Bekaru Sinch vs State Of U.P

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 1959

Decision Date: 26 March 1962

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, J. L. Kapur

In the matter titled Bekaru Sinch versus State of U P, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 26 March 1962. The judgment was authored by Justice Raghubar Dayal, with Justice J. L. Kapur sitting on the bench. The official citation of the decision is reported in 1963 AIR 430 and 1963 SCR (1) 55, and it is also referenced in the citator entry D 1979 SC 1498 (2,4). The case was decided under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), specifically sections 499, 500, 502, and the schedule‑V form No. XLII, which govern the procedure for surety bonds, the substitution of one surety for another, and the forfeiture of such bonds.

The factual backdrop involved an accused person, identified as “R,” who obtained bail by furnishing a personal bond together with three sureties, a requirement that he satisfied. On 7 July, one of the sureties, referred to as “S,” applied to have his surety bond discharged. Two days later, on 9 July, the accused R submitted an application requesting that the bond of the appellant be accepted in place of S’s bond, and on that same day the appellant lodged his own surety bond. Along with the bond, the appellant filed an affidavit asserting that he possessed sufficient property to satisfy the bond, and an advocate (“vakil”) certified the appellant’s solvency. The bond was then forwarded to the Tehsil for verification and was formally accepted there on 20 August. Subsequent to these events, R failed to appear before the court and was deemed to have absconded, leading to the forfeiture of the appellant’s surety bond. The appellant challenged the forfeiture, contending that it was illegal because, in his view, the bond had not been properly accepted. He argued that no arrest warrant had been issued for R at the time S sought discharge of his bond, that S’s bond had not been formally cancelled, and that R had not executed a personal bond on the reverse side of the form on which the appellant had executed his bond. The Court held that the appellant’s surety bond had indeed been properly accepted and that the forfeiture was lawful. It clarified that the purpose of section 502 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to ensure continuity of surety bonds and to permit the accused to replace an existing surety with a new one; the section does not impose conditions precedent for the acceptance of a new surety. The Court observed that there was no necessity to issue an arrest warrant for R, as he was present in court on 7 July when S applied for discharge and could have indicated his intention to offer a fresh surety on 9 July. The Court’s interest lay in securing a new surety to allow R to remain on bail, and it therefore rightly accepted the appellant’s bond. Consequently, S’s bond was deemed cancelled and the appellant’s bond took effect. The acceptance of the appellant’s bond was considered to have occurred on 9 July when the requisite affidavit was filed in accordance with section 499(3) of the Code, and the advocate’s certification of solvency was submitted. The formal acceptance of the bond on 20 August was deemed immaterial, and the Court further noted that it is not a requirement for each surety to execute the surety bond on the reverse of the accused’s personal bond.

In this criminal appeal, the Court noted that the matter arose from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 9 June 1958, which directed the accused, Ram Narain, to furnish a personal bond of one lakh rupees together with three sureties—two sureties of Rs 40,000 each and one surety of Rs 20,000—because he was charged with criminal breach of trust in respect of the funds of the Pikaura Co‑operative Society. The High Court ordered that the personal bond and the three sureties must be furnished within three weeks of the order and further directed that Ram Narain would not be arrested during that period; however, if he failed to furnish the required security, he would be liable to be re‑arrested and detained until the bonds and sureties were supplied. The Court observed that Ram Narain had previously furnished a personal bond and sureties in connection with an earlier allegation of embezzlement, but a fresh order became necessary because the police had submitted more than one charge‑sheet relating to the amount allegedly embezzled, and it was feared that the original security might not be effective. Accordingly, on 26 June 1958 Ram Narain executed a personal bond for Rs 1,00,000 and offered the required sureties: Kashi stood as surety for Rs 40,000, Safir Hussain for Rs 40,000, and Smt. Sona for Rs 20,000. The surety bond of Safir Hussain could not be verified at that time because he was hospitalized; when the bond was presented to him for verification on 12 July 1958, he refused to verify it. Earlier, on 7 July 1958, Safir Hussain had filed an application before the Magistrate seeking cancellation of his surety bonds in connection with the alleged embezzlement of Rs 40,000 and Rs 80,000, and Ram Narain was present in court on that day. No specific order was passed on Safir Hussain’s application. Subsequently, on 9 July 1958 an application on behalf of Ram Narain was filed requesting that Bekaru’s surety be accepted in place of Safir Hussain’s surety. Bekaru submitted a surety bond offering to stand as surety for Rs 40,000 for Ram Narain’s appearance in court. He was identified by Sri Ahmad Husain, Vakil, who certified that Bekaru Singh possessed sufficient property to stand surety for the amount. The Magistrate ordered that verification be obtained from the Tehsil, and upon receipt of the Tehsil report the magistrate accepted the bond.

