Banwari vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 1961

Decision Date: 14 February, 1962

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar

In the matter titled Banwari versus State of Uttar Pradesh, a judgment was delivered on fourteen February 1962 by a bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice Raghubar Dayal, Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice A. K. Sarkar. The petition was filed by Banwari and the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh. The citation of the decision appears as 1962 AIR 1198 and 1962 S.C.R. Suppl. (3) 180. The matters discussed involved provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifically section 34 relating to common intention, and sections 302 and 307 dealing with murder and attempt to murder. Relevant procedural provisions were taken from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, notably sections 226, 234, 239 and 537.

The factual background disclosed that Banwari was armed with a firearm while Ram Charan carried an axe, and the two were traveling together when they encountered a person named Lakhan. After a brief conversation, Banwari fired a shot that killed Lakhan. The pair continued along the road and subsequently met Bhagwan; following another brief exchange, Banwari again discharged his weapon, resulting in Bhagwan’s death. The villagers, upon learning of these incidents, pursued the two accused. In the course of the chase, Banwari shot at a third individual, Narayan, who sustained injuries but survived. The police lodged a single report describing the three incidents and issued three separate charge‑sheets. A magistrate issued three orders of commitment, framing charges against the two accused under section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code for the first incident, under section 302 read with section 34 for the second incident, and under section 307 read with section 34 for the third incident. When the matter reached the Sessions Court, the judge framed what were described as amended charges: for both accused, section 302 read with section 34 for the murder of Lakhan; for Banwari alone, section 302 for the murder of Bhagwan; and for Banwari alone, section 307 for the attempted murder of Narayan. The Sessions Judge recorded the entire evidence in a single trial and, by a common judgment, convicted Banwari and Ram Charan, sentencing Banwari to death and Ram Charan to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the judgment on several grounds, arguing that the trial was illegal because the procedural steps taken by the Sessions Judge were not authorized by law, that Ram Charan’s conviction for the murder of Bhagwan and the attempted murder of Narayan was improper because he was not tried for those specific offenses, and that the application of section 34 to Ram Charan was erroneous since there was no common intention between him and Banwari to commit the offenses.

The Court held that although the practice of recording evidence for multiple offenses in a single trial, when the offenses arose from separate committal orders, was not sanctioned by the procedural statutes, this defect did not invalidate the trial. The procedural irregularity was deemed curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court observed that the three offenses charged against the appellants were of the same nature and therefore a joint trial was permissible under section 234 of the Code. Consequently, the trial was not vitiated by the procedural lapse, and no prejudice was shown to have been caused to the appellants. The Court further noted that, while the Sessions Judge did not formally consolidate the committal orders, the effect of recording the evidence and presumably examining the accused only once amounted to a single joint trial, which was within the ambit of the law as interpreted under sections 231 and 239 for offenses allegedly committed jointly within a twelve‑month period. The Court also distinguished the charges framed by the Sessions Judge as “amended” charges, clarifying that they were in fact additional charges and not replacements of the magistrate’s original charges. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences were upheld.

The Court observed that trying both appellants for the three offenses, each alleged to have been committed jointly within a twelve‑month period, was permissible under sections 231 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It further held that even where three separate committal orders existed, the Sessions Judge was authorized to conduct a single trial if sections 234 to 239 allowed a joint trial of the offences. In the present matter, the Sessions Judge did not formally merge the committal orders, yet the practical effect was a single trial because evidence was recorded in one case only and the accused were apparently examined only once. The Court found that no procedural defect was occasioned by this approach and that the appellants suffered no prejudice as a result of the manner in which the trial was conducted. The decision cited the precedent set in Payare Lal v. State of Punjab, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 328, as supporting authority for the view that such procedural irregularities are curable. Regarding the charges against Ram Charan, the Court noted that he had been charged with all the offences for which he was ultimately convicted. The so‑called amended charges framed by the Sessions Judge were characterised as additional charges rather than substitutions for the original charges framed by the Magistrate. The Court explained that the Sessions Judge lacked authority to drop any charge under which the accused had been committed, although he could frame, add to, or otherwise modify a charge when a person was committed without a charge or with an imperfect charge.

Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the conviction of Ram Charan could not be upheld because the evidence showed that he did not participate in any of the three incidents. The factual matrix failed to demonstrate that Ram Charan shared a common intention with Banwari to commit any of the offences. No allegation was made that Ram Charan harboured enmity towards any of the victims, nor was any pre‑concert between him and Banwari established. The mere fact that Ram Charan was present in Banwari’s company throughout the episodes did not permit an inference of common intention. Accordingly, the question of whether Ram Charan dissociated himself from Banwari never arose, because he was never shown to have associated himself with Banwari in the first place. The judgment section then recorded the criminal appellate jurisdiction, stating that Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 1961 was filed by special leave against the Allahabad High Court order dated 8 December 1960 in Criminal Appeal No. 1517 of 1960 and Referred No. 104 of 1960. Counsel for the appellants appeared for Banwari and Ram Charan, while counsel for the respondent appeared for the State. The judgment, delivered on 14 February 1962 by Justice Raghu Bar Dayal, addressed the appeal against the High Court’s dismissal and the confirmation of the convictions pronounced by the 11th Additional Sessions Judge, Etawah. Banwari was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murders of Lakhan Singh and Bhagwan Singh and under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code for attempting to murder Babu Singh. Ram Charan was convicted of the same three offences read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Court recorded that Banwari and Ram Charan were each charged with three offenses, each offense being read together with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The factual matrix leading to the present appeal was set out as follows. Banwari, who belonged to the Lodh caste, and Ram Charan, who was respectively armed with a firearm and an axe, were passing through the field of Lakhan Singh. Lakhan Singh stopped them and asked Banwari where he was going. Banwari answered that he intended to shoot birds. Afterwards Lakhan Singh turned away. Banwari then discharged two rounds of his gun at Lakhan Singh. The victim fell to the ground and died as a result of the gunshots.

Subsequently, Banwari and Ram Charan continued moving in a southerly direction. After travelling a distance of roughly six or seven furlongs, they encountered Bhagwan Singh, who was engaged in grazing his cattle. Bhagwan Singh questioned Banwari about his destination. Banwari replied that he was proceeding to the river to shoot crocodiles. Bhagwan Singh informed him that there were no crocodiles in that river and urged him to return to his own work. When Bhagwan Singh turned toward the south, Banwari fired a shot at him. Bhagwan Singh fell down and sat. Banwari fired a second shot at the same victim, and then discharged two additional shots. The cumulative effect of these four shots caused Bhagwan Singh’s death.

After the killing of Bhagwan Singh, a group of villagers pursued the two appellants. During the pursuit Banwari again opened fire. He attempted to shoot at Babu Singh but instead struck Narayan Singh. The incidents were reported in a single police report lodged at the local police station. Following the investigation, the police forwarded three charge‑sheets to the magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The magistrate then registered three separate cases: one case for the murder of Lakhan Singh, a second case for the murder of Bhagwan Singh, and a third case for an offence punishable under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, arising from the attempt to shoot Babu Singh and the consequent injury to Narayan Singh. All three accused were subsequently committed for trial before the Sessions Court, each case being assigned a distinct trial number – Sessions Trials Nos. 34, 37 and 38 of 1960 – based on the three committal orders.

In the trial concerning the murder of Lakhan Singh, the magistrate framed two separate charges: one charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code against Banwari, and another charge against Ram Charan for an offence under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the proceedings relating to the murder of Bhagwan Singh, the magistrate framed a single charge against both Banwari and Ram Charan, again under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Finally, in the case under section 307, a common charge was framed against both accused for an offence under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

When the Sessions Trial No. 34 of 1960 began on 18 July 1960 – a date on which the other two Sessions Trials were also scheduled to be heard – the learned Sessions Judge framed the charges as amended charges. Specifically, in Sessions Trial No. 34 of 1960, the Judge framed a charge against Banwari and Ram Charan for an offence under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, this charge being linked to the murder of Lakhan Singh.

