Banarsi Das vs Seth Kanshi Ram and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 94 to 97 of 1960

Decision Date: 17 December 1962

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, Syed Jaffer Imam, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the case titled Banarsi Das versus Seth Kanshi Ram and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 17 December 1962. The opinion was authored by Justice J.R. Mudholkar and the bench was composed of Justices J.R. Mudholkar, Syed Jaffer Imam and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The case is reported in 1963 AIR 1165 and 1964 SCR (1) 316 and is cited in RF 1991 SC1020 (13). The matters before the Court involved the application of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 (specifically Article 106), the Indian Partnership Act 1932 (section 43), and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Order 20, Rule 15). The plaintiff, Banarsi Das, instituted a suit against his brothers, who had earlier formed a joint family, seeking a declaration that the partnership they had created after ceasing to be a joint family in connection with a sugar mill had been dissolved on 13 May 1944. On that same date one of the brothers had previously filed a suit for dissolution of the partnership, which had subsequently been dismissed for default. In the present suit the plaintiff also prayed for a decree for accounts against defendants I and II and for the appointment of a receiver. The trial court granted the decree, ordered the winding up of the firm, appointed a commissioner and directed that the accounts be furnished as prayed for. Before the High Court, Seth Kanshi Ram—who had not filed a written statement and against whom the trial‑court proceedings had proceeded ex parte—contended that the suit was barred by limitation and, in any event, he should not be compelled to render accounts. The plaintiff countered that the suit was for the distribution of the assets of a dissolved firm and was therefore not subject to limitation. The High Court observed that the limitation plea was raised for the first time before it, and, relying on section 3 of the Limitation Act, held that it was bound to consider the limitation defence and dismissed the suit. After deciding the limitation issue, the High Court issued consequential orders affecting the various appeals lodged by the other defendants. On appeal to this Court it was argued that the limitation question, which had not been raised in the grounds of appeal before the High Court, constituted a mixed question of fact and law and should not have been entertained by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the suit for dissolution filed on 13 May 1944 had concluded in a dismissal for default; consequently, no date of dissolution of the partnership as contemplated by Order 20, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been fixed by any court, and the plaint could not be construed as the notice required under section 43 of the Partnership Act to terminate the partnership. Even

The Court observed that if one were to assume that the summons, together with the plaint, constituted the service of notice terminating the partnership, then the effective date of dissolution could only be identified as the day on which the last remaining partner received such service. Because the determination of that specific date required an inquiry into factual matters, the Court held that the High Court had erred in classifying the limitation issue as a purely legal question. Moreover, the High Court was found to have improperly permitted the limitation defence to be introduced for the first time during the hearing, at the behest of a party who had neither filed a written statement nor raised the limitation question before the trial court.

The appeal fell under the civil appellate jurisdiction and involved Civil Appeals numbered ninety‑four to ninety‑seven of the year 1960. These appeals challenged the judgment and order dated fifteen March 1956 rendered by the Allahabad High Court in First Appeals numbered one‑seventy‑two, three‑sixty‑four, and three‑seventy‑nine of 1954. Counsel for the appellant in appeals ninety‑four to ninety‑six included Veda Vyasa, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, Shiv Shastri and K. K. Jain, while counsel for respondent number two in appeal ninety‑seven was also listed. For appeal ninety‑seven, the appellant was represented by Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vohra, who also acted for respondent two in appeal ninety‑four and for respondent one in appeals ninety‑five and ninety‑six. Additional counsel included K. L. Gossain and Sohan Lal Pandhi for respondent one in appeals ninety‑four and ninety‑seven, respondent two in appeal ninety‑five, and respondent four in appeal ninety‑six; Harbans Singh for respondent three in appeal ninety‑four; and J. P. Agarwal for respondent four in appeal ninety‑four as well as for respondents three and four in appeals ninety‑five, ninety‑six and ninety‑seven respectively. The judgment was delivered on seventeen December 1962 by Justice Mudholkar, who noted that the appeals were brought forward on certificates granted by the Allahabad High Court under Article one hundred thirty‑three, clause one, sub‑clause (c) of the Constitution, based on the High Court’s orders of fifteen March 1956.