On 20 August 1958 the magistrate formally accepted the surety bond that had been offered by Bekaru Singh. The accompanying report from the tehsil, however, revealed that the house described in the bond and claimed to be worth Rs 60,000 was actually assessed at a value of Rs 16,075. The police charge‑sheet in the matter appears to have been placed before the court on the same day, 20 August 1958, and at that time a summons was ordered for the appearance of Ram Narain on 1 September 1958. The summons was never served. Because Ram Narain failed to appear on the scheduled date of 1 September, and again on 9 September and 23 September, the court on 24 September issued orders under sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing that action be taken against him and that notices be sent to the sureties requiring them to produce him in court. When Ram Narain also failed to appear on 29 October 1958, the court proceeded to forfeit the personal bond filed by Ram Narain as well as the bail bonds furnished by the sureties. The court further directed that notice be given to the sureties, requiring them either to pay the stipulated penalty or to show cause why the amount should not be recovered from them. Bekaru Singh objected to the forfeiture of his surety bond, but on 20 April 1959 the objection was rejected by the learned judicial officer, who ordered that the sum of Rs 40,000 be recovered from Bekaru’s movable property by attachment and sale. Bekaru appealed this decision, but his appeal was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, and a subsequent revision application to the High Court was also dismissed. He has subsequently filed the present appeal by special leave, contending that the magistrate should not have accepted Bekaru Singh’s surety bond without first complying with sub‑sections (2) and (3) of section 502 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 502 provides that, upon an application for discharge of a bail bond, the magistrate shall issue a warrant of arrest directing the released person to appear before him, and that, upon that person’s appearance or voluntary surrender, the magistrate shall either discharge the bond or call upon the person to furnish other sufficient sureties, committing him to custody if he fails to do so. The appellant argues that a warrant should have been issued for Ram Narain when Safir Hussain applied for discharge of his surety bond, and that only after Ram Narain’s appearance under such a warrant could the magistrate have considered the fresh surety offered by Bekaru Singh. The magistrate, according to the appellant, failed to observe this procedural step and therefore could not lawfully accept the new surety. The court, however, does not agree with this contention.

The provision was intended to ensure that a surety bond, which allowed an accused to be released on bail, remained in force until the accused appeared before the Court. It also permitted the Court to act if the accused later wished to replace that surety with another security. These requirements were not intended to be conditions that must be fulfilled before a new surety could be accepted in place of the earlier one. In the facts of this case, there was no reason to issue a warrant for Ram Narain’s arrest merely because Safir Hussain had applied to have his surety bond discharged. The Court did not know the specific circumstances under which no order was issued on 7 July 1958 regarding Safir Hussain’s application. Ram Narain, who attended the Court on that day, may have informed the Court that he intended to furnish a new surety on 9 July. Nevertheless, a new surety was indeed presented on 9 July, with Bekaru acting as the surety to satisfy the requirement for a fresh bond. An application filed on behalf of Ram Narain requested that the Court accept Bekaru’s surety bond in substitution for Safir Hussain’s bond. The Court did not err in accepting Bekaru’s surety bond; it sought a fresh surety to permit Ram Narain to remain on bail. Bekaru provided the surety bond, and his ability to stand surety for forty thousand rupees was certified by a vakil; consequently, Safir Hussain’s bond was cancelled and replaced by Bekaru’s bond. Accordingly, the Court found no incompetence in the Magistrate’s decision to accept Bekaru’s surety bond in lieu of Safir Hussain’s bond. Although Bekaru’s bond was formally accepted on 20 August 1958, that timing did not affect the substantive issues. Section 499(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that, before a person is released on bail, the bail bond be executed by the accused and also by sureties to assure accused’s attendance in Court. Section 499(3) states that, to determine whether sureties are sufficient, the Court may, if it deems appropriate, accept affidavits proving the relevant facts or may conduct any further inquiry it considers necessary.