In Sessions Trial No 37 of 1960 the learned Sessions Judge framed an amended charge against Banwari under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, alleging that Banwari had committed the murder of Bhagwan Singh. In Sessions Trial No 38 of 1960 the judge framed an amended charge against Banwari for an offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, holding that Banwari had shot at Babu Singh and Narayan Singh with the intention and knowledge, and in circumstances such that, had his act caused death, he would have been guilty of murder. The judge read the amended charges in open court and explained them to the accused, as required by section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On 18 July 1960 the judge recorded that the amended charges had been read and explained to the prisoner, who pleaded not guilty, and that Sessions Trials 37/60 and 38/60 were being consolidated with the main case, with evidence to be recorded under section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judge noted that the learned Deputy Government Counsel opened his case and examined the witnesses listed. The judge then observed that three Sessions trials—Nos 34, 37 and 38 of 1960—each involving both Banwari and Ram Charan as accused, were being heard together and would be disposed of by a single judgment. Banwari was charged under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murders of Lakhan Singh and Bhagwan Singh, and under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code for an attempted killing of Narayan Singh on 12 November 1959 in the village of Boorhadana, police station Dibiapur. Additionally, Banwari and Ram Charan were charged jointly under section 302 read with section 34 and under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for acting in furtherance of a common intention to commit the murders and the attempted killing. In the concluding order, the learned Additional Sessions Judge held that Banwari was found guilty under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Lakhan Singh and was convicted and sentenced to death. He was also found guilty under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Bhagwan Singh and was likewise convicted and sentenced to death, with the sentence to be carried out by hanging until death. Furthermore, Banwari was found guilty under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and was convicted and sentenced to eight years of rigorous imprisonment. The other accused, Ram Charan, was found guilty under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Lakhan Singh and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was also found guilty under section 302 read with section 34 for the murder of Bhagwan Singh and received a further term of life imprisonment. In addition, Ram Charan was found guilty under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced accordingly.

Ram Charan was found guilty of the offence charged under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment. The Court ordered that all sentences imposed on him would run concurrently. At the time of sentencing he was already in custody, and the judgment directed that he remain detained until he had completed the term of his imprisonment. The judgment issued by the Sessions Judge was declared to govern the three criminal proceedings identified as Sessions Trials numbers 34, 37 and 38 of the year 1960, and a copy of that judgment was to be treated as binding for all three trials.

The appellants subsequently filed a criminal appeal before the High Court, claiming that the appeal was directed against the order of the Sessions Judge in the three Sessions Trials numbered 34, 37 and 38 of 1960. In their appeal they raised three principal grounds: first, that the convictions were not supported by the weight of the evidence on record; second, that the prosecution witnesses had failed to establish any offence; and third, that the sentences imposed were unduly harsh. The High Court examined the evidence presented at trial, held that the case against the appellants was proved, and consequently dismissed the appeal.

On behalf of the appellants, counsel advanced four specific contentions. The first contention asserted that Ram Charan had not been tried for the murder of Bhagwan Singh or for the attempted murders of Babu Singh and Narayan Singh because the Sessions Judge had limited the trial to the offences enumerated in the amended charges that had been read to and explained to the accused; therefore, the conviction for those two offences was alleged to be invalid. The second contention complained that the Sessions Judge had conducted three distinct trials based on three separate commitment orders but had recorded evidence for only one of those trials, namely Sessions Trial No. 34 of 1960. This, it was argued, effectively amalgamated the three trials into a single proceeding, a procedure that was not authorised by the Code of Criminal Procedure; the alleged procedural defect, not curable under section 537 of the Code, was said to have vitiated the trial. The third contention maintained that, even assuming the trial was valid, the death sentence imposed on Banwari was excessively severe. The fourth contention questioned the conviction of Ram Charan on the ground that there was no evidence on record showing that the offences were committed by Banwari in furtherance of a common intention shared with Ram Charan. In the absence of proof of a prior concert or of any motive on the part of Ram Charan to join Banwari in the commission of the offences, the mere fact that Ram Charan was present with Banwari at the time the three offences occurred was deemed insufficient to sustain his conviction.