The factual background presented by the Court described that the plaintiff, Kundan Lal, and the defendants numbered one through five—namely Banarsi Das, Kanshi Ram, Kundan Lal, Munnal Lal, Devi Chand and Sheo Prasad—were brothers who had originally constituted a joint Hindu family until the year nineteen thirty‑six. Among the family’s assets was a sugar mill located in Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, known as “Sheo Prasad Banarsi Das Sugar Mills.” Following the dissolution of the family arrangement, the brothers resolved to operate the sugar mill as a partnership rather than as members of the joint Hindu family. The partnership was to be at will, with each brother agreeing to share equally in both profits and losses. Management of the mill was to be entrusted to one brother designated as the managing partner. The agreement further stipulated that for the financial year nineteen thirty‑six to thirty‑seven, which commenced on the first of September nineteen thirty‑six, the first defendant, Banarsi Das, would serve as the managing partner, and that for subsequent years the managing partner would be the individual unanimously nominated by the brothers, with the interim provision that the partner who functioned as managing partner in the preceding year would continue in that role until a new unanimous nomination was made.

In this case the appellant, Das, who was also the first respondent in the civil appeals numbered ninety‑four to ninety‑six of 1960, had been appointed the managing partner of the family sugar mill under the agreement that the brothers had executed. The agreement stipulated that for each succeeding year the brothers would unanimously nominate a managing partner, and until such a unanimous nomination was made the person who had acted as managing partner in the preceding year would continue in that capacity. Accordingly, for the financial years 1941 through 1944 the brother Kundanlal held the position of managing partner.

On the thirteenth day of May 1944 the brother Sheo Prasad, identified as defendant number five and now deceased, instituted a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Lahore. The suit sought dissolution of the partnership and the rendering of accounts against Kundanlal, and the other brothers were joined as defendants. The Subordinate Judge, by an order dated the third of August 1944, appointed a pleader named P C Mahajan as receiver of the partnership assets. Dissatisfied with this appointment, the parties appealed to the High Court in a revision proceeding, where they subsequently reached a settlement. Pursuant to the terms of that settlement, the High Court directed that Kanshiram be appointed as receiver in place of Mr Mahajan, effective from the fifth of April 1945.

During this period the District Magistrate of Bijnor, invoking the Defence of India Rules, assumed control of the mill and appointed Kundanlal together with his son to operate the mill as agents of the Uttar Pradesh Government for the year 1944‑45. The government renewed this lease for the following year, namely 1945‑46. On the twenty‑eighth of August 1956 the parties, with the exception of the brother Devi Chand, filed an application before the Lahore court requesting that the receiver execute a lease in favour of Banarsidas for a term of five years. The application was made on the suggestion of the District Magistrate of Bijnor, and the Subordinate Judge issued an order conforming to the request.

In September 1946 Banarsidas obtained possession of the mill. Meanwhile, Sheo Prasad had applied to the court for the distribution of a sum of Rs 8,10,000 out of a total of Rs 8,30,000 that was held by the receiver, and he argued that the amounts due to Kundanlal and Banarsidas should be retained until they rendered their accounts. Despite this objection the entire sum was distributed among all the brothers, and Devi Chand acknowledged receipt of his share on the fourteenth of November 1946. The Lahore suit was subsequently dismissed for default on the eleventh of October 1947, after the parties had migrated to India following the partition of the country.

On the eighth of November 1947 Sheo Prasad instituted another suit before the civil judge of Bijnor, seeking a perpetual injunction that would restrain Banarsidas from acting as receiver. That suit was dismissed on the third of March 1948. Subsequently, on the sixteenth of July 1948 Sheo Prasad transferred his one‑sixth share in the mill to Banarsidas, after which Banarsidas began to receive the profits attributable both to his own share and to the share formerly held by Sheo Prasad. Finally, on the seventh of October 1948 the suit from which the present civil appeals arise was filed by Kundanlal against all his brothers.