When Bekaru submitted the surety bond, he also filed an affidavit declaring that the property described in the bond was valued at more than forty thousand rupees. Sri Ahmed Husain, a vakil, certified that Bekaru owned sufficient property to stand surety for that amount in question. Given these circumstances, the Magistrate was entitled to accept Bekaru’s surety bond without further delay and to proceed with the bail process. The Magistrate could also have conducted additional inquiry, and accordingly he directed verification of the property from the Tehsil for that purpose. In the Court’s view, Bekaru’s bond was deemed accepted on 9 July, pending any further orders that might arise upon receipt of the Tehsil report. Moreover, under Section 500 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ram Narain’s continued bail was justified once Bekaru’s surety bond had been filed. Section 500(1) provides that as soon as the bond is executed, the accused shall be released from custody.

The law provides that as soon as a bail bond has been executed, the individual for whose appearance the bond was furnished must be released. This rule implies that the accused is to be set free upon execution of the bond, and that the bond should be accepted at its face value at the outset. Section 501 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorises the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person who was released on bail if it later appears that the sureties were accepted by mistake, fraud, or any other reason, or if the sureties subsequently become insufficient. Consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the magistrate's formal acceptance of Bekaru’s surety bond on 20 August 1958 does not alter Bekaru’s liability under that bond which arose on 9 July 1958. In any event, Bekaru remained liable on the bond for the failure of Ram Narain to appear before the court on a date that fell after 20 August 1958. It may be noted that, up to the appellate stage, it was contended that the surety bond had been accepted on 20 August 1958 after the magistrate had become aware of Ram Narain’s absconding. The Court rejected that contention because no evidence was produced to support the allegation. Another argument raised was that the surety bond executed by Bekaru Singh was not printed on the reverse side of a personal bond executed by Ram Narain, and that, in the absence of such a personal bond, Bekaru’s surety bond could not be lawfully accepted. The petitioners relied upon the decision in Brahma Nand v. Emperor (1) and several other cases that expressed a similar view. Those authorities are distinguishable on the facts of the present case. In Brahma Nand’s case (1), the accused had not executed any personal bond, and the court held that the surety bonds could not be forfeited.

Here, Ram Narain executed a personal bond on 26 June 1958, and one of the sureties, Kasbi, signed the surety bond that was printed on the back of Ram Narain’s bond. Ram Narain had already undertaken to pay Rs 1,00,000 if he failed to appear before the court when required. The other sureties also pledged to pay the amounts specified in their respective bonds in the event that Ram Narain failed to appear. Each of those surety bonds is valid in its own right. Accordingly, Bekaru’s surety bond is as effective and lawful as the bond executed by Kashi, which, like the others, appears only on the reverse side of Ram Narain’s bond. No provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that all sureties must execute the bond on the same piece of paper on which the accused signs the personal bond, nor does it require the accused to execute multiple personal bonds identical in terms to the number of individual sureties. The mere fact that Form No XLII, Schedule V of the Criminal Procedure Code prints the contents of the two bonds—one to be signed by the accused and the other by the surety—on the same form does not compel them to be executed on the same sheet of paper.

The Court observed that the bond in question had been executed on a sheet of paper. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that the bond furnished by Bekaru could be forfeited if Ram Narain failed to adhere to the conditions of his own bond, which had been signed on 26 June 1958. In reaching this conclusion, the Court also held that Ram Narain was not obligated to execute a fresh bond, as reflected in the citation A. 1. R. 1939 All. 682, when Bekaru supplied a new surety to replace the surety bond previously provided by Safir Hussain. The Court therefore concluded that the appellant’s bond had been correctly forfeited because Ram Narain did not appear before the Court as required. On the basis of these findings, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appeal be rejected.