Representing the State, counsel argued that the Sessions Judge had lawfully framed amended charges in addition to the charges originally framed by the Magistrate, and that it was permissible for both appellants to be tried together for the various offences in a single trial. It was further submitted that the conviction of Ram Charan was correct. The Court therefore identified the primary issue for determination as whether the Sessions Judge had, by framing amended charges, added to the original charges framed by the Magistrate, or whether he had substituted the original charges with the amended ones.

The Sessions Judge received the charge that had been prepared by the Magistrate and, in the judgment quoted earlier, expressly stated that Banwari stood charged for the three offences simpliciter and also stood jointly with Ram Charan for the same three offences read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. This declaration makes clear that the Judge did not intend the amended charges to replace the charges originally framed by the Magistrate. Two additional points support this conclusion. First, the Sessions Judge possessed no authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure to dismiss any charge for which the accused had been committed to trial. Second, under section 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge could, when a person is committed for trial without a charge or with an imperfect or erroneous charge, frame a new charge, add to an existing charge, or otherwise alter it as the circumstances required. Because the Magistrate had failed to frame a charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code simpliciter for the murder of Bhagwan Singh, and had also omitted a charge under section 307 simpliciter for the attempted murder of Babu Singh and Narayan Singh, the Sessions Judge found it necessary to frame these charges and did so. Moreover, the Magistrate had not charged Banwari under section 302 read with section 34 for the murder of Lakhan Singh; consequently, the Sessions Judge prepared a charge against both Banwari and Ram Charan for that offence. This amended charge can be regarded either as a substitution of the Magistrate’s original charge or as the Magistrate’s charge amended by the addition of Banwari’s name and an alteration of its language. In the final order, the Sessions Judge recorded a conviction of Banwari for the offences simpliciter and a conviction of Ram Charan for those offences read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. At that stage, there was no necessity to record a conviction of Banwari under the section 34 charge. Nevertheless, it would have been advisable, at the commencement of the trial, to charge Banwari both for offences simpliciter and for offences read with section 34 so as to avoid any future contention that he might be convicted of an offence for which he had not been charged, either an offence read with section 34 where no such charge existed or an offence simpliciter where no charge had been framed. The Court therefore holds that the contention that Ram Charan was convicted of an offence with which he had not been charged lacks any force.

The learned Sessions Judge failed to comply with the requirements of section 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because he neither read aloud nor explained the charges that had been framed by the Magistrate. Nevertheless, this omission did not invalidate the trial, as section 537 of the Code provides that the trial remains valid unless it is shown that the appellants suffered prejudice because of the omission. The practice of recording evidence for offences that were the subject of separate Sessions Trials within the proceedings of a single Sessions Trial was not supported by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Each distinct trial was required to proceed independently, which meant that every stage of each trial, including the recording of evidence, had to be conducted separately. The crucial issue therefore was whether the improper procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge had tainted the trial regardless of whether any prejudice was actually caused to the accused. The State contended that both appellants, Banwari and Ram Charan, could have been tried together for the offences they faced, relying on sections 234 and 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court held, however, that the provisions of section 235 did not justify a single trial for those offences. Although the three charge‑sheets submitted by the police to the Magistrate were not placed before the Court, the fact that three charge‑sheets were filed and that the Magistrate issued three separate commitment orders indicated that the prosecution had not presented the offences as having arisen from a single transaction. The Court nevertheless agreed that sections 234 and 239 of the Code would have permitted a joint trial of the appellants for the offences with which they were charged and tried. Section 234 authorises the trial of a person charged with three or fewer offences of the same kind committed within a twelve‑month period, defining offences of the same kind as those punishable under the same provision of the Indian Penal Code or any special law with the same maximum punishment. The two offences under section 302 relating to the murders of Lakhan Singh and Bhagwan Singh fell under the same section and therefore were of the same kind. Moreover, the proviso to section 234 treats an attempt to commit an offence as being of the same kind as the offence itself, making the charge under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code of the same kind as the charges under section 302. Consequently, the three offences for which the appellants were charged were of the same kind, and a single joint trial of those offences would have been justified under section 234 of the Code.

Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribed the joinder of persons at a single trial and provided that individuals accused of more than one offence of the same kind, as defined in section 234, and who had committed those offences jointly within a period of twelve months, could be charged and tried together. Consequently, the trial of both Banwari and Ram Charan for the three offences, each alleged to have been committed jointly within the twelve‑month period, would have been permissible under that provision. Nonetheless, the learned Sessions Judge did not attempt to try the appellants together in one proceeding. The record showed that he conducted three separate trials but recorded the evidence in only one of them. Counsel argued that the consolidation of three distinct Sessions Cases was not supported by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Code, through sections 233 to 239, ordinarily required that each distinct offence be tried separately, except in the circumstances covered by sections 234, 235, 236 and 239. The argument further asserted that if separate committal orders had been issued for distinct offences that fell outside the exception to section 233, those offences could not be tried together by merging the three cases. However, this did not imply that when separate committal orders involved the same person, or persons who could be tried together under the statutory exceptions, the accused could not be tried in a single trial. It was observed that it often happened that persons accused of committing a particular offence or offences jointly, or as part of the same transaction, were not presented for trial at the same time because some of them were unavailable. When those persons later became available, they could be committed for trial subsequently. In such a situation, if the first committal had not yet proceeded to trial, the Sessions Judge was not obligated to conduct two separate trials, each corresponding to a committal order. He was free to try all the accused together in one trial, thereby consolidating the proceedings arising from the two committal orders into a single trial.

The committal order merely conferred cognizance on the Sessions Court to try the persons so committed; it did not bind the Sessions Judge to try only those persons in a solitary proceeding. The question of whether the various committed persons should be tried together depended not on the number of committal orders but on the requirements of sections 233 to 239 of the Code. If a single trial could be justified under those provisions and there was no prejudice to the accused, the Sessions Judge could lawfully consolidate the committal orders and try the accused together. For the purpose of the trial, the Judge could frame a fresh charge containing appropriate counts against the accused, thereby replacing the charges that had been framed by the Magistrate in the separate committal proceedings.

In the matter of committal proceedings, the Court observed that when a single committal order sends persons to trial for different offences that, under sections 234 to 239 of the Code, cannot be tried together, a joint trial of those persons would be illegal. The Court therefore explained that the legitimacy of a joint trial before the Sessions Judge depends entirely on whether the provisions of the Code allow a single trial for the offences involved. Accordingly, the Court held that although a Sessions Judge may not try in one trial persons who have been committed under separate committal orders for distinct offences whose joint trial is not sanctioned by sections 234 to 239, the Judge is nevertheless authorized to try in one trial those persons who, even if committed by separate orders, can be tried together under the said sections. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court noted that the learned Sessions Judge did not expressly intend to merge the separate committal orders and conduct a single trial; however, in practice the Judge recorded evidence for all the accused in a single proceeding, apparently examined each accused only once, heard all arguments together, and finally rendered one common judgment covering the three Sessions Trials. Because the procedural conduct effectively amounted to a single trial, the Court concluded that there is no substantive question of the Judge having improperly amalgamated or consolidated the three trials. In the circumstances, the Court found that the trial was not vitiated by any procedural flaw and that no prejudice to the accused was demonstrated in regard to the conduct or the result of the trial. While the Court reiterated that, in principle, each separate trial should proceed independently and therefore the procedure adopted by the learned Sessions Judge was technically incorrect, the pivotal issue became whether this error invalidated the trial and the convictions or could be remedied under section 537 of the Code. The Court expressed the view that the defect does not invalidate the trial because section 537 provides a remedy for such irregularities. Referring to the decision in Payare Lal v. The State of Punjab (1), the Court quoted the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottoya v. King Emperor, noting that when a trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code, the trial is fundamentally bad and cannot be cured; however, if the trial follows substantially the Code’s requirements and only a minor irregularity occurs, that irregularity can be cured under section 537, even though it represents a breach of the Code’s comprehensive provisions. The Court thus concluded that the present case falls within the category where the irregularity is curable, and consequently the trial of the appellants is upheld as valid.