In this suit Kundanlal instituted proceedings against all of his brothers, seeking the reliefs enumerated in paragraph twenty‑nine of the plaint. The reliefs he claimed were as follows: first, a declaration that the partnership of the Shiv Prasad Banarsi Das Sugar Mills in Bijnor, which had existed between the parties, was dissolved on the thirteenth day of May, 1944, and, if the court were of the opinion that the partnership continued to exist, a request that the court order its dissolution, the value of this relief being placed at five thousand rupees; second, an order that an account be taken from defendants one and two, or from any of them, and that a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff for the sum that might be found to be due to him by virtue of his share in the assets, profits and monies in the possession of the defendants, the value of this claim being five hundred rupees; third, the appointment of a pendente‑lite interim receiver for the Seth Shiva Prasad Banarsi Das Sugar Mills, Bijnor; fourth, any other relief to which the plaintiff might be entitled against either or both of the defendants as the court deemed appropriate; and fifth, an award of costs to the plaintiff. On the thirtieth day of July, 1949, Banarsidas filed his written statement in response to the suit, while none of the other dependent parties made any appearance. Subsequently, on the eighteenth day of December, 1950, the court dismissed an application that had been made for the appointment of a receiver on the ground that Kanshi Ram, who had earlier been appointed as receiver by the Lahore High Court, continued to hold that office. During the pendency of this suit, the appellant Banarsidas entered into an agreement with Devchand and Kanshi Ram under which he took over all of their rights and interests in the mill for a period of five years beginning on the first day of July, 1951. On the nineteenth day of February, 1951, he applied to the court for an order directing Kanshi Ram to grant him a lease of the mill for the same five‑year period starting on the first of July, 1951. It is relevant to note that, under an earlier arrangement, Banarsidas had obtained a lease of similar duration which was scheduled to expire on the thirtieth day of June, 1951. On the twenty‑sixth day of April, 1951, the court appointed a Mr. Mathur as receiver, and on the first day of July, 1951, he granted a lease of five years to Kundanlal on certain terms that were to be settled by the court. The issues in the suit brought by Kundanlal were framed on the seventh day of December, 1951, and one of the principal issues concerned whether the lease dated the twelfth day of September, 1946, which had been granted to Banarsidas, was void from its inception or merely voidable, and, in either case, what its legal effect would be. On the second day of April, 1954, the counsel appearing for Kundanlal stated that he did not wish to pursue that particular issue any further and that the sole remaining question was the accounting of the parties. In view of this concession by the plaintiff, the court decreed the suit, declaring the dissolution of the S. B. Sugar Mills with effect from the thirteenth day of May, 1944 and addressing the related accounting and receiver matters as outlined in the subsequent order.

In the decree, the court declared that the partnership known as Bijnor was to be dissolved with effect from 13 May 1944. It further specified the distribution of the plaintiff’s share as one‑sixth of the partnership, while the share of defendant number one, Seth Banarsi Das, was fixed at one‑third, and each of defendants two through four was allotted one‑sixth.

The court held that Seth Kanshi Ram was liable to render accounts to the plaintiff and the other defendants concerning the joint stores and lubricants identified in Exhibits I and VII. It ordered that Shri P. N. Mathur would continue in the role of receiver until such time as further orders might be issued. Additionally, the court appointed Shri Kashi Nath as Commissioner for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the mills; the Commissioner was directed to prepare a full statement of the credits, properties, effects and stock presently belonging to the mills and to submit that report to the court. After the report’s submission, the court would hear and determine any objections and then fix a date for the sale of the mills’ assets. The Commissioner was instructed to receive further directions from the court as necessary.

Three appeals were filed in the High Court against this decree. One appeal was lodged by Kanshi Ram, another by Banarsi Das, and the third by Munna Lal. It should be noted that the trial decree had been entered ex parte against both Kanshi Ram and Munna Lal. Moreover, none of the parties to the appeals challenged the winding‑up order of the partnership business or the appointment of Shri Kashi Nath as Commissioner. The High Court heard the three appeals together and delivered a common judgment on 15 March 1958. In that judgment the court dismissed the appeals of Banarsi Das and Munna Lal, while granting only a partial relief to Kanshi Ram.

Consequent upon the High Court’s decision, the suit brought by Kundan Lal was upheld for the declaration that the partnership should be dissolved as of 13 May 1944 and that the six brothers each held the shares in the partnership as determined by the trial court. All other reliefs claimed in the suit were rejected. Because three separate appeals had been filed before the High Court, the appellant Banarsi Das had to file three distinct appeals in order to comply with procedural requirements.

