reasons that the evidence does not disclose sufficient grounds for commitment, unless the magistrate believes the case should be tried before him or another magistrate. In the present matter, the magistrate held that the authority granted by sub‑section (6) allowed him to examine the evidence in detail and, if unsatisfied, to discharge the accused. The High Court did not accept this view.

Representing the appellants, counsel relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. The State of Bombay (1). The counsel argued that the magistrate’s approach to determining whether credible evidence existed was correct, and cited passages from that judgment in support. The cited case interpreted section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, after amendment by Act 26 of 1955, governs proceedings instituted otherwise than on a police report and permits a magistrate to discharge an accused when he finds that there are insufficient grounds for commitment to trial. Although the language of sections 209 and 207A differs, it is submitted that the force of the two provisions is likewise distinct, with section 209 allowing a magistrate to enter upon the merits of a case in a manner that section 207A does not. Whether the differing language results from a deliberate legislative choice or from the involvement of different drafters, the test for discharging an accused should, in large part, be the same under both provisions.

In this case the Court observed that both provisions require the Magistrate to meet a higher threshold for discharge under section 207A than under section 209, and that it is unnecessary to define the full scope of section 207A or compare it in detail with section 209. The language of the statutes indicates that the Magistrate must find a stronger justification for discharging an accused under section 207A. Nonetheless, regardless of how the two expressions are interpreted, neither provision gives the Magistrate authority to decide the matter as if the trial before the Sessions Court were already concluded. Accordingly, the Court noted that, as the counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded, subsection (6) of section 207A cannot be used to try the case in the Magistrate’s court. In other words, the provision merely requires the Magistrate to commit the accused to the Sessions Court whenever a prima facie case exists that is triable by that higher court. The Court explained that it is unnecessary to enumerate every kind of case that would satisfy this test, because the present matter is not a borderline situation where only theoretical difficulties arise.

The Court further held that, on examining the reasons recorded by the Magistrate, it was clear that he did not simply determine whether evidence, if accepted, could establish a prima facie case. Instead, he went beyond that step and deliberately disbelieved the evidence through an extensive and meticulous examination that involved his own assessment of inconsistencies and improbabilities. He effectively tried the entire case from beginning to end, disbelieving the testimony of the injured person and other eyewitnesses, contrasting oral accounts of the offence with medical evidence, and relying on his personal observations of the crime scene and numerous other factors. The Court concluded that, although subsection (6) of section 207A gives the Magistrate the power to commit an accused for trial, it does not empower him to try the case himself and pre‑empt the decision of the Sessions Court. The Magistrate’s discharge order therefore exceeded his jurisdiction. The Court found no need to delineate the limits of a Magistrate’s power to refuse commitment in detail, as the order was plainly beyond authority. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, dismissed the appeal, expressed regret over the considerable delay that might prejudice either side, and urged that the case now proceed day by day for a swift disposal. Finally, the Court directed all lower courts handling the matter to disregard any expressed opinions on the merits of the case, ensuring that future decisions be made without such influence.

The Court declared that the merits of the case, irrespective of any opinion expressed by the Court itself, by the High Court, or by the Magistrate who initially heard the matter, and irrespective of any such opinion contained in this order or in any order that preceded it, were to be entirely set aside. The Court emphasized that the decision on the case must be rendered without allowing any such expression of opinion to have any influence whatsoever. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.