In this case, the Court observed that the procedural defect identified by the lower court fell within the first category described by the Privy Council, namely a lack of competency rather than a mere irregularity. The Court therefore concluded that the question of the Sessions Judge’s authority to try all the alleged offences in a single proceeding was not implicated by the impugned procedure. The amendment to section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, effected by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act XXVI of 1955), was held not to aid the appellants because the amendment broadened the scope of section 537 to include cases of misjoinder of charges. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the trial of the appellants had been valid. Banwari was sentenced to death under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Counsel for the appellant argued that Banwari’s shooting of Lakhan Singh was provoked by Lakhan’s alleged words, and that in the absence of a clear motive the appropriate punishment should have been a lesser term for murder. The Court did not accept this argument. It noted that the trial court had rejected Banwari’s account of the exchange with Lakhan Singh, and even assuming the exchange were true, the Court found no justification for Banwari to fire at Lakhan Singh twice, nor for the separate shooting of Bhagwan Singh, who was not said to have provoked him. The Court therefore saw no reason to deem the death sentence unjustified or to reduce it.

Regarding the alleged participation of Ram Charan, the Court held that his conviction could not be sustained. The record showed that Ram Charan did not take part in any of the three shooting incidents. His mere presence with Banwari after the first shooting was not sufficient to infer a common intention to fire at anyone, including Lakhan Singh, Bhagwan Singh, Babu Singh, or Narain Singh. The prosecution had not demonstrated any pre‑existing enmity between Banwari and the victims, nor any prior plan between Banwari and Ram Charan to provoke or shoot any of the victims. The Court described the incidents as accidental, stating that had Lakhan Singh and Bhagwan Singh not questioned Banwari, the shootings might not have occurred. The Court rejected the lower court’s imputation of common intention to Ram Charan on the basis of his failure to distance himself from Banwari’s actions, observing that no evidence showed Ram Charan had associated himself with Banwari’s conduct at the outset. The Court therefore concluded that the conviction of Ram Charan could not be maintained.

In considering the case, the Court examined whether Ram Charan had failed to distance himself from the conduct of Banwan. The Court noted that the issue of disassociation did not arise at the time when Ram Charan had not, in the first place, joined or participated in Banwari’s activities. It was observed that Ram Charan was probably quite bewildered by Banwari’s decision to fire at Lakhan Singh, a reaction that any ordinary person would have found shocking. After the fatal shooting of Lakhan Singh, the record states that both Banwari and Ram Charan proceeded in a southerly direction together. The narrative further indicates that only after Bhagwan Singh was also shot dead did the two individuals take to their heels and flee the scene. The Court concluded that Ram Charan could not have foreseen a second shooting involving Bhagwan Singh, and therefore there was no evidence of any pre‑arranged plan to kill the second victim. The simultaneous flight of Ram Charan with Banwari following the second shooting was interpreted as a natural instinct to protect himself from the anger of the villagers, who might have presumed his involvement in the series of incidents. When the Court viewed his presence in this light, it recognized that villagers could easily have formed such a suspicion, and that his hurried departure was not a sign of guilty conscience but rather an attempt to avoid popular retaliation. In the circumstances, the possession of an axe by Ram Charan at the time was not intended for violent use against Lakhan Singh or any of the other victims; the axe could have been carried as a routine tool for the work he was performing that day. Accordingly, the Court expressed the opinion that Ram Charan did not share a common intention with Banwari in the acts that led to the deaths of the victims and that his conviction was therefore erroneous. On that basis, the Court dismissed the appeal filed by Banwari, allowed the appeal filed by Ram Charan, and acquitted him of all offences for which he had previously been convicted. The appeal was therefore allowed in part.