During the hearing before the High Court each party advanced its position. Devichand and Munna Lal sought to have the winding‑up order set aside. Kundan Lal, on the other hand, asked that the order be affirmed but that he should not be required to render any accounts. Kanshi Ram argued that the suit was barred by limitation and, in any event, he should not be compelled to give an account. Banarsi Das contended that the winding‑up order should be maintained and that both Kundan Lal and Kanshi Ram ought to render accounts. The High Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the claim for accounts was time‑barred under Article 106 of the Limitation Act. Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s counsel raised further submissions before the High Court, arguing that…

In this case, the Court noted that although a suit for accounts and a claim to share of profits could be barred by the limitation period, the part of the suit that sought distribution of the assets of the dissolved partnership was not covered by Article 106 of the Limitation Act and therefore was not time‑barred. The High Court rejected this argument and held that both the claim for accounts and the claim for distribution of the partnership assets were barred by limitation. The High Court observed that no defendant had raised the limitation defense in the trial court, but it concluded that the plaint itself disclosed that the suit was barred by time and, consequently, the court was obliged under section 3 of the Limitation Act to dismiss the suit. The plaintiff then contended that none of the three appeals before the High Court had questioned the portion of the decree granting a share in the partnership assets, and therefore that portion should not be interfered with. The High Court, however, invoked Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that the provision gave it competence to set aside the claim decreed by the trial court, and consequently allowed the appeal of Kanshi Ram. In doing so the Court overlooked that the same order should have addressed the monies lying in the court. When Banarsidas appealed, he argued that the part of the decree declaring the partnership dissolved on 13 May 1944 should be set aside. The High Court refused to consider this point because Banarsidas had admitted in his written statement that the partnership had indeed been dissolved on that date. The High Court also characterized the decree against Banarsidas, as far as that relief was concerned, as a consent decree and held that an appeal from a consent decree was barred by section 96, sub‑section (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On that basis the Court dismissed Banarsidas’ appeal.

The Court further explained that the sole relief sought by Munnalal was an order directing Banarsidas to render accounts for the year 1944‑1945. Since the High Court had already determined, while dealing with Kanshi Ram’s appeal, that the claim for accounts was barred by limitation, the Court held that Munnalal’s appeal should also be dismissed. Banarsidas had filed appeals against the judgments and decrees of the High Court in all three matters, which were recorded as Civil Appeals Numbers 94, 95 and 96 of 1960. Kundanlal had filed an appeal from the judgment and decree in Kanshi Ram’s appeal, recorded as Civil Appeal Number 97 of 1960. These appeals together formed the subject matter of the present judgment.

In this matter the Court noted that the present judgment would govern all of the appeals listed as Civil Appeals Nos. 94 to 97 of 1960. The counsel appearing for Banarsidas presented five principal submissions. First, it was submitted that under the Partnership Act the partners have a right to wind up the partnership business even if a suit for accounts is barred by Article 106 of the Limitation Act. Second, it was argued that because the Court had appointed Kanshi Ram as Receiver, he occupied a fiduciary position with respect to the other partners and therefore any assets in his possession must be regarded as held for the benefit of all partners; consequently he was obliged to render accounts regardless of any other considerations. Third, the counsel contended that the question of limitation had not been raised in either the plaint or the grounds of appeal before the High Court and, being a mixed question of fact and law, it should not have formed the basis of the High Court’s decision; if the Court deemed it necessary to consider the point under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it ought to have complied with Order 41, Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, framed a specific issue and remitted the matter to the trial court for determination. Fourth, it was submitted that the Court was incorrect in holding that the limitation period for the suit began on 13 May 1944. Fifth, it was argued that the High Court erred in invoking Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Before addressing these submissions, the Court observed that at the outset of the arguments the counsel for Banarsidas made a conditional offer: if all parties agreed, Banarsidas would waive his claim for accounts against Kundanlal and Kanshi Ram provided that the decree of the trial court was restored in all other respects. While counsel for the two parties named in the offer were prepared to accept it, two other parties declined, and therefore the Court was obliged to resolve the appeals on their merits. The Court identified the central issue as whether the suit was barred by limitation; it further noted that if the appellants succeeded on that point, the first, second and fifth submissions would become moot.

The Court then turned to the factual background set out in the plaint. The plaintiff, Kundanlal, pleaded in paragraph 10 of the suit that the partnership, being an at‑will partnership, was dissolved on 13 May 1944, the same date on which Sheo Prasad instituted suit No‑105 of 1944 in the Sub‑Judge’s Court at Lahore. The High Court had emphasised that Banarsidas had admitted this date in his written statement on at least three separate occasions. The Court held that such admissions bind the party only as to the factual matrix and do not determine the legal question of limitation. It therefore accepted that the fact of the partnership being at‑will was admitted, but cautioned that the legal implication of that admission required separate analysis. Counsel for Banarsidas further argued that the mere filing of a suit for dissolution does not constitute a notice of dissolution, relying upon a legal treatise which states that a party’s approach to the court for dissolution does not operate as a notice of dissolution. The counsel also referred to Order 20, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a partnership is deemed dissolved as of the date specified in the decree, noting that the Lahore suit was dismissed in default and no decree was rendered, rendering any claim of dissolution on the basis of that suit untenable. Conversely, some respondents contended that, because the partnership was at‑will, it should be considered dissolved from the date the dissolution suit was instituted, invoking the provisions of sub‑section (1) of the relevant statutory provision. The Court thus set the stage for a detailed examination of the limitation issue in light of these factual and legal contentions.

It was contended that merely filing a suit for the dissolution of a partnership does not constitute a notice of dissolution. To support this proposition, reference was made to volume 68 of Corpus Juris Secundum, page 929, where the law is stated: “The mere fact that a party goes to court asking for dissolution does not operate as notice of dissolution.” The argument continued by citing Order 20, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a partnership is deemed dissolved as of the date specified in the decree. Since the Lahore suit was dismissed in default and no decree was ever issued, it would be inaccurate to claim that the partnership was dissolved merely because a suit had been instituted. Conversely, some respondents argued that, because the partnership was “at will,” it should be considered dissolved from the date the suit for dissolution was filed. They relied on subsection (1) of section 43 of the Partnership Act, which reads: “(1) Where the partnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention to dissolve the firm.” This contention appeared to be based on an analogy with suits for partition of joint Hindu family property, where settled law holds that if all parties are adults, the institution of a partition suit severs the joint status of the family members. However, that analogy cannot be transferred because the partners’ rights to firm property differ fundamentally from the members’ rights in a joint Hindu family. Members of a joint Hindu family possess an undivided interest in family property, whereas partners of a firm hold only a tenancy‑in‑common interest. When a partition suit is instituted, the joint status is normally severed, and thereafter the parties hold the property as tenants‑in‑common, a position somewhat akin to that of firm partners. In an at‑will partnership, when a partner seeks dissolution, his objective is to wind up the firm, obtain his share of the firm’s assets, possibly be discharged from further liabilities, and see the firm cease to exist. He may effect dissolution by giving notice as prescribed in subsection (1) of section 43, without involving the court; however, if he chooses not to give such notice and instead proceeds to court, the procedural provisions of Order 20, Rule 15 will govern the outcome.

When a partner elects to obtain a judicial decree for the dissolution of the partnership, the procedure prescribed in Order Twenty, Rule of the Code of Civil Procedure becomes applicable. That rule provides that, in any suit seeking the dissolution of a partnership or the determination of partnership accounts, the Court may, prior to issuing a final decree, issue a preliminary decree which declares the respective shares of the parties, fixes the date on which the partnership shall stand dissolved or shall be deemed to have been dissolved, and directs that the accounts be taken and any other necessary actions be performed as the Court deems appropriate. This provision is of universal application, covering both partnerships at will and those that are not at will, and it does not contain any limitation that would restrict its operation solely to non‑at‑will partnerships.

Section forty‑three, subsection (1) of the Partnership Act does not itself specify the date from which a firm is to be regarded as dissolved. To determine that date, one must refer to subsection (2), which states that the firm is dissolved as of the date mentioned in the notice as the date of dissolution, or, if no date is mentioned, as of the date on which the notice is communicated. The language of this provision clearly envisages the inclusion of a specific date in the notice. A plaint that initiates a suit for dissolution does not constitute a “notice” within the meaning of the subsection, and consequently, the date of service of a summons accompanied by a copy of such a plaint cannot be treated as the date of dissolution of the partnership; the provisions of section forty‑three therefore do not assist in that circumstance.

Assuming, however, that the term “notice” were interpreted broadly enough to encompass a plaint filed in a dissolution suit, subsection (2) still mandates that the firm be deemed dissolved as of the date of communication of the notice. Under that interpretation, the partnership would be considered dissolved at the moment the summons, together with the copy of the plaint, is served upon the defendant. Where there is a single defendant, the date of service of that summons would be the dissolution date; where there are multiple defendants, the dissolution date would be the date on which the last summons is served. Because a partnership can be deemed dissolved only from a single point in time, the relevant date must therefore be the date on which the final summons was served.

If the High Court intended to extend the benefits of section forty‑three to any of the defendants before it, it was required to contemplate fully the consequences of those provisions. The record, however, does not contain any evidence that would enable the Court to ascertain the date on which the last summons was served in the present case. In the absence of such material, the High Court could not correctly apply the provisions of section forty‑three to determine the dissolution date.

In this case the Court observed that the record did not disclose the exact date on which the last summons was served, and therefore the High Court was in error when it held that the suit was barred by limitation. The Court pointed out that the High Court had disregarded the submission made on behalf of Kanshi Ram that the limitation issue was not a pure question of law but a mixed question of fact and law, and consequently the High Court should not have permitted the limitation plea to be raised for the first time at that stage. The Court was satisfied that the High Court’s approach had caused prejudice to certain parties and that this prejudice alone justified setting aside the High Court’s order. Even if the High Court found the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act overwhelming, the Court held that it should have at least allowed the parties supporting the trial‑court decree to meet the limitation defence by amending their pleadings. After such amendment, the proper course would have been to frame the limitation issue as a point for determination and to remit the matter to the trial court for findings. Instead, the High Court treated the pleading of one defendant as conclusively determining both fact and law and dismissed the suit. The Court noted that, had the defendants been given an opportunity, they might have proved the dates of service of the summonses and also shown that the suit was not barred because of an acknowledgment that arose during the discussion. No argument on acknowledgment was advanced by the plaintiff or by the defendant Banarsidas, apparently because counsel were taken by surprise and could not obtain instructions on that aspect. The Court was of the clear opinion that the High Court erred in allowing the limitation plea to be raised by defendants who had not even filed a written statement, and that it was not appropriate to permit a wholly new point to be raised by a party that was not contesting the suit.

On the basis of this finding the Court concluded that the High Court’s decision must be set aside and that the decree of the trial court should be restored. The Court further observed that some of the parties, namely the appellant Banarsidas, the plaintiff‑respondent Kundanlal and the defendant‑respondent Kanshi Ram, were amenable to certain variations in the decree, but other parties objected to those variations; consequently the appeals had to be decided on their merits. In view of these considerations the Court allowed the appeals of Banarsidas and Kundanlal and restored the trial‑court decree, without ordering costs.

The Court allowed the appeals filed by Banarsidas and Kundanlal, restored the decree of the trial court, and expressly declined to make any order as to costs. In addition to these appeals, the Court heard two civil miscellaneous petitions, numbered 1482 of 1962 and 1534 of 1962, which were pending before it. The first petition sought an early termination of the lease that this Court had granted during the pendency of the appeals, arguing that the lease should not continue. The petitioners explained that the original five‑year term had been fixed because the Court anticipated that the litigation would require that length of time. They further contended that the case had actually concluded within approximately one year and a half, rendering the continuation of the lease unnecessary. Beyond the practical consideration that terminating the lease before its expiry might not serve the parties’ interests, the Court expressed doubt as to whether it possessed legal authority to do so. Consequently, the Court rejected the first petition and declined to order any premature termination of the lease at this stage. Regarding the second petition, the parties agreed that the issues raised should be dealt with by the Receiver when it distributes the assets of the mill. During the hearing, counsel for Banarsidas informed the Court that he had installed new machinery intended to improve the efficiency of the mill’s operations. He further requested that, before the mill was sold, he be permitted to remove that machinery so that he could retain the improvements. One suggestion put forward was that the mill could be sold together with the newly installed equipment, which might benefit all parties at the time of sale. The other parties, however, preferred that Banarsidas remove the machinery before the lease expired, arguing that this would be the most suitable course. Given the conflicting positions, the Court declined to issue any specific direction concerning the removal or sale of the machinery. The Court noted that the parties were free to reach an agreement on how the Receiver should handle the machinery when it proceeds with the sale. If the parties could not agree, the Court suggested that they could seek further directions from the High Court. Finally, while dismissing both civil miscellaneous petitions, the Court again refrained from awarding any costs to either side. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeals and expressly stated that no order as to costs would be made against